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Abstract
The dramatic change in the international security environment after the collapse of the bipolar system
has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the existing nuclear non-proliferation
regime. Furthermore, the success of the Pakistani Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Technology (GCET)-
based nuclear weapons program has imposed a great challenge on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) regime. In this context, this study tried to answer two questions: (a) what is the probability of
proliferators successfully producing Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment
Plants (GCEPs) and (b) how effective is the current NPT regime in dealing with this issue.
In order to tackle these two questions, an integrated methodology is used that reflects all factors
affecting the nuclear proliferation on the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. A quantitative assessment
of the proliferation risks of producing HEU for multiple scenarios is presented using success tree
models, uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis, importance measures, and expert opinion. This
assessment identifies the factors that can reduce the proliferators' success of producing HEU, which
will be helpful in prioritizing the use of the IAEA's limited resources.
The study found that legal capabilities of the NPT regime are more problematic than technological
capabilities in preventing proliferators from producing HEU at GCEPs, since the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) is the only NPT regime component that has compliance-enforcing resources.
This study recommends three approaches as follows: First, the NPT regime should take a multi-faceted
approach that incorporates all NPT regime components into each step of nuclear weapons program
development. Second, the NPT regime should impose nuclear elements control via Multilateral Export
Control Regimes (MECRs). Third, the NPT regime should develop an approach that challenges HEU
production from both technological- and legal points of view. Since law governs technological
capability, a multidimensional approach that includes this relationship would be more effective than an
approach that focuses on either aspect individually.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael W. Golay
Title: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
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XRF X-ray Fluorescence
ZC Zangger Committee
INTRODUCTION TO STUDY
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Since the enforcement of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, only
India and Israel successfully detonated nuclear bombs in the decade that followed. After the demise of
the Soviet Union and collapse of the bipolar system, the resulting dramatic change in the international
security environment negatively impacted the non-proliferation regime. As a result, North Korea,
Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Libya attempted to acquire nuclear weapons, with North Korea and
Pakistan doing so successfully. At the time, the international community considered these countries
incapable of developing nuclear weapons programs. These countries' success, contrary to public belief,
implies that nuclear weapons technology had spread to states of very limited resources and technology.
The international community has continued its efforts to build a more effective non-
proliferation regime in response to this threat. A number of frameworks have been proposed to deal
with nuclear proliferation issues. These frameworks are known as the nuclear non-proliferation regime
or the NPT regime, named after the original NPT mentioned previously. These efforts seemed to be
successful until Pakistan and North Korea conducted nuclear weapons testing in 1997 and 2006,
respectively. This implies that the NPT regime may have not been effective in nuclear nonproliferation.
Furthermore, the emergence of nuclear black markets, so-called A. Q. Khan Network, has been
imposing a serious challenge to the NPT regime because the network enabled the clandestine uranium
enrichment program of Libya and Iran with the Pakistan's Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Technology
(GCET).
Unfortunately, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other intelligence agencies
did not detect nuclear weapons in these countries until Iran and North Korea reached the final stage of
development. In addition to the decreased stability of international order, the spread of dual-use
technologies with potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) applications has also contributed to
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the international community is questioning the
effectiveness of the current NPT regime in addressing and resolving non-proliferation challenges.
Methods of strengthening the NPT regime have been continuously researched over the last
several decades. However, most of the studies have limitations in connecting theories to practice. First,
most studies have limited scopes in analyzing nuclear proliferation, focusing on only a few details of
the entire problem. Second, most studies suggest only hypothetical solutions to solving non-
proliferation issues. Therefore, further research is required in order to improve the manner by which the
NPT regime prevents and disables nuclear proliferation especially using GCET.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is inherently an issue of international politics. Like other
international regimes, the NPT regime has both political or legal and technological means to achieve its
objective. These two means should complement each other. I However, due to the unique nature of
nuclear technology, the emphasis placed on technological means should be greater than those of any
other international regimes. The technological means of the NPT regime can be represented by the
IAEA safeguards; however, the implementation of IAEA safeguards requires political means. In this
regard, it would be correct to define the IAEA safeguards as the combination of legal and technological
means.
In order to evaluate the capabilities of the NPT regime, particularly in dealing with the nuclear
proliferation based on GCET, it is essential to develop a methodology that systematically diagnoses the
NPT regime. The clear understanding of capabilities and limitations of the NPT regime is the backbone
to solve complex nuclear non-proliferation issues. Therefore, the objectives of this thesis are as follows:
Objective I: To develop a risk analysis model for Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) production at
Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs)
- What are the capabilities of proliferators for producing HEU at GCEPs?
- What are the capabilities of the NPT regime?
- What is the probability of proliferators successfully producing HEU at GCEPs?
Objective 11: To make recommendations for the NPT regime to reduce the risks associated with
GCEPs
- What problems hinder the effectiveness of the NPT regime?
- What will increase the effectiveness of the current NPT regime?
1.3 Previous Work on Nuclear Non-proliferation
Previous non-proliferation studies have been performed from either a political or engineering
perspective. It is important to recognize that the combination of these two perspectives would result in
more robust non-proliferation policies against nuclear proliferation. However, a study that embraces all
components of the NPT regime and both legal and technological perspectives has not been performed.
Ryukichi Imai, "Safeguards against Diversion of Nuclear Material: An Overview," Annals ofAmerican Academy
of Political and Social Science (AAPSS) 430 (March 1977).Imai provides a good discussion about the different
positions and roles between the politicians and the technological community for nonproliferation. He claims that it
is important to accept the definite limitations of the capabilities of the IAEA safeguards. Then the combination of
safeguards and political tools will effectively work for nonproliferation.
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1.3.1 Types of Non-proliferation Studies
Figure 1.1 shows types of non-proliferation studies. These studies are typically divided into two
approaches: Nuclear Engineering and Political Science. From a political approach, studies generally
focus on why and how a governing body makes the decision to "go-nuclear". Engineering-based
research analyzes diversion scenarios during the nuclear fuel cycle process and the effectiveness of
safeguard systems.
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Figure 1.1 Types of Nonprolifer tion Study
1.3.2. Pr vious Nucl a  Prolifer tion Research from Political an  Legal Standpoints
Finding determinants of a state's decision to support nuclear proliferation has been a popular topic in
political science-based studies. Stephen Meyer (1984) studied a model that analyzed nuclear propensity
over time by considering technological capabilities and the relative presenceor in odef motivation
variables. Other research has analyzed the relationship between economic and technological capabilities
of countries and their propensity on nuclear proliferation. Legal-based studies concerning nuclear
nonproliferation generally review the legal effectiveness of the NPT, United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), and export control regimes.
1.3.3. Previous Nuclear Proliferation Engineering-Based Research
A. Proliferation Resistance Evaluation
Proliferation Resistance (PR) is defined as the characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes
the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology in order to acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device.2 A nuclear energy system that has a high PR will
decrease the probability of nuclear proliferation of nuclear weapons.3 This is due to the fact that such
facilities are difficult to divert for military purposes. The US Department of Energy (DOE)' TOPS (l),4
Generation IV International Forum (GIF)'s PR & PP evaluation (2006), IAEA's INPRO (2007),6 and
William Charlton et al. (2006)'s Multi-attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA)-based study 7 provide good
examples of such facilities.
B. Safeguards Modeling
Safeguard studies includes diversion scenario analysis and modeling of safeguard effectiveness based
on developed scenarios. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (1995) conducted a safeguard
options study that provided proliferation pathways (diversion scenarios and methods), objectives of
enhanced safeguards, needs for enhanced safeguards, and options enhanced safeguards for an entire fuel
cycle.'
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has been modeling nuclear safeguard
effectiveness for uranium-treating facilities using LLNL Integrated Safeguards System Analysis Tool
(LISSAT). LISSAT can be used as a framework that can perform systems analysis for evaluating the
effectiveness of a safeguard system for a nuclear fuel cycle facility.9 Modeling efforts using LISSAT
were made for the safeguard approaches to Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCFs) and GCEPs. H.
Elayat et al., (2004) analyzed safeguard effectiveness in a UCF and a GCEP and developed diversion
scenarios such as the "skimming scenario." 0 Later, H. Lambert et al., (2007) evaluated and compared
effectiveness of different safeguard options to GCEPs."
2 IAEA, Proliferation Resistance Fundamentals for Future Nuclear Energy Systems (IAEA, STR-332,, December
2002).
3 Matthew Bunn, Proliferation-Resistance (and Terror Resistance) of Nuclear Energy Systems: Harvard
University Lecture for Nuclear Energy Economics and Policy Analysis (Harvard University, April 12, 2004);
available from http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Nuclear-Engineering/22-812JSpring2004/0B02F941-0668-4952-
A209-E9A160766B33/0/lecl7slides.pdf.
4Task Force on the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee U.S. Department of Energy, "Technical
Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power System (TOPS) " (Oct.
2000).
5 GIF/PRPPWG-2006/005, "Evaluation Methodology for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of
Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems," (November 2006).
6 IAEA, "Guidance for the Application of an Assessment Methodology for Innovative Nuclear Energy System:
INPRO Manual-Overview of the Methodology," (IAEA-TECDOC-CD-1575 Rev.1, Nov. 2008).
7 William S. Charlton et al., "Proliferation Resistance Assessment Methodology for Nuclear Fuel Cycles," Nuclear
Technology, no. 157 (Feb. 2007).
8 E.A. Hakkila et al., The Safeguards Options Study, LA-12918-MS (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National
Laboratory, April 1995).
9 W.J. O'Connell H.A. Elayat, and B.D. Boyer, "Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards System Modeling"
(paper presented at the Proceedings of the 45th Annual Conference of the Institute of Nuclear Materials
Management INMM, Nashville, TN, July 16-20, 2006).
10 H. A. Elayat, Howard Lambert, and William J. O'Connell, "Systems Analysis of Safeguards Effectiveness in a
Uranium Conversion Facility" (paper presented at the Proceedings of the 45th Annual Conference of the Institute
of Nuclear Materials Management INMM, Orlando, FL, July 10-14, 2004), H.A. Elayat, "Gas Centrifuge
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C. HEU Production Scenarios
Table 1.1 summarizes previous studies about proliferation scenarios for producing HEU at GCEPs with
results and limitations. The Safeguards Options Study (1995) conducted by Los Alamos National
Laboratory provides an extensive analysis of different scenarios to produce HEU at Uranium
Enrichment Facilities (UEFs).
Table 1.1 Comparison of Studies on HEU Production Scenarios
Study Scenarios studied Results / Limitations
Sneak-out and Break-out scenarios Results
Safeguards (1) Unauthorized activities at declared - Quantitative comparison forOptions Study facilities*Quniavecm rsofr
(1995) Different off-design operation modes various off-design operation
(2) Undeclared uranium enrichment facilities modes, including timelines
Sneak-out and Break-out scenarios Results
(1) Break-out * Theoretical operating time to
- Different SWU capacities
- Different feeds (NU, 5% LEU)
(2005) - Different tails assay (0.4 and 2 %) Limitation(2) Sneak-out * No data on total required masses
- Clandestine GCEP with clandestine UCF
- Concurrent use of a declared and clandestine snoutiaenalso
GCEP sekotseai
Break-out scenario in two modes of operation
with different feeds
Alexander (1) Approaches Results
Glaser - Batch recycling and cascade interconnection - Production rate (kg per year)
(2008) (2) Feeds and SWU requirement - SWU requirements
* NU feed with 6,000 P-rI machines
* 3.5 % LEU feed with 2,000 P-No machines
Sneak-out and Break-out scenarios
(1) Clandestine GCEP
Aexane ( NU feed Results(2008) (2 F 4.8 % LEU feed q Required time to produce 20 kg
(2) Batch recycling at declared GCEP of 93.1% HEU
- Various SWU capacity expansion scenarios
(from 7,500-75,000 SWU/yr)
1.4 Scope of Work
Nuclear non-proliferation is basically a political objective. However, it is necessary to understand the
technological aspect of nuclear proliferation if this problem is to be solved. Thus, nuclear non-
proliferation should be understood from both an engineering and political standpoint. Figure 1.2 shows
the topology of topics explored in this study.
Enrichment Plant Safeguards System Modeling".; and H.A. Elayat, "Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards
System Modeling".
1 H. Elayat H. Lambert, W. J. O'Connell, L. Szytel, M. Dreicer, "LISSAT Analysis of a Generic Enrichment
Plant" (paper presented at the 48th Annual Meeting of the Institute Nuclear Materials Management Tucson, AZ,
July 2007).
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Figure 1.2 Topology of Study
In political science, the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and the analysis of the NPT regime
using regime theory are the main topics. Analyzing the capabilities of the NPT regime components
including the IAEA, the United Nations (UN), Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRs), treaties,
and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the basis of understanding of what can be done to
prevent nuclear proliferation by the international community. In this case, each element has its own
unique features and capabilities in preventing nuclear proliferation.
In the area of engineering and science, the technological analysis of nuclear weapons programs
and the NPT regime's technological capabilities for detecting or verifying12 nuclear weapons programs
12 In engineering or a quality management system, "verification" is the act of reviewing, inspecting, testing, etc. to
establish and document that a product, service, or system meets the regulatory, standard, or specification
requirements. Detection is the extraction of information from any clear or clouded ambient or otherwise accessible
stream of information without neither support from the sender nor synchronization to the sender.
29
are important issues. Among various technologies required for a nuclear weapons program the
acquisition of fissile materials, Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Weapon-Grade Plutonium
(WGPu), is the most important and difficult step. Recent studies have also found that Gas Centrifuge
Enrichment Technology (GCET), used in the production of HEU, imposes the most serious threat to the
NPT regime. Thus, the success probability of clandestine HEU production was chosen for a quantitative
study. The areas included in the present study are listed in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Areas of Study
Areas of study Topics
- Incentives and disincentives for nuclear proliferation
Political and legal
- Regime theory
science
- Legal authority and effects of international arrangements
Nuclear - Nuclear weapons program and nuclear fuel cycle
engineering and - Uranium conversion technology
science - Uranium enrichment technology
Generic- Technological background of nuclear weapons program 
detection
- Satellite imagery
engineering 
-Destructive assay and nondestructive assay
Quantitative
- Success tree methods for risk analysis
analysis
IAEA safeguards - Field experience regarding the actual application of IAEA's safeguards
1.5 Methodology
The procedure developed for evaluating the success probability of HEU production is based on the
methodology developed by Ham (2004)."1 He called his procedure an "integrated methodology" 14 since
it fully characterized all elements of nuclear proliferation - from the definition of actors, to quantitative
pathway analysis via the export elicitation. In the present study, the methodology developed here is also
considered an integrated methodology but differs from Ham's definition in the following contexts:
- Integration of legal and engineering aspects
Compare both legal and technological measures in the NPT regime against nuclear proliferation
activities
13 Hyeongpil Ham, "An Integrated Methodology for Quantitative Assessment of Proliferation Resistance of
Advanced Nuclear Systems Using Probabilistic Methods" (MIT, June 2005). Chapter 2.
14 PNNL defines an integrated methodology as "a set of computer tools that have been interfaced to enable the
undertaking of a complete nonproliferation assessment." S. V. Mladineo et al., "Guidelines for the Performance of
Nonproliferation Assessments," (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), PNNL-14294, May 2003).
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- Integration of various quantitative methods
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) using success trees, expert elicitation, and quantitative
analyses. 15
- Integration of field experience and theoretical studies
Combining experiences from IAEA inspections and theoretical backgrounds including inspection
technology such as satellite imagery
- Integration of all components in a typical nuclear fuel cycle
1.6 Results of Study
1.6.1 NPT Regime Study
A. Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation
The dynamics of nuclear proliferation are so complex because there are many factors that govern its
existence. Under particular situations, some of these factors are competing. These factors can be
classified into the following three categories:
- Environment: international (exogenous) and domestic (endogenous)
- Features: political, military and economic,
- Duration: fixed and situational
Causal loop diagrams, one of the important tools of system dynamics, were chosen in order to
describe the complexity of nuclear proliferation dynamics.16 Two diagrams were chosen in order to
describe nuclear dynamics from two different dimensions: (a) a domestic level focusing on endogenous
variables, and (b) an international level focusing on exogenous variables.
B. The NPT Regime's Safeguard Effectiveness
Three approaches to evaluate the power and effectiveness of the NPT regime were proposed. To
evaluate the effectiveness of the NPT regime, the number of states that acquired nuclear weapons
during specific time periods was calculated. This study found that the NPT regime has been previously
effective, but is currently facing challenges because of the instability in the international security
environment and the spread of nuclear weapons technology.
5Ibid., Chapter 9. Assessment Methods and Tools, pp.42-85.
16 System dynamics is an approach to understanding the behavior of complex systems over time. What makes
using system dynamics different from other approaches to studying complex systems is the use of feedback loops
and stocks and flows. These elements help describe systems with a variety of affecting factors to a system. In
particular, causal loop diagrams are useful in describing causes and results in the form of feedback. John D.
Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill
Higher Education, 2000). ,pp. 141-149.
C. The NPT Regime's Power
The NPT regime's power can be described qualitatively using selected evaluation criteria: resources and
capabilities. These criteria are described as follows:
- Resources: Implementing, compliance-enforcing, and verifying resources
- Capabilities: legal and technological capabilities
The power of all NPT regime components was analyzed in terms of these two basic qualitative
evaluation criteria.
1.6.2 HEU Production at GCEPs
A. Scenario Development and Modeling
Three scenarios for producing HEU at GCEPs were identified through a literature survey: (a) a break-
out scenario using a declared GCEP, (b) a sneak-out scenario using a clandestine GCEP only, and (c) a
concurrent sneak-out scenario using both a clandestine and a declared GCEP. All three of these
scenarios are composed of two main strands: the provision of nuclear material to a GCEP and the off-
design or clandestine operation of a GCEP for HEU production. Detailed descriptions of these
scenarios are available in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3 Topology of Success Trees for HEU Production Scenarios
Note: [a] ESWA (Environmental
(Differential Absorption LIDAR)
Sampling over Wide Area), LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), and DIAL
Basic Events Categorization Proliferation activities to detect
[1] HEU production in batch recycling mode
HEU production in off- [2] HEU production in reconfiguration mode
design operation modes [3] HEU production with Add-on modular cascades
[4] HEU production in connection of multiple cascades
s production in [5] Excess LEU production for additional time
udecloess L[6] Excess LEU production at increased product rate
undeclared operation modes [7] Excess LEU production with add-on cascades
[8] Diversion from Light Water Reactors (LWRs)Diversion of nuclear [9] Diversion from Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCFs)
material from a nuclear fuel [10] Diversion from Fuel Fabrication Plants (FFPs)
cycle [11-12] Diversion from GCEPs: NUF6 , LEUF6
Operation of declared UCFs [13] Conversion of NU to NUF6
for processing undeclared [14] Conversion of LEU to LEUF6
uranium
[15-18] ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL at short distances /at long distances
Detection of clandestine for both clandestine GCEPs and UCFs. [a]
UCF / GCEP [19-20] Commercial satellite imagery and military satellite imagery
for clandestine GCEPs.
Illicit acquisition of nuclear [21] NU, [22] NUF6, [23] LEU, [24] LEUF6
material
B. Summary of Experts Opinion
Table 1.4 presents a qualitative summary for each basic event as evaluated by experts in each field.
Quantitatively-evaluated values were used as input for calculating success probabilities using the
success trees developed in this study. From this table, it is evident that the detection of clandestine
operation of GCEPs and UCFs is highly unlikely. However, the detection of clandestine UCFs is more
promising than clandestine GCEPs for detecting nuclear weapons.
Table 1.4 Evaluation of Proliferator Success Probability from Experts
Safeguarders' Evaluation on
Cases possible detection proliferator success
means probability
Declared GCEP Excess LEU production Likely
opertionSafeguards
operation HEU production Unlikely - likely
Declared UCF Undeclared NUS Highly likelySafeguards
operation Undeclared LEU Unlikely-likely
Declared uranium UF6 from UCFs, GCEPs Safeguards Likely
diversion Non-UF6 from Reactors, Safeguards Highly likely
FFPs
Undeclared UF6 form Safeguards Likely-highly likely
uranium illicit Non-UF6 form
acquisition NUF6UF6 Safeguards Highly likely(NUF6/LEUF6)
Environmental Highly likely
sampling
Clandestine GCEP HEU production DIAL Highly likely
operation
Satellite imagery Highly likely
Clandestine UCF Undeclared NU/LEU Environmental Likely-highly likely
operation sampling/ LIDAR
Notes
[a] LIDAR (Light and Detection Ranging) and DIAL (Differential Absorption LIDAR)
[b] Highly likely (75-100%), likely (50-75%), unlikely (25-50%), and highly unlikely (0-25%).
C. Summary of Quantitative Results
Two types of quantitative evaluation were performed using the success trees developed in this study.
First, proliferators' success probabilities were analyzed for two types of countries (countries under
INFCIRC/153 and those under INFCIRC/540) given Scenarios (a), (b), and (c). The purpose of this
analysis was to examine the difference in probabilities for countries with high levels of IAEA safeguard
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applications and compliance vs. countries with low levels. The results showed that the probability of
successfully producing HEU would be significantly high, if a proliferator decided to do so. Additionally,
three types of quantitative analyses including uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis, and importance
analysis were performed. These analyses demonstrated that the success tree models were very useful in
identifying strengths and weaknesses of the NPT regime and exploring the impacts of possible policy
implications. However, they are subject to a high level of uncertainty. For this reason, additional
research would help in strengthening the conclusions presented in this study.
1.7 Thesis Organization
This study is composed of four parts as shown in Figure 1.3. Part I is an introduction to the study and an
overview of an integrated methodology. Part I and II contain two main themes of the study. Part I is
dedicated to identifying features and capabilities of two actors, the NPT regime and proliferators,
competing in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Safeguarders are the ones in charge of
preventing proliferators from developing their nuclear weapons programs. Part I is essential to
understanding the complex problems of nuclear proliferation that the international community is facing.
To that end, Part I includes the followings; a review on political theories about why and in what cases
states want to have nuclear weapons (Chapter 3); a general description about a nuclear weapons
program (Chapter 4); generic capabilities of the NPT regime (Chapters 5) and features and capabilities
of the IAEA, as sole NPT components with verification resources (Chapter 6 and 7). Part I works as a
framework to formulate the capabilities of the NPT regime, which are necessary to the integrated
methodology developed in Part II.
Part II focuses on the quantitative evaluation of success probabilities of proliferators in
producing HEU through an integrated methodology. Part II contains four parts: (a) technological
analysis on uranium enrichment technology and gas centrifuge enrichment technology (Chapters 8 and
9); (b) legal and technological analysis on the IAEA's capabilities for preventing HEU production at
GCEPs (Chapters 10 and 11); (c) development of proliferators' scenarios for producing HEU (Chapters
12 and 13); and (d) modeling of HEU production scenarios and a quantitative analysis of the model
through an integrated methodology. (Chapter 14) Finally, the conclusion of the study provides the
summary of the study and provides recommendations to strengthen the current NPT regime.
Proliferators' Perspective
Safeguarders' Perspective
Ch 1. Introduction
Introduction
Ch 2.0Overview of Integrated Methodology
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11-2 I
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Figure 1.3 Composition of Chapters
CHAPTER 2
OVERVIEW OF AN INTEGRATED METHODOLOGY
2.1 Introduction - Modeling Procedure and Integrated Methodology
This chapter is devoted to the brief description of a general procedure to conduct the integrated
methodology developed for evaluating success probabilities of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
production. This integrated methodology evaluates probabilities using success tree analysis. This
modeling procedure starts with problem identification and ends with quantitative analysis of the model.
The quantitative results of this integrated methodology are provided in Chapter 14.
2.2 Modeling Procedure
The integrated methodology developed in this study is performed in eight steps from problem
identification to quantitative analyses as shown in Figure 2.1.
Step 1.
Problem Identification
Step 2.
Scenario Development
Step 3.
Success Tree Establishment
Step 4.
Basic Events Identification
Step. 5
Structure Function
Identification
Step 6.
Basic Events Quantification
Step 6.1
Expert Opinion
Step 6.2[ Hierarchic Metrics
Step 7.
Quantification
Step 8.
Quantitative Analysis
Figure 2.1 Procedures for Developing Integrated Methodology
The first step is to identify the problem that modelers are interested in. For this step, modelers
need an extensive survey to develop an understanding of the problem, which will be the fundamental
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background of the model-building process. The second step is to identify and develop plausible
scenarios that describe how two actors, safeguarders and proliferators in this study, will interact. This is
essential because nuclear proliferation involves the competition between safeguarders and proliferators.
This step requires field experience and creativity to develop realistic scenarios.
The third step is to build success trees based on the scenarios developed in step two. The
establishment of success trees translates narrative scenarios into a logical flow of sequential events. The
goal of establishing success trees is to obtain quantified probability values for the overall questions of
proliferation, otherwise known as 'top events'. This quantification process involves the identification of
a structure function (step 5) and the evaluation of basic events (step 4 and 6). The last step is to conduct
quantitative analyses to develop insights based on different model settings used to simulate a variety of
environments. Generic tasks and specified tasks for each step are described in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Procedure to Perform an Integrated Methodology
Relevant
Step Generic tasks Specified tasks (nonproliferation) Chapters
Introuctin toWhat are the characteristics of a NuclearIntroduction Weapons Programs? 4,5
Problem What is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime?
identification Features of proliferators and safeguarders
Interacting players -Who are they? 3,5,6,7
-What can they do?
Target identification What are elements required for nuclear 8,9
weapons programs?
Scenario Safeguarder's strategy How do safeguarders prevent nuclear weapons 10, 112 isvtheNucleaidentification programs?dvelrProliferator's strategy How do proliferators pursue a nuclear weapons 12,13
identification program?
End state definition What is the end state and how is it defined? 14
Success tree Build success trees Translate proliferation scenario into success3 eWhat using events and nucla14
_______________logical gates______
4 Basic events Identification of basic Gruigobacevns1
identification events
2 Structure Identification of pro 10, 1
function system functions Euto o acltn o vnspoaiiy1
Basi evnts uanifictio of Expert opinions elicitation through
6 Bai vns Qatfcto f questionnaire 14
evaluation basic events Top metrics development
7 Quatification of Top events probabilities calculation using 14identifinmodels Saphire
8 Quantitative Setatfity analysis Explore various policy options and technology 148 Ssiti evt analysis
Banysicvns Impotatnc o banlsic evl
2.3 Step 1. Identification of the Problem
The first step in any model development involves the understanding of the problem. In the present study,
a nuclear proliferation world is defined as the arena where the two actors, safeguarders and proliferators,
are interacting with regard to nuclear weapons program-related technology, materials and equipment as
shown in Figure 2.2. The characterization of actors and nuclear weapons programs is the basic step
towards building a model that describes nuclear proliferation problems.
Nuclear Proliferation World
Figure 2.2 Schematic Drawing of Nuclear Nonproliferation System
In the nuclear proliferation world, the two actors are competing with each other for control of
nuclear elements. Nuclear elements are defined as components required for a nuclear weapons program
such as nuclear technology, nuclear material, and nuclear equipment.
Proliferators want to develop nuclear weapons and their schemes for acquiring nuclear weapons
are represented by nuclear weapons program. The following assumptions are made with regard to the
characteristics of proliferators:
- Assumption #1: Potential proliferators include only state actors, not non-state actors.
- Assumption #2: Every country has a will to develop nuclear weapons if they are allowed to. At a
minimum, they are ready to consider an option to acquire nuclear weapons.
- Assumption #3: Potential proliferators can divert material from a nuclear fuel cycle into a
nuclear weapons program.
- Assumption #4: Proliferators continue to try to look at the vulnerabilities of the safeguarder itself
or safeguard measures and obtain useful information in order to improve their diversion or concealment
tactics.
Safeguarders want to prevent or stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Safeguarders'
actions against nuclear proliferation are performed through the authorization of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. In this study, safeguaders are defined as actors within the NPT regime, and are
generally represented by the IAEA.
2.4 Step 2. Scenario Development
The scenarios used in this study will cover the interactions between proliferators and safeguarders. To
fully develop realistic scenarios, the strategies of both the proliferators and the safeguarders must be
considered. In order to apply our methodology we will focus our scenarios on one aspect of a Nuclear
Weapons Program, the procurement of fissile material.
2.4.1 Nuclear Weapons Program
A nuclear weapons program begins with the decision to initiate pursuit of nuclear weapons and is
complete upon the test of a manufactured nuclear device. A nuclear weapons program requires an
extensive range of technologies and resources. By looking at overall nuclear weapons program, required
technology, material, and equipment for the successful completion of nuclear weapons programs can be
identified. The process of developing nuclear weapons involves many steps. The most difficult and
critical step is the procurement or production of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
2.4.2 HEU production
In this study, the step of fissile material acquisition was chosen for a quantitative analysis using success
tree techniques due to its importance and complexity. HEU production can be conducted at two types of
Uranium Enrichment Facilities (UEFs): declared and clandestine facilities. In some cases, it is even
possible to use two types of facilities simultaneously. For the successful production of HEU,
proliferators need to prepare nuclear material, and build or buy specialized equipment and technology.
2.5 Step 3. Success Tree Development
A success tree using a logic diagram provides a systematic approach to the incorporation of all root
causes (basic events) for each proliferation scenario. The main purpose of a success tree method is to
translate identified scenarios and root causes that lead to the top event in a clear, systemic fashion into a
format that allows quantitative analysis. A success tree method also helps identify diversion scenarios
that were not identified in step two. Each step of a nuclear weapons program can be analyzed with the
integrated methodology; however, only HEU production is analyzed in this study. Before starting
success tree development, several factors are considered. First, developers should define the top events,
depending on the purposes of study or based on the ease of quantification as shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Possible Ways to Build Success Trees or Failure Trees
Actors Results Name Possible description of a top event
Success A A nuclear weapons program is successfully stopped.
Safeguarders Failure B A nuclear weapons program is not detected.
A nuclear weapons program is not stopped.
Success C A nuclear weapons program is successfully completed.
Proliferators Failure D A nuclear weapons program failed.
A nuclear weapons program is detected.
Second, the level of detail for describing basic events should be defined. A success tree can be
built either in a very complex, detailed way or in a very simple, rough manner. The advantage of simple
success trees is that they are easily understood, but by simplifying the tree it becomes more difficult to
accurately quantify the probabilities. The resulting calculations may not provide the level of detail that
is necessary to describe the probability of the top event.
2.6 Step 4. Basic Events Identification
In the process of success tree development, basic events are identified in parallel. In most cases, the
characteristics of the basic events allow then to be grouped. During this process, descriptions of basic
events can be reviewed and kept consistent. In addition, each group of basic events may require
assumptions to clarify the analysis of results. The grouping of basic events makes the quantification
process of basic events easier. In more complex models, the grouping of basic events becomes more
important.
2.7. Step 5. Structure Function Establishment
As shown in Table 2.2, a top event can be described using either a success tree or a failure tree. In this
study, the problem is analyzed using a success tree. A structure function is the function that enables the
calculation of a top event probability. Establishing a structure function according to success tree
techniques is described below. This function can be described in terms of Minimal Path Sets (MPSs).
The preparatory step in establishing structure function is to identify MPSs with basic events. An
MPS is a path set that leads to system success, not containing another path set as a subset. MPSs are
expressed in terms of basic events. For example, if the co-occurrence of three basic events, YA, YB, and
Yc, leads to system success, the corresponding MPS is described as MPS = {YBYCYC}. There are two
ways of describing a structure function with MPSs: Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) and Sum-of-
Products Form (SPF). Equations 2-1 and 2-2 are DNF and SPF, respectively.
Yr =U MPSn =1(1- MPS)(1 -MPS) ... (1- MPSJ) (2.1)
i=1
N N-1 N N
Yr = M, - M,M +.....+(-1)N+M1 , (2.2)
i=1 i=1 j=i+1 i=1
The next step is to substitute basic events (YA, YB) for MPSs in the structure function. Basic events can
be substituted for MPSs in the DNF or SPF. For example, if there are only two MPSs in the success tree,
and those are described as MPS1 = {YAYC}, MPS 2 = {YBYC}, the structure function (YT) can be written
as:
YT =1-(1-MPSl)(1-MPS 2)=1-(1- Y Y)(1 - Y ) (2.3)
Finally, one can further simplify this function using the fact that yk = Y for k>O because all basic events
are all binary variables. The quantification of this structure function can be done by applying simple
probability theory to equation (2.3) as follows:
N N-1 N N
P(Yr) = P(Z M,) - P(Z I MMj)+.P....+P((-1)N+IJ jM,) (2.4)17
i=1 i=1 j=i+ i=1
2.8 Step 6. Basic Event Evaluation: Evaluation of Model Inputs
The main inputs to the top event probability calculation are reasonable values for basic event
probabilities. There is no way to evaluate exactly the basic event probabilities. For the quantification of
basic events, the following three ways can be used:
- Eliciting experts' opinions based on their experiences
- Developing metrics composed of factors that affect basic event probabilities
- Developing success trees for each basic event separately during basic event quantification process
17 The probability of MPS can be calculated using the following rule: P(MPSI)= P(YAYB) = P(YA)P(YB)
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In this study, the first two approaches were developed and the quantitative analysis was done only
through the elicitation of expert opinions.
2.8.1 Elicitation of Expert Opinion
The risk analysis of uncertain events inherently requires quantification of probabilities for which little
or no experimental data exist. Risk assessment involves many uncertain quantities, only some fraction
of which agrees with statistics and modeling. Judgment of experts is needed to supplement and interpret
available information. A structured and detailed process is essential to obtaining non-skewed and
informed expert knowledge18 Experts may have well-founded opinions to justify those uncertainties.
The use of judgmental probability allows for the inclusion of uncertainties in risk assessment. The
quantification of expert opinion in the form of judgmental probabilities is known as expert-opinion
elicitation. 19 A typical procedure to obtain expert opinions is shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Procedure for Expert-Opinion Elicitation
Step Tasks
-Conduct literature survey
Selection of experts 
-Utilize a professional network
Preparation of -Prepare questions to obtain data in a way that minimizes
questionnaire uncertainties and ambiguity
Collection of expert -Send the questionnaire to the experts
opinions -Receive answers from the experts
Quantification -Aggregate multiple data obtained from experts
Interpretation of expert -Conduct a quantitative analysis
opinions *Re-contact experts as a part of fine-tuning process, if necessary
For the present study, time
shown in Table 2.4.
periods are divided based on the safeguards features of the NPT regime as
18S. V. Mladineo et al., "Guidelines for the Performance of Nonproliferation Assessments.", pp.6 6 -69.
19 Bilal M. Ayyub, "Uncertainties in Expert-Opinion Elicitation for Risk Studies" (paper presented at the
Proceedings of the 9th United Engineering Foundation Conference on Risk-Based Decision Making in Water
Resources, Santa Barbara, CA, 2000).
Table 2.4 Classification of Time Period Concerning IAEA Safeguards Development
Time B. Moran (2007) 20 Carlson and Leslie (2005)21 Present study
Level 0
1960s Before the NPT ( i n eg i INFCIRC/66(significant safeguards issues)
1970s-1980s From the NPT's entry Level I INFCIRC/153
into force in 1970 to AP (INFCIRC/153)
1990s in 1997 Level II INFCIRC/540
(INFCIRC/540 implemented
2000s 1997 to present satisfactorily, not yet qualified Matured INFCIRC/540
for Integrated Safeguards (IS)
2010s Integrated 
Safeguards
2010s_ _ -System (ISS)
Multiple experts are typically chosen to increase the objectivity of quantification while decreasing
biased opinions. There are several methods to handle multiple data acquired from experts and several
approaches to better treat data from multiple sources. Table 2.5 lists some approaches for this treatment.
Table 2.5 Available Methods for Treating Multiple Sources
Approach Method / Model Reference
Budnitz et al.
Equal-weight (1997, SSHAC)22
Mathematical Simple easy-to use method Quantitative weight Clemen and Winkler
aggregation 
-linear opinion pool
approach -logarithmic opinion pool
Classical model Cooke (1991)24,
Bayesian model Morris (1977) 25
Behavioral Delphi method Clemen and Winkler
approach Nominal group technique (1999)
20 B. Moran, "An Evaluation of Safeguards Approach Options for Large Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment"
(paper presented at the INMM 48th Annual Meeting Tucson, AZ, July 2007).
21 They defined five levels from Level 0 to Level IV. Level III is "Integrated safeguards satisfactorily," and Level
IV is "Integrated Safeguards implemented satisfactorily for extended period." John Carlson and Russell Leslie,
"Safeguards Intensity as a Function of Safeguards Status" (paper presented at the INMM 2005 Symposium,
Phoenix, AZ, July 2005).
22 R.J. Budnitz et al., "Recommendations for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis: Guidance on Uncertainty and
Use of Experts, NUREG/CR-6372 " (Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC), NUREG, 1997).
23 R.T. Clemen and R.L. Winker, "Combining Probability Distributions from Experts in Risk Analysis," Risk
Analysis 19, no. 2 (1999).
24 R.M. Cooke, Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford
University Press, 1991).
25 P.A. Morris, "Combining Expert Judgements: A Bayesian Approach," Management Science 23, no. 7 (Mar.
1977).
In this study, the equal-weight approach is used for congregation of expert opinions. The equal-
weight approach is simple and has advantages over other methodologies. In the use of this approach,
two factors should be considered. First, all experts should be assumed to be equally credible. Second,
extreme expert opinions should be truncated.26
2.8.2 Hierarchic Metrics-Index Method
The metrics should be able to relate to the characteristics of the system that needs to be analyzed.
Difficulties with developing metrics include a lack of independence of the metrics, the need to facilitate
the understanding and use of the results of an assessment, diverse employment of metrics.27
A. Hierarchic Metrics Formulation
A metric for each basic event was developed to provide a way to evaluate basic events. This method can
be alternately used in the absence of experts' opinions. However, these metrics can help shape what
factors experts have in mind in order to provide their evaluation. The methodology is performed in five
steps as shown in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6 Procedure for Quantification of Basic Events by Index Values
Step Process Remarks
Establishment of hierarchic metrics All affecting factors
1
-Top, intermediate, and basic metrics to basic events
Quantitative relationship between intermediate
metrics and basic metrics
System Similar to theQuantitative relationship between top metrics and
2 function aggregation of
intermediate metrics
establishment multiple data
Quantitative relationship between a basic event and
top metrics
3 Basic metrics evaluation High (3), medium (2),
-scores can be assigned through literature survey or available data low (1), None (0)
Top metric value calculation
4 -current values with assigned values at step 3
-perfect values with high values for all basic metrics
5 Transformation of top metric-index numbers into probability Data analysis
values
26 Ham, "An Integrated Methodology for Quantitative Assessment of Proliferation Resistance of Advanced
Nuclear Systems Using Probabilistic Methods".p.165.
27 S. V. Mladineo et al., "Guidelines for the Performance of Nonproliferation Assessments." pp.3 2 -41.
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The first step in establishing hierarchic metrics is to identify all factors affecting a top measure.
A hierarchic metric is composed of several layers of metrics: top metrics, intermediate metrics, and
basic metrics28 each layer of metrics are represented as X, Y and Z, respectively as shown in Figure 2.3.
In this study, basic metrics are identified in terms of individual measures or programs available in the
NPT regime. In this study, top metrics include the detectability by systems (legal capabilities), the
detectability by technology (technological capabilities), and a specific factor needs consideration.
--- - -- --- --- - --- - -- -- --- --- -- - -- -- --- - -- -- --- - --a-... . ... . .. .. ... . .. ... . .. .. ... . .. ..
Basic Event
TopMeaure
.. . .. . ..---- - -- - - -- - -- - - -- - -- - - -- - .. . . .. . .. . ..-. ...-. . . .. ..-. . .. . .. . . ..-.. . .
.. . .. . .
STop Me A Top Metrc B Top Mtr C
(X1 (X2) (X3)
... .- .. .. . - -... .  . .. . - .. .. .. .- . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - -
- - - - - . . . . . . . . . .
Intermediate A1 Intermediate A2 intennediate BI intermediate B2 Intemediale C1 Intennedate C2(Yii) (Y12) (Y21) (Y22) (Yt) (Y32)
Figure 2.3 Structure of Hierarchic Metrics
B. Index Numbers for Top Measures
Index numbers are used in quantifying top measure values using a hierarchic metrics. An index number
method provides a means to compare values in different settings. 29 An index number can be obtained
using simple values for the current time and a predetermined base time. The base time is some arbitrary
time chosen by the analyst and values for other periods determine a series of index numbers. In this
study, a base period is set some time when safeguards system reaches its maximum capacity. Namely,
they are obtained when all basic metric values are assigned their maximum values.
2 r some basic metrics, affecting elements may be added to detail the basic metrics for better description.
29 Economics, an index number method is used as a way to standardize the measurement of numbers so that
they are directly comparable.
A structure function for a hierarchic metrics can be generally represented as:
P(Top Measure)= f (X), X = {X,, X 2 ,X 3 ,...X,} (2.5)
where, X, = f, (L ) , _, = I){Y,1 ',Y,2 3,...Y} ; Yj = fj (Z), Z = {Z,I, Zij2 , Z 3 ,...Zjk} ; and i, j, and
k are numbers of top, intermediate, and basic metrics, respectively.
Input values for basic metrics (Z11 1 , Z 11 2, ... , and Zijk) are obtained based on the evaluation
using multiple references from 0 to 3. An index number for a top measure in hierarchic metrics is
calculated through proper structure functions. These index numbers can be transformed into probability
values with data analysis.30
2.9 Step 7. Quantification-Calculation using Saphire@
Top event probabilities in a success tree were calculated using Saphire (Include manufacturing
company name and location). Two types of quantitative calculation were performed using success tree
models as shown in Table 2.7. First, quantitative calculation #1 yielded top event probabilities for
different types of countries under different scenarios. Second, quantitative calculation #2 provided the
impact of changes in each basic event probability (i.e., available policy options) on the top event
probability. Comparing the results of studies #1 and #2 may determine how the IAEA's limited
resources should be prioritized when dealing with nuclear nonproliferation.
Table 2.7 Quantitative Calculation Performed for Success Tree Analysis
Classification Description
- At Type A countries
-High level of safeguards type (Additional Protocol)
Calculation #1: -High level of domestic safeguards 
system
-High level of cooperation with the IAEA
Impact of
- At Type B countries
safeguards system 
-Medium or Low level of safeguards (INFCIRC/153)
-Medium or Low level of domestic safeguards system
-Medium or Low level of cooperation with the IAEA
Calculation #2:
- Advancement and introduction of detection technologies
Impact of enhanced
- Enhancement of safeguards system
safeguards system
30 For instance, in the area of financial study, index values could correspond to credit ratings for each firm.
Through quantitative data analysis, each range of index values is assigned a range of probability values.
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Table 2.8 summarizes how these quantitative analyses can be done and what outcomes are obtained.
Table 2.8 Ways to Conduct Quantitative Analyses and Outcomes
Type of How to conduct? What are obtained?
analysis
Uncertainty Insert different distribution of basic event Different distribution of the top event
analysis probabilities (i.e., standard deviations)
Replace original basic eventReplce oiginl baic eentChanges in top event probability
Sensitivity probabilities with multiplied values
analysis Obtain different top event distributions Sensitivity to different experts
according to different expert opinions
Probability for each minimal cutsets
Rank MPSs in terms of probability Portceraig minimal
Importance values in a decreasing order. cutets
cutsets
analysis Obtain Fussell-Vesely Importance Risk significance evaluation of basic
measure [a] events
Note: [a] Importance measures in Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) also include the Birnbaum importance
measure, Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) and Risk Achievement Worth (RAW).
In the present study, Fussell-Vesely importance measure was chosen among several importance
measures in order to rank the importance of individual basic events. The Fussell-Vesely (F-V) of basic
event i (BE) is the fraction of the normal (baseline) Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) would be
reduced if the probability of BEj was always zero. This can be represented as:
FV = - R
R
(2.6)
where R4 is the base-case risk metric, and R' is the risk metric with the probability of basic event i is
always zero.
2.10 Step 8. Quantitative Analysis: Assessment
Three types of quantitative analysis were performed with the integrated methodology: uncertainty
analysis; sensitivity analysis; and importance analysis. The purpose of each analysis is as follows: First,
uncertainty analysis is done to measure the 'goodness' of a result. There are two types of uncertainties:
aleatory and epistemic. Aleatory uncertainty results from the inherent variability in a phenomenon that
is modeled. On the contrary, epistemic uncertainty is caused by the limited knowledge about the
31 Mohammad Modarres, Risk Analysis in Engineering: Techniques, Tools, and Trends (Boca Raton, FL: CRC
Press, 2006).
32 George Apostolakis, "Lecture 10 Probabilistic Calculations for 22.39 Elements of Reactor Design, Operations,
and Safety " (MIT, Fall 2007)
phenomenon. Sources of uncertainties are described in Table 2.9. Second, sensitivity analysis is done to
determine how sensitive a model is to changes in the value of the basic events and to changes in the
structure of the success tree model. Third, importance analysis is done to depict the MPSs and basic
events that most likely contribute to successful production of HEU.
Table 2.9 Sources of Uncertainties33
Classification Sources of uncertainties
Phenomenon
- Inherent variability in the phenomenon under consideration
uncertainty
Aleatory Mathematical
Aem l - Use of different mathematical models for describing the
uncern phenomenon in the model of the world. (i.e., success tree method)
uncertainty
Modeling process 
- Assumptions and approximations used in modeling process
uncertainty
Epistemic - Numerical evaluation process for basic events (expert-judged
Parameter values from different experts)
uncertainty - Method used for the aggregation of the evaluation obtained from
different experts
2.11 Summary
This study will provide insight into (a) how the NPT regime and IAEA safeguards evolved over time
and (b) whether there is a close correlation between the NPT regime's effectiveness and the success of
nuclear weapons proliferation. An integrated methodology was used for this study, comprised of eight
separate procedures. The methodology starts with problem identification which helps to construct
scenarios associated with each problem. These scenarios are subsequently translated into success trees.
However, in most cases, obtaining objective input values of basic events for the quantitative evaluation
of success trees can be challenging. Thus, expert opinion must be elicited in the instance where either
the occurrence of basic events in the success trees is very rare or those events cannot be modeled
quantitatively. It should be noted that expert judgment is subject to a high level of uncertainty due to
the subjectivity of expert evaluation of basic events. In this regard, quantitative analyses are necessary
to explore the reliability of models.
33 In fact, it is precisely for problems where data are limited and where simplifying assumptions have been used
that a quantitative uncertainty analysis can provide an illuminating role, to help identify how robust the
conclusions about model results are, and to help target data gathering efforts. H.C. Frey, Quantitative Analysis of
Uncertainty and Variability in Environmental Policy Making (Washington DC: AAASIUS EPA Environmental
Science and Engineering Fellows Program, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992).
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PART I IDENTIFICATION OF ROLES IN THE NPT REGIME
Part I is dedicated to identifying characteristics and capabilities of two roles at work in the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Two roles are safeguarders and proliferators. Safeguarders
prevent proliferators from developing nuclear weapons. Part I is essential to understanding the complex
problems of nuclear proliferation that the international community is facing.
In Chapter 3, drawing upon a wide variety of empirical studies in nuclear proliferation, variables that
affect the decision to initiate nuclear proliferation were identified. Those variables were then used to
analyze the dynamics of nuclear proliferation using causal-loop diagrams. Chapter 4 described the
overall schematic of a typical nuclear weapons program. Through this chapter, one can understand how
a nuclear weapons program proceeds once the decision is made to develop nuclear weapons and what
resources are required.
In Chapter 5, the NPT regime was reviewed through a literature review in political science and legal
studies. The chapter starts by reviewing a general regime theory in political science and then, a regime
theory was applied to the NPT regime. Through this chapter, conceptual criteria for analyzing the
effectiveness and power of the NPT regime were proposed. Two criteria, resources and capabilities,
were used for evaluating the power of the NPT regime and making recommendations in Chapter 15.
Chapter 6 introduces the IAEA's safeguards systems, which can be interpreted as legal capabilities of
the IAEA. Through chapter 6, one can understand how the IAEA performs its verification activities and
in what capacity. Chapter 7 analyzes technological capabilities of the IAEA, focused on technologies
used for verification activities at declared facilities or for declared materials.
CHAPTER 3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
3.1 Introduction
Nuclear proliferation has been a critical issue since the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945. The world
witnessed the annihilating power of nuclear weapons, and soon enough, major powers such as the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China engaged in a nuclear arms race to obtain this
deadly, yet attractive, power. In this chapter, I will examine the theory of nuclear proliferation from the
standpoint of international politics, focusing on why some states seek nuclear weapons and under what
conditions other states forbear nuclear weapons. In other words, I will review the incentives and
disincentives that affect whether a state initiates a nuclear weapons program from the viewpoint of
realism and liberalism, which are the two main schools of thought that explain security matters in
international relations study.
This review will provide an understanding of the basic nature of nuclear proliferation, which
will also be useful in developing strategies for improving nuclear nonproliferation regime. However,
there is no single factor in predicting the behavior of potential proliferators because the nuclear
proliferation propensity of states varies over time as the international security environment changes. As
a basic approach to model the complexity of nuclear propensity, a simple causal-loop model that
describes the relationship between incentives and disincentives, and nuclear propensity is proposed.
3.2 International Security Environment in the Post-Cold War Era
During the Cold War, a discernible pattern of world order existed. The international system of the Cold-
War era was defined as the bipolar system by two superpowers. This period was dominated by military
competition between the two superpowers and their respective allies. Countries with an alliance
relationship with the superpowers could rest assured that they would be protected by their partner
superpower if they faced security threats. 34 In contrast, non-nuclear weapon states that were not under
the protective umbrella of a superpower perceived serious threats." Structural constraints resulting from
the bipolar system prevented states from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The concepts of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and second-strike capability were
developed in the 1960s and, then, Nuclear Detente, including the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
(SALT) between the US and the Soviet Union were followed from the late 1960s until the early 1980s.
34 Peter Van Ham, Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics, and Policies, (New York,
NY: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993). p.5 1.
3 William Epstein, "Why States Go - And Don't Go - Nuclear," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, Vol. 430, Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects, Problems, and Proposals, (Mar.,1977), pp.16-28
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After the demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, the bipolar system collapsed,
but the strong and secure world order that some predicted would replace the bipolar system has not
materialized. The collapse of the bipolar system unsealed the Pandora's box of long-suppressed ethnic
conflicts and nationalist sentiments which had been locked during the Cold War. Nationalism, religion
and transnational ethnicity have recently supplanted ideologies of the Cold War era. 36 Some call
contemporary international order the unipolar system, with the only superpower being the United States,
whereas others believe the world is now a multilateral system. Since the Cold War ended, the strategic
importance of some regions of the world has declined, resulting in a limited engagement of two former
superpowers. Some states lost their protection by one of these superpowers, and they started to prepare
for the new international security system of self-help. This situation has caused instability in some
regions and resulted in regional arms races in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. As
a result, the possibility of nuclear proliferation has increased, and the dynamics of international relations
have become more complex. It is evident that this kind of insecurity and uncertainty has inflamed the
aspirations of some states to achieve nuclear status, especially when they are located in a high-conflict
38
region.
3.3 International Relations Theory for Nuclear Proliferation
Two main schools of thought in international relations theory are realism and liberalism. These two
theoretical paradigms help provide theoretical explanations of state behaviors in relation to nuclear
weapons proliferation. Incentives and disincentives of nuclear weapons acquisition, nuclear deterrence,
the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and the roles of nuclear weapons in the future are some of the
topics that fall into this realm of international politics. Furthermore, consequences of nuclear industry's
growth and problems of whether the spread of nuclear weapons will contribute the stability of the world
are other important issues under debate.39
3.3.1 Realism and Nuclear Proliferation
Realism in international relations holds that nation-states are unitary in the sense that states act as
rational autonomous actors regardless of their internal nature. Based on this assumption, realism further
argues the following: sovereign states are primary actors in international affairs; the main goal of states
36 See Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz, and Charles Westin, Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War
Era, (London/New York: Routledge, 2000).
37 For more discussion on regional arms race after the end of the Cold War, see Peter Van Ham (1993), pp.5 8-6 9 .
38 See more detailed discussion in T.V. Paul, Power VS Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons?, (Ithaca,
NY: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), pp. 1 8-27. Paul classified regions into high-conflict, moderate-
conflict, and low-conflict regions in terms of conflict level and security dilemma, coupled with the presence of
militarized inter-state disputes and crises, and the economic interdependence level. For example, a high-conflict
region is characterized by protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries. States are extremely sensitive to relative
gains. Interstate economic relations are minimal.
39 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company,
Inc.,1995). 1st edition.
is to maintain and ensure their own security; relations between states are determined by their relative
levels of power. The level of a state's power is primarily determined by the state's military and
economic capabilities.4 "
Realist theory dominated the early stage of nuclear proliferation studies primarily because of
the lack of information about other motivators during the Cold War.41 Realism provides good
explanations for why some states choose to acquire nuclear weapons. Rational deterrence theory 42 and
hegemonic theory43 are good examples that are based on realism. Realists see nuclear choices as the
decision of the states in consideration of relative military capabilities, their participation in alliances,
and their roles within the international system.
International system State
Internal Nuclear
balancing wacqison
Absence of No security Pursuit of jl custoFundamental + sovereign 
- guarantee to the - W balancing
anr Hy authority Y H states H strategy
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Figure 3.1 Realism and Nuclear Proliferation
Figure 3.1 shows why states seek nuclear weapons in an anarchic international system where no
authority exists. 44Realists believe the following with regard to arms acquisition: First, states acquire
arms in order to protect their vital interests, especially within a self-help system.45 Second, states need
to be prepared to deter any possible attacks by acquiring arms. They believe that their neighbors may
engage in military actions against them if they do not have the means to protect themselves from attacks.
Third, states want to achieve superior weapons capabilities so as to increase their power and prestige
40 Kenneth Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
4' Tanya Ogilvie-White, "Is there a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,"
The Nonprolferation Review, (Fall, 1996), pp.4 3 -6 0 .
42 Once more than one country has acquired a second-strike nuclear capability, war between then is highly
unlikely to occur like in the Cold War era: mutually assured destruction (MAD). Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear
Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review, Vol.84, no.3 (Sep., 1990), pp.7 3 1-7 4 5 .
43 Hegemonic stability theory realists argue that the presence of a strong hegemony is what makes for a successful
regime. They believe that regimes simply reflect the distribution of power in the international system.
44Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and
Ukranian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Political Psychology, Vol.17, no.4,
(Dec.,1996), pp.727-757.
45 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Policies, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). A "Self-help system"
means the system where the actors cannot call on a higher authority to resolve difficulties or provide protection.
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and preserve their autonomy. In this context, states should keep their rights to manufacture nuclear
weapons.
There are limitations in the realist's explanation for nuclear proliferation. First, the concept of
states' relative power is only a sufficient condition to decide nuclear proliferation. Second, the evidence
of states' preference for internal balancing over external balancing has not been supported empirically.
Third, realism does not explain states' voluntary forbearance of nuclear proliferation.46 In sum, the
realists do not necessarily predict that a state will proliferate, just that the state will be motivated to
respond to a threat of power differential with its neighbors or competitors for restoring the balance of
power in an anarchic world. 4
3.3.2 Liberalism and Nuclear Proliferation
Liberalism in international relations holds that the configuration of interdependent state preferences
determines states' behavior, unlike realism, where state capabilities are seen as critical. Institutionalism,
functionalism, and constructivism fall into the category of liberalism. Liberalists, often under criticism
for their naivet6 about state power, hold that interdependence among state actors, democratic peace, and
the effects of international institutions change states' behavior.48 However, liberalists can also provide
an explanation for nuclear choices in regions where low levels of interdependency among states exists.49
As far as international politics are concerned, liberalists believe the following: First, the use of
force in international politics can be minimized by appealing to human nature and promoting
cooperation. Second, liberalists focus on ways to avoid conflict among states by regulating state
behavior through international institutions or international regimes because they believe actors' interests
and capabilities can be altered by those international systems. 50 Third, interaction between states is not
limited to the political and security relations but also economic and cultural activities. Therefore,
economic interdependence will not only serve economic objectives but decrease the need to resolve
differences between states using armed conflicts.
Liberal institutionalists provide the key explanations for norms and rules contained in regimes.
As for nuclear nonproliferation, liberalism explains nuclear forbearance, interstate dependence, and the
effect of regimes and norms on states' behavior very well. Liberalists believe that regimes or
international cooperation come about through a convergence of state interests, and that international
institutions help create the synthesis of interests. 5'In contrast, realists argue that regimes can be
46 Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot (1996).
47 Robert Holcombe (MIT M.A. Dissertation, 2006), p.2 7 .
48 Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, International Organization, Vol.51,
no.4, (Autumn 1997), pp.5 13 -53 .
49 T.V. Paul (2000), p. 14 .50 Andrew Moravcsik, (1997).
51 Regimes facilitate cooperation by establishing standards of behavior which signal to all other members that
individual states are in fact cooperating. When all states expect the other participants to cooperate, the probability
of sustaining cooperation increases dramatically.
successful only if there is a strong hegemonic power that forces other states to cooperate. The
theoretical background of regime theory will be detailed in Chapter 5.
3.4 Factors Affecting Nuclear Proliferation
A first step in the study of how a state reaches a decision to go nuclear is to find affecting factors in the
decision making process. Factors affecting incentives or disincentives for nuclear proliferation can be
classified in three dimensions: (i) environmental contexts (international or domestic) 52 ; (ii) political,
military, and economic factors; and (iii) time-frame (short-term and long-term or preemptive and/or
reactive). Furthermore, some factors can affect both nuclear proliferation as well as nuclear forbearance,
depending on whether they increase or decrease in relative magnitude. The international and domestic
environment of states is shaped by the political or diplomatic, economic, and military status of countries.
Some factors may vary over the short term, while others do not change over the long term. Table 3.1
shows a summary of research that attempts to model the dynamics of nuclear proliferation propensity.
Table 3.1 Summary of Research with regard to Modeling of Nuclear Proliferation
Authors Factors considered Methods
1.Motive conditions or incentives5 3
Meyer (1) international political power/prestige incentives Nuclear
(1986) (2) military/security incentives, Propensity model(3) domestic political incentives
2.Dissuasive conditions
(1) The security model: nuclear weapons and international
threats
Sagan(1997) model: Qualitative
s4 (2) The domestic politics model: nuclear pork and parochial description
interest
(3) The norms model: Nuclear symbols and state identity
1.Depedent variables
2.Explanatory variables Survival and
(1) Technological determinants- hazard methods &
Singh, Way (2) External determinants-the presence (or absence) of a security
ss (2004) threat and a security guarantee
(3) Internal or domestic determinants-democracy, liberalizing logistic
governments, an autonomous domestic elite, and symbolic/status regressions
motivations
52 T.V. Paul (2000) looked at nuclear proliferation at the regional level by using variables of the level of conflict
and co-operation, and the level of politico-security interdependence in a given region. T.V. Paul (2000), p. 1 5.
* Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press,
1986). p.4 6 .
5 Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International
Security, Vol.21, no.3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp.54 -8 6 .
* Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test," The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.48, no.6 (Dec., 2004), pp.8 5 9- 8 85 .
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(Continued)
1. Opportunity: economic capacity and nuclear technology
diffusion
Jo and 2. Willingness: Probit regression
Gartzke 56 (1) International security: conventional threat, nuclear threat, analysis and
nuclear defense pact, diplomatic isolation White robust(2008) (2) Domestic politics: domestic unrest, democracy estimation5 7
(3) Norms: NPT membership, NPT system effect
(4) Status: major power status, regional power status
As can be seen, no single factor can explain the complexity of nuclear proliferation. Most single
factors do not appear to have a direct correlation to a state's decision to proliferate nuclear weapons,
meaning that, normally, a state makes this decision based on its own evaluation of a larger set of factors.
However, there is one exception. A state's assessment of its international security threat does seem to
yield a close correlation to whether that state chooses or does not choose to go nuclear.
3.5 Incentives for Acquiring Nuclear Weapons
Form the realists' perspective that sees state power as the essence of explaining nuclear proliferation, all
nations want to enhance their power and, thus, improve their position of influence in the world. It is a
reasonable assumption that, in a world with few nuclear weapons, a state which breaks out of nuclear
disarmament might be able to exert more leverage than in a world where nuclear weapons are abundant.
The incentives for nuclear weapon acquisition embrace a broad range of political, military, and
economic motivations. For example, Ham (1994) sees that three factors are important in making
countries want to acquire nuclear weapons: acute threat perceptions, general national security concerns,
and political prestige.58
All possible factors affecting nuclear incentives are further detailed in Table 3.2. Among these
factors that influence a state's decision, some factors vary over the short-term, while others take a long
time to change. As shown in Table 3.2, the factors that do not change over the long-term are described
as 'fixed," while situational factors that are subject to change depending on the situation are defined as
"situational." The validation of time duration for each factor goes beyond the scope of this study;
however, it would be valuable to look at variations of each factor over time. If a proliferator has an
enduring capacity, such as self-reliable domestic resources like petroleum or a strategic leverage holder
based on its geopolitical importance, it could willingly take a risk of going nuclear. 59
56 Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol.5 1, no.1, (Feb., 2007), pp. 16 7 -19 4 .
5 Jo and Gartzke used a standard cross-section time-series data structure and classified variables into dependent
variables and independent variables.
58 Peter Van Ham (1994), p. 73 .
59 Iran has a large amount of petroleum, while North Korea has a strategic holder mainly due to its successful
efforts in creating tensions in Far East Asia region.
Table 3.2 Incentives for the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons
Time-
Environment Factors Description frame
-Aspiration for political prestige (regional or global) 61
-Aspire to be global or regional power status/pretensions F
-Assert political and military independence
-Deter regional intervention by superpower
-Overcoming International pariah status 62
Political
International -Demonstrate national viability (by pariah countries) to S
60 power 63force international community to sit up and take note.
/prestige
-Overcoming an inferior position within an alliance
structure
-Enhance bargaining position within an alliance with a F
nuclear power
-Assert politico-military independence
-Emergence of Nuclear Threat64 S
-Response to a security threat from a nuclear-armed
adversary
Military -Response to an adversary with a latent capacity of
International 6
/Security manufacturing nuclear weapons65
'Disappearance of security assurance 66 / alliance S
-Response to an adversary with an overwhelming F
conventional military threat67
(Continued)
60 Stephen M. Meyer (1986).
61 Williams Epstein (1977).
62 Some states do not always acknowledge the international norm and do not show regime-guided behavior. They
fear being in a situation of precarious diplomatic isolation, without credible security support or political moorings
inside great power alliance structures. Peter Van Ham (1993), pp.7 2 -7 3 . For more information how to determine
"pariah state" Robert E. Harkavy, "Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation", International Organization, Vol.35,
no.1 (Winter 1981), pp. 135-163. Harkavy defined Israel and South Africa, as pariah states, and Taiwan and South
Korea as "quasi-pariah" states.
63 It is true that having enrichment and reprocessing capabilities is one of important components of national
security. It can demonstrate to surrounding countries that a state has achieved a high-tech level of industry.
64 Stephen M. Meyer (1986), pp.56 -60 .
65 This factor is considered contentious and varies over time in different countries. A state adjacent to an adversary
with a nuclear latent capacity may consider two opposite situations: the initiation of a nuclear arms race and the
creation of superiority over its adversary. The case of Brazil and Argentina shows this contradictory explanation.
66 Generally there exist two types of nuclear security assurance. One is positive security assurance, which provides
a so-called nuclear-umbrella, while the other one simply promises not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.
67 Peter V. Ham, p.51. The Gulf war showed that developing countries' conventional weapons cannot hold against
Western high-tech electronic, precision warfare. This has strengthened the conviction of some states that non-
conventional weapons are the sole guarantee of national security.
-Maintenance of unstable regime (use of nationalism) 69
-Overcoming domestic turmoil
S
-Enhancing political leader's power position under domestic
Domestic unrest
politics68  -Public's national pride
-Raising a morale or pride by defense establishments
-Raising national self-image after major military defeat
-Raising national leader's popularity
-Economic/industrial spinoffs" S
Economic -Change in defense strategy from conventional forces to
benefits70  nuclear forces because of intolerable economic burden 72
-Possession of uranium reserves F
Note: F and S stand for fixed and situational, respectively.
Table 3.3 examines some states that sought to develop nuclear weapons by detailing the corresponding
incentives for making that decision. It should be noted that the factors analyzed in Table 3.3 were the
ones considered by states at the time of the decision because surrounding environments that states face
vary over time. If there is a state with natural uranium reserves, it is always a viable option to develop
nuclear weapons programs. It is a less viable alternative for states that must seek out uranium on the
international black market. As can be seen, security threats and nuclear ambition are the principal
factors in motivating states to launch nuclear weapons programs.
Iran and North Korea are good examples of supporting nuclear incentives. These states have
either real or perceived enemies that are much stronger militarily than those states. Achieving nuclear
weapons would allow them to dramatically improve their security situation. Also, once a state achieves
or is close to achieving nuclear weapons, their international status increases. The leaders of those states
have been successful in forcing the major international players to acknowledge them and draw them
into the negotiation table. They can be viewed as players on the international scene. The leaders can
show their populace that they have become major players who can negotiate from positions of power.
As a result, the morale of their populace can increase, and the leaders can strengthen their political
positions.
68 Stephen M. Meyer (1986), pp.6 3 -64 .
69 A domestic turmoil can be overcome by diverting domestic attention or direct domestic energies away from
domestic problems. And the power position of political leaders can be strengthened by inciting nationalism,
especially in the case of military government
70 William Epstein (1977), pp. 22-24.
71 Economic benefits from nuclear proliferation are well-described in the paper written by William Epstein (1977);
and George Quester "Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation," The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science. Vol. 430, (March 1977), pp.70-81.
72 Stephen M. Meyer (1986), p.6 5 .
Table 3.3 Cases of Motivation for Nuclear Weapons"
Country Domestic context International / Regional context
-Economic spinoff -A security threat from a nuclear-armed
-Morale booster after the defeat by the adversary (Britain)
U.K. -Ambition for regional power prestige
-Military government (overcoming sense of inferiority to Brazil)
-Domestic politics -Global and regional power prestige
Brazil -Military government -Response to an adversary with a latent
-Uranium reserves capacity of manufacturing nuclear weapons
France -Morale booster after military defeats -Global power prestige
-Regime change -Regional power prestige
Iran -Uranium reserves -Deterrence from a superpower
-National pride -Security threat from Israel
-Security threats from surrounding Arab
countries, as well as, the Soviet Union.
-Political tools -Diplomatic leverage
-National pride -Security threats from the US forces in SouthKorea 
-Uranium reserves Korea
.a . -Security threat from India (nuclear-armedPakistan -Defeat by India in 1971 avray
adversary)
South -Political tools -Security threat from the Soviet Union and
Africa -Uranium reserves surrounding countries
-Fear of a possible GermanSwitzerland -of a p e Security threat from the Soviet UnionSwitzrland acquisition of nuclear weapons____________________
Sweden -Uranium reserves -Security threat from the Soviet Union
3.6 Disincentives for Acquiring Nuclear Weaponry
Disincentives are mainly explained by liberalism. Disincentives are a set of dissuasive conditions that
tend to work against nuclear proliferation and work throughout the whole nuclear weapons programs.
Some states do not feel that they need nuclear weapons and other states shut down their nuclear
weapons programs in the middle of development or even after the successful testing of nuclear weapons.
A couple of member states of the former Soviet Union forwent their nuclear weapons that they inherited
and returned them to Russia.
If disincentives are put into a context of time sequence of occurrences, some factors are either
the results of proliferation activities within proliferation states themselves or the responses from the
international community after detection, while others are preemptive ones deterring states from making
the decision to "go-nuclear." Disincentives given by international community can be divided into
"sticks and carrots." Carrots are given under the condition that a proliferator forgoes a nuclear weapons
73 The cases of Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, Sweden, and Switzerland are excerpted from T.V. Paul (2000).
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program. On the contrary, sticks are punishments that include the withdrawal of currently-existing
economic and technical assistance, economic military sanctions,74 and diplomatic isolations.
Table 3.4 Disincentives of Nuclear Weapons Program76
Environment Factors Description Features
-Fear of negative consequences of violating international legal
commitments (NPT, NWFZ): Worries about the resultant political S P F
Political fallout and international punishments in case of violation
-Acquisition of peaceful reputation and good international images
International by complying with legal commitments C R S
-Joining or re-joining the international mainstream
-Economic returns : Financial and technical assistance in return for
Economic termination of nuclear weapons program77  C R S
-Ending of economic sanctions or economic isolation 78
-Fear/punishment of causing regional proliferation: existence of a S P/ R S
rival with a latent capacity
-Fear/punishment of preemptive threats 0
-Preemptive intervention by a major power S P/R S
-Military sanctions by the UN Security Council
79 -Security Assurance Provision from nuclear powers
-Nuclear security: positive or negative security assurance C P/R S
-Conventional security: assurance of a supply of conventional arms
to a threatened country8
-Reduction or termination of security threat
-Nuclear threat: nuclear disannament8 2, establishment of NWFZ13  C P/R S
-Conventional military threat: arms reduction
74 See George Quester (1977) for various types of sanctions.
75Joseph Nye sees security guarantees, technical assistance, sanctions, multilateral persuasion, and declaratory
policy as diplomatic measures. For more discussion, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Part 11.3 Diplomatic Measures in eds.
Robert D. Blackwell and Albert Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations: Consequencesfor U.S. Policy, (New York, NY:
Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1993).
76 Stephen M. Meyer (1986), pp.6 7 -74 .
77 Ukraine chose to forgo its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and security assurances from both
the United States and Russia. On this issue see T.V. Paul (2000), p. 118.
78 Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberley A. Elliot and Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered:
History and Current Policy, (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economic, 2007), 3 rd edition. They
analyzed the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives. They used two
dependent variables to measure a sanction's success: policy result and sanctions. These two variables with values
from 1 to 4 are multiplied and it is counted as a sanctions success if the values are equal or greater than 9.
79 Michble A. Flournoy, Part 111.6 Implications for U.S. Military Strategy, in eds. Robert D. Blackwell and Albert
Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations
Book, 1993).
80 Both Sweden and Switzerland initiated nuclear weapons programs but forewent them due to the fear that the
Soviet Union might conduct a preemptive attack. See T.V. Paul (2000) pp.84 -9 8.
81 William Epstein (1977).
82 This issue is contentious in the nuclear nonproliferation field. Epstein claims only drastic nuclear disarmament
would reverse the nuclear arms race, where as George Quester claims that the halting of nuclear proliferation will
require a low-key and subtle approach since excessive abstraction and clarity can lose low visibility of nuclear
matters. William Epstein, (1977), pp.16-28; and George Quester (1977).
83 Brazil and Argentina became non-nuclear through a bilateral process and established the Brazilian-Argentine
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).
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____
nEconomic se Expenditure Burden: Intolerable economic burden caused84noicP/ R Sby nuclear weapons program14
Domestic -Fear of unauthorized seizure by antigovernment groups [a] R S
Environment Domestic -Termination of need to use nuclear weapons as a political tool
Politics in order to acquire national leader's popularity R S
-Power transition from military government to civilian government
Notes
[a] Domestic unrest that leads to instability and inability to control nuclear weapons
[b] P and R denotes preemptive and reactive, respectively.
[c] S and C stand for stick and carrot, respectively.
[d] F and S stand for fixed and situational, respectively.
Table 3.4 details a list of the disincentives that a state would have to consider in making its
decision of whether or not to continue with a nuclear weapons program. In most cases, disincentives to
nuclear proliferations come from the fears of proliferating states about negative consequences or
responses from the international community as a consequence of the revelation of its nuclear
proliferation program.
Table 3.5 shows some states that started nuclear weapons programs or acquired nuclear weapons, but
ended up forbearing them. Generally it would be very difficult to clearly define when each state started;
however, a reasonable assumption will be probably when they started to build nuclear facilities. As far
as the end of nuclear weapons program is concerned, the announcement by national leaders or the
participation in the NPT is regarded as its termination.
Table 3.5 Cases of States that Discarded Nuclear Weapons Program by Disincentives
Duration of
Countries Domestic International nuclear
weapons
program [a,b,d]
-Economic burden -Economic incentives (promoting
. -Fear of causing regional nuclear economic cooperation) Mid 1970s to
proliferation -Re-join the international community 1983
-Transition to Civilian government
Brazil -Transition to Civilian government *Economic incentives (promoting 1975 to 1990
economic cooperation) 
________
-Economic incentives Mid 1970s toLibya Not available -Consequences of violating 2003
international commitments
(Continued)
84 The costs of a large array of delivery vehicles and other support systems far exceed those of nuclear warheads.
Erwin Hsckel, Chapter 3. Towards non-nuclear security: costs, benefits, requisites, pp.56-79, Regina Cowen Karp,
ed., Security Without Nuclear Weapons?: Deterrent Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security, (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1992). P.71. For further information on specific numbers, see Stephen Schwarz, Atomic
Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940, (Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 1998)
-Economic burden -Economic assistance
South -Political instability -Diplomatic pressure
Africa -Domestic political change -Disappearance of threats with the
(political reform) collapse of Communism
South -Domestic instability due to the 'Diplomatic pressures and incentives
Korea assassination of the former leader Military incentives 1972 to 1981
-Threats of economic sanctions
-Political leaders' benefit cost
Switzerland analyses Fear of preemptive attack from 1945 to 1969
-Division of political leaders on potential adversaries
'Fear of causing regional nuclear
Sweden85  nuclear proliferation decision 1952 to 1968
(domestic opposition) proliferation (West Germany)
-Diplomatic pressure 1974 to 1978
Taiwan [d] Not available -Security assurance
-Threats of economic sanctions
-Economic assistance
Ukraine -Economic burden for maintenance -Security assurance 1991 to 1994
costs -Diplomatic incentives: Joining
international community
Notes
[a] Argentina, Libya, South Korea, and Taiwan from Meyer (1986), p.8 .
[b] Argentina, Brazil, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea and Ukraine are from Paul (2000).
[c] Some data from Table 1. Leonard Spector (1994), p.3 6 .
[d] Meyer (1986), p. 13 3 .
Figure 3.2 shows the presumed duration of nuclear weapons programs in nine states.
The figure prescribes important information about when their nuclear weapons programs
initiated and how long nuclear weapons programs proceeded.
Argentina
Brazil
Libya
South Africa
South Korea
Switzerland
Sweden
Taiwan
Ukraine
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Figure 3.2 Duration of Nuclear Weapons Programs in States
85 The Swedes realized that it would be difficult to possess both strong conventional and nuclear capabilities
simultaneously. T.V. Paul (2000), pp. 88-89. The Swedes feared that West Germany could acquire nuclear
weapons. T.V. Paul (2000). p.90
3.7 Complexity of Nuclear Proliferation
Many factors affect the initiation and termination of nuclear weapons program. It seems that the
international environment and a nation's power prestige are correlated to nuclear proliferation. However,
it seems to be more challenging to prove that domestic factors affect the decisions about nuclear
proliferation. Table 3.6 shows the results of an analysis of the correlation between domestic factors and
the nuclear proliferation decision. Sing and Way (2004) and Jo and Gartzke (2007) claim that the
technological level of states might have been related to their nuclear propensity. In contrast, Meyer
(1986) claims that only domestic politics affect the decision for nuclear proliferation.
Table 3.6 Research on Relations between Factors and Go-nuclear Decision
Author Technological level Economic status Domestic Politics
Sing and Way 0 X X
Meyer X N/A 0
Jo and Gartzke 0 0 X
A. Complexity of Domestic Political Stability
Argentina and Brazil halted their nuclear weapons programs after the advent of democratic government
in 1983 and 1990, respectively. 16 However, Singh and Way (2004) concluded that neither
democratization nor democracy has any discernible effects on nuclear proliferation decision. Jo and
Gartzke (2007) supported their claim that the levels of democracy and domestic unrest do not affect to
the initiation of nuclear weapons programs. Meyer (1986) suggests two disincentive factors could be
considered with regard to the domestic political stability of each state such as domestic unrest and risk
of unauthorized seizure.87 He concludes that domestic unrest is a factor proven sufficiently though
historical references were relatively few.
B. Complexity of Economy
It seems that a minimum level of economic size in terms of GDP is required to initiate nuclear weapons
programs. Hhckel claims that an economic analysis with regard to nuclear proliferation policy can
provide objective criteria to understand nuclear proliferation policy of states. He suggests that a broad
range of national resources is required for a nuclear weapons program such that most developing
countries cannot reach a nuclear weapons program unless they have the sheer size of their human
resources such as China and India.88
86 Leonard S. Spector, Strategic Warning and New Nuclear States, Defense Intelligence Journal, Vol.3, (1994),
pp.33-52.
87 Stephen M. Meyer (1986), pp.6 4 -7 1 .
88 Erwin Hackel (1992), pp.5 6 -7 9.
Singh and Way (2004) also conclude that nuclear proliferation is reasonably well accounted for
by the level of economic development. They used GDP per capita, GDP squared and industrial capacity
index to measure the effects of technological determinants. Singh and Way found very interesting
results with their model. The model revealed that at low levels of GDP, further economic growth is
proportional to the exploration of the nuclear option, but at high levels of GDP, the effect levels off and
reverses, probably because of the fear of economic sanctions. As the economy of a state grows,
involvement in the world economy (i.e., economic interdependence) will increase though it remains
somewhat unclear to conclude that a causal linkage exists.89 This is a very meaningful result because
this implies that economic sanctions might work more efficiently in a state a high level of economic
interdependence, as Paul (2000) described.90
C. Complexity of Technology Level
Meyer (1986) claims that there is no common description of the trend or the relation between the
technological level of states and nuclear proliferation. He set up three models to identify the relationship
between the technological level and the nuclear proliferation process as follows: 91
- Model I: latent capacity longevity and the number of proliferation decisions
- Model II: the ratio of proliferation decisions to latent capacity opportunity
- Model III: the rate of proliferation decisions to levels of nuclear development (nuclear
infrastructure level)
In contrast to Meyer's study (1986), it was believed that only technologically sophisticated
nations with large GDPs, well-educated human resources and indigenous nuclear facilities could
produce nuclear weapons. Hickel claims that the lack of qualified manpower is a generic feature of
developing countries and is the most difficult challenge to get over.92 However, the fast diffusion of
technology enables more countries to have sophisticated engineering and industrial capacity. Nuclear
technology has diversified, which makes it harder to track illegal or clandestine acquisition of nuclear
technology. The development of the internet and dual-use items contributes to the ease of nuclear
technology acquisition. We can carefully conclude that possessing the technological capability is not a
necessary condition to initiate nuclear weapons programs mainly due to the global spread of nuclear
technology, which lowered the latent capacity threshold requirement. However, the technological level
of a state can be a sufficient condition because a minimum level of technology seems to be required.
89 For more information, see Singh and Way, p.882
90 T.V. Paul (2000), pp. 18 -2 7 .
91 Stephen Meyer (1986), pp.7 5-9 1
92 Erwin Hickel (1992), p.7 1.
3.8 Analysis with Published Index Values
Twenty five states that were or are conceived as having nuclear weapons programs were selected for a
simple analysis to review the relationship between nuclear proliferation propensity, and economic and
technological capabilities, and domestic politics. For an analysis, indices published by international
institutions were used, including Science and Technology Capacity Index (STCI), Knowledge Economy
Index (KEI), Human Development Index (HDI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and World
Governance Indicators (WGI) [See Appendix A].
Iran, North Korea and Pakistan have low values of economy- and technology-related index
values as shown in Figure 3.3 (a), (b), and (c) they overcame those difficulties in developing their
nuclear weapons programs. North Korea spends approximately one third of their GDP on their
military,93 which seems to allow them to overcome this factor. Furthermore, this might be attributed to a
lowered technology threshold resulting from the spread of nuclear technology. As can be seen from
Figure 3.3, only (f), Political Stability and Absence of Violence Indicator (one of six types of
governance indicators), seems to be related to the propensity of nuclear proliferation of states. Most of
states with negative values used to have sought nuclear weapons and are seeking nuclear weapons.
However, it seems that this indicator does not seem to apply in the case of North Korea because of
North Korean regime's tight control over its populace and intolerance for dissent.
10
8
6
4
2
cfcP
(a) Knowledge Economy Index (KEI)
Note: Index values are not available for Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.
(Continued)
93 CNN, "Facts on North Korea: One of the world's most secretive nations," CNN, February 10, 2005. May 4,
2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/04/22/nkorea.facts/index.html> Military expenditures
account for 31.3 percent of GDP expenditures.
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Figure 3.3 Index Values of Countries
3.9 Causal-loop Diagrams for the Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation
Meyer (1986) exhibited the time trend of nuclear proliferation in terms of nuclear propensity based on
specific motivational variables he defined. A causal-loop diagram can be drawn to describe these
dynamics of nuclear proliferation over time as shown in Figure 3.4. In the causal loop diagram, only
situational factors were considered among various nuclear proliferation determinants for the description
of dynamics.
-
(a) Nuclear Propensity Affected by International Environment
Punishments from +
Boxes shaded are both Exogenous and internationalEndogeneous Variables. Community
National + I
+ | en.,ar .
BI
R1
R1
(b) Nuclear Propensity Affected by Domestic Environment
Figure 3.4 Nuclear Propensity and Affecting Situational Factors4
94 B, D denotes a balancing loop and a reinforcing loop respectively.
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Through the causal-loop diagram in Figure 3.4, we can see how the NPT regime or the
international community can work for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. For example, the
international community can develop ways to enhance balancing loops and to disconnect reinforcing
loops. The role of the NPT regime can be very important as an external force to break causal loops
within the system through various means.
3.10 National Leader's Decision
A process that leads to a decision on whether a country will "go-nuclear or not" is very complex as
described above. All of these factors should be applied on a case-by-case approach. 95 The decision on
the initiation of nuclear weapons programs is likely to be dependent on a benefit and cost analysis
(BCA), in other words, how a decision maker weighs each component of benefits and costs. National
leaders make the decision to "go-nuclear or not" in consideration of both domestic and international
environments surrounding the state. Basically, a decision to initiate a nuclear weapons program is made
through the complex analysis of perceived benefits and costs in a reasonable and careful way. The
benefits can be advantages of being nuclear powers and rewards from the international community
when states terminate their nuclear proliferation processes. The costs of seeking a program are the risk
of an unfavorable attitude on the world stage and penalties from the international community in the
form of sanctions, in various ranges and varying degrees. Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan stay the
course with their nuclear weapons program despite the disincentives offered by the international
community. It is clear that the leaders of these states estimate that the benefit from nuclear weapons
outweighs the punishment.
To explain the complex mechanism of nuclear proliferation, role theory was suggested as a
comprehensive and promising theory. Glenn Chafetz et al. (1996) suggest that roles of states can be
created by the combination of an actor's subjective understandings of role conceptions, role
expectations, and the particular context where the role is being acted out. These roles are not
deterministic, so they change over time at different states. 96 Moreover, the dispositions of national
leaders can be important factors in states' decision. Hymans (2006) introduced the concept of National
Identity Conceptions (NICs) of a state's identity in terms of status dimension and solidarity dimension.
Hymans measured two dimensions and used the data in analyzing a state's nuclear decision. 97 A
propensity for nuclear proliferation varies when national leaders change at each state. Iran's case clearly
shows how the leader of a state plays a pivotal role in "going nuclear."
" George Quester (1977).
96 Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot (1996).
97 Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy,
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
3.11 Conclusion
A variety of factors that can affect a state's decision to pursue nuclear proliferation was reviewed based
on the theories of realism and liberalism. The two theories have their own pros and cons in explaining
the nuclear proliferation of states and international politics; however, realism has a tendency to over-
predict arms acquisition, whereas liberalism underestimates it. Among various factors that affect the
"go-nuclear or don't go-nuclear decision," security threats are considered to be the most important one
to international relations theorists. In this regard, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea all have either real or
perceived enemies that are much stronger militarily than those states. Achieving nuclear weapons would
allow those states to dramatically improve their security situation and they can be viewed as players
who can negotiate from positions of power on the international scene.
In reality, nuclear proliferation is far more complex than security concerns alone because other
factors such as economic, political and domestic factors should be taken into consideration. Moreover,
international and domestic environments change over time. A national leader's technical and
political confidence and perception of his nation's role seem to also be critical in making a decision to
go nuclear. A national leader should be confident that his country has a reasonable amount of economic
resources and technological resources for going nuclear in the anticipation of negative consequences. If
a national leader has a strong NIC as a nuclear power, it would further increase the nuclear propensity
of his state. In this regard, the dispositions of leaders should be considered as important factors for the
description of nuclear proliferation.
CHAPTER 4 NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
4.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews a nuclear weapons program from a technical point of view. An extensive range of
technological capabilities are required for a nuclear weapons program. Once the "go -nuclear" decision
is made, a nuclear weapons program will start with the building of human resources and end with the
testing of developed nuclear weapons. A very important factor is the type of fissile material, plutonium
or uranium, used for the nuclear weapons because different designs and nuclear facilities are required to
produce each material, owing to different properties and production paths. Different nuclear weapon
designs, each of which evolved over time, require different materials for detonation. Those designs
include pure fission weapons, fusion-boosted fission weapons, and two-stage thermonuclear weapons.
Available resources and nuclear latent capacity of a proliferation state, including a technology
level, the available budget, and the availability of nuclear materials will decide the context of a nuclear
weapons program. These factors will determine the time required to complete the nuclear weapons
program. In this regard, it is important to understand what components are required and what
procedures should be taken to make a nuclear weapons program successful. This chapter provides an
understanding of a nuclear weapons program to help elucidate the generic procedure of a nuclear
weapons program in terms of resources and capabilities.
4.2 Steps of Nuclear Weapons Program
A nuclear weapons program can be broadly defined as a program that includes nuclear warheads,
advanced delivery systems, secure command and control facilities, and an operative strategic doctrine.
Alternatively, a nuclear weapons program can be narrowly defined as simply a program manufacturing
a nuclear explosive device. For the purposes of this study, the latter definition will be used. A nuclear
weapons program is often divided into two categories, weaponization activities and fissile material
acquisition activities. This is not only to stress the importance of acquiring fissile material but also to
highlight weaknesses of IAEA safeguards in the detection of weaponization activities because the role
of current IAEA safeguards is focused on nuclear material. 98
98 Carlson and Leslie, "Safeguards Intensity as a Function of Safeguards Status".
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Figure 4.1 Nuclear Weapons Development Program of Potential Proliferators
Figure 4.1 shows the general steps to acquire nuclear capabilities within proliferation states. As
can be seen from the figure, the first step is the decision to "go-nuclear" by the leaders of proliferation
states. Then, a proliferator initiates a nuclear weapons program by building human resources and
constructing nuclear facilities. For step 2 through step 6, one or more steps can be skipped, depending
on the level of latent capacity or on whether external supports are available. The U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD)'s Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) provides a good overview of what
technologies are required for a nuclear weapons program. The list explains nuclear weapons technology
in great detail, coupled with tables that contain technology parameters and reference data for each
technology. 99
4.3 Fissile Materials for Nuclear Warhead
Uranium 235 (U-235) and plutonium 239 (Pu-239) are the most common, verified fissile materials for
making nuclear warheads. In addition to these materials, U-233, Neptunium 237 (Np-237), and
Americium 241 (Am-241) are also fissile materials from which nuclear warheads could be made.100
However, they are not preferred over HEU and separated plutonium. For example, a Neptunium bomb
" U.S. Department of Defense, "Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), Part II: Weapons of Mass
Destruction Technologies, Section 5-Nuclear Weapons Technology." <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-
2/p2secO5.pdf>, The Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), is a detailed and structured compendium of
the technologies the Department of Defense (DoD) assesses as critical to maintaining superior United States
military capabilities. The MCTL is used as a technical foundation for U.S. proposals for export control in the New
Forum, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Groups, Australia Group, and other
nonproliferation regimes. The MCTL is used as a reference for evaluating potential technology transfers and
technical reports and scientific papers for public release. The information is used to determine if the proposed
transaction would result in transfer that would permit potential adversaries access to technologies, not whether a
transfer should or should not be approved.
100 The United States, at least, has tested designs containing U-233. France, and perhaps other nuclear weapon
states, may have experimented with neptunium-237 in nuclear tests. International Panel on Fissile Materials
(IPFM), "Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty,"
(2008).
requires high-energy neutrons to initiate nuclear fission and Am-241 emits highly penetrating gamma
rays that increase the radioactive exposure of any personnel handling the material. In addition, bare
critical masses of Neptunium and Americium are rather large: 73 kilograms and 60 kilograms,
respectively.11 Each fissile material has its own unique features with regard to the nuclear fission
reaction. More importantly for this study, each fissile material requires a different pathway for
acquisition. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the different features of Pu-239 and U-235 as weapons-usable
fissile material. The critical mass for each differs over each design because each design has a different
mechanism of neutron generation and nuclear fission chain reaction.
Table 4.1 Comparison between Uranium and Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons
Criteria U-235 Evaluation Pu-239
Critical mass 20-25 kg 8 kg
v (thermal) [a] 2.418 < 2.871
q (thermal) [a] 2.068 2.145
a (thermal) [a] 0.169 0.362
Effective Energy 192.9+0.5 MeV 198.5±0.8
Released [b]
Notes
[a] Lamarsh and Baratta (200 1)102
[b] James Duderstadt (1976)103
Table 4.2 Critical Masses of Fissile Materials"
Material Bare sphere (kg) Fully reflected sphere (kg)
Highly Enriched Uranium 52 17
(a phase of Pu-239) 10 4WGPu (6 phase of Pu-239) 105  16 6
U-233 15 6
101 Kenton J. Moody, Ian D. Hutcheon, and Patrick M. Grant, Nuclear Forensics Analysis (Boca Raton, FL: CRC
Press Inc., 2005).
102 John R. Larmarsh and Anthony J. Baratta, Introduction to Nuclear Engineering, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 2001).,p.82. a is the capture-to-fission ratio, 11 is the average number of neutrons emitted
per neutron absorbed in the mixture, and v is the average number of neutrons released per fission.
103 James J. Duderstadt and Louis J. Hamilton, Nuclear Reactor Analysis (Ann Arbor, MI: John Wiley & Sons Inc.,
1976).,p.67. The value of the effective energy released in and following fission of the principal isotopes by
thermal neutron.
104 Moody, Hutcheon, and Grant, Nuclear Forensics Analysis.
105J. Carson Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium," Science & Global Security 4 (1993)..
Plutonium metal can exist in six allotropic forms corresponding to six different crystalline configurations. The two
forms most often mentioned with respect to weapons are these two phases. (a phase density = 19.6, and 8 phase
density =15.7 [gram/cm3]
4.3.1. Uranium
The fundamental question is to determine how much uranium and in what form/enrichment is required
to make a nuclear bomb. Below 10 per cent, enriched metallic uranium cannot be made to explode
because the critical mass, the minimum quantity of fissionable material necessary for a nuclear
explosion, is essentially infinite. The IAEA uses "a Significant Quantity (SQ)"16, which is based on an
estimate of minimum critical mass of uranium required to make a nuclear weapon. The value of critical
mass depends on the specific isotope, material properties, and the type of nuclear weapon design. It is
generally regarded that 25 kilograms of uranium enriched to about 80 percent U-235 would be
necessary for an implosion bomb. Table 4.3 shows definitions of uranium according to U-235
enrichment ratio.
Table 4.3 Definition of Uranium With Respect To U-235 Enrichment Ratio
Class Definition U-235
Uranium in which the abundance of the isotope U-235 is less than
Depleted that occurring in natural uranium, e.g., uranium in spent fuel from
Less than 0.7 1%
Uranium (DU) natural uranium fuelled reactors and tails from uranium
enrichment processes.
Uranium as it occurs in nature, having an atomic weight of
Natural
approximately 238 and containing minute quantities of U-234, 0.71%
about 0.7% of U-235 and 99.3% of U-238.
Enriched uranium containing less than 20% of the isotope U-235. More than
Low Enriched
LEU is considered a special fissionable material and an indirect 0.71% and less
Uranium (LEU)
use material. than 20%
Any mixture of U-235 with the more abundant, non-nuclear-
explosive isotope U-238 in which the U-235 concentration is 20 %
or more
Highly Enriched
Any mixture of U-233 when the U-233 concentration is 12 % or More than 20%
Uranium (HEU)
more
HEU is considered a special fissionable material and a direct use
material.
Weapons-Grade Weapons-grade uranium, generally higher than 93 percent
Uranium More than 93 %
enriched uranium.
(WGU)
06 As for uranium, 75 kg of U-235 in HEU and 25 kg of U-235 in LEU.
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As the uranium enrichment ratio increases, the critical mass decreases significantly as shown in Figure
4.2. The use a good neutron reflector and a sophisticated implosion system would further decreases the
required critical mass. As uranium enrichment reaches 20 percent (HEU), uranium then can be
considered a highly sensitive material. Assuming that a uranium enrichment facility operates with a
tail's assay of 0.25 percent U-235, 197.34 kilogram of natural uranium feed is required to produce 1
kilogram of WGU, which means a total of 4.93 metric tons of natural uranium feed for manufacturing
one nuclear bomb.
50
Endhmont (Wt%l
Figure 4.2 Relationship between Critical Mass and Uranium Enrichment Ratio'07
4.3.2 Plutonium
Pu-239, which is the only fissile material that can be used for nuclear bombs among the plutonium
isotopes, is produced when the most common isotope of uranium, U-238, absorbs a neutron and then
decays to plutonium. It is produced in varying quantities in virtually all operating nuclear reactors. As
fuel in a reactor is exposed to longer and longer periods of neutron irradiation, higher isotopes of
plutonium build up as some of the plutonium absorbs additional neutrons, thereby creating Pu-240, Pu-
241, and so on. Pu-238 also builds up from a chain of neutron absorptions and radioactive decays
starting from U-235. However, except for Pu-239, other plutonium isotopes create some difficulties for
the design and fabrication of nuclear weapons as follows:
- Pu-238 decays relatively rapidly, thereby significantly increasing the rate of heat generation in the
material.
'
07 A. Glaser, Making Highly Enriched Uranium (Princeton University, 2007 [cited Mar. 3 2009]); available from
http://www.princeton.edu/-aglaser/lecture 2007_makingheu.pdf.
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- Pu-240 has a high rate of spontaneous fission (more than Pu-239), meaning that the plutonium in
the device will continually produce many background neutrons, which have the potential to reduce
weapon yield by starting the chain reaction prematurely
- Pu-241 has a half-life of 14-year and results in Am-241
Table 4.4 shows the classification of plutonium grades according to different plutonium isotope
concentration ratios.
Table 4.4 Classification of Plutonium
Isotopic composition [a]
Isotopic grade Pu-240 110 1  Pu-239 11091
Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242
no more than
Super-grade - 98.0% 2.0% - - 3% N/A
Weapons- 0.012% 93.8% 5.8% 0.35% 0.022% less than 7% typically
grade about 93 %
from 7 to between 80
Fuel grade N/A 19 % and 93 %
Reactor grade 1.3% 60.3% 24.3% 9.1% 5.0% over 
19% less than 80
percent
Mixed Oxide N/A 30 % or N/A
(MOX) grade more
Note: [a] Carson Mark (1993), pp. 111-128.
Materials that contain plutonium can be classified into five grades in terms of the ratio of Pu240 to all
isotopes of plutonium or Pu-239 to all isotopes of plutonium. Weapons-grade and super-grade
plutonium are well-suited for nuclear weapons. However, there is some debate as to whether nuclear
weapons can be made with reactor-grade plutonium. It is generally felt that it should be possible to
make low-yield weapons (up to a few kilotons) from reactor grade plutonium. 10 Some weapons experts
are of the opinion that, with a sophisticated design, a reactor grade plutonium fission weapon can have
as much of a yield as one made with weapons grade plutonium (up to about 20 kilotons). However, a
reactor grade weapon would use more plutonium for the same yield. Reactor grade plutonium is also
more difficult to handle and engineer.
108 U.S. Department of Energy, "Plutonium: The First 50 Years. United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition,
and Utilization from 1944 to 1994," (1996).
109 U.S. Department of Energy, "Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile
Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives," (January 1997).
110 R. W. Selden, Reactor Plutonium and Nuclear Explosives (Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy,
[cited May 23 2008]); available from http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/selden.pdf.
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4.4 Design of Nuclear Weapons
4.4.1 Pure Fission Weapons
Pure fission weapons are the first generation design and are often called one-stage fission or atomic
bombs. These weapons were the ones built first and used in real warfare. Two types of pure fission
weapons are available according to the design of the detonation mechanism as shown Figure 4.3.
Conventional
Chemical Explosive
Sub-critical Pieces
of U235
Neutron Initiator
Explosives
Tamper/Pusher
Plutonium Core
(a) Uranium-based bomb
Convendonal
explosive Gun barrelI
(b) Plutonium-based bomb
Fag exloeWsi Sine explosive
Neutron kwor
Hollow Uranium Cylinder
"bullet target
(c) Gun-Assembly Design
7  
M CMSS1Orical
shockwave
compresses
core
(d) Implosion Design
Figure 4.3 Designs of Pure Fission Bombs 11
For pure fission bombs, the differences in detonation mechanisms are mainly due to the different
properties of Pu-239 and U-235. Table 4.5 details important differences between a gun-assembly design
and an implosion design. A gun assembly design typically uses uranium, whereas an implosion design
uses plutonium. It should be noted that a gun assembly design is less complicated than an implosion
design in terms of manufacturability and it is therefore more reliable.
"1 Wikipedia, Nuclear Weapon Design.
TampenPusher
Table 4.5 Comparison of Two Designs of Pure Nuclear Weapons
Gun assembly design Implosion design
Detonator"2  Gun-type detonator Implosion-type detonator
Fissile material Uranium Pu-239, (Possibly U-235)
- South Africa1 1 3  - U.S. Trinity and Fatman bombs dropped
Examples - U.S. Little Boy114 on Nagasaki
- Pakistan11 5  - North Korea
Neutron
A strong source of alpha particles'1 6  A source of neutrons
initiator
Compression Milliseconds Microseconds
time of material
Weight Heavy Light (less material is required)
Reliability Certain (test is not required) Uncertain (test is required)
Technology Low High
threshold
Usability for - Compact design for loading ballistic
- Not adequate for a compact design mislsostaecbmer
missiles missiles or strategic bombers
4.4.2. Fusion-boosted Fission Weapons
Fusion-boosted fission weapons or boosted fission weapons are the second generation design and this
design can greatly reduce the amount of fissile material required in the nuclear warhead. It is known that
fusion boosting by tritium and deuterium (T/D) gas can contribute to the increase in weapon's fission
energy release. As shown in Figure 4.4, the primary part of a fusion-boosted weapon consists of three
components: the central spherical plutonium 'pit', the beryllium 'pit liner', and surrounding
high-explosives. Beryllium is used as the reflector material. 117
112 J.D. Dyson, Documentation and Diagrams of the Atomic Bomb: File Courtesy of Outlaw Labs ([cited May 1
2008]); available from http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/neutronics/todd/nuc.bomb.html.
113 South Africa manufactured five nuclear weapons with gun-assembly design but had conducted no nuclear tests
of their gun-assembled devices.
114 The design of Little Boy, 80% of U-235 60 kg, 48 kg of U-235, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, had not been
proof tested before the war shot.
115 Marko Beljac, Pakistan and the Prospectsfor Nuclear Terrorism (Australian Policy Online, 2008 [cited May 8
2008]); available from http://apo.org.au/commentary/pakistan-and-prospects-nuclear-terrorism.
116 U.S. Department of Defense, "Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), Part 1I: Weapons of Mass
Destruction Technologies, Section 5-Nuclear Weapons Technology." Po-210 or some similarly active alpha
emitter. The South African devices did not use any neutron source other than background radiation.
117 GlobalSecurity.org, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Beryllium ([cited May 24 2008]); available from
www.globalsecurity/org/wmd/intro/beryllium/htm.
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Figure 4.4 Design of Fusion-boosted Fission Weapons [U.S. Swan Device]1 18
In this design, once the detonators create a chemical explosion, the fission reaction is
initiated. The high temperature and pressure from fission reactions will make a mixture of
tritium and deuterium gas fuse into helium and release neutrons. The neutrons generated from
the fusion reaction will start a large number of new chain reactions as long as the pit remains
critical. The fusion reaction of tritium and deuterium can be described as follows:
ID +' T -> 4 He +'0 n + 17.6 (MeV) (4.1)
4.4.3 Two-stage Thermonuclear Weapons - 3rd Generation Design
Thermonuclear weapons are the third generation design. They constitute an advanced design of fusion-
boosted fission weapons and are often called hyrdogen bomb. Figure 4.5 shows the Teller-Ulam design,
which is the most well-known design of a multi-stage thermonuclear weapons.
118 Wikipedia, Nuclear Weapon Design ([cited Mar. 3 2008]); available from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thermonuclear-weapon.
Figure 4.5 Drawing of Two-Stage Thermonuclear Weapon119
In this design, the reaction first starts with the detonation of chemical explosives that surround a
plutonium pit. The explosive force compresses the pit and neutrons are introduced into the pit by a
neutron generator. Through these two processes, a fission reaction occurs in the primary section. The
fission reaction mechanism in this bomb design, up to this stage, is the same as that in a fusion-boosted
fission bomb. As a result of the fission reaction, x-rays are emitted and absorbed in the casing of U-238,
thereby heating a very thin layer that lines the casing to high temperature and turning polystyrene foam
to plasma. The plasma re-radiates thermal energy, thereby compressing the secondary and causing
fissile material in the secondary to initiate fission. Simultaneously, lithium-6 deuteride (fusion fuel)
begins a fusion reaction and emits neutrons which cause the tamper to undergo fission. This is the
second fission reaction in a bomb. 2 0
4.5 Human Resource Capacity Build-Up
A nuclear weapons program starts with the assembly of human resources. The build-up of qualified
manpower including scientists, engineers, technicians, skilled workers, planners and administrators is
critical throughout the process of a nuclear weapons program. 1'2 They must be able to conduct a wide
range of theoretical and practical tasks related to the design, development, testing, and manufacture of a
"9 Ibid. The W87 Warhead Design
20The Nuclear Weapon Archive, Section 4.0 Engineering and Design of Nuclear Weapons ([cited April 4 2008]);
available from http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4.html.
121 It is estimated that the thousands of manpower generally is required. More than ten thousand personnel were
involved in Iraqi nuclear weapons program.Jeffery Richelson, "Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with
the Threat?," in Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War, ed. Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwak (Washington.
D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994).
nuclear weapon. Even though nuclear technologies can be imported, proliferators must have a
foundation of internal capability. The rationale for the need for internal capability is obvious. The more
effective the internal capability, the higher the domestic learning efforts during technology transfer; and
the more successful efforts will be at acquiring further technology. 2
In order to educate nuclear physicists and nuclear engineers, many states have sent students and
professionals abroad for education to acquire the basic expertise that can be easily diverted for a nuclear
program. Most nuclear weapon experts in proliferation states received their initial education in the
United States, Britain, or Germany. After the completion of academic study, they have obtained
additional expertise through specialized training sessions at companies or institutes, the demonstration
of equipment or technology, practical training on the use of purchased equipment, or discussions with
foreign experts. 123They can use their knowledge in establishing nuclear programs at the college level
and building nuclear research facilities with the help of foreign experts, i.e., nuclear cooperation.
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Figure 4.6 Components for Human Resources Establishment
4.6 Nuclear Facility Construction
Under the NPT regime, there is nothing illegal about any state having enrichment or reprocessing
technology. Typically, the initial step to construct a nuclear facility is through a contract with states that
have advanced nuclear technologies. A national decision will be made whether to build a declared or a
clandestine facility for nuclear weapon development. Once the technology for both construction and
operation have been accumulated, potential proliferators may try to build a clandestine, dedicated
facility for nuclear weapon development program. In that case, potential proliferators must obtain dual-
use items via various routes including the nuclear black market.
122 Gillian Marcelle, Policy Briefs, Technology Acquisition and Domestic Learning (Jan. 1 2007 [cited Feb. 5
2009]); available from http://www.scidev.net/en/policy-briefs/technology-acquisition-and-domestic-leaming.html..
However, the case of Libya was an exception, it just tried to import Turn-Key gas centrifuge to save time and
overcome technical threshold.
12 Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Iraq's Acquisition of Gas Centrifuge Technology Part H:
Recruitment of Karl Heinz Schaab ([cited Mar. 3 2008]); available from
http://www.exportcontrols.org/centpart2.html.
Figure 4.7 shows the kinds of nuclear facilities that are required for the acquisition of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. As earlier mentioned, some states have sought two paths
simultaneously, whereas others have chosen a single dedicated path.
Nuclear FacilitiesF cle
for Fissile Material
Production
HEU rodutionPlutonium
U ffacilities ProductionFacilities( Facilities
Uranium Uranium Nuclear Reactor Spent Fuel Plutonium
Conversion Enracilities Storage Reprocessing
Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities
Figure 4.7 Nuclear Facilities Required for Nuclear Weapons Development Program
4.6.1 Facilities for Uranium Enrichment
Two kinds of facilities are required in order to produce Weapons-Grade Uranium (WGU): Uranium
Conversion Facilities (UCFs) and Uranium Enrichment Facilities (UEFs). Most uranium enrichment
technologies operate on a gaseous form of uranium, i.e., UF6. UCFs are used to convert yellow cake
(U30s), which is the form of uranium after a milling process, into UF6. The gaseous product of uranium
from uranium conversion facilities is enriched to the level that the proliferators desire. Gaseous
Diffusion Plants (GDPs) and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) are the most common
technologies; however, GCEPs are replacing gaseous diffusion plants."14 If proliferators chose gas
centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment, the construction of gas centrifuge manufacturing
facilities would provide a high level of flexibility for diverting declared facilities and constructing
clandestine GCEPs.
4.6.2. Facilities for Plutonium Reprocessing
Three kinds of facilities are required if proliferators want to build nuclear weapons based on plutonium
material: reactor facilities, spent fuel storage facilities, and reprocessing facilities. First, Plutonium
124 Orpet Peixoto and Laercio Vinhas, "Information Protection When Applying Safeguards to Centrifuge
Enrichment Facilities," (Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials (ABACC), 2004).
does not occur naturally and has to be made through the neutron bombardment of U-238 in nuclear
reactors. U-238 undergoes a nuclear reaction, and produces Pu-239, which is the main fissile material
among plutonium isotopes as shown in Figure 4.8. Second, after uranium fuels are irradiated in nuclear
reactor facilities, they need to be stored until the decay heat and radiotoxicity of the spent fuel is
removed. Facilities for this process are called spent fuel storage facilities. Third, reprocessing facilities
are required, which are normally designed to recycle plutonium in spent fuels such as MOX fuel.
4.7 Production of Fissile Materials
The next step following nuclear facility construction is the production of fissile material from
constructed facilities. Throughout the entire process of a nuclear weapons program, the acquisition of
HEU or separated plutonium is generally considered to be the most difficult. Even if nuclear facilities
are constructed, a certain degree of technological know-how is required for proliferators to successfully
or efficiently operate the facilities. Pathways for producing HEU and Weapons-Grade Pu differ
considerably. In this chapter, only Pu-239 production will be reviewed. Figure 4.8 shows the
radiochemical equations for the production of fissile material through the irradiation process. Pu-239 is
produced by bombarding U-238 with neutrons in reactor facilities. Also, U-233 can be produced in a
nuclear reactor by irradiating Th-232, Np-237, and Am-241 can also be produced in a nuclear reactor.
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Figure 4.8 Production of Various Fissile Materials
A variety of nuclear reactors exist for numerous applications and all of these reactors can
produce Pu-239. Figure 4.9 shows how much of each plutonium isotope can be produced in different
types of nuclear reactors, including Gas-Cooled Reactor (GCR), Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (AGR),
Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) or Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU), Boiling Water
Reactor (BWR), Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), and Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). The
figure below shows the plutonium production rates for each type of reactor when their design bum-up is
achieved. Generally, reactors designed for low-burnup of uranium fuel produce a higher grade of
plutonium for manufacturing weapons.
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Figure 4.9 Compositions of Plutonium from Different Reactors"5
Figure 4.10 shows the trade-offs between the increase in the quantity of the plutonium isotopes
and the increase in the grade of the plutonium-containing materials. As burnup time increases, the
quantity of plutonium increases at the expense of plutonium quality. It is typical to use low-burnup
reactor types or to operate for short-duration in reactors with high-bumup. The latter is the case with
North Korea, which used a graphite moderated reactor for plutonium production.
.
5 PBMR from J.S. Herring and P.E. MacDonald, "Characteristics of Mixed Thorium-Uranium Dioxide High
Burnup Fuel" (paper presented at the ANS 1999 Annual Meeting, June 6-10 1999). and other reactors from Table
I. Typical Isotopic Compositions of Spent Fuel at Discharge from Power Reactors in John Carlson et al.,
"Plutonium Isotopics - Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Issues" (paper presented at the IAEA Symposium on
International Safeguards, Vienna, Austria, Oct. 13-17 1997).
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Figure 4.10 Fuel Burnup and Its Impact to Other Attributes126
4.7.3 Tritium (fusion material)
Tritium is used in a fusion-boosted weapon as well as in a thermonuclear weapon to boost its nuclear
explosive yield. In both designs, tritium fuses with deuterium to create more high energy neutrons.
However, the tritium must be replenished regularly because it has a half-life of only 12 years. Tritium is
contained in all modem nuclear warheads. Because it does not occur in nature except in unretrievable
traces, it must be produced artificially.12 7 It is not possible to use renounce the use of tritium for
warheads, because this would require new warhead designs and the need of nuclear testing.
The natural origin of tritium is in the upper atmosphere of the earth from atmospheric nitrogen
or oxygen by bombardment with cosmic ray neutrons or solar photons. Tritium has been commonly
produced in nuclear reactors by bombarding lithium 6 with neutrons. Tritium can also be extracted from
irradiated heavy water that has been used to moderate or cool certain types of reactors. In this case,
tritium is produced by neutron irradiation of deuterium, which is a hydrogen isotope that contains one
proton and one neutron. Tritium is recovered from nuclear power plants and can be enriched through
further processes, including water electrolysis, water distillation, thermal diffusion, permeation through
membranes, as well as adsorption and chromatography. Tritium can be also produced using IR laser-
126 Taeshin Kwak, "Development of Proliferation Resistance for Nuclear Reactors (Term Paper for 22.251:
System Analysis of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle)," (MIT, 2007).
127 Annette Schaper, "Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty," Disarmament Forum 2 (1999).; M.
Kalinowski and L. Colschen, "International Control on Tritium to Prevent Its Horizontal Proliferation and to
Foster Nuclear Disarmament," Science and Global Security, The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament,
and Nonproliferation Initiatives 5, no. 2 (1994/95)..
induced multiphoton dissociation (IRMPD) from Halogenated Methanes, Halogenated Ethanes, and
Halogenated Propanes. 128 Table 4.6 shows the sources of tritium, including both natural and artificial
sources.
Table 4.6 Sources of Tritium [Gheorge Visaru, 1993]
Sources Chemical reactions
- Neutron bombardment
Natural Upper - 14N + n -+ T+ 2 C - 4.3 MeV
atmosphere 160 + n T + 14C
- Residues of nuclear weapons test
Thermonuclear
- D + D -+ T + H + 4.03 MeV
detonations 
-
6Li + n -> T + 4He + 4.69 MeV
- Nuclear reactions with thermal neutrons (in coolant water)
- D + n -+ T + gamma + 6.26 MeV
- Li + n -> T + 4He + 4.69 MeV (lithium impurities of the fuel rods
from the primary coolants or from graphite rods)
Fission nuclear
- Nuclear reactions with fast neutrons in 14B(from control rods) or in 14
Artificial reactors
N (from residual gas)(LWR and - 1 Bn +H
- 1"B + n ->T + 2 He
WR) 
- 14N + n -T + 2 C -4.3 MeV
- Activation reaction of deuterium (natural concentration is 0.015%) and
the reaction of hydrogen from ordinary water
- H + n -+ D + n -+ T + y + 6.26 MeV
Fusion nuclear - D-D reactions
reactors - D + D- T (1.01 MeV) + H (3.02 MeV)
4.8 Nuclear Weapons Manufacturing
In order to manufacture nuclear weapons, detailed weapon designs as well as both non-nuclear
materials,12 9 and manufacturing equipment (i.e., industrial furnaces) are required in addition to the
preparation of fissile material. 130 Furthermore, detailed technical know-how, including component
fabrication information, and assembly instructions is required for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Human resources required at this step include a nuclear physicist or engineer, skilled machinists,
explosives experts, and electronics personnel. Industrial infrastructure is also necessary. Another
128George Vasaru, Tritium Isotope Separation (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press Inc., 1993).
129Beryllium, polonium-210, tritium and gallium belong to this category and these materials have dual-use
purposes.
30Carlson and Leslie, "Safeguards Intensity as a Function of Safeguards Status".
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important factor that warrants consideration is the development of nuclear-capable delivery systems,
coupled with the miniaturization of nuclear warheads. However, delivery systems for nuclear warheads
are not considered in this study.
Generally, the manufacture of nuclear weapons is divided into two parts: shaping of fissile
material and manufacture of implosion devices. The step of nuclear weapon manufacture begins with
the acquisition of dual-use items such as high-explosive lenses, high-energy electrical components,
high-flux neutron generators, and specialized casting and machining equipment. Manufacture of fissile
material for nuclear warheads includes conversion of fissile material into metallic form (pure uranium),
and casting and machining of fissile material into the shapes required for a weapon.
However, the acquisition of fissile materials does not pose a challenge. Since the infrastructure
of nuclear weapons design from 30-50 years ago is considered obsolete,' 3 1 such information is readily
available to nuclear weapon developers. Technology developments in other industries have also helped
to increase the availability of this technology.
4.9 Nuclear Weapons Test
4.9.1 Objectives of Nuclear Test
US DOD's MCTL provides a broad definition of nuclear testing as tests that encompass all
experiments where special fissionable material is placed in contact with high chemical explosives,
which are then detonated with an ignition propellant. In order to complete a nuclear weapons program,
calculations, laboratory experiments, and field testing of all the components are necessary. However,
prototype nuclear weapons could be manufactured prior to a full-yield test [See Appendix B].
The objectives of nuclear tests include the development of new nuclear weapons, understanding
the effects of nuclear explosions, the verification of the reliability and safety of deployed nuclear
weapons 2, and the development of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
Nuclear Explosion Tests were generally carried out with the following purposes:
- Development of new models of nuclear weapons133
- Verification of functionality of Stockpile Weapons (weapon health) 34
- Production verification of a developed design,
- Development of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives (PNEs), and
131 Richard Garwin and Simonenko Vadim, "Nuclear Weapon Development without Nuclear Testing?" (paper
presented at the The Pugwash Workshop on Problems in Achieving a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, London,
England, Oct. 25-27 1996).
132 This is related to the possible deterioration of weapons and their vulnerability to the effects of explosions.
133 R.S. Norris, "French and Chinese Nuclear Weapon Testing," Security Dialogue 27, no. 1 (1996).
134 To detect deterioration not visible on static radiographs, some of the pits taken at random from the stockpile
can be cut open and their condition inspected by microscope. S.D. Drell and Bob Peurifoy, "Technical Issues of a
Nuclear Test Ban," Annual Review ofNuclear and Particle Sciences 44, no. 44 (1994).
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-Study of weapon effects135
In the case of new nuclear weapons development, modeling itself is not enough to guarantee
accurate prediction of nuclear explosive yield. Politically, a certain proliferator who hopes to
demonstrate its technical prowess may therefore elect to pursue nuclear testing.
Nuclear testing can be divided into three types: hydrodynamic, hydronuclear, and nuclear
explosive yield testing. To conduct nuclear tests, test sites, technical know-how such as nuclear
explosive yield data and simulation laboratories equipped with supercomputers are required.
Hydrodynamic nuclear testing is permitted under the CTBT while hydronuclear testing and nuclear
explosive yield testing are not. For hydronuclear testing, the yields that are generally achieved range
from much less than 1 kg TNT equivalent to many tons. A methodology to verify the occurrence of
nuclear explosive yield test is detailed in Chapter 8.
4.9.2 Cases of Non-Testing
A proliferator may not require full-yield nuclear testing for the completion of its nuclear weapons
program. It is possible to build simple nuclear weapons without a nuclear explosion test. This would
depend on the nature of the weapon as well as the prior experience, technical capabilities, and the
degree of assurance of the proliferators. Some types of nuclear weapons like a Hiroshima-type bomb
can be built and deployed without any kind of yield test, and a proliferator could have reasonable
confidence in the performance of such a device.
Experts still differ with regard to the degree of limitations that the absence of tests imposes on
bomb design and the level of weapons sophistication. 136 There will be always a nagging doubt as to
whether or how well newly-developed weapons will perform. Without nuclear tests of substantial yield,
it is difficult to build compact and light fission weapons and essentially impossible to have any
confidence in the design of a boosted or thermonuclear weapon. If there is no a full-yield nuclear test,
then great care must be given to the non-nuclear experiments with high-capacity computers, including
the demonstration of the behavior of the non-nuclear components including the firing set, detonators,
and neutron generators. Table 4.7 lists cases where nuclear weapons tests may not be required.
135 The United States typically tested six times in the development of each new model of nuclear weapon, while
France is said to have used some 22 per model.
136 Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, Opaque Nuclear Proliferation (Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1991).
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Table 4.7 Cases that Do Not Require Nuclear Weapons Tests
Cases Background
A nuclear bomb with weapons-grade uranium is highly trustable, thereby not
WGU-based bombs' requiring weapons tests. For example, gun-type design weapons such as
"Little Boy" and South African nuclear bombs had not gone through tests.
Nuclear weapon with A full-yield nuclear test is unnecessary if a design is already certified by
a certified design previous tests. 137
Either if the devices were stolen or if the weapon were "legitimately"
Acquisition of nuclear
acquired from a nuclear power, presumably use control information would be
weapons passed on to purchaser.
No confirm or no Some countries want to keep a secret of nuclear weapons development like
denial (NCND) the case of Israel
4.10 Time Required for Nuclear Weapons Program
The estimate on the time requirement for the successful completion of a nuclear weapons program is
one of the debatable questions in the study of nuclear nonproliferation. Obtaining information about the
pattern of a nuclear weapons program is essential to establishing effective nonproliferation policies.
Meyer (1986) defines Lag time as the amount of time a given country requires after the proliferation
decision to produce its first nuclear weapon. The shorter the lag time, the higher the risk of going
nuclear. 138 However, it should be noted that lag time is significantly dependent on a latent capacity of a
state.
Leonard Spector (1994) argues that states typically take ten years to develop nuclear
weapons.139 He argues that states that have sought nuclear weapons generally have required at least a
decade and refers to this pattern as the "Ten Year Rule." As shown in Figure, current NWS developed
their nuclear weapons in less than five years; however, a decade or more has been required for
developing countries. The MCTL140 estimates that new proliferators with First-world technological
bases can probably build their pure nuclear fission design weapons three to five years after making a
political decision to do so, including nuclear facility construction and nuclear material acquisition,
137 Frank Barnaby, How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s (New York, NY:
Routledge, 1993)., p. 4 7 .
138 For more information, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1984)., pp. 14 9-15 3 .
139 Leonard S. Spector, "Strategic Warning and New Nuclear States," Defense Intelligence Journal 3, no. 1
(Spring 1994).
140 U.S. Department of Defense, "Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), Part II: Weapons of Mass
Destruction Technologies, Section 5-Nuclear Weapons Technology."
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under the assumption that finances and resources are available. Three to ten more years may be
additionally required to develop nuclear weapons of an advanced design. 141
Country
US
Soviet Union
UK
France
China
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India
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North Korea
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Figure 4.11 Time Spent for Completion of Nuclear Weapons Program1
4.11 Summary
The overall process of a nuclear weapons program was reviewed in this chapter. A nuclear weapons
program is very complex and requires an extensive and a high level of capabilities whether they are
intrinsic or extrinsic. The process of nuclear weapons program explained in this Chapter does not need
to be sequential because each step of nuclear weapons program can proceed in parallel. Table 4.8
summarizes what components are produced and what capabilities are required at each stage of a nuclear
weapons program, after the decision is made to "go-nuclear" by national leaders. In order for a nuclear
weapons program to be successfully, nuclear material, equipment for facilities and weapons
manufacture, and human resources (i.e., technical know-how) should be prepared and well-combined.
141 Robert Bledsoe, "Laser Isotope Enrichment: A New Dimension to the Nth Country Problem?," Air University
Review (March-April 1978). He argued that it would take five to ten years when the decision is made to nuclear
weapons. Two to three years to plan, design and construct conventional enrichment facilities; and an additional
two to three years for material production and weapon assembly.
142 Time spent refers to a time from the go-nuclear decision to the successful test of its first nuclear device.
Spector, "Strategic Warning and New Nuclear States."
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Table 4.8 Components and Steps of Nuclear Weapons Program
Step Procedure Components
1 National leader's decision - Environment and capabilities
- Nuclear engineers and scientists
2 Human resource build-up - Technical know-how acquisition
- Research reactor construction
For HEU production
- Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
- Uranium Enrichment Facility (UEF)
- Gas centrifuge manufacture facility
For WGPu production
facilities
- Reactor facilities
- Spent fuel storage facilities
- Plutonium Reprocessing Facility (PRF)
- Significant quantity of fissile material: U-235, Pu-239,
4 Fissile material acquisition Np-239, and Am-241
- Tritium for weapons of advanced designs
- Nuclear warhead design
Nuclear weapons
5 - Manufacturing facilities
manufacturing
- Delivery systems
- Test equipment preparation
6 Nuclear bomb tests - Simulation and non-nuclear test
- Test site preparation
CHAPTER 5 THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
REGIME
5.1 Introduction
A number of institutional and non-institutional frameworks have been proposed to deal with nuclear
proliferation issues since the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) went into force
in 1970. This framework is often referred to as the nuclear nonproliferation regime or the NPT regime.
Yet, there are disputes about whether or not the NPT regime has been successful because several
countries have proliferated despite the existence of the NPT regime. However, it should be noted that no
international regimes can be perfect in achieving the objectives in specific issue areas; therefore,
theoretical tools to describe how successful the NPT regime has been are necessary to clarify disputes.
This Chapter provides the fundamental framework in understanding and analyzing the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. The final objective of this chapter is to develop a tool to analyze the power and
the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This Chapter is divided into two parts. The first
part of this Chapter is devoted to examining regime theory such as regime concept, regime effects,
regime effectiveness and regime power. The second part offers a comprehensive analysis on the nuclear
nonproliferation regime based on regime theory. As a result, quantitative as well as qualitative ways of
describing the power and the effectiveness of the NPT regime will be obtained.
5.2 International Regimes in International Relations Theory
5.2.1 Regime Theory in Liberalism and Realism
The study on regime theory can be divided into three categories: 143the objectives of regime formation
and the functions, maintenance and disappearance of regimes; classification of regime types by features;
and consequences or effects of regimes (evaluation of regimes' success and quantitative methodology to
measure effectiveness of regimes). 144 Theories of international regimes can be classified as realism,
neoliberalism, and constructivism. These approaches differ over the nature of international cooperation
and the degree to which international institutions play a role. Liberalists believe that cooperation comes
about through a convergence of state interests, and that international institutions help create the
synthesis of interests. One related school in liberalism, liberal institutionalism, argues that regimes
141 Chan-Kyu Kim, "A Study on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime" (Dongguk University, 2000). p.4 0 .
44 Helm and Sprinz define regime effects as improvements in the object of evaluation that can be attributed to the
regime. Carsten Helm and Detlef Sprinz, "Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes,"
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 5 (Oct. 2000). Krasner also assumes the set of causal relationships
between basic causal variables (powers and interests) and their related behavior and outcomes though regimes,
which could be conceived of as intervening variables. Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variable," International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982).
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affect the behavior of states under the assumption that international cooperation among states is possible
in the anarchic system.
On the contrary, realists attempt to explain regimes based on the relationship of power using
hegemonic stability theory. From the viewpoint of realism, international regimes are the products of
existing power relationships that reflect the relative power distribution of states in the international
system. In other words, realists argue that the presence of a strong hegemony is the factor that makes
regimes successful and features of regimes change along with the balance of bargaining power among
the states that negotiate the establishment of new regimes.
5.2.2 Concept of International Regimes
The concept of regimes varies over their roles and relative contexts between international regimes and
international organizations or international institutions. Keohane (1989) defines international
institutions as ones that include international organizations, international regimes, and conventions.14 5
Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) define international regimes as informal ordering mechanisms, whereas
international organizations are concrete entities. They suggest that international organizations can
contribute to the effectiveness of international regimes. Various definitions of regimes proposed by
international relations scholars are summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Definitions of Regime by Different Scholars
Scholar Definition
Keohane and Nye "Sets of governing arrangements" that include networks of rules, norms, and
(1977)146 procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects.
Haas (1980)14 A mutually coherent set ofprocedures, rules, and norms.
Social institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiable
activities (or meaningful sets of activities).
Krasner (1983)149 Principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor
expectations converge in a given issue-area.
145 Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1989). p.2 .
46 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company
1977). p. 19 .
147 Ernst B. Haas, "Technological Self-Reliance for Latin America: The OAS Contribution," International
Organization 34, no. 4 (Autumn 1980).
148 Oran Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," World Politics 32, no. 3 (April 1980).
149 Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variable."
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(Continued)
Specific institutions involving states and/or transnational actors, which
particular issues in international relations.
An authoritative arrangement among international actors (states) that facilitates
Tate (1990)151 the accomplishment of specific goals through a process involving coordination
or expectations and modification of certain behavioral patterns.
Kratochwil and Governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations
Ruggie (1986)152 and organize aspects of international behavior in various issue-areas.
5.3 Regime Effects
5.3.1 Concepts of Regime Effects
The most fundamental issue in regime theory is the question of whether regimes make any difference in
the behavior of participating states, i.e., effects of regimes. Regime effects can be defined as the
improvements in the object of evaluation that can be attributed to regimes.153 Krasner (1982) explores
the significance of regimes in impacting related behavior and outcomes via the mechanism approach,
in other words, introducing basic causal variables and intervening variables. Basic variables are further
classified as exogenous variables and non-exogenous variables. Exogenous variables such as state
interests and state power are treated as important variables that can generate regimes on their own. In
contrast, regimes are assumed to be intervening variables between basic variables and the outcomes of
regimes. Figure 5.1 shows four different approaches Krasner summarized (1982) regarding the issue of
regime significance as follows: (a) The Realist sees power resources as the sole and decisive variable,
whereas an international regime is an intervening and non-independent variable; (b) The Modified
structuralist (or neorealist) suggests that regimes may matter, but only under fairly restrictive conditions;
(c) The Grotian sees regimes are fairly effective;14 and (d) considering feedback, regimes can be
conceived in a fourth manner as autonomous variables independently affecting related behavior and
outcomes as well as basic causal variables.155
150 Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4
(1988).
151 Trevor McMorris Tate, "Regime-Building in the Non-Proliferation System," Journal ofPeace Research 27, no.
4 (Nov. 1990).
152 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, "International Organization: The State of the Art on the Art of the
State," International Organization 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986).
153 Helm and Sprinz, "Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes."
154 Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," International
Organization 36, no. 2, International Regimes (Spring 1982).The basic causal variables he suggests include
egoistic self-interest, political power, norms and principles, usage and custom, and knowledge.
15s Ibid.
Direct Link Related Direct Link RelatedBasic Causal Behavior and Basic Causal Behavior and
Variables Outcomes Variables Outcomes
Regimes Regimes
(a) Realist View
(b) Modified Realist View
Regimes
Basic CausalBasic Causal Related
Variables Variables Regimes Behavior and
Related Outcomes
jc::-- *~Behavor and 
Vaibe
Outcomes
(c) Grotian View (d) Regimes as autonomous variables
Figure 5.1 Different Views on Regime Effects
5.3.2. Measurement of Regime Effects
Helm and Sprinz (2000) define regime effects as improvements in the object of evaluation that can be
attributed to the regime. 156 Similarly, Mitchell (2004) defines regime effects as changes that are best
explained by the regime and cannot be explained by other factors. Regime effects encompass intended
and unintended, direct and indirect, and desirable and undesirable effects. In contrast, regime
effectiveness includes only intended and direct effects. 157 Levy et al. (1993) propose the concept of
three Cs for measuring regimes effects.158 Three Cs include level of concern (do states care about the
problem?), contractual environment (Can they strike profitable bargains?) and state capacity (Can they
implement what they agree to?). Weiss (1999) suggests the concept of compliance in order evaluate
regime effects. 159 He defines compliance as a matter of whether and to what extent countries do adhere
to the provisions of the accord, which includes implementation and enforcement. He uses compliance
as a means to measure the degree to which the actors whose behavior is targeted by the agreement
conform to the implementing measures and obligations.
156 Helm and Sprinz, "Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes."
157 Ronald B. Mitchell, "Chapter 6. A Quantitative Approach to Evaluating International Environmental Regimes,"
in Regime Consequences ed. Arild Underdal and Oran R. Young (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2004)., p. 12 4 .
158 M.A. Levy, R.O. Keohane, and P.M. Hass, "Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental
Institutions," in Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, ed. P.M.
Haas, R.O. Keohane, and M.A. Levy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993)., pp. 397-426.
159 E. Brown Weiss, "Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: The Baker's
Dozen Myths," University of Richmond Law Review 32 (1999). For more discussion about the definitions, see
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), "Comparative Analysis of Compliance Mechanisms: Under
Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements," (Nairobi: Dec. 2005).
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5.4 Regime Effectiveness
5.4.1. Concepts of Regime Effectiveness
Victor et al. (1998) define regime effectiveness as a measurement of "the degree to which international
agreement lead to changes in participating members' behavior that helps to solve specific problems."160
Young and Levy (1998) define regime effectiveness as "a matter of the regime's contributions that
institutions make to solving the problems that motivate actors to invest the time and energy needed to
create them." Yet, the meaning of effectiveness can significantly vary depending on approaches used:
problem-solving, legal (compliance), economic (economic efficiency), normative (fairness or justice,
stewardship, participation, and so on), and political.161 In general, regime effectiveness is regarded as a
concept to evaluate regime effects using quantitative methodology. 62
5.4.2 Measurement of Regime Effectiveness
The quantification of regime effects is not an easy task because cases for carrying out quantitative
analysis on the performance of regimes are both limited in number and sometimes difficult to draw
clear conclusions from. Most work using a quantitative approach to evaluating international regimes has
been done in the study of international environmental regimes. 163 Stokke (2004) uses Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) to explain regime effectiveness in a qualitative way.164 He proposes the
use of causal processes, or mechanisms for analyzing regime effectiveness: the mechanism of shaming
rather than reward to connect regimes and problem-relevant behavior with some Boolean expressions.
Quantitative analysis has been done to analyze some aspects of effects where a qualitative
analysis approach does not work well. Those aspects include (i) comparison of effectiveness between
sanctions and rewards, (ii) under what conditions one is more effective than other, (iii) what kinds of
problems are easier to resolve, etc. Helm and Sprinz (2000) developed a general measurement concept
for assessing the degree to which international environmental regimes contribute to environmental
problem-solving by introducing the concepts of non-regime counterfactual (NR), collective optimum
(CO), and actual performance (AP). Effectiveness scores (E) can be calculated using the equation
AP-NRE =P N (5.1)
CO-NR
'60D. G. Victor, K. Raustiala, and E.B. Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International
Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998)., p.4 6 0 .
161 Oran R. Young and Marc A. Levy, "Chapter 1. The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes," in
The Effectiveness ofInternational Regimes, ed. Oran R. Young (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)., pp.3-6.
162 Helm and Sprinz, "Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes."
163 For more information, see Mitchell, "Chapter 6. A Quantitative Approach to Evaluating International
Environmental Regimes.", pp.121.
'' Olav Schram Stokke, "Chapter 5. Boolean Analysis, Mechanisms, and the Study of Regime Effectiveness," in
Regime Consequences, ed. Arild Underdal and Oran. R. Young (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2004)., pp. 87 -12 0 .
where
-Non-Regime Counterfactual (NR)
The value when none of the instruments used to solve the problem can be ascribed to the
international regime. This is the lower bound of problem-solving capacity of the regime.
-Collective Optimum (CO)
This is the point where the marginal collective costs of using the policy instrument equate to the
collective benefits. This the upper bound of problem-solving capacity of the regime.
-Actual Performance (AP)
AP-NR
CO-NR
Non-regime Actual Collective
Counterfactual Performance Optimum
Figure 5.2 Measuring Regime Effectiveness
The effectiveness of regime is given as the relative distance that the AP has moved from the NR
toward the CO or as the percentage of the regime potential has been achieved. (The regime potential is
the distance between NR and CO). 165 This value falls strictly into the interval [0, 1].
5.5 The Power of International Regimes
5.5.1 Conceptual Framework
The concept of power is fundamental to explain what regimes can or cannot do in terms of achieving the
goals set by regimes. It seems that there has been no study on how to evaluate the power of regime.
Some research about the power of states has been done to measure the relative power of states. This
could be applicable to evaluating the power of regime. RAND (2005) proposes three levels in
measuring the power of states: resources or capabilities, or power-in-being, conversion of resources or
165 Helm and Sprinz, "Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes."
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capabilities through national processes, and power in outcomes.166 According to the report, the power of
states is the converted product of resources or capabilities of states. However, resources and capabilities
of states are not distinguished in the report. And it acknowledges that measuring state power is the most
elusive among three levels.
A. Resource-based Model
It will be absolutely more elusive if one wants to measure the power of international organizations or
international regimes rather than that of states. A resource-based model in management science may be
useful for describing the power of organizations. The model introduces resources and capabilities to
explain the competence of organizations. Oden (1999)167 distinguishes resources from capabilities as
follows: resources are "inputs into a firm's production process such as capital, equipment, skills of
individual employees, finance and talented managers.", whereas a capability is "the capacity for a set
of resources to integratively perform a task or activity to achieve a desired end state." Based on these
definitions, the resource-based theory assumes that each organization is a collection of unique
resources and capabilities that provides the basis for its strategy and is the primary source of its
returns.168
B. Organizational Capability
Ulrich and Wiersema (1989)169 propose the concept of "organizational capability", which is defined as
"an organization's ability to establish internal structures and processes that create organization-
specific competencies and enable it to adapt to changing external pressures." Sparrow and Braun
(2007) also introduce organizational capability and define it as "a capacity to deploy resources for a
desired end result of organizations."17 0
Based on the previous discussion with regard to the power of international regimes, resources
and capabilities will be employed in this study in order to describe the power of international regimes.
166 Gregory F. Treverton and Seth G. Jones, "Measuring National Power," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National
Security Research Division, 2005).
167 Howard W. Oden, Transforming the Organization: A Socio-Technical Approach (Westport, CT: Quorum
Books, 1999)., pp.56-57. The relationship between resource or capabilities and state power in RAND report seems
similar to the relationship between resources and capabilities in Oden's study.
168 Michael A. Hitt, R. Duane Ireland, and Robert E. Hoskisson, Strategic Management, Competitiveness and
Globalization: Concepts and Cases, 6th ed. (Mason, OH: Thomson, 2005)., pp. 19-20 .
169 Davis Ulrich and Margarethe F. Wiersema, "Gaining Strategic and Organizational Capability in a Turbulent
Business Environment," The Academy of Management Executive 3, no. 2 (May 1989). In the original context, a
firm is used instead an organization but I modified it for the purpose of study.
170 Paul R. Sparrow and Werner Braun, "Chapter 5. Human Resource Strategy in the International Context," in
Handbook of Research in International Human Resource Management, ed. Michael M. Harris (Philadelphia, PA:
Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007)., p.86.
5.5.2 Resources of International Regimes
Resources of international regimes can be directly derived from the concept of regime effects and they
will include implementation, verification resources, and compliance-enforcement resources.
Implementation refers to the actions that governments take to translate international accords
into domestic law and policy. In other words, implementation of international agreements means the
legal implementation of international commitments into national law in the form of legislation or
regulations, judicial decrees, or other actions. "'7 However, the level of implementation may not be a
direct indicator of how effectively it changes the behavior of target groups. Mazmanian and Sabatier
(1981) identified three factors that affect the implementation process: tractability of the problems
addressed by a statute; ability of statute to structure implementation; and non-statutory variables
affecting implementation. 7 2 The last factor can be measured as the level of system infrastructure.
Compliance means conforming to a specification or policy, standard or law that has been
clearly defined. 173 There are two types of approaches to compliance, an enforcement model of
compliance and a managerial model of compliance; however, it seems that the former is best suited for
the scope of the study. 14
Enforcement refers to the actions that will be taken by international regimes once violations or
non-compliance occur. Enforcement involves formal dispute settlements, procedures and penalties,
sanctions, or other coercive measures to induce compliance with obligations.415 The UNEP (2007)
provides compliance mechanisms to be enforced that encompass performance information reviews,
multilateral non-compliance procedures, non-compliance response measures, and dispute settlement
procedures. 176
171 H.K. Jacobson and E. Brown Weiss, "Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords,"
Global Governance 1, no. 2 (1995).
172Paul A. Sabatier and Daniel A. Mazmanian, "Chapter 1. The Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework of
Analysis," in Effective Policy Implementation, ed. Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1981). They propose six factors as non-statutory variables: socioeconomic conditions and
technology, media attention to the problem, public support, attitudes and resources of constituency groups, support
from sovereigns, and commitment and leadership skill of implementing officials, pp.6-7.
17 For more discussion about a treaty of compliance, see Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1995)., pp.1.-28.
174 Abram Chayes et al., "Chapter 3. Managing Compliance: A Comprehensive Perspective," in Engaging
Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, ed. Edith Weiss and Harold
Jacobson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000)., pp.4142.
175 Weiss, "Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths."
176 Dispute resolution procedures can be invoked in case of non-compliance by participating members to the
regime. These procedures are composed of negotiation, conciliation, and binding arbitration and all of these
procedures can be either voluntary or compulsory. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
"Comparative Analysis of Compliance Mechanisms: Under Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements.",
p.29-33. For more discussion on dispute settlement from legal perspective, see United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), "Comparative Analysis of Compliance Mechanisms: Under Selected Multilateral
Environmental Agreements.",pp. 110-118; Math Noortmann, Enforcing International Law: From Self-Help to Self-
Contained Regimes (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2005).
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Verification is defined as "a mechanism or procedure to confirm that each state party to the
agreement is acting in conformity with its obligations, and to detect those who violate their
obligations." 177 Verification resources can enable international regimes to check whether or not the
implementation process in participating states is going well.
The required amount and the type of verification resources may vary for different regimes.
Thus, during the formation process of international regimes, verification features should be set up
carefully. 178In general, verification is merely considered as a technical issue; therefore, the technical
community may regard the enhancement of technological capabilities as the main objective that the
community can contribute. Yet, politics becomes a main player whenever some states are held in
suspicion. In this regard, verification resources should be seen from both legal and technical aspects.
Figure 5.3 Resources of a Regime
5.5.3 Capabilities of International Regimes
It would be possible to convert the resources of international regimes in several ways. For the scope of
this study, an international regime's capabilities are described from technical and political perspectives.
177 j. Christian Kessler, Verifying Nonproliferation Treaties: Obligation, Process, and Sovereignty (Washington
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995).
178Negotiation for appropriate verification framework is done through bargaining, coercion, persuasion, coalition-
building, and other political processes For more discussion about political aspects of verification, see Nancy W.
Gallagher, The Politics of Verification (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999)., pp. 1-2 6 .
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Bell and Pavitt (1993) define technological capability as the resources needed to generate and manage
technological change, which are accumulated and embodied in skills, knowledge, experience and
organizational systems. 179 Marcelle (2007) suggests that technical capabilities are organizationally
integrated capabilities of both embodied (held-in people) and non-embodied (a property of components)
elements. These elements include skills, attitudes, knowledge, aptitudes, equipment, devices, machinery,
and software. 180
Martinez (1996) defines the legal capability of international organizations as the ability to
enact binding decisions directly applicable on member states. 181 Following this classification,
implementing and compliance-enforcing resources can translate into legal capabilities among regime
resources. In contrast, verification resources can be projected as legal capabilities as well as technical
capabilities.
5.6 Features of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
A number of institutional and non-institutional frameworks have been proposed to deal with nuclear
proliferation issues since the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) went into force. This framework is
often referred to as the nuclear nonproliferation regime or the NPT regime, named after the NPT. The
nuclear nonproliferation regime is one of international regimes, but it has unique features that differ
from those of other international regimes.
A fundamental question might arise as to whether a set of international efforts toward nuclear
nonproliferation can be defined as a regime. Brzoska (1992)182 suggests that it is normal to speak of a
"nuclear nonproliferation regime" because international regimes rest on explicit or tacit principles and
norms that seek to lead participants into new patterns of international behavior, specific rules about
what is permissible behavior and procedures that guide mutual policy choices. Simpson and Howlett
(1994) argue that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is an international security regime which can
make a serious impact on the interests of party states. 183
Kessler (1995) describes four elements that constitute the ideal form of an international control
regime, and applies his concept to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.184 He introduces the concept of
179 M. Bell and K. Pavitt, "Technological Accumulation and Industrial Growth: Contrasts between Developed and
Developing Countries," Industrial and Corporate Change 2, no. 2 (1993).
180 Marcelle, Policy Briefs, Technology Acquisition and Domestic Learning.
181 M. Magdalena and Martin Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organization (Leiden, The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996)., p.2 94 .
182 Michael Brzoska, "Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation System a Regime? A Comment on Trevor Mcmorris Tate,"
Journal ofPeace Research 29, no. 2 (May 1992).
183 Simpson and Howlett also provided very good definition on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. "The nuclear
non-proliferation regime is an integrated network of treaties and others standard-setting arrangements which
provide a comprehensive framework for the behavior of states, and international organizations and other actors, in
the nuclear area. John Simpson and Daryll Howlett, "The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling toward 1995,"
International Security 5, no. 1 (Summer 1994).
184 Kessler, Verifying Nonprolferation Treaties: Obligation, Process, and Sovereignty., p.9.
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"control regime" to make non-proliferation regimes for nuclear weapons, biological-chemical weapons,
and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the main purpose of his analysis.
Figure 5.4 Overall Structure of NPT Regime based on Kessler's Definition
This paper will use the definition proposed by the CRS report as follows:
"The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral
and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and domestic agencies, and
the domestic laws ofparticipating countries." 185
This CRS' definition is strongly supported by Brzoska's (1992) definition of international
regimes in the sense that his definition allows for the consideration of all kinds of arrangements within
an issue area, not bound to specific institutions. All of the NPT regime components mentioned above
vary greatly in terms of what needs to be controlled, the degree of legal authority, and the number and
characteristics of member states. Table 5.2 shows the summary of current NPT regime components that
work toward nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
185 Sharon A. Squassoni, Steven R. Bowman, and Carl E. Behrens, "CRS Report for Congress: Proliferation
Control Regimes: Background and Status," (Washington DC: 2006)., p. 10 .
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Table 5.2 Summary of NPT Regime Components
Classification Background / Legal authority Year
Treaty NPT International Treaty 186 1970
International
Atomic Energy Statute of the IAEA (1956) 1957
Agency
International UN Conference The first Special Session on Disarmament of the 1978
.t on Disarmament United Nations General Assembly (1978)Organizations
UN Disarmament Disarmament Committee of 1952 1978
Committee
UN Security UN Charter Chapter V and VII 1946
Council
Zangger Article 111.2 of the NPT 1970
Committee
Multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Ford Administration Initiative 1974
Export Control Group
Regimes IAEA INFCIRC/254 [a] 1978
Wassenaar Former COCOM export control regime 1996
Arrangement
Partial Test Ban Agreement in the form of Treaty 1963
Treaty
Comprehensive UNGA resolution 48/70 (1993) 1996Complementary Test Ban Treaty
Treaties Fissile Material UNGA Resolution 48/75L (1993) 1995
Cutoff Treaty
Nuclear Weapons UN, Article VII of the NPT 1970
Free Zone
UNSC 1540 committee
Proliferation The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 2003
Multilateral Security Initiative
Mass Destruction (2002)
Efforts a
Diplomatic and economic measures based onNon-military areet
agreements
Domestic Systems and Regulations National legislation and administrative authorities -
Note: [a] Communication Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear
Material, Equipment or Technology
186 A Treaty is an agreement in written form between nation-states (or international agencies, such as the United
Nations, that have been given treaty-making capacity by the states that created them) that is intended to establish a
relationship governed by international law. Various terms have been used for such an agreement, including treaty,
convention, protocol, declaration, charter, covenant, pact, act, statute, exchange of notes, agreement, modus
Vivendi, and understanding. The UN Charter states that treaties must be registered with the UN to be invoked
before it or enforced in its judiciary organ, the International Court of Justice.
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5.7 The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT is the key treaty that sets up standards for the international nonproliferation regime, and the
NPT provides the legal and institutional basis for this regime. The treaty is often interpreted as having
three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. The
text of the NPT was negotiated between 1961 and 1968 and the Treaty was opened for signature on July
1, 1968.
Table 5.3 Problematic Articles in the NPT
Classification Article Statements related Cases
"..not seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons...."
"6... agreements shall commence within 180 days from
Art III the original entry into force..." North Korea
Ambiguous r "...agreements shall enter into force not later than
legal eighteen months..."
Interpretation "Nothing....shall be interpreted as affecting the
Art IV inalienable right .... to develop research, production Iran
187
and use of nuclear energy....
"...potential benefits from peaceful applications of .Art V ,, India
nuclear explosions...
"Each party.....have the right to withdraw from the
Ambiguous Treaty" 188 North
legal Art X "...give the notice of such withdrawal ...to the United Korea 189
Interpretation Nations Security Council three months in
advance...."
Inherent Art I, VI Nuclear Disarmament
defect Art VII ". . .the right of any group of states to conclude regional NWFZ
treaties for the total absence of nuclear weapons."
North Korea
Enforcement and punishment Ira
Absent N/AIran
provision Security assurance resolutions [a]
Note: [a] UNSC Resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995)
187 Xinjun Zhang, "The Riddle of Inalienable Right in Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of the
Nuclear Weapons: Intentional Ambiguity," Chinese Journal of International Law 5, no. 3 (2006).; Robert Zarate,
"The NPT, IAEA Safeguards and Peaceful Nuclear Energy: An "Inalienable Right," but Precisely to What?,"
(Washington D.C.: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2007).
188 George Bunn and John Reinelander, "The Right to Withdraw from the NPT: Article X Is Not Unconditional,"
Disarmament Diplomacy 79 (April/May 2005).; Jenny Nielsen and John Simpson, The NPT Withdrawal Clause
and Its Negotiating History (Mountain Center for International Studies (MCIS), July 2004 [cited Jan. 10 2009]).
189 Frederic L. Kirgis, North Korea's Withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," , (Jan. 2003) (The
American Society of International Law (ASIL), Jan. 2003 [cited Apr. 4 2008]); available from
http://www.asil.org/insigh96.cfm#author.
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The NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970. As of today, there are 189 signatories to the treaty. The
treaty established five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), including the U.S., Britain, China, France, and
Russia. As a result, the NPT has discriminatory features in its nature by allowing the NWS to possess
nuclear weapons, while prohibiting the Non-NWS (NNWS) from developing nuclear weapons.
Consequently, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferation) is stressed but
disarmament of nuclear weapons (vertical proliferation) is often disregarded. More importantly, the
NPT set up an inspection system it calls "safeguards," based on agreements between NNWS and the
IAEA.
A legal review of the articles of the NPT is critical before discussing the potential of the NPT
regime. Although the treaty has been successful for nearly 40 years, it has faced difficulty because of
the drawbacks in its nature, as shown in Table 5.3. The legal problems of the NPT context can be
divided into ambiguity, unreality or idealism, and lack of enforcement clauses. Articles II, III, IV, V,
and X are ambiguous, Article I, VI, VII are far from implementation without the strong political will of
the five NWSs. Most importantly, the NPT lacks an enforcement clause as well as provision of a
security guarantee.190
There is no explicit organization for the NPT; instead, the NPT Review Conference is held at
UN headquarters every five years with the objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty in
accordance with Article VIII. Before the NPT review conference, the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)
is generally set up, and holds three sessions to address substantive and procedural issues during the
upcoming Review Conference.
5.8 International Organizations
5.8.1 United Nations (UN)
The global efforts for achieving nonproliferation and arms reduction are being made under the
leadership of the UN. The UN is an international organization whose main functions include
maintenance of international peace and security, arms control and disarmament, economic welfare and
cooperation, social welfare and cooperation, dependent areas, and development of international law.
Figure 5.5 shows the five administrative bodies in the UN and the linkage between the UN and the
NPT regime.
190 From the outset of the negotiations on the NPT in the 1960s, many non-nuclear-weapon states made clear that
in exchange for commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons they expected certain assurances from nuclear-
weapon states. It was not possible to include such a provision in the NPT. John Carlson, "Views on Regional Non-
Proliferation Arrangements" (paper presented at the INMM/ESARDA Workshop, Tokyo, Japan, November 13-16
2000).
104
Economic and Trusteeship
oiCouncil Council
NPT-related
UNCD UNDC organization
(1979) (1952) ..... Independent, but
co-operative links
FMCT Not yet effective
Figure 5.5 United Nations Organs related to Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons191
A. United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Among five administrative bodies of the UN, the UNSC is the strongest organ in terms of legal
authority from the perspective of international law. Important subsidiary bodies of the UNSC are the
Military Staff Committee (MSC) and sanctions committees. Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Actions
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), which came into
force on 24 October 1945, gives the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) the power to adopt
enforcement actions in the event of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
Though there is some disagreement over the legal power of the UNSC, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) declared that the UNSC has the sole power to require enforcement by coercive action in
1962.
Legal powers of the UNSC are exercised by adopting resolutions. Types of UN resolutions can
be classified into recommendations and decisions, with the latter type legally binding. Pursuant to
Chapter VII, the UNSC may decide to adopt resolutions that create obligations on its addressees.192
Article 41 and Article 42 stipulate the use of non-military and military measures, respectively "to
191 UNOG (United Nations Office at Geneva), UNODA (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs), UNCD(United NationsConference on Disarmament), UNDC (United Nations Disarmament Commission), and CTBTO
(Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization).
92 Marko Divac Oberg, "The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the Un Security Council and General Assembly in
the Jurisprudence of the ICJ " The European Journal ofInternational Law 16, no. 5 (2006).
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maintain or restore international peace and security." In general, non-military measures, including
economic sanctions and diplomatic sanctions in the form of sanctions, have been preferred and applied
by the UNSC.
The role of the UNSC in relation to the NPT regime has been increasing. First, it relates to
Article X of the NPT with regard to the states' right to withdraw from the NPT. Even though the role of
UNSC in this matter is not clearly stated, the UNSC is the only organ that can stop arbitrary withdrawal
of proliferators. Second, the UNSC can complement the NPT in the sense that it is the only element that
has enforcement resources in the NPT regime. In the case that the IAEA refers the violation of IAEA
safeguards to the UNSC, the UNSC can issue resolutions to take actions against proliferators, including
economic, diplomatic, and military sanctions. Third, the UNSC has legal authority over non-member
states to the NPT because all non-NPT stares are UN member states. In particular, the UNSC released
its resolution 1540 in 2004, which calls for swift passage of the UNSC Resolution 1540 requiring all
states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure sensitive materials within their
borders. The 1540 committee collated legislative data of member states that contains the status of
national implementation of UNSC 1540.193 Some states outside the NPT such as Israel and Pakistan
followed the UNSC resolution 1540, but North Korea did not report its status of the implementation of
requirements.
B. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
UN General Assembly (UNGA) was established in 1945 under the UN Charter. The UNGA comprises
all 192 Members of the UN and it is the chief deliberative organ of the UN, providing a unique forum
for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter. Pursuant
to its "Uniting for Peace" resolution of November 1950 (resolution 377 (V)),194 the Assembly may also
take action if the Security Council fails to act, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member, in a
case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. 195 The
Assembly can consider the matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to members for
collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security through special sessions and
emergency special sessions. In relation to the NPT regime, in 1993, UNGA released consensus
resolution (48/75L) that convinces a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
193 This database has been developed by the Committee established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) for
the purpose of providing additional information on the national implementation of regulations and measures
related to the resolution.
194 For more information, see UN Dag Hammarskjdld Library, ([cited Aug. 8
2008]).<http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/landmark/pdf/ares377e.pdf>
195 In general, the UN General Assembly (UNGA)'s resolutions are known for having only a recommendatory
effect as a declarative statement; thus, UNGA's resolutions lack the legal authority except for the case that the
states agree to accept the UNGA's resolutions as binding. Mohamed Sameh M. Amr, The Role of the International
Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of the United Nations (Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International, 2003).pp.171-173.
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nuclear explosive devices, i.e., the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), would be a significant
contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects.
C. United Nations Conference on Disarmament (UNCD)
The UNCD is the successor to various Geneva-based arms control bodies dating back to 1960. The
Conference on Disarmament was established in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating
forum of the international community, and this was a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament
of the United Nations General Assembly held in 1978. The terms of reference of the UNCD include
practically all multilateral arms-control and disarmament problems. The CD is regarded as an
autonomous body, although it has a close relationship with the United Nations. The focus of the UNCD
are: cessation of the nuclear arms race; nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war; prevention of
an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, new types of weapons of mass destruction and new
systems of such weapons, including radiological weapons; and a comprehensive program of
disarmament and transparency in armaments. The CD holds three sessions each year. During the
second session of 1995 in March, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed by consensus to
establish an Ad hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a cutoff treaty based on the 1993 UN
General Assembly's consensus resolution (48/75L). The CD adopted a mandate to negotiate a ban on
the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons - The Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT);
however, negotiations have not started, as CD members have struggled to adopt a work program. The
CD can only approve decisions by consensus, and the insistence of a few states to link FMCT
negotiations to other nuclear disarmament issues has not produced tangible outcomes.
D. United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of
the UNGA, which is mandated to consider and make recommendations on various disarmament related
issues and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special sessions devoted to
disarmament held thus far. The UNDC was originally established in 1952 and ceased to convene after
1965. It was re-established and strengthened at the first Special Session of the General Assembly
devoted to Disarmament in 1978 to succeed an earlier Disarmament Commission.
The UNDC reports annually to the General Assembly and has dealt with numerous
disarmament-related problems, including both nuclear and conventional. The UNDC has submitted
guidelines and principles on various subject items, including guidelines for appropriate types of
confidence-building measures, guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to
disarmament within the context of global security, and guidelines and recommendations for objective
information on military matters.
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5.8.2 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
The IAEA was set up as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization in 1957 within the United Nations
family. When the NPT entered into force in 1970, the IAEA was entrusted with key roles and
responsibilities. Since then, the IAEA has been the "international safeguards inspectorate and a
multilateral channel for transferring peaceful applications of nuclear technology." The IAEA Statute
guides the IAEA's mission and the vision. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple
partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The IAEA's mission is
referred to as three main pillars: Safety and Security; Science and Technology; and Safeguards and
Verification. Its key roles are making a contribution to international peace and security, and to achieve
social, economic and environmental development.
5.9 Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRs)
There are currently five export control regimes: the Zangger Committee (ZC or ZAC), Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). All of these regimes have linkage with the NPT regime in varying
degrees. Multilateral Export Control Regime (MECR) is a common term describing these systems,
which regulate the supply of major conventional arms systems and materials in association with
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). MECRs prevent transfers that contribute to the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.
MECRs can help deter proliferation by: raising the cost of proliferation; providing signals that
countries are attempting to acquire WMD; and slowing efforts to acquire WMD. ZC, NSG, and WA are
worth mentioning with regard to the NPT regime. Especially, ZC and NSG are dedicated to the NPT
regime. Participating countries of these export control regimes would inform this organization of all
sensitive nuclear or nuclear-related exports, and have the mandate and legal rights to verify that the
transactions are indeed legal.
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Table 5.4 Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRs)
Regime Control Items and Lists Legal Basis
The Trigger List for controlling nuclear sensitive materials and NPT 111.2
ZC (1974)
equipment (INFCIRC/209)
Two control lists; Part I and Part II
-Part 1 : Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers NPT 111.2
NSG (1977)
-Part 2: Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use (INFCIRC/254)
Equipment, Material and Related technology.
AG (1985)196 Control lists CWC and BTWC
MTCR MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software, and No supporting
Technology Annex
(1987) treaty
Category 1 items and Category 2 items
-List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies; Tier 1-Basic, Tier
None
WA (1996) 2-Sensitive (The weakest197
*List of munitions (7 categories)
Note: CWC and BTWC stand for Chemical Weapons Conventions and the Biological
Convention, respectively.
and Toxin Weapons
The ZC, the NSG and the AG are considered to be more effective than the MTCR and the WA due to
the existence of supporting treaties. 198 ZC and NSG had been enhanced after the crisis with the Iraq's
nuclear weapons program. [See Appendix C for current status]
5.9.1 Zangger Committee (ZC)
The Zangger Committee, also known as the Nuclear Exporters Committee (NEC), was established in
1974. The purpose of the ZC is to provide clear interpretation of Article 111.2 (material and equipment
control) of the NPT that provides legal background for the ZC. Nuclear export control policies of the
ZC for NPT Parties and specific details are documented in INFCIRC/209 of 1974. The ZC has its own
trigger list for controlling nuclear sensitive materials and equipment and these are incorporated as
Annex II in the Additional Protocol. Only NPT signatories can be a member of ZC, which is distinct
from the NSG. The ZC maintains and updates a Trigger List (triggering safeguards as a condition of
supply) of nuclear-related strategic goods to assist NPT Parties in identifying equipment and materials
subject to export controls. The ZC reports a trigger list to the Secretary General of the IAEA.
196 Australia Group participants are now playing an active and constructive role in the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague.
197 However, WA is the only regime that has existing infrastructure and permanent Secretariat in Vienna among
MECRs. In addition, WA was set to strengthen international security by promoting transparency and responsible
exports of conventional arms and dual-use goods. Its overall purpose was to prevent "destabilizing accumulations"
of conventional weaponry.
198 Michael Beck, "Viewpoint: Reforming the Multilateral Export Control Regimes," The Nonproliferation Review
(Summer 2000).
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5.9.2 Nuclear Suppliers Group
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established as a Ford Administration initiative in 1975. Often
called "London Club," 99 the NSG had meetings in London between 1975 and 1977 to agree on steps to
reduce the risk of commercial competition undermining safeguards commitments, especially the
transfer of sensitive uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies and the requirement
of full-scope safeguards prior to nuclear purchases. 200 The NSG guidelines were first published in
February 1978 as IAEA document INFCIRC/254. Establishing the guidelines, the NSG members did
not openly institutionalize the cooperation.2 01 Since then, the NSG did not go on meeting after adopting
the guidelines while the NSG had influenced the export policies of the members on a bilateral basis
until 1980s. Iraqi nuclear weapons program discovered in the early 1990s made multilateral cooperation
202within the NSG important again.
What makes the NSG different from the ZC are as follows: first, the Non-NPT signatory can be
a member.203 Second, different from trigger list items of the Zangger Committee that lists EDPs, Dual-
Use Items (DUIs) of the NSG do not generally qualify for regular reporting to the IAEA because of
their lower level of significance and limited scope of controllability as well as the limited information
management capacity of the IAEA.204
5.9.3 Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) was designed to foster multilateral cooperation to promote
transparency, exchange of views and information and greater responsibility in transfer of conventional
arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The WA is the successor of the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) during the Cold War era, which was formally
dismantled in 1994. The WA countries maintain effective export controls for items on agreed lists based
on common understandings of risks associated with the transfer of these items. The List is incorporated
by WA Participating States in their national legislation. The WA Secretariat provides support to the
199 Tate, "Regime-Building in the Non-Proliferation System."
200 The Nuclear Suppliers Group imposed curbs on selling nuclear fuels and equipment to India from 1974 to 2008.
Indiasaver.com, France to Sell Nuclear Reactors and Fuel to India (Indiaserver.com, 2008 [cited Jan. 11 2009]);
available from <http://www.india-server.com/news/france-to-sell-nuclear-reactors-and-4123.html>.
201 Ham, "An Integrated Methodology for Quantitative Assessment of Proliferation Resistance of Advanced
Nuclear Systems Using Probabilistic Methods"., p.16. The principal reason for this was due to the opposition
among developing countries that regarded the NSG as a supplier cartel preventing the applications of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes.
202 Ian Anthony et al., Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, SIPRI
Research Report No.22 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2007).
203 All ZC members participate in the NSG. But Belarus, Brazil, Cyprus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta and New Zealand participate only in the NSG as of Sep.2006.
204 NSG members currently share only the information about the denials. NSG, in combination with the IAEA,
should share both any denials of an export and key approvals. Fritz W. Schmidt, "Nuclear Export Controls
Closing the Gaps," IAEA Bulletin 46, no. 2 (Mar. 2005).
110
plenary meetings and sub-groups, and facilitates the Participating States for their information exchange
process with the help of the Wassenaar Arrangement Information System (WAIS). 20 s
5.9.4 Challenges
The problems of the MECRs arose as the A. Q. Khan network that sold nuclear program elements to
North Korea, Iran, and Libya was revealed in the early 2000s. The A. Q. Khan network was masterful
in making use of loopholes in the MECRs. The network identified countries that had inadequate
national export laws yet adequate industrial capability for the network's purposes; these countries were
both inside and outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The network also knew how to obtain equipment
from countries in Europe with stringent export control systems. As can be concluded from this fact,
having a unified and effective system of dual-use export controls is now more important than ever
before. 206
The problems of current MECRs can be summarized as follows: First, MECRs are not a legally
binding regime because they rely upon informal arrangements 207 and thus MECRs have no choice but to
depend on the basic principle of cooperation with restrictions as the exception. Consequently, MECRs
are limited in membership and verifying noncompliance of participating states. Second, the complexity
of each regime's trigger list hinders participating state from sharing information among them or with
the IAEA. Third, participating states inherently have very low level of will to comply with MECRs. The
authorities are unlikely to carefully scrutinize exports or encourage curiosity about the actual end-use of
an item because it is very hard to know the actual purpose of the materials or the parts they were
contracted to make. In addition, the companies had little motivation to confirm the explanations about
the end-use of the items. Four, cooperation between MECRs and the IAEA has not been clearly
established yet. Export control information is not systematically shared with the IAEA primarily due to
the enormous volume of information as well as ineffective cooperation between the IAEA and
208MECRs. [See Appendix C]
Figure 5.6 shows how development and dispersion of nuclear technology impacted the
efficiency of nuclear trade control. This figure also includes how expansion of membership to MECRs
would work for the efficiency of MECRs.
205 Sune Danielsson, "Basic Information on the Wassenaar Arrangement," in Wassenaar Arrangement Export
Control and Its Role in Strengthening International Security, ed. Auer Dorothea (Vienna, Austria: Vienna School
of International Studies, Jan. 2005).
206 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: World toward Closing Gaps in
the International Nonproliferation Regime" (paper presented at the 45th Annual Meeting for the INMM, Orlando,
FL July 2 2004).).
207 Charles Lipson, "Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?," International Organization 45, no. 4
(Autumn 1991).
208 Schmidt, "Nuclear Export Controls Closing the Gaps."
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Figure 5.6 Causal Links in the MECRs
5.10 Complementary Treaties
5.10.1 Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ)
The concept of a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) was first developed in the late 1950s, as a possible
complementary measure to the efforts of the international community towards establishing a global
non-proliferation regime. 209 A NWFZ is defined by the UN as an agreement, generally by
internationally recognized treaty, to ban the use, development, or deployment of nuclear weapons in a
given area. A specified region in which countries commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test,
or process nuclear weapons. A NWFZ can provide mechanisms of verification and control to enforce its
obligations. Hence, a NWFZ is conceived as incremental measures toward total nuclear disarmament,
and these agreements have steadily grown in number since the first, governing Antarctica.
The Article VII of the NPT affirms the right of countries to establish specified zones free of
nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly reaffirmed that right in 1975 (UNGA Resolution 3472).
Band outlined the criteria for such zones. Among basic elements of NWFZ are a treaty that establishes
209 The Soviet Union first introduced the idea of a NWFZ in Central Europe at the United Nations General
Assembly in 1956. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), NWFZ Clearinghouse (May 13 2008
[cited Jun. 14 2008]); available from <http://cns.miis.edu/nwfzclearinghouse>.
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regions for no nuclear weapons and a protocol for ratification; provision of negative security by NWSs;
and acceptance of comprehensive verification measures administered by the IAEA. 210
Table 5.5 Examples of NWFZs
Opened for Entered
signature into force
Treaty of Tlatelolco Latin America and the Caribbean 1967 2002
Treaty of Bangkok ASEAN states 1995 1997
Treaty of Rarotonga The South Pacific 1985 1986
Central Asian
Nuclear Weapon Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Tajikistan, 2006 Not yet
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Free Zone
Treaty of Pelindaba African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty 1996 Not yet
The contribution made by NWFZs to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been widely
acknowledged. In practice, it is hard to establish NWFZs where suitable areas cannot be defined easily
and the level of trust among states in the region is relatively low. No NWFZ has been established in a
region that includes the territory of any of the five NWSs that are party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as three states - Israel, India and Pakistan - that are not. The
Middle East is a good example. It seems unlikely that the Middle East will establish NWFZs in the
foreseeable future. In addition, it was reported that no African Arab state will ratify the Treaty of
Pelindaba until Israel, which is just outside the zone, renounces its nuclear weapons program. Though
they are not NWFZ-type treaties, three treaties for Banning Nuclear Weapon Deployment are worth
mention: the Antarctic Treaty; outlaw of Nuclear Weapons by Austria with the Atomsperrgesetz in
1999; and declaration of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.
5.10.2 Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
The UN proposed the negotiation of a fissile materials production banning treaty (hereinafter, FMCT)
in December 1993 through UNGA consensus resolution (48/75L), after US President Clinton called for
a multilateral convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives or outside
international safeguards. The UNCD was assigned the venue for negotiating a FMCT since 1995. The
210 Carlson, "Views on Regional Non-Proliferation Arrangements".
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widespread international support for an FMCT was obtained through the NPT RC at the 1995 and 2000
NPT Review Conference.2
Ideally, the most important feature of the FMCT should be non-discriminatory standards toward
both NWS and NNWS with universal and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) unlike the
NPT.m The treaty would expand the membership, including five NWSs and States Outside the NPT
(SON), into a verification regime. A verification regime for the FMCT will be similar to comprehensive
safeguards in the NNWS but the application will be expanded to NWSs and SONs. The FMCT may
require all production facilities of direct-use material to be either shut down or converted to civilian use
and subject to safeguards.
Issues
To date, the UNCD has not been able to start such negotiation as it has not been able to reach agreement
on its substantive program of work. The start of negotiations on an FMCT is not likely to occur in the
near future because of three fundamental issues that are preventing states from starting negotiation for
the FMCT as shown in Figure 5.7.
Scope of Fissile
Materials
Future Production
Future Production :& Existing Stocks : Future Production.
only Management & Existing Stocks
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Tritium
DU, NU
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Level of
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and PRF
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Shutdown UEF and PRF
------------------------------------------ /----------------------
Downstream
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Figure 5.7 Varying Degrees of Scopes for FMCT
211 Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/synopses/fmct.cfm> and
Reaching Critical Will <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/fmct.html>.
212 Annette Shaper, "Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty," Disarmament Forum, no. Two (1999).
114
The First issue is about the level of fissile material cut-off. The issue of existing stocks blocked
consensus on the negotiation of an FMCT. If existing stocks are included in a FMCT, it would be a
great burden for the NWS because downblending of existing stocks of weapons-grade fissile materials
is required. If not included, materials produced in the future may be falsely declared as earlier
production or existing stocks may be flown to NNWS or non-state actors. The Second issue is related to
the scope of the fissile materials, namely, what kinds of materials need to fall into the category of
control. Tritium, depleted uranium and natural uranium are used for manufacturing advanced nuclear
weapons. Furthermore, it is reported that Americium and Neptunium can be used for nuclear weapons.
Military HEUs for naval fuels can pose another challenge against a FMCT from different perspective.
The Third issue concerns the level of verification coverage for different facilities. The most feasible
scenario is to place currently-operating reprocessing plants and uranium enrichment plants under
safeguards for verification.m'
5.10.3 Test Ban Treaty - PTBT (LTBT) and CTBT (1996)
A. Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)
Since the test of the first nuclear bomb, Trinity, on July 16, 1945, more than 2,000 nuclear tests were
conducted worldwide until 1998. The peak of nuclear weapons tests occurred in 1962. Atmospheric
tests by the two superpowers generated about 72 MT of nuclear explosive yield as fallout in a single
year. The next year, the US, USSR, and the UK - but neither China nor France - signed the Partial Test
Ban Treaty (PTBT) or Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in Moscow on 5 August 1963. The Treaty
prohibited nuclear explosions within the Earth's atmosphere, oceans, and outer space, while not banning
tests underground.2 14 These nuclear tests have generated concern with regard to negative environmental
consequences. When a nuclear test is executed, it promptly generates a huge amount of thermal energy
and massive doses of neutron, x-rays and gamma-ray radiation. These types of radiation cause
dangerous radiation exposure to the ecosystem of the earth. 215
B. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed resolution 48/70 by consensus supporting the
multilateral negotiation of a CTBT in 1993. This is the first time that a consensus resolution in support
of a CTBT has been adopted by the UNGA. The Treaty was opened for signature on 24 September
1996. The UN Secretary-General is the depositary of the Treaty, and convenes, upon the request of a
majority of ratifying states, the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty.
213 Hui Zhang, FMCT Verification: Case Studies, IAEA-SM-367/9/04 (IABA, 2004).
214 Since the LTBT was signed in 1963 by the U.S, U.K. and Soviet Union, nuclear detonations by these countries
have been underground. France and China were not parties to the LTBT, their tests gradually moved from the
open atmosphere to subterranean sites-underground and under the sea.
215 Moody, Hutcheon, and Grant, Nuclear Forensics Analysis.
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The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
(CTBTO), as an interim and independent organization, was established on 19 November 1996. This
Commission would lay the groundwork required and build up the global verification regime to monitor
compliance with the Treaty.216 The CTBTO has its own membership and budget, but it has a
relationship agreement with the United Nations since 2000. The Agreement provides a framework for
cooperation between the two organizations.
The CTBT adds no new obligation to non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT.
The Treaty is neither intended to force NWS to give up their nuclear weapons nor to reduce the number
of nuclear weapons. The CTBT would simply create a new international norm against the testing of
nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, it has not yet entered into force,217 and some of the states of greatest
concern are unlikely to sign it in the foreseeable future. Even the U.S. Senate declined to ratify the
CTBT submitted by President Clinton on October 13, 1999.
5.11 Ad-hoc Multilateral Efforts: Non-Military and Military
5.11.1. Non-Military Multilateral Efforts
Non-military measures are used when one wants to change a state's behavior without resorting to
military options. The purpose of non-military efforts is to create a situation where a proliferator
concludes that the costs of a nuclear weapons programs exceed the benefits. Non-military efforts were
successful during the Cold-War Era, but effects have been weakened over time. Multilateral non-
military efforts can be divided into intelligence cooperation, diplomatic efforts, and economic efforts.
A. Intelligence Cooperation
Cooperation among the intelligence community can significantly enforce the strengths of the regime in
the early detection of nuclear weapons programs by sharing a variety of information with regard to
nuclear proliferation activities. The early detection would provide the broad opportunity and flexibility
for the engagement of the international community in the form of diplomatic, military, economic
intervention. For example, the U.S. intelligence community's secret penetration of the Khan network
led to the seizure of the ship BBC China bound for Libya.218 The success of nuclear weapons program
216 Legal aspects of the CTBT are well-explained in Hans Holderbach, The CTBT - Legal Aspects of Its
Implementation (2006); available from http://www.vertic.org/assets/TheCTBT_-
Legal AspectsofitsImplementationDubai_HHMay_06_1 172.pdf.
m To enter into force, the CTBT must be signed and ratified by the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty.
These States formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament and
possessed nuclear power or research reactors at that time. To date, 33 of the Annex 2 States have ratified the
Treaty. So far, 175 States have signed the Treaty and 120 have deposited their instruments of ratification, of
which 33 are States whose signature and ratification are necessary for the Treaty to enter into force.
218 Albright and Hinderstein, "Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: World toward Closing Gaps in the
International Nonproliferation Regime". For more discussion about the role of intelligence in nuclear proliferation,
see Phil Williams, "Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Understanding and Probing Comlexity," review of
Reviewed Item, Strategic Insights, no. 6 (2006).
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in South Africa and the cases of Iran, Iraq, and Libya clearly show how important the early detection of
programs though intelligence community activities is.
The UNSC, through the Military Staff Committee (MSC), can play an important role in
facilitating cooperation among the international community. The MSC may provide access to the
National Technical Means (NTM), in particular, military satellites for tracking the illicit shipment or
transfer of nuclear elements according to Article 45 of UN Chapter VII.
B. Diplomatic Efforts
Successful cases of diplomatic efforts are often made by the U.S. In the mid-1970s, some major nuclear
exporting states such as France and Germany were planning to transfer enrichment and reprocessing
technology to South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan and Brazil. The U.S. was very successful in stopping the
spread of successful nuclear technologies in case of South Korea and Taiwan (in the 1970s and in 1987,
respectively) by utilizing the leverage of high dependence of these countries on U.S. security and
economic support. However, it was not successful in the case of Germany's provision of enrichment
and reprocessing technology to Brazil.
C. Economic Efforts
Due to globalization, the economy of most states is integrated into the global economic system to
varying degrees. Almost all states are reliant on foreign technology, the international financial system
and international trade. Even though some proliferators such as Iran hold the "oil weapon", they can
never be free from economic pressures from the international community. The case of Libya showed
how economic efforts were successful. It became clear that Khadafy decided Libya could better assure
its security through a positive relationship with the U.S. and the West than with a risky and costly
policy of developing WMD. Libya's leaders thought that their nation's growing economic difficulties
could be resolved only by redirecting resources into development, integrating closely into the world
economy and seeing sanctions ended. 219 Table 5.6 shows possible measures of diplomatic and economic
efforts; however, in this case, diplomatic and economic efforts were used together.
219 Tom Lantos, Halting the Nuclear Black Market (SFGate.com, Mar. 30 2004); available from
<www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/03/30/EDGL05T5KN1.DTL>.
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Table 5.6 Cases of Multilateral and US-led Efforts
Classification Description Example
-Preventing the use of international financial system
for conducting transactions
-Preventing money transfers
-Prohibition on granting loans and opening credit
lines
-Freezing of proliferators' assets abroad
North Korea,
Economic S220*Preventing the acquisition of material or technology Iran, Iraq,
s Sanction 2  -Barring the dual-use items to proliferators 'i '
-Embargoing advanced war materiel Paki A,
-Preventing participation in advanced studies
-Halting IAEA technical assistance in the nuclear
field
-Restriction on the acquisition of specific items
-Restriction on the acquisition of advanced
technology
- Economic incentives North Korea.
Economic . South Africa,
options Incentives Nuclear Supply Assurances, financial benefit,Brzl
nuclear technology transfer Brazi,
Argentina
South Korea,
Pressures - US-led Diplomatic Pressure Taiwan,
Iran
- Multilateral Talks North Korea,
Iran
Diplomatic - Security Assurance Provision
options (i)United Nations Security Council resolutions 255 South Korea,
Incentives (1968) Taiwan,
and 984 (1995); Taian,
(ii)Effective international arrangements to assure Japan,
non-nuclear- weapon States against the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons;
5.11.2 Multilateral Military Efforts
A. Military Actions
Military options are always considered if a proliferator seeks a nuclear weapons program despite
peaceful international efforts. Military options should be the last measure to deal with a proliferator due
to possible negative consequences. In this case, legality issues may arise in executing multilateral
220 Aharon Zeevi Farkash, Iranian Strategic Vulnerabilities: Implications for Policy Options to Halt the Iranian
Nuclear Program (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs); available from http://www.jcpa.org/text/iran_page 38-
43.pdf.. Economic sanctions include trade wars, and economic warfare and financial restrictions (Mostly through
authorization by UNSC). Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work?," International Security 22,
no. 2 (Autumn 1997).
118
efforts. The UN Charter Chapter VII, Article 51 provides the right to take military action for self-
defense either individually or collectively, until the UNSC has taken measures necessary. m
A group of states or an individual state can use military efforts in anticipation of justification of
their actions pursuant to Article 51. Israel's action in attacking and destroying the Syrian nuclear facility
on September 6, 2007 was almost certainly a breach of international law, whether the facility was for
military purposes or civilian purposes.m As Syria had not yet attacked Israel, any justification for
Israel's use of force pursuant to Article 51 must have been found, if at all, by resort to the principle of
anticipatory self-defense.m
Possible multilateral military options can be military strikes, military augmentation, or military
withdrawal. Flournoy (1993) suggests deterrence, preventive war, preemption, and defense as
possible U.S. military options in dealing with nuclear proliferation. He also stresses the importance of
declaratory policy and political support for U.S. military options.22 s
Saunders (2003) provides possible military options in case of a nuclear proliferation crisis at
tactical level. 226 Generally, there are three issues when military strike option is considered:
- Locating all facilities and fissile material stocks that could be used in a nuclear weapons program;
- Possessing the capability to destroy these targets; and
- Preventing a proliferator from military retaliation with artillery fire, missiles strikes, chemical or
biological weapons use, escalation to a full-scale conventional war, or nuclear weapons.227
B. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
On May 31, 2003 President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is a
global initiative aimed at stopping shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery
systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI can work as a means to complement existing export
221 This article has been cited as support the legality of the Vietnam War.
222 Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits uses of force "against the territorial integrity" of any other
state. States retain the inherent right of self-defense as defined in Article 51 of the Charter. Article 51 allows
unilateral acts of force in self-defense on a temporary basis "if an armed attack occurs" against a member of the
United Nations.
223 Daniel Joyner, "North Korean Links to Building of a Nuclear Reactor in Syria," Implicationsfor International
Law 12, no. 8 (2008).
224 For more discussion on "preventive war", see Jeffrey Record, "Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and
Counterproliferation," Policy Analysis 519 (2004).
225 Michele A. Flournoy, "Chapter 6. Implications for U.S. Military Strategy," in New Nuclear Nations:
Consequences for U.S. Policy, ed. Robert D. Blackwell and Albert Carnesale (New York, NY: The Council on
Foreign Relations, 1993). Philip Zelikov, "Chapter 7. Offensive Military Options," in New Nuclear Nations:
Consequences for U.S. Policy, ed. Robert D. Blackwell and Albert Carnesale (New York, NY: The Council on
Foreign Relations, 1993)., pp. 16 2 -19 5. He suggests three sets of variables (timing and context for offensive action,
the nature of adversary, the targeting objectives) for the use of military force to eliminate the danger of nuclear
proliferation and explains some strategic issues including risks of military operations.
2 26 Philip C. Saunders, North Korea Special Collection: Military Options for Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear
Program (2003); available from http://cns.miis.edu/north korea/dprkmil.htm.
227 The last factor should be carefully reviewed during analysis process for adopting military options. In addition,
Iran had the largest combined oil and gas reserve in the world and it may try economic retaliation using 'oil
embargo' that can lead to the world economy depression.
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control systems because it provides the international community with an effective means to take
physical actions that support UNSC 1540 (2004) by interdicting illicit shipment or transfer of WMD-
related components. The PSI can be interpreted as multilateral military efforts for nuclear
nonproliferation; however, the Initiative's action is not an engagement but rather a preemptive measure.
The PSI has carried out three kinds of activity in order to strengthen its capabilities; (1)
interdiction operations, (2) interdiction exercises, and (3) Operation Expert Group (OEG) meetings.228
The PSI has been credited with the seizure of the centrifuge components on the BBC China, which
resulted in the renouncement of the Libyan clandestine nuclear weapons program. The development of
information sharing and arrangements for practical operation though the PSI has the potential to make a
very important contribution to the effective enforcement of export controls.
One of the challenges of the PSI is that it has no legal background. The PSI is a set of activities,
neither a formal treaty-based organization nor arrangements and agreements. Furthermore, in
accordance with the Sea Convention, the Initiative is in conflict with the right of innocent passage,
which gives the ships the rights of freedom of seas and innocent passage. In this regard, the PSI cannot
alone fix the fundamental weaknesses of the current MECRs exposed by the discovery of the Khan
network.
5.12 Laws and Systems of Participating States (The U.S. Case)
International treaties or agreements should be reflected into legislation in order to have robust legal
effects from the perspective of international law. It takes a while for international treaties to have legal
effects in member states and in the international community.229 Even though international treaties are
legislated, they will be practically effective only after a national system to fulfill treaty requirement is
set up. It takes also time to settle administrative procedures for implementation. In particular, national
export control systems should be established in a way that can be harmonized with MECRs.
In this study, the U.S. national system for nonproliferation is studied because the U.S. has a
well-organized legal framework to control illicit trade of nuclear elements. The U.S. governmental
organizations that work for nuclear non-proliferation include the Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC),
Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS),
Department of Energy (DOE), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Security Council
(NSC). Specific roles are explained in Appendix. However, it should be noted that the strong will of
228 Operational Expert Group (OEG) meetings, which are meetings of enforcement officers, can be regarded as a
kind of steering committee for the PSI. The OEG meetings are an opportunity for core PSI participants to work on
information sharing arrangements and operational concepts for interdictions based on the experience gained in
actual operations and exercises. Ian Anthony, Christer Ahlstr6m, and Vitaly Fedchenko, Reforming Nuclear
Export Control: The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (New York: 2007: Oxford University Press Inc.
2007)., pp. 10 9 -11 1.
229 Sharon Hanson, Legal Method & Reasoning, 2nd ed. (London, U.K.: Cavendish Publishing Co., 2003).,
pp.115-117.
230 Sabatier and Mazmanian, "Chapter 1. The Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis."
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states to comply with the NPT regime is critical to preventing nuclear proliferation. All supplier states
may be occasionally tempted to sell nuclear-related items for economic and/or political reasons.
5.13 Quantification of the NPT regime effectiveness
5.13.1 Walsh' Approach
Before the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) was negotiated in the 1960s, it was widely assumed
that proliferation is inevitable and about 25 states would have nuclear weapons capability by the end of
twentieth century.' In this context, the NPT is often considered to be a success in a sense that only
three states have proliferated nuclear weapons after the NPT entered into force. Walsh (2006) argues
that the success of the NPT is being largely ignored despite the NPT's contribution to nuclear
nonproliferation. He further claims that the nuclear nonproliferation regime was one of the biggest and
unheralded public policy achievements in the twentieth century.m This argument brings up the need of
quantitative methods to measure whether the NPT regime has been successful or not.
Walsh (2006) also suggests that there are three standards in measuring success and failure of
the NPT regime: the perfection standard, the pragmatists' standard, and comparative performance
standard. He argues that 75% of countries that could have become nuclear weapons states decided to
remain non-nuclear weapons states.m The effectiveness of the NPT regime can be quantified using his
argument as follows:
Number of States Acquired Nuclear Weapons 8
Effectivess =1- = - 0.75 .... (5.2)NPT Number of States with Potential Nuclear Capability 32
5.13.2 Helm and Sprinz's Approach
The concept of regime effectiveness in international environmental regimes developed by Helm and
Sprinz (2000) may be applicable to measure the effectiveness of nuclear nonproliferation because
verification technologies are important factors in the success of regimes in both NPT regime and
international environmental regimes. Some may argue that a direct application of this method to the
NPT regime because this method is developed in the study of international environmental regimes,
which has very different features from the NPT regime. First, the amount of environmental pollution
can be quantified in a continuous fashion, whereas the nuclear proliferation is binary. Second, the
231 John Carlson, Russell Leslie, and Annette Berriman, "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime" (paper
presented at the 44th Annual Meeting of the INMM, Phoenix, AZ, July 13-17 2003).
32 Jim Walsh, "Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-Proliferation" (paper presented at the
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Stockholm, Sweden, Oct. 2005).
233 Ibid. He only provides the list of 24 potential nuclear weapons states that remained non-nuclear. Having
considered that only 8 states had successfully detonated nuclear weapons (in his case, he excluded North Korea),
eight states out of a total of 32 states gives the number that only 25 percent of states with nuclear weapons states
actually obtained nuclear weapons capability.
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impact of environmental pollution is steady, whilst that of nuclear proliferation is volatile. However,
this review has some values that the effectiveness of the NPT regime may be quantified despite its
possible flaws.
The concept of perfect standard discussed by Walsh (2006) is used, the effectiveness score of the NPT
regime can be obtained in the following:
- Collective optimum: no country has acquired since the NPT (i.e., perfect standard)
- Non-regime counterfactual: the number of states that would have acquired these weapons without
the NPT
- Actual performance: the number of states that has acquired a nuclear weapons capability.
We can assume that the non-regime counterfactual is 25 and actual performance is 4. This is based
on the fact that India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea have acquired nuclear weapons capability.
The effectiveness of the current NPT regime (ENPT) can be obtained with equation above
AP-NR 4-25
CO-NR 0-25
5.13.3 Competitive Approach
Figure 5.8 shows the relationship between the states that successfully tested nuclear weapons and the
newly-introduced NPT regime components over time. It seems that there were four nuclear arms race
periods from the 1940s to the 2000s including the one that we are facing now. If the slopes for each
period are compared, they appear to go down and the NPT regime seems to be very effective in the
1980s and 1990s. However, in assessing whether the NPT regime has been effective, two time factors
should considered. First, some delays should be considered between the time when a new NPT regime
component was introduced and when it became effective as a practical method. Second, it takes a while
to complete a nuclear weapons program as noted in Chapters 3 and 4. In this regard, even though the
figure seems to show that the NPT regime was effective in the 1980s and 1990s, it cannot be obviously
said that the NPT regime was really effective.
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Figure 5.8 Nuclear Proliferation and the NPT Regime over Time
5.14 Resources of the NPT Regime
5.14.1 Implementation Resources of the NPT regime
Implementation resources of the NPT regime can be interpreted as the combination of membership of
NPT regime components and domestic efforts to reflect those components in the form of legislation.
However, only membership of the main components in the NPT regime is shown in Table 5.7 because
domestic efforts are state-specific and beyond the scope of this study.
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Notes
[a]. Australia Treaty of Rarotonga of 1985, Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, Treaty of Pelindaba of 1964
[b]. CTBT: <http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user upload/procurement/CTBTOMemberStates.doc
[c]. ZC: <http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Zangger/Members/default.htm>
[d]. NSG: <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/member.htm>
[e]. WA: <http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html>
[f]. PSI: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm>
[g] X denotes that the country has membership in the NPT regime component.
5.14.2 Verification Resources of the NPT Regime
The NPT regime continues to face a shortage of verification resources. The IAEA is the only
component that has verification resources. The NPT regime's verification resources fail to keep pace
with the increasing verification demand because of the development and spread of nuclear technology.
The dual characteristic of nuclear energy technology continuously poses an additional challenge to the
NPT regime. The IAEA has been developing a system to optimize the use of its limited resources such
as the Integrated Safeguards System (ISS) and information analysis system.
5.14.3 Compliance-Enforcement Resources of the NPT Regime
The NPT regime does not have explicit compliance-enforcing resources. And most nonproliferation
regime components are not legally-binding. As a result, the use of correcting or punishing measures is
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very limited in the NPT regime, which can be regarded as the weakest point of the NPT regime. For
example, the NPT has no enforcement clause; therefore, the NPT provides no penalties for quitting or
violating the treaty. As a partial solution, the UNSC can provide compliance-enforcing resources if the
IAEA requests. In the case of non-compliance in the NPT regime, a variety of response measures are
available by the UNSC, ranging from diplomatic, economic to military measures. The policy choice
between economic sanctions and military coercion crosscuts the theoretical divide in international
relations theory between liberal insitutionalism and realism.23 4 Table 5.8 shows the available resources
of all the NPT regime components.
Table 5.8 Summary the NPT Regime's Resources
nentation
ources
Verification
Resources
Compliance-
Enforcement
Resources
Classification ImpleRes
Treaty NPT
IAEA
International UNSC
Organization
UN
MECRs NSG, WA, ZC
PSI
Multilteral Intelligence
Cooperation comnt
Diplomatic
cooperation
Domestic Laws and
systems systems
FMCT
Complementary CTBT
Treaties
I NWFZ
A
A
Possibly IAEA235 N/A
CTBTO N/A
A A
Notes
[a] 0 and A denote direct possession and indirect possession, respectively.
[b] FMCT and CTBT are not effective yet and NWFZ is applied only in the region where it is established.
5.15. Capabilities of the NPT Regime
The IAEA defines that the safeguards system consists of "three, interrelated elements: (i) the Agency's
statutory authority to establish and administer safeguards; (ii) the rights and obligations assumed in
safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and (iii) the technical measures implemented pursuant
234 Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work?."235Hui Zhang, "Should and Can the FMCT Be Effectively Verified?," INESAP Information Bulletin 28 (April
2008).
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to those agreements." 2 36 John Carlson et al., (2006) 237 suggest that the IAEA's safeguards
capabilities can be considered in two broad categories, technical and legal. The next step for this
paper, then, is to conceptualize the legal and technical capabilities of components of regimes in relation
to resources of regimes. In this paper, John Carlson et al. (2006)'s view is used and is defined as follows.
- Legal capabilities - organization's statutory authority to exercise its legal rights and responsibilities
- Technical capabilities - technical measures and technical expertise to conduct verification activities
The capabilities of all NPT regime components can be analyzed using this framework and
Figure 5.9 and Table 5.9 show the analysis of the capabilities. However, it should be noted that they are
dependent upon each other.
UNGA Res.
United UNCD 48051 (1993)
Nations FMCT(1945) (1979) ,(1945).. ..
UNSC Res. 1540 UN Charter
i15 4 [0 UNSC Chapter Vil
C t Resolutions --------- UNSC
09%
.......- Art. X
CTBT : CTBTO ,-'(1996)
NPT
(1970)
NWFZ IAEA Not Effective
Ratification (1957) YetIA E
ecN Enhancement
Art. 111.2
Os Direct
Relationship
States
ZC-Cooperative
Relationship
Figure 5.9 Legal Framework of the NPT Regime via the NPT
236 "IINFCIRC/640, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report Submitted to the
Director General of the IAEA," (Vienna, Austria: IAEA, Feb. 2005).
237 Carlson and Leslie, "Safeguards Intensity as a Function of Safeguards Status".
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Table 5.9 Capabilities of NPT Regime Components
Components Legal capabilities Technical capabilities
- NPT
IAEA - Safeguards techniques
- Safeguards agreements
- Resolutions under the UN Charter
International UNSC Chapter VII N/A
organizations 
- UNSC 1540 Committee
- UN Charter and UNGA resolution 377
UNGA N/A
________ 
_(V) of 1950
- Authorization systems of member
MECRs NSG, WA, ZC states - Information analysis
- International cooperation system
PSI - Interdiction operations N/A
Intelligence - National TechnicalMultilateral Information collection and sharing(NTMs)
Cooperation community
Diplomatic 
- Incentives, sanctions and pressures N/A
cooperation
- National export control system - Border control system
Domestic Legislation andDmstic Lgsatin a Systems of Accounting for and - Physical protection
systems system Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) system
FMCT * International treaty - Similar to safeguards
- International
Complementary CTBT - International treaty Monitoring System
- Data Analysis System
NWFZ - NPT and UN -Similar to safeguards
5.16 Conclusion
A regime theory and its application to the NPT regime, the components of the NPT regime, and a
theoretical approach to evaluate the power and effectiveness of the NPT regime at international level
were reviewed. For the evaluation of the effectiveness of the NPT regime, both quantitative and
qualitative ways were studied. There have been a number of disputes about whether the NPT regime has
been really effective. However, the study showed that the NPT regime contributed to the deterrence of
potential proliferators from proliferating.
Reviewing the evolution of the NPT regime, most non-proliferation measures were
implemented after nuclear proliferation events had occurred. In addition, there was a delay for a newly-
introduced NPT regime component to become effective. Therefore, the development of analytical tools
for evaluating the NPT regime will be helpful when developing policies to prevent future nuclear
proliferation. This tool would help analyze strengths and weaknesses of the NPT regime to prevent, or
at least, deter nuclear proliferation.
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CHAPTER 6 OVERVIEW OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS
6.1 Introduction
Article III of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires each member state to conclude a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 238 The NPT entitles the IAEA to verify that no member state is in
violation of the NPT in order to assure the international community. The IAEA should have enough
capabilities to verify states' declarations and to detect undeclared facilities or activities. Among various
systems in the IAEA, IAEA safeguards system is a means for verification and it encompasses the
Agency's statutory authority, the rights and obligations, and technical measures for verification. If
safeguards cannot detect proliferation activities, the NPT regime will collapse.
In this regard, it is critical to understand the capabilities of the IAEA safeguards. However, the
IAEA has several types of safeguards, specific to each member state. Because different safeguards types
provide different capabilities to the IAEA, the IAEA's capabilities will vary significantly depending on
which types of safeguards agreements was concluded between the IAEA and each member state. In this
study, the IAEA's safeguards capabilities is analyzed in terms of technical and legal capabilities.23 9 This
chapter will focus on the review of IAEA safeguards for legal capabilities.
6.2 The IAEA and Safeguards
The IAEA's legal basis for continuing safeguards activities is given by the NPT because the NPT
mandates its member states to establish safeguard agreements with the IAEA. Without the NPT, key
elements of nuclear fuel cycles would be excluded from safeguards coverage, although some nuclear
facilities and materials would be still covered by only non-NPT safeguards.240 IAEA Statute Article A.6
gives designated IAEA inspectors access and their inspection rights.
The IAEA's relationship with the UN is regulated by special agreement INFCIRC/1 1 signed on
October 30, 1959.241 In terms of its Statute, IAEA Statute XII, Agency Safeguards, the IAEA Board of
238 Each state party should commence the negotiation of IAEA safeguards agreements within 180 days from the
entry into the NPT. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than 18 months after the date of initiation of
negotiations.
239 Carlson and Leslie, "Safeguards Intensity as a Function of Safeguards Status". Legal authority issues generally
involve the IAEA's access to specific locations; the IAEA's access to particular information; and its right to
question personnel. The IAEA's legal capability is to facilitate employment of particular safeguards measures.
Issues of the IAEA's authority will concern the IAEA's right of access to specific locations. They can also relate
to the IAEA's right to request particular information, and its right to question specific persons. Technical detection
capability includes inspection capability and monitoring capability. There are some overlaps between techniques
for inspection and monitoring activities such as satellite imagery and environmental sampling.
240Simpson and Howlett, "The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling toward 1995." Currently, the IAEA has 145
members, while the NPT has 189 member states.
241 D.M. Edwards, "International Legal Aspects of Safeguards and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,"
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 33, no. 1 (Jan. 1984).The UNGAs of 1954 and 1955 reached
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Governors reports to the UNGA and to the UNSC regarding non-compliance by States with their
safeguard obligations as well as on matters relating to international peace and security. The UNSC and
IAEA are partners within the UN system and the UNSC has authority to empower the IAEA to act on
its behalf to help the UNSC meet its obligations.
Office of the Director
General of the IAEA
Figure 6.1 IAEA Organizational Chart
The IAEA has six departments as shown Figure 6.1, with the IAEA Department of Safeguards
serving as organizational hub for the IAEA's safeguards work. Similar regional agencies are
EURATOM and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
(ABACC) established through regional safeguards arrangements.
the view that the IAEA should not be a specialized agency of the UN but an autonomous organization with co-
operative links with the UN and the various relevant UN organs.
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6.3 Historical Background of IAEA Safeguards
The IAEA safeguards system 242 has evolved over time to deal properly with threats. The types of
Safeguards Agreements currently available pursuant to the NPT are summarized in Table 6.1. All of
these safeguards systems differ in the undertakings, the obligations and scope of IAEA verification
activities.
Table 6.1 Types of IAEA Safeguards
Safeguards Title IAEA Reference Since Current Applicationdocument
Item-(or facility) specific 1965INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 Non-NPT SignatoriesSafeguards Agreement (before NPT)
Comprehensive Safeguards NNWS of NPT member
Agreements (CSA) or
Full-Scope Safeguards (FSS) 1970 stte
Voluntary Offer Agreements INFCIRC/153
(VOA) 24 3  NWS
Small Quantities Protocol WSW
(sP)441974 NNWS4(SQP)244
Additional Protocol (AP) INFCIRC/540 1997 All states with any type of
safeguards agreement
In establishing safeguards agreements between states and the IAEA, the membership of the
NPT, the nuclear status of states, i.e., Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) or Non-Nuclear Weapon States
(NNWS), and the existence of significant nuclear activities are the factors that determine the type of
safeguards that will be applied.
INFCIRC/66 was the original IAEA safeguards that existed before the NPT entered into force.
After the entry into force of the NPT, INFCIRC/153 was introduced in order to deal with proliferation
of nuclear weapons. As a result of the detection of Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program, "93+2
242 Webster dictionary defines safeguard as a precautionary measure, stipulation, or device b: a technical
contrivance to prevent accident. Lovett defines safeguards as "a collective term that comprises those measures
designed to guard against the diversion of material such as source and special nuclear material from uses
permitted by law or treaty, and to give timely indication of possible diversion or credible assurance that no
diversion has occurred. James E. Lovett, Nuclear Materials : Accountability, Management, Safeguards ([Hinsdale,
Ill.]: American Nuclear Society, 1974)..
243 NWSs have entered into limited scope VOA (voluntary offer safeguards agreements) modeled in CSAs. These
VOA agreements place no obligation on the state in relation to the nuclear materials to be subject to safeguards
and they permit the state to withdraw nuclear materials and to remove facilities from the list designated by the
state which the IAEA can select for the purposes of safeguards implementation.
244Russell Leslie, John Carlson, and Annette Berriman, "Ensuring Effective Safeguards Coverage of States with
Small Quantities Protocols," Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (2007).
245 The standard text of SQP was first introduced in 1971, and was available to States which had less than
specified quantities of nuclear material and no nuclear material in a nuclear facility. For such States, safeguards
implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. Small Quantities Protocol is designed to apply
safeguards for most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear
material. (states with no significant nuclear activities)
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program" was applied as a temporary measure to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards. The IAEA ended
up the Additional Protocol (AP) to equip the IAEA with important new tools and systems for
verification. However, the IAEA is still under scrutiny as to whether the Additional Protocol (AP) has
sufficient authority and capabilities to deal with current proliferation challenges.
6.4 Facilities and Materials under Safeguards
6.4.1 IAEA Safeguards on Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
The application of IAEA safeguards is undergoing development. Table 6.2 shows the evolution of
safeguards for a variety of nuclear facilities in a nuclear fuel cycle.
Table 6.2 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Safeguards Types Applied
First application of Related
Type of Facility First recognition safeguads
safeguards Articles
Large Reactor Facilities INFCIRC/26/Add. 1 (1964) All
Plutonium Reprocessing Facilities INFCIRC/66/Rev.1 (1966) Annex I
Uranium Conversion Facilities246 [e]
Annex II
Fuel Fabrication Plants INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (1968)
Separate Storage Installation 61-66
Isotope Separation Plants INFCIRC/153/Corrected (1972) 106
Uranium Mines and INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 INFCIRC/540 248  2.a.(v) [c]
Concentration Plants (U. Th)2 7[d (1968) [b]
Nuclear material outside facilities 49
Location Outside Facilities (LOF) (INFCIRC/153)
Operational status of LOF (INFCIRC/540) 2.a.(ii)
Notes
[a] 26 and 66 from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf66r2.shtml
[b] This document mentions that a mine or an ore-processing plant is not under safeguards.
[c] The provision of this information does not require detailed NMA.
[d] Article 78. This plant is expressed as "Ore-Processing Plant" in INFCIRC/66/Rev.2
[e] The IAEA did not conduct verification measures at UCFs until the 2000s. Safeguards verification typically
begins after the uranium conversion process at the head end of the facility.
246 K. E. Owen, "Implementation of IAEA Policy Paper 18 in Canada, IAEA-CN-148/39" (paper presented at the
International Safeguards Symposium, Vienna, Austria, Oct. 16-20, 2006).; Jay Doo et al., "Safeguards Approach
for Natural Uranium Conversion Plants" (paper presented at the 44th Annual Meeting of Institute of Nuclear
Material Management, Phoenix, AZ, Jul 13-17 2003).
247 R. Scott Kemp, "On the Feasibility of Safeguarding Uranium Mines," Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 2 (Jul.
2006).
248 The Additional Protocol Article 2 (v) prescribes that "Information specifying the location, operational status
and the estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines and concentration plants and thorium
concentration plants, and the current annual production of such mines and concentration plants for .......... as a
whole. .......... shall provide, upon request by the Agency, the current annual production of an individual mine or
concentration plant. The provision of this information does not require detailed Nuclear Material Accountancy
(NMA)."
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Safeguards for large reactor facilities have the longest history of application. The IAEA has
limited experience applying safeguards to sensitive nuclear facilities: PRFs and UEFs. Developing
safeguards approaches for Uranium Enrichment Facilities (UEFs) and Plutonium Reprocessing
Facilities (PRFs) are still on-going. The IAEA started the routine application of safeguards to PRFs
since May 1977 and to UEFs since 1979 (at Almelo and Capenhurst). 249
The weakest part in applying safeguards to nuclear fuel cycle is uranium mining and milling
facilities. It is not easy to develop safeguards for these facilities that can achieve safeguards
objectives. 250 The AP requires states to provide information about those facilities, but it still lacks
capability to achieve the IAEA's safeguards objectives.
6.4.2 Materials under Safeguards
Article III.2 of the NPT tells each state party to the treaty undertakes not to provide nuclear material
(i.e., special fissionable material and source material) to any NNWS for peaceful purposes, unless it is
subject to safeguards. The IAEA safeguards provides guidelines what kinds of and how nuclear material
is safeguarded because it is not possible to safeguard all types and quantities of nuclear materials.
However, some of nuclear materials are not under safeguards and those are listed in Table 6.3. But it
should be noted that exemptions of nuclear material from safeguards are not available unless material is
first declared and agreed by the IAEA at the request of the state.
Table 6.3 Comparison of CSA and AP for Safeguards Application Concerning Nuclear
Material
Classification Description CSA AP [e]
All source or special fissionable material in all
Nuclear
peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the
material
state
Other than Uranium Ore Concentrate (UOC)
Source Uranium Ore Concentrate (UOC)
[34] [2a(vi)()
material
International transfer of UOC for non-nuclear X
purposes [34(a)(b)]
(Continued)
249 IAEA, "The Present Status of IAEA Safeguards on Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities," IAEA Bulletin 22, no. 3/4
(1980). This document states that the IAEA had three enrichment plants under safeguards in 1980 under an ad-hoc
regime. The IAEA started applying safeguards on a routine basis at the URENCO and Japanese facilities soon
after completion of the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP) in 1983. The details about HSP are available in
chapter 10.
210 Kemp, "On the Feasibility of Safeguarding Uranium Mines.".
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Special fissionable material used in gram quantities X
X
or less [36.(a)]
Used in non-nuclear activities in a non-nuclear end- X 0
use form [36.(b)] [2.a.(vii)7
Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of Pu-238 X
Exemption exceeding 80% [36.(c)]
XOfrom One kg in total of special fissionable material [a
safeguards
Ten metric tons of NU and DU with an UER 0.5%
[37.(b)] [dv)
Twenty metric tons of DU with an UER 0.5% or X
below [37.(c)] [2
X
Twenty metric tons of thorium
[37.(d)] [2.O.(viW
Consumed or diluted nuclear material, which has X X
Termination
become practically irrecoverable [11, 35] [2a(viii)]
Exempted material is to be processed or stored
Re-application together with safeguarded nuclear material
of safeguards Further processing of intermediate or high-level X
waste containing plutonium
Notes
[a] X and 0 (in green boxes) stand for "subject to safeguards" and "not subject to safeguards," respectively.
[b] Nuclear materials in a non-nuclear end-use form means that it has not reached to the composition and purity
suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched)
[c] Italic (in yellow boxes) means that the provision of information does not require detailed Nuclear Material
Accountancy (NMA).
[d] Numbers in parentheses refer to articles and paragraphs in the AP and CSA, respectively.
[e] The quantities and detailed NMA requirement for reporting should be referred to INFCIRC/540.
[fl For example, uranium in phosphate ore for manufacture of fertilizer.
Figure 6.2 presents a flow chart describing the applicability of safeguards for different types of nuclear
materials and facilities covered under the CSA and the AP. The chart is useful in understanding under
which circumstances safeguards are not applied.
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Safeguards are slit [-No
applied.I
Safeguards are not applied to uranium
ore or ore residue [3,112}
U mines octrafonPlants
Is material imported or
exported?
Is the material
for nuclear purposes?
34(a)(b)]
All source or special fissionable material [21
YES
Safeguards e
applied.
ceeding one
Anual reporting effective kg within 3months?
92,95]
YES
IAEA maintains Early notification
record [12] [92,95] 1
YES
Safeguards are not
applied.
Not under safeguards
Under safeguards
(a) Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
All source or special fissionable material
[2] of CA[under safeguards 2a(v)]
r--- - ts nuearpmaeeaij Safeguards are not l+ No I p reprt angCFte Can be exempled
applied under CSA. i 'o udar purposes? slage? [3(c)]
NO YES
I I
Applicaton ofAP - - - .-.-.. AppricatiorloWA -.-..... Application of AP- ------ - -
I I t
Safeguardse 
not applied.
Safeguards e appled feguards areapplied. Safeguards e not:applied,
YES
Application f
-Application of AP Additional Protocol
meAP?(2'arviii)
Numbers in[ ] denotes Para.
of CSA orArt of AP
YES
UnderCA
Safeguards re not
applied UnderAP
(b) Under Additional Protocol with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
Figure 6.2 Flow Chart for Safeguards Application under CSA and AP
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Safeguards are not
applied
6.5 Types of IAEA Safeguards
There are several types of safeguard regimes in existence. These include: INFCIRC/66, INFCIRC/153,
INFCIRC/ 153 coupled with INFCIRC/540, and Integrated Safeguards (IS). In general, only one of these
safeguard regimes applies to a given member state at any given time. The following will provide a
general background for understanding IAEA's safeguard regimes.
6.5.1 INFCIRC/66
INFCIRC/66 was established before the NPT entered into force.25 1 India, Israel, and Pakistan, which are
not state parties to the NPT, have this type of safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This is a partial
safeguards applied since 1965. It requires a state to report to the IAEA about its stockpile and provides
access to limited nuclear facilities declared by a state. However, this type of safeguards only applied to
fuel manufacturing plants. INFCIRC/66 was provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968 as
INFCIRC/66/Rev.1 and INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. INFCIRC/66/Rev.1 was published to provide additional
provisions for reprocessing plants and INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 was to provide further provisions for
safeguarded nuclear material in uranium conversion plants and fuel fabrication plants.
6.5.2 INFCIRC/153 (Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements)
INFCIRC/153 type safeguards is the most common type of safeguards, and this type is called
comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) or full-scope safeguards (FSS) system. INFCIRC/153 is
designed to focus on Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA), and it provides the IAEA with the right
and obligation to ensure safeguards are applied to all nuclear material through inspection activities.
A. Authority of the IAEA
The objective of INFCIRC/153 agreements is to confirm the correctness of states' declarations in terms
of nuclear material through the timely detection of any diversion of significant quantities252 of nuclear
material as declared by the state from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosives, or for any other purpose.
251 However, this type of safeguards is still legally binding. Para 4 of Article I.A. of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 states that
"Provision of this document...will only become legally binding upon the entry into force of a safeguards
agreement....."
252 Timely detection and significant quantity are noteworthy in the statement. The IAEA set the timeliness goal to
prevent proliferators from diverting material into nuclear weapons manufacture. The IAEA also defines a
significant quantity as "The approximate quantity of nuclear material in respect of which, taking into account any
conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded."
The quantities given which are relevant to an enrichment plant are 25 kg of U-235 in uranium enriched to 20 per
cent or more, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and 75 kg of U-235enriched to lower values, low-enriched uranium.
The difference in mass is due to the assumption that the conversion process difficulty in enriching to weapon-
grade levels.
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B. Undertakings of States
INFCIRC/153 requires all members to create a State System of Accounting for and Control of its
nuclear material (SSAC), to be responsible for implementing effective accountancy arrangements, and
to control imports and exports of nuclear material,m coupled with a Voluntary Reporting Scheme (VRS)
of 1993 whose components are incorporated in the AP. INFCIRC/153 greatly strengthened the
capabilities and authority of the IAEA. However, the limitations of INFCIRC/153 should be clearly and
carefully understood. Often, IAEA's authority based on INFCIRC/153 type is not understood correctly
owing to its name, full-scope safeguards. It requires additional measures to enhance IAEA's
safeguarding capacities because it is only focused on material diversion at declared facilities.
Limitations caused by focusing on nuclear material are in the following:
C. Limitations of the CSA
Despite the authority given to the IAEA, the CSA allows only limited access to limited facilities and
poses some problems. First, the application of safeguards is limited to nuclear material. Therefore,
inspection activities cannot be performed at facilities that have nothing to do with nuclear material such
as a nuclear weapon design program or manufacturing facilities for equivalent to a weapon and
clandestine facilities not declared by a state. Second, full-access is not given to IAEA inspectors at
declared facilities. Even at declared facilities that are related to NMA, locations open to inspection
activities are limited to particular points where nuclear material is expected to flow (i.e., strategic or key
measuring points) 254. Third, the IAEA has very limited means to resolve any issues in the event that
NMA is not correct. Even though a special inspection can be used under INFCIRC/1 53, few have been
invoked because neither the IAEA nor the states on the BOG wanted to raise any politically delicate
doubts about either the reliability of CSA or the honesty of some NPT parties.25 s Fourth, under the CSA,
safeguards do not involve any specific measures for detection of undeclared feed or the undeclared
product and tails that might be produced from it. Hence, INFCIRC-153 safeguards are not able to cover
detection of clandestine acquisition activities. Finally, the IAEA allocated its safeguard resources purely
based on the size of the nuclear fuel cycle, which resulted in the concentration of its effort on the highly
253 Under CSAs, States are required to declare the types and quantities of material subject to safeguards in an
initial report on nuclear material. Any subsequent import or export of nuclear material is also to be reported, this
may be done in a consolidated annual report.
254 For access for inspections, please refer to paragraph 76 (c) and (d) of INFCIRC/153.
255 The IAEA invoked the special inspection provision on two occasions: Romania in 1992 and North Korea in
1993. The IAEA conducted Romanian inspection and Romania actually asked to be inspected to build confidence
that it had abandoned the Ceausescu regime's nuclear weapons program. But, North Korea refused to allow
it.James M. Acton, Mark Fitzpatrick, and Pierre Goldschmidt, The Iaes Should Callfor a Special Inspection in
Syria. (Carnegic Endowment for Internatioal Peace, Feb. 26 2009 [cited Mar. 15 2009]); available from
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index/cfm?fa=view&id= 22 7 9 1>.. For more information
concerning procedures, refer to Paragraphs 73, 77, and 83 (b) of INFCIRC/ 53.
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developed countries with large fuel cycle facilities. Consequently, few resources were allocated for
unpredictable countries with declared fuel cycle of small size.256
6.5.3 Additional Protocols (INFCIRC/540)
INFCIRC/540 type safeguards are called the Additional Protocol (AP) to the Agreement. The term
Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS) is used for the combination of the CSA and the AP. This type of
safeguards was developed in a response to lessons learned from the case of Iraq. Iraq was an NPT state
subject to a CSA, but the IAEA did not discover an extensive clandestine nuclear weapons program in
Iraq until it was made known after the Gulf War. It led the IAEA to conclude that the CSA, which
concentrates on verifying nuclear material accountancy (NMA) only at facilities declared by a State,
was inadequate. The IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) requested that its Standing Advisory Group on
Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) propose ways to strengthen safeguards system of the IAEA.
A. Authority of the IAEA
The objective of INFCIRC/540 is to confirm the completeness as well as the correctness of state
declarations by demonstrating the absence of undeclared nuclear material/activities. In this regard,
INFCIRC/540 requires new verification methods and technologies, including information collection and
analysis, advanced environmental sampling, and the use of satellite imagery. The AP improved
capabilities to detect undeclared production of fissile materials on the one hand, but the legal provisions
and the methods to be applied will require several years for full implementation. The AP's major
justification is to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material/activities and the completeness of
state declarations.
From many perspectives, the AP empowers IAEA inspectors to achieve safeguards objectives
with enhanced detection capability and legal authority. The most important feature of the AP for
verification is complementary access given to inspectors. According to complementary access, IAEA
inspectors can be given unlimited and intrusive access - the ability to inspect any location where
undeclared nuclear activities or suspicious activities might be going on, at least theoretically. However,
unlike a special inspection under the CSA, complementary access is regarded as a common process
under the AP for resolving any inconsistencies, without causing any political sensitiveness. Figure 6.3
shows the enhanced verification authority of the IAEA through the AP.
256 About 75 per cent of the routine and ad hoc inspections were conducted in Germany, Japan and Canada.
Wolfgang Fischer and Gotthard Stein, "On-Site Inspections: Experience from Nuclear Safeguarding,"
Disarmament Forum Three (1999).
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Special Inspections
83 (b). As promptly as possible after consultation
73 (a) and (b).
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Figure 6.3 Notice Requirements for Inspections under CSA and AP
B. Undertakings of States
As IAEA inspectors' authority increases, states with the AP in force should provide more extensive
information to the IAEA than with only the CSA. Under the CSA, the Voluntary Reporting Scheme
(VRS), which was endorsed by the BOG in 1993, is not mandatory. However, it is incorporated in the
AP as a mandatory feature for providing extensive information to the IAEA.
C. Limitations
There exist limitations in the application of the AP from the standpoint of both legal authority and
technical capability. First, the membership of the AP is still limited. In order for APs to be fully applied,
member States should conclude safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As of January 2009, only about
89 countries have APs in force as shown in Figure 6.4. In particular, some countries with significant
nuclear activities such as Iran are not participating in the AP. Second, Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG)'s
Dual-Use Items (DUIs) are not included in AP requirements, whereas Zangger Committee (ZC)'s
Especially Designed or Prepared (EDPs) are currently listed in Annex II of the AP.m The collection of
information about Dual-Use Items (DUIs) will be one of the important parts in strengthening IAEA
safeguards. But the volume of legitimate trade, especially in sensitive DUIs is a bit overwhelming and
257Carlson and Leslie, "Safeguards Intensity as a Function of Safeguards Status".. The IAEA needs to review,
update, and expand the control list contained in Annex II to the Additional Protocol.
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would tend to swamp the IAEA's analysts. 258 Third, in practice, IAEA inspectors are not given
unlimited access to nuclear facilities. States can still designate restricted areas, and access to those
restricted areas requires advance notice. A member state can use so-called "managed access" with a
view to preventing the dissemination of proliferation sensitive information.259
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6.5.4. Integrated Safeguards
Since the early 1990s, the Agency has been developing "Integrated Safeguards,"261 to maximize
effectiveness and efficiency within available resources through an optimized combination of all
safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and
additional protocols. This type of safeguards can be a partial solution to resolving the issues of resource
shortage in the IAEA and to reducing burdens of states from the IAEA's inspection activities,
The IAEA must be able to draw two conclusions in order for a state to qualify for the
implementation of integrated safeguards: non-diversion of declared nuclear material; and the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in the states as a whole. These conclusions should be re-
affirmed annually. If the Agency were not able to re-affirm, then corrective actions would be taken.
258 Personal communication with John Carlson and Russell Leslie, Jan.8, 2009.
259 Article 7 of INFCIRC/540 provides the situations where managed access can be applied.26 0Annette Berriman, Russell Leslie, and John Carlson, "Information Analysis for IAEA Safeguards" (paper
presented at the INMM 2004 Symposium, Orlando, FL, July 2004).
61 Jill N. Cooley, "Integrated Nuclear Safeguards: Genesis and Evolution," in Verification Yearbook 2003, ed.
Trevor Findlay (London, United Kingdom: VERTIC, 2003).
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6.6 Overall Schematic of IAEA Safeguards Inspections
IAEA verification systems can be classified into three categories; verification of reported information
by states, verification of absence of non-reported activities or compliance with IAEA safeguards by
inspection system on site, and verification via monitoring. All information gathered through verification
activities is compiled, analyzed, and documented in Safeguards Implementation Reports (SIRs).
According to the type of safeguards applied, different inspection regimes and subsequently, different
detection technologies are applied. In this section, different types of inspection regimes are reviewed.
Different technologies used for verification activities will be reviewed in Chapter 7.
6.6.1. Inspection Regimes
Safeguards visits and inspections are performed by IAEA inspectors at nuclear facilities or Locations
outside Facilities (LOF) based on the safeguards agreement concluded by the IAEA and a state. Four
types of inspections can be applied as shown in Table 6.4. Each type has a different scope, purpose,
frequency, and procedures. These factors will impact the effectiveness of an IAEA inspection.
Table 6.4 Different Types of IAEA's Inspections and Visits under CSA 262
Types Purpose Circumstance Para
-Verification of a State's initial report of
Ad hoc nuclear material or reports on changes 
-Before a subsidiary arrangement 71
inspections -Verification of the nuclear material has entered into force
involved in international transfers
Routine - Regular inspections for verification of -Defined schedule 72
inspections nuclear material accountancy
-Resolution of inconsistent information -If the IAEA estimates that
Special obtained between from routine inspections information made available by the
inspections and declared by states State concerned is not adequate for 73 [a]
263 -Access to information or locations in the IAEA to fulfill its
addition to ad hoc and routine inspections responsibilities under CSA.
-Design Information Verification
-Fact finding and technical discussions in
Safeguards connection with the development of -At appropriate times during the
.i.s safeguards approaches 46-48
-Negotiations and discussions with facility
and State authorities regarding safeguards
implementation matters.
Note: [a] Also Paragraphs 53 and 53 of INFCIRC/66.
262 IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols ([cited
May 5 2009]); available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sgoverview.html..
263 The Director General is empowered to request a special inspection in a CSA state, based upon unresolved
questions that suggest that a state may be in violation of its CSA provisions. The provisions of the AP for
complementary access are intended to improve the ability to resolve significant questions in the light of
experience.
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6.6.2 Randomized Regimes
To increase the efficiency of safeguards through increasing proliferators' unpredictability, the IAEA
developed randomized inspection regimes. Randomized inspection regimes can be categorized
depending on three factors: the nature of the timing of the inspection, the notice given to the facility,
and whether they can occur during off-hours. Current inspection regimes that are available to the IAEA
are shown in Table 6.5:
Table 6.5 IAEA's Randomized Inspections [IAEA Glossary (2001) and Sanborn (2004)] 264
Category Description Reference
Random An inspection performed at a facility or a location outside IAEA
inspections facilities on a date chosen randomly Glossary
-An inspection performed at a facility or a location outside Para 84 of
facilities for which no advance notice is provided by the IAEA to 153Unannounced the State before the arrival of IAEA inspectors. Para 50 of
-These inspections involve very short notice with several hours 66
and can occur at any time including off-hours.
Short notice -An inspection performed at a facility or a location outside Para 72 offacilities for which less advance notice is provided by the IAEA to 153
the State than provided than paragraph 83 of 153.
-An inspection performed both on short notice and randomly (on a
Short Notice date chosen randomly).
Random -Part of a safeguards approach developed for LEU fuel fabrication IAEA
Inspection plants subject to safeguards, in order to provide improved Glossary
(SNRI) coverage of domestic transfers of nuclear material. -SNRIs may
be used at other facilities as necessary, including GCEPs.
Limited Hexapartite
Frequency -Part of safeguards approach developed for GCEPs subject to Safeguards
Unannounced CSA at a stated uranium enrichment level of five percent or less. Project
Access (LFUA) (HSP)
6.7 State Reporting Systems
6.7.1 State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC)
Each State with a CSA is required to establish and maintain a State System of Accounting for and
Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). The SSAC is the state authority which is on, office or persons
who are formally designated to keep track of nuclear material and activities and to interact with national
or international entities such as the IAEA on safeguards implementation measures. An effective SSAC
will require legislation and regulations as well as staff trained on the reporting procedure as shown in
264IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition, International Nuclear Verification Series No.3 (Vienna,
Austria: IAEA, 2002)., pp.8 4-89 . For more discussions see Jonathan Sanbom, "Considerations Regarding the
Scheduling and Implementation of Random and Unannounced Inspections, IAEA-SM-367/12/04," (2004)..
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Figure 6.5. The practice of Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA) begins with facility operators at the
facility level and finishes with the SSAC at the state level.
An effective SSAC contributes to the deterrence and detection of theft or misuse of nuclear
material, thereby contributing to the security of nuclear material and combating illicit trafficking.
Through the IAEA SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS), its legislative and technical assistance programs,
the IAEA helps states develop the laws and regulations, providing recommendations and suggestions
for improvements to their State systems for accountancy and control (SSACs) of nuclear material.265
Figure 6.5 Components of SSAC
6.7.2 Voluntary Reporting Scheme (VRS)
Voluntary Reporting Scheme (VRS) was introduced in 1993 for the voluntary reporting by States of
nuclear material not otherwise required to be reported to the IAEA under CSA, and of exports and
imports of specified equipment and specified non-nuclear material. VRS was later incorporated in
Annex II of INFCIRC/540 with a list of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. Under the AP,
states are required to provide information on uranium mining, nuclear fuel cycle-related research and
development, and the production and transfer of specified items. However, VRS cannot be forced in
states where the AP is not in force, and non-compliance with the VRS is not the violation of IAEA
safeguards.
265 IAEA, "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Security, Overview of Safeguards Requirements for
States with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities," (Jun. 2006)..
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6.7.3. Physical Inventory Verification (PIV)
A. Undertakings of States
Facility operators are supposed to report physical inventories 266 at least once a year to the IAEA. Since
October 1991 all inventory changes must be reported monthly within 30 days after occurrence as
Inventory Change Reports (ICRs). The physical inventory declared by the facility operator is verified
by the IAEA through a Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) inspection. During the period, IAEA
inspectors verify randomly- selected items on the inventory list for existence and consistency with item
descriptions.267
B. Undertakings of the IAEA
The IAEA can establish an itemized list of each facility's nuclear material inventory on the basis of the
data contained in the initial report and subsequent inventory changes. Verification of such itemized lists
can be carried out during the first few months of the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards
agreement. PIV is conducted on a yearly basis by the IAEA to verify the amount of physical inventories
and physical inventory changes (including the analysis of shipper-receiver differences and Material
Unaccounted For (MUF) over successive material balance periods). Between PIVs, monthly inspection
activities can take place, and these are called Interim Inventory Verifications (IIVs).
After completion of verification activities, two types of final reports are submitted to the IAEA:
- Physical Inventory Listing (PIL): a summary of the facility's inventory
- Material Balance Report (MBR): a summary of all the changes in inventory during the past
Material Balance Period (MBP)
The IAEA can compare data declared by states and data obtained through PIV activities. When these
two reports are consistent, the MBP for the each facility is closed for the past year.
C. Limitations
First, physical inventory reports are still subject to falsification by states because nuclear material
inventory is reported to the IAEA monthly. Second, NMA involves statistical errors. Even though
International Target Values (ITVs) were suggested, MUF would be large enough to divert sufficient
nuclear materials for a weapon if the state in question has significant legitimate nuclear activities.
266 Physical inventory is the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of nuclear material on
hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures.
INFCIRC/153, para. 113. Records and reports systems are stated in paragraphs 51-58 and 59-65, respectively.267 Oleg Bukharin, "U.S.-Russian Bilateral Transparency Regime to Verify Nonproduction of HEU," Science &
Global Security 10 (2002)., Appendix C. IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants.
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6.7.4. Design Information Verification (DIV)
A. Undertakings of the IAEA
Design Information Verification (DIV) is the process to verify declared design information on the
construction of new nuclear facilities, and it is central to the implementation of IAEA safeguards
especially at nuclear facilities that deal with fissile materials such as uranium enrichment facilities
(UEFs) and plutonium reprocessing facilities (PRFs).
The IAEA has the right to verify the design information throughout the lifetime of a facility
from construction to decommissioning up to once a year. The DIV is performed through inspector
observation, appropriate measurements and tests in order to confirm (i) that the actual facility is
constructed in line with the design information submitted by the states, (ii) the initial inventory of
nuclear materials, and (iii) that the facility operates in the same way as explained by the state.26s
As for UEFs, the DIV provides a reference for understanding the normal steps for introducing
feed and removing product and tails, and for assuring thereafter that no temporary or permanent
modifications are made that would allow the plant or any part of it to be used for the production of
undeclared HEU.
B. Undertakings of States
The IAEA requires states to provide Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) on new facilities as
well as on changes in existing facilities that handle safeguarded nuclear material as soon as the state
authorities decide to construct, authorize construction, or modify a facility. According to VRS or the AP,
states are generally required to report Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) 180 days before they
begin construction of new nuclear facilities, and this information is used by the IAEA for verification.269
DIQs will include data on material flows, safeguards arrangements, and facility layout.
C. Limitation
A certain state may have a different requirement with regard to the DIV. For example, according to
safeguards agreements between Iran and the IAEA (INFCIRC/214 of 1974), Iran is required to report
DIQs 60 days prior to the introduction of nuclear material into the facility. But, the IAEA requires states
to provide design information 180 days before the start of construction work since the adoption of
"93+2 programme."270
268 Thomas Shea, "Reconciling IAEA Safeguards Requirements in a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile
Material for Use in Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices," Nuclear Arms Control Two (1999)..
269 Bukharin, "U.S.-Russian Bilateral Transparency Regime to Verify Nonproduction of HEU.".
270 For more information see, R.J. Budnitz et al., "Recommendations for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis:
Guidance on Uncertainty and Use of Experts, NUREG/CR-6372
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6.8 Conclusion of Safeguards Activities
6.8.1 Information Analysis
The information of interest to the IAEA includes (i) nuclear material accountancy (the quantities of
nuclear material), (ii) transfer of equipment and technology, and (iii) any activities related to nuclear
fuel cycle. The IAEA gathers a full range of information through state declarations, in-field verification
activities, and other sources including third parties and open sources as shown in Figure 6.6.
IAEA Informatio
Sources
States Declaration eults of in-ties Other sources
Technology Facility NM rd npcinMntrn overnmental Oe ore
nfRmainIfraioDnomto Information Parties Oe ore
Intelligence MECRs External Commercial Non-
Community Sources Satellites safeguards DB
of IAEA
Figure 6.6 Information Sources of the IAEAm2 1
Collection and evaluation of information from open sources makes an important contribution in the
information analysis process. Open source information alerts the Agency to nuclear trafficking events
not yet reported through official channels. For example, trade of materials for non-nuclear use that
contain uranium contaminants can be identified through the evaluation of open sources. When the
Secretariat obtains information from an open source, it seeks confirmation from the Member State
concerned.
The IAEA analyzes all the information that they have collected from various sources to produce
annual Safeguards Implementation Reports (SIRs). The accuracy, quality, and reliability of information
are the main foci during the process of information analysis. However, the actual process of information
analysis requires particular skills and expertise in information handling, technical knowledge about the
nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear weaponization activities, and even knowledge about the States.
The Division of Information Management under the Department of Safeguards is in charge of
data processing, secure information distribution, information analysis, and knowledge generation
necessary to the IAEA for independent, impartial and credible safeguards conclusions. Among four
271
"INFCIRC/640, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report Submitted to the
Director General of the IAEA.", pp. 9-10
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sections within this division, the Section for Information Collection and Analysis (ICA) contributes to
the analysis of all-sources of information necessary for credible conclusions, concerning the compliance
of States with their safeguards obligations. The ICA participates in the information review process and
deals with technologies for information collection, processing, dissemination, and analysis in support of
the State evaluation process. Nuclear Trade and Technology Analysis Unit (TTA) is within this
section.272 The TTA centralizes analysis of all procurement networks.273
6.8.2 Modeling Efforts to Support Information Analysis
The importance of the IAEA's information analysis capabilities is significantly increasing with the
expansion of the volume of information that the Agency collects. During "Programme 93+2", as its
task five, "Improved Analysis of Information on States' Nuclear Activities," the IAEA developed a
model to identify, describe, and characterize the nuclear activities of states. Features such as a state's
nuclear fuel cycle technologies, all plausible state-specific acquisition paths for acquiring weapons-
usable material, and the state's potential with regard to enrichment or reprocessing were modeled.274
This model is called the "Physical Model". The model can be used as a tool for ensuring the coherence
and consistency of the various nuclear programs and the proliferation pathways available to each
state.27 s
Inputs for the Physical Model can be any type of information related to proliferation activities.
Clandestine nuclear facilities tend to release unique indicators may imply that those facilities are under
construction or under operation. A multiple indicators may be required in order to raise the reliability of
safeguards conclusion. In this regard, the Physical Model can process multiple types of information,
which is qualitative or indicative. 2 76 Table 6.6 shows the types of information used in the Physical
Model. The Physical Model is currently under periodic review and serves as a fundamental technical
component of the IAEA's state evaluations process.
272 Clandestine trade in sensitive nuclear technology was suddenly heightened in late 2003, subsequently Board of
Governors (BOG) requested investigation why it had increased. In an effort to stop this activity, Nuclear Trade
Analysis Unit (NUTRAN) was established in 2004.
273 The TTA receives and gathers three types of information: Trade in the items listed in the Additional Protocol
Annexes for those states with an AP in force; Voluntary reporting by supplier states for trade involving states
without an AP; and Items and non-nuclear materials not included in the AP Annexes.
274Z. Liu and S. Morsy, "Development of the Physical Model, IAEA-SM-367/13/07," (2007)., <http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF%20files/Session%2013/Paper/o20l3-07.pdf>
275 Berriman, Leslie, and Carlson, "Information Analysis for IAEA Safeguards".; Australian Safeguards and Non-
Proliferation Office (ASNO), "Annual Report 1999-2000, Annex G ASAP, Australian Safeguards Assistance
Program," (2000)..
276 Jun Liu, Da Ruan, and Roland Carchon, "Synthesis and Evaluation Analysis of the Physical Model Indicator
Information by Computing with Words" (paper presented at the Proceedings of the 5th International FLINS
Conference, Gent, Belgium, September 16-18 2002).. During "Programme 93+2", as its task five, "Improved
Analysis of Information on States' Nuclear Activities," the IAEA developed a model to identify, describe, and
characterize the nuclear activities of states. Features such as a state's nuclear fuel cycle technologies, all plausible
state-specific acquisition paths for acquiring weapons-usable material, and the state's potential with regard to
enrichment or reprocessing were modeled. This model is called the "Physical Model".
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Table 6.6 Factors Analyzed for Use by the Physical Model [Liu and Morsy (2007)277
Information types Contents Collection Means
- Especially Designed Equipment - MECRs,Trade Activity
- Dual-Use Items - States declaration
Technology R & D - Equipment, instrument, operation, - States declaration
By-products - Environmental signatures, - In-field 
verification
Effluents - Discharges, - Commercial 
satellites
- Retained waste - Intelligence community
- Feed material for nuclear facilities to
Nuclear Material - States declaration
Non-Nuclear______ produce weapons-usable materials - In-field verification
Non-Nuclear.
Material - Auxiliary material - MECRs
- In-field verification
- Auxiliary system,*Comrilstlte
Other observables - Commercial satellites
- Casks/containers
- Intelligence community
6.8.3 Safeguards Reports
After all verification activities are analyzed, the Secretariat of the IAEA reports the results and
conclusions to individual states, to the IAEA Board of Governors, and to the UNSC as summarized in
Table 6.7.
Table 6.7 Reporting of Safeguards Implementation by the IAEA '
To Title of Report Content
90 (a) statement Statement on inspection results
States with CSA but no Conclusions on verification activities for
AP 90 (b) statement each facility over a material balance
period.
States with an Item- Safeguards Transfer Statement that the inspection disclosed no
Specific Safeguards Agreement (STA) letter departure from the terms of the safeguards
Agreement agreement
10 (a) statement Referring to the relevant article in AP
The results of activities in respect of
States with CSA and AP 10 (b) statement questions or inconsistencies
Conclusions drawn from inspection
10 (c) statement activities
Safeguards Statements on safeguards implementation
Board of Governors Implementation Report in the preceding calendar year
(SIR)
277 Liu and Morsy, "Development of the Physical Model, IAEA-SM-367/13/07.".
278 "INFCIRC/640, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report Submitted to the
Director General of the IAEA."
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A summary of the report is issued annually to highlight the main achievements and developments.
These summaries are in the form of 'Safeguards Statement', and 'Backgrounds to the Safeguards
Statement and Executive Summary.' 2 79
6.9 Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
6.9.1 Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
The basic guidelines for physical protection systems were developed by the IAEA during the early
1970s. The basic concepts, purposes, and functions of physical protection are provided in
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4., titled as the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.28 o
This requires that appropriate measures, consistent with national requirements, should be taken to
protect the confidentiality of information relating to transport operations, including detailed information
on the schedule and route. This sets an objective for States to (1) establish conditions which would
minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal of nuclear material or for sabotage and (2) to
provide information and technical assistance in support of rapid and comprehensive measures for
location and recovery of missing nuclear material and minimization of the radiological consequences of
sabotage.
Physical protection generally consists of a variety of measures for the protection of nuclear
material or facilities against sabotage, theft, and diversion. Physical protection measures can be divided
into administrative and technical measures. The States should have legislation to provide the regulation
of physical protection. In addition, the State should define requirements for the physical protection of (i)
nuclear material and (ii) nuclear facilities. As for nuclear material, the document requires physical
protection against unauthorized removal of nuclear material in use and storage; and nuclear material
during transport, depending on the nuclear material categorization (Category I, II and III according to
total amount, radiation exposure, and enrichment ratio). As for nuclear facilities, this document requires
different physical protection requirements against sabotage of nuclear power reactors and other facilities.
6.9.2. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
A. CPPNM of 1980
The original CPPNM was opened for signature in March 1980 with entry into force February 1987. The
Convention was focused primarily on nuclear material being shipped internationally. The Convention
279 IAEA, Reports & Reviews ([cited Oct. 10 2008]); available from
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/index.html.
280 The guidance given in INFCIRC/225 recognizes that the implementation of these requirements will vary from
country to country depending on their existing constitutional, legal and administrative systems; the assessment of
the threat for the potential theft of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities; the technical skills and the
professional and financial resources available to the competent authority; and social customs and cultural
traditions.
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set international standards for nuclear trade and commerce and established a framework for
international cooperation in the field of physical protection.
The Convention required state parties to ensure they have the necessary instruments in place to
implement the Convention. The Convention obliges state parties to ensure the protection of nuclear
material within their territory or on board their ships or aircraft during international nuclear transport.
The obligations described in the document are as follows:
-Make specific arrangements and meet defined standards of physical protection for international
shipments of nuclear material,
-Cooperate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material,
-Make as criminal offences specified acts to misuse or threats to misuse nuclear materials to harm
the public, and
*Prosecute or extradite those accused of committing such acts.
B. Amended CPPNM
By the late 1990s many states not were parties to the CPPNM believed its scope, which was limited to
nuclear material in international transport, was too narrow. In 1999, the IAEA convened an open-ended
group of experts to consider whether there was a need to amend the CPPNM. In 2001, the group of
experts recommended that the CPPNM should be amended and proposed a set of physical protection
objectives and fundamental principles. The IAEA Board of Governors adopted those recommendations,
and the IAEA convened a group of legal and technical experts to draft an amendment to the CPPNM. In
July 2005, amendment that significantly broadened and strengthened the Convention, so-called "the
Amended CPPNM," was adopted by consensus.28 '
The Amended CPPNM outlines security requirements for the protection of nuclear materials
against terrorism and provides for the prosecution and punishment of offenders of international nuclear
trade laws. 282 The amended CPPNM makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear
facilities and material in peaceful domestic use and storage as well as in transport. It also provides for
expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen
or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and
combat related offenses. The amendments will take effect once they have been ratified by two-thirds of
281 IAEA, "Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274/Rev. 1),"
(May 1980)..
282 Squassoni, Bowman, and Behrens, "CRS Report for Congress: Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and
Status.".
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283the States Parties of the Convention. As of January 2009, the CPPNM has 139 parties with 45
signatories.284
6.9.3. International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)
The IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) was developed to provide advice
to member states to assist them in strengthening the effectiveness of their national physical protection
system, according to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(INFCIRC/274/Rev.1). The implementation of CPPNM requirements will vary in different states from
many aspects. Thus, a case-by-case approach should be applied. The IPPAS is available to all countries
with nuclear materials and facilities.
On receipt of a request for an IPPAS mission, the IAEA will designate a Technical Officer
and compose a team of experts in physical protection. The Service proceeds from a document review,
interviews with personnel, and direct observation. The team will compare the procedures and practices
of physical protection in a member state with (i) the obligations specified under the CPPNM
(INFCIRC/274/Rev. 1), (ii) the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
(INFCIRC/225), and (iii) equivalent good practices elsewhere. The team will make an IPPAS mission
report that contains recommendations and suggestions. However, it should be noted that the ultimate
responsibility for physical protection is that of the Member State.28 s
6.9.4. Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB)
The ITDB has been released annually since 1995 in response to nuclear black market activities. As of
August, 2007, ninety six states are the members of the ITDB program. The ITDB was designed to
facilitate exchange of authoritative information on incidents of illicit trafficking and other related
unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials among states. Over the years
its purpose has expanded to maintaining and analyzing this information with a view to identifying
common trends and patterns.
The information for ITDB is based on state-confirmed information about illicit trafficking as
well as open sources. The ITDB Secretariat produces Quarterly and Annual Reports containing statistics
of the ITDB information and its assessment. According to these reports, incidents of nuclear trafficking
have increased over the last several years. It is not clear whether this increase in trafficking reflects
283 IAEA, International Conventions & Agreements: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
([cited Apr. 4 2008]); available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm.html.;
Andrew Leask, "Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Implementing the Amended Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," in Regional Seminar (Sydney, Australia: 2007)..
284 IABA, Status of Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Sep. 24, 2009 [cited Oct. 31
2009])..
285 IAEA, Guidelines for IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) ([cited Feb. 5 2009]);
available from http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SS/Protection/foreword.html.
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what really happens because this increase might be partially revealing of better reporting from states-
parties.
6.10 Challenges of IAEA Safeguards
Despite continued significant efforts to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of IAEA safeguards,
the IAEA is still facing a lot of challenges as listed in Table 6.8. Challenges are described in terms of
capabilities and resources.
Table 6.8 Summary of Challenges
Classification Challenges
- Under the CSA, inspectors' access is limited to declared facilities. Even at
Legal capabilities declared facilities, restricted areas can be set.
- A state can block or hinder effective implementation of technical measures.
Compliance-
- The IAEA does not have legal authority to enforce compliance with
enforcing obligations when a suspected compliance is detected.
resources
- The IAEA does not conduct routine verification measures at uranium mines
and concentration plants. [a]
-The IAEA lacks technological capabilities for detecting some level of defects
Verification and verifying nuclear 
facilities.
- The development of facility-specific safeguards is not satisfactory yet.
resources
- The IAEA does not have resources to manage a large volume of information
concerning nuclear trade.
- The IAEA lacks financial resources because of a zero real-growth budget on
the IAEA for about 20 years prior to 2004. [b]
- The Additional Protocol (AP) is not universally applied.
- Most IAEA programs are limited in membership
-The Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
resources
(CPPNM)
-Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB)
Notes
[a] Under AP, uranium mines and concentration plants are subject to safeguards verification measures, although
the IAEA does not required detailed NMA. The IAEA can verify these facilities using complementary access.
[b] If the IAEA could have a resident inspector at the facilities, its verification resources can be significantly
increased.
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6.11 IAEA's Treatment of States in Non-Compliance
In the case of a state's non-compliance with safeguard arrangements, the IAEA itself does not have any
significant enforcement methods. Article XII, paragraph A.7 of the IAEA Statute states that the IAEA
has the right "to suspend or terminate assistance and withdraw any material and equipment made
available by the Agency....," in the event of non-compliance. However, it is highly unlikely that the
IAEA could exercise this right, especially if proliferators had acquired nuclear elements through black
markets. In such a case, the IAEA would need to refer the case to the United Nations Security Council.
In order to refer a case of non-compliance, the IAEA would need to provide the international
community with the expected non-proliferation assurances for the state, i.e., through special inspections
or complementary access. Currently, narrow legal interpretation of the IAEA's authority under a CSA
and AP makes it extremely difficult. Thus, the IAEA has been developing a model called "Temporary
Complementary Protocol (TCP)" to deal with this problem as shown in Figure 6.7.
STEP 1
Non-compliance is Reported to
Director General (DG) of the IAEA.
STEP 2
DG reports to Board of Governors
(BOG).
STEP 3
BOG reports to UNSC, UNGA, all
Members
STEP 4
UNSC's releases Generic Resolution.
, Presidential Statement
Step5 . UNSC Resolution
UNSC releases 1st Resolution.
---------------------------
IAEA's right to use TCP
Step 6
UNSC releases 2nd Resolution.
Suspension of all
---------------------------- sensitive nuclear
activities
Step 7
UNSC releases 3rd Resolution.
Suspension of military
---- ---------------------------- I cooperation
Figure 6.7 Overall Schematic in Case of Treating Non-Compliance
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The TCP can make up for the weaknesses of the AP that requires correction when a state found
to be attempting to evade the IAEA verification system. The TCP can address five main areas for
strengthening the IAEA's authority for verification. These areas include: access to information (including
clarifications and amplifications in order to resolve questions and inconsistencies; access to persons;
access to locations; access to data and documents; and other types of restrictions on: freedom of
movement; the use of the IAEA's equipment (including recording messages); and limitations on the
number of designated inspectors, visas etc. 286
6.12 Summary
IAEA safeguards systems and security measures including administrative issues were reviewed mainly
from a legal perspective. The implementation of IAEA safeguards varies over states in consideration of
the status of the states and safeguards agreements that were made between the IAEA and the states. It is
not easy but critical to distinguish different features of each type of safeguards system. The IAEA is
facing challenges because of the rapidly-increasing number of nuclear facilities and nuclear material
transfers and subsequent lack of resources to deal with challenges. However, the IAEA is continuing its
efforts to strengthen the safeguards system and to use its limited resources in an effective and efficient
way, in cooperation with member states.
The greatest challenge for nuclear safeguards has been to establish an effective detection
system against undeclared or clandestine nuclear activities. Many safeguards experts argue that states
that intend to acquire nuclear weapons would not try to divert nuclear material from declared nuclear
facilities but instead create a clandestine weapons program.28 7 However, there exist proliferation
pathways to acquire nuclear weapons from declared nuclear facilities by capitalizing on the loopholes of
the current NPT regime or by taking the risk of being detected based on prepared scenarios.
2 86 P. Goldschmidt, " IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance," (Washington, D.C:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008). Available from
< http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/GoldschmidtDealingPreventively_7-12-08.pdf>
287 Fischer and Stein, "On-Site Inspections: Experience from Nuclear Safeguarding."
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CHAPTER 7 IAEA'S TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES FOR
SAFEGUARDING DELCARED NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND
MATERIALS
7.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews technical capabilities of the IAEA in terms of both what technical measures it has
and what technical measures can do as well. The reason of reviewing only the IAEA's technical
capabilities is that the IAEA, currently, is the only component that has verification resources and
technical capabilities as a regular feature in the NPT regime. The IAEA has technical tools in order to
achieve its safeguards objectives stated in Chapter 6.
The IAEA's technology for safeguards includes Non-Destructive Assay (NDA), Destructive
Assay (DA), Load Cell-Based Weighing System (LCBS), Containment and Surveillance (C/S), and
Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM). It is very important to understand the current status of
technical capabilities of the IAEA for evaluating the detection probability of proliferation activities, if
any. The analysis of technical capabilities is focused on the technical specification of the IAEA
safeguards measures for inspection and monitoring activities with focus on uranium enrichment-related
activities. The IAEA can or should borrow technical capabilities from other components of the NPT
regime for detecting clandestine nuclear activities. The applicability of these capabilities for detecting
clandestine nuclear facilities will be reviewed in Chapter 11.
7.2 Non-Destructive Assay (NDA)
7.2.1 Introduction to NDA Techniques
Techniques for the determination of U-235 enrichment ratio (UER) at Uranium Enrichment Facilities
(UEFs) and for the assessment of plutonium-containing materials at Plutonium Reprocessing Facilities
(PRFs) can be broadly categorized into two types: NDA and DA. NDA techniques include gamma-ray
spectrometry (GRS), neutron spectrometry, X-ray fluorescence (XRF), K-edge densitometry,2 88 Nuclear
Resonance Fluorescence Imagery (NRFI), 289 and Tunable Diode Laser Spectrometry (TDLS). 290 The
288 Densitometry measures photons that are transmitted through the sample without interaction, whereas XRF
measures the radiation produced by photons that interact within the sample. As far as enrichment measurement is
concerned, densitometry is usually better suited for uranium-bearing samples with high concentrations, where as
XRF is the more useful technique for a sample with low concentration.
289 William Bertozzi et al., "Nuclear resonance fluorescence and effective Z determination applied to detection and
imaging of special nuclear material, explosives, toxic substances and contraband, "Nuclear Instruments and
Methods in Physics Research B, Vol.261, (2007), pp.3 3 1-336; and William Bertozzi and Robert J. Ledoux,
"Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence Imaging in Non-Intrusive Cargo Inspection," <
http://www.passportsystems.com/pr/CAARIPresentation.pdf>
290Natacha Peter et al., Tunable Diode Laser Spectroscopy in International Safeguards (2007 [cited Dec. 2008]);
available from
<http://tdls.conncoll.edu/2007/Peter 20TDLS% 20in/20International%20SafeguardsPaper20(2).pdf>.;A.G.B
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technique of choice depends on what kind of energy is efficiently working in the measurement. GRS
and neutron spectrometry could be further classified as passive or active, depending on whether a
detector senses spontaneous decay or induces the radiation from a material using an external source.291
Among these techniques, GRS is the most widely used technique for UER measurement. GRS
detectors can be divided into high-Purity germanium (HPGe) semiconductor, CdZnTe semiconductor,
and Nal scintillator. Each detector has different performance features that determine resolution
capabilities, efficiencies, and requirements for measurement.292
NDA offers great advantages over DA in terms of timeliness, low costs, ease of operation and
maintenance, and operator safety. NDA measurement can be made during an inspection without
sampling as well as without altering the physical or chemical state of the nuclear material. Neutron
spectrometry is not as efficient as GRS in UER measurement. In neutron measurements, the sample's
matrix and physical dimensions strongly influence the extent of neutron interactions between the
sample and the detector. A passive neutron measurement is not appropriate for UER estimation because
of low neutron emission from non-irradiated uranium material. Also, it should be noted that NDA is
more or less inferior to DA in terms of accuracy and precision.293
7.2.2 Uranium Enrichment Measurement with NDA
NDA can be applied to an entire fuel-cycle for material accountancy, process control, and perimeter
monitoring to meet the demands of the IAEA's safeguards inspection activities. NDA can provide
useful information such as UER, the total uranium content, and so forth; among these, UER is the most
important information.294 IAEA inspectors can select the appropriate UER measurement technique
under specific measurement conditions such as the physical form of uranium (solid, liquid, or gas),
matrix of uranium, properties of uranium containers, and even different presumed UERs.
A variety of direct or indirect ways of measuring UER have been developed using different
daughter nuclides of U-238 and U-235 and different energy ranges of interests in relation to the gamma-
ray line separation capability of detectors. Nuclear reaction equations for U-235 and U-238 are given as
follows:
erezin et al., "UF6 Enrichment Measurements Using TDLS Techniques," Spectrochim Acta A Mol Biomol
Spectrosc 66, no. 4-5 (2007).
291 For more information see R. N. Ceo and K. A. Thomson, "Some NDA Techniques Applied to International
Safeguards Projects," Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry 243, no. 1 (2000).
292 For comparison of these detectors, see Duc T. Vo, "Comparison of Portable Detectors for Uranium Enrichment
Measurements," Journal of Radiological and Nuclear Chemistry 276, no. 3 (2008)., pp.693-698; and Rolf Arlt,
Victor Ivanov, and Kevin Parnham, "Advantages and Use of Cdznte Detectors in Safeguards Measurements."
293IAEA, "Non-Destructive Assay (NDA): Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards," IAEA Bulletin 19,
no. 5 (Oct. 1977)..
294 For more information on quantitative analysis see N.C. Tam et al., "Non-Destructive Analysis of Low-
Enriched and Natural U Samples by Gamma-Spectrometry," Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics
Research A 515, no. 2003 (Dec. 2007)., pp.644-650. The "in" stands for metastable and indicates a nucleus with
additional energy.
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Two methods are available in measuring UER; the infinite thickness method (or enrichment meter
principle coupled with attenuation correction) and the intrinsic calibration method using peak-ratio
techniques. The infinite thickness method uses enrichment meter principle uses a standard uranium
calibration set with attenuation correction. This technique uses the fact that the net peak area under the
185.7 keV y-ray is directly proportional to the UER when the infinite thickness condition is fulfilled.
However, this method has two main drawbacks. First, this method requires the calibration of detectors
using two reference nuclear material standards with different enrichments prior to measurement of
unknown samples.295 Thus, the use of this technique is limited to calibrated geometries.2 96 Second, for
gaseous UF6 at pressures on the order of ten torr, the mean-free path is on the order to 50 meter. Thus,
the enrichment-meter principle cannot be applied. 297 The intrinsic calibration method measures the
ratios of known peak intensities by applying a relative efficiency curve as a function of energy. Several
gamma intensities from individual uranium isotopes are measured and then these values are normalized
to a common efficiency curve. 298
7.2.3 Gas-Phase Enrichment Measurements Using High Resolution Gamma-ray
Spectrometry
Either Am-241 or Co-57 can be used as a calibration source as well as XRF-inducing source for a High
Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector, depending on the pressure. First, at high pressure (around 700 torr),
Am-241 is used as a source and the UER of UF6 is calculated from:
E = (7.3)C 1n(TAm 2 4 )
295Haluk Yiicel, "The Applicability of MGA Method for Depleted and Natural Uranium Isotopic Analysis in the
Presence of Actinides (232Th, 237Np, 233Pa and 241Am)," Applied Radiation and Isotopes 65 (2007).
296 N.C. Tam et al., "Non-Destructive Analysis of Low-Enriched and Natural U Samples by Gamma-
Spectrometry." The application of infinite thickness method is limited to about 0.25 cm for metal samples and
7cm for UF6 with a density of 1 g/cm3.
297 for the enrichment-meter principle to be valid, the unraium material thickness must be equivalent to several
mean-free path s for the 185.7-keV gamma ray from U-235.
298 N.C. Tam et al., "Non-Destructive Analysis of Low-Enriched and Natural U Samples by Gamma-
Spectrometry."
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where C is a calibration constant, R is the measured count rate of the 186-keV gamma rays from the
decay of U-235, and TAm-241 is the transmission through UF6 gas of 60-keV gamma rays from an
external Am-241 source. 299 This technique is intended for use at the Portsmouth GCEP as a technique
to measure the enrichment in the product UF6 gas entering the product withdrawal facility. These
measurement results were intended to serve as a partial-defect check for material-balance verification.
Second, at low pressure (i.e., inside cascade halls of GCEPs), the 122-keV of Co-57 source is
used instead because the density of UF6 does not allow for sufficient sensitivity for the transmission
measurement. The uranium K, 98.4-keV x-ray count rate measures the total amount of uranium in the
gas. The K, is induced by X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) of the gaseous UF6 using a Co-57 source. 3"
[See Appendix D]
7.2.4 NDA Application at UEFs: CHEM and CEMO
Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) and Continuous Enrichment Monitoring System (CEMO)
are two types of on-line NDA measurement techniques authorized by the IAEA.
A. Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor
LANL developed CHEM during the mid-1980s as a method of detecting the presence of HEU in
cascade header piping and providing a Yes/No answer. It has the advantage that it can take into account
the presence of deposits on the piping wall, and thus provide an enrichment measurement for the gas
only. It was intended for use during LFUA inspections to the cascade hall. Since the measurement uses
a HPGe detector, which has a relatively low gamma-ray detection efficiency, the technique takes a
fairly long time to reach a result. The technique worked well on the large diameter cascade header
pipes at the Portsmouth GCEP. However, it turned out that the URENCO plant piping was much
smaller in diameter and operated at somewhat lower pressures than at Portsmouth GCEP. As a result, it
was much more difficult to obtain a usable result.
The CHEM was used during the HEU Downblending Verification Experiment at the
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in 1997-1998 in order to explore the applicability of
299 Hastings A. Smith Jr., "Chapter 7. The Measurement of Uranium Enrichment Measurement," in Passive
Nondestructive Assay ofNuclear Materials (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991).
3 o P. L. Kerr et al., "IAEA Verification Experiment at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant: Report on the
Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor, LA-13557-MS," (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory,
March 1999).; For further details, see Stephane F. Terracol et al., "Ultra-High Resolution Gamma-Ray
Spectrometer Development for Nuclear Attribution and Non-Proliferation Applications" (paper presented at the
2004 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record, Rome Italy, Oct. 16-22 2004).; and D.A. Close et al.,
"The Measurement of Uranium Enrichment for Gaseous Uranium at Low Pressure" (paper presented at the
Proceedings of the 7th Annual Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management, ESARDA, Leige,
Belgium, May 21-23 1985)..
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CHEM as a system for rapid on-line NDA measurements of gaseous UF enrichment. 301 However, the
HPGe detector, which must be cooled to liquid-nitrogen temperatures, was in very close contact with
diffusion-plant process piping, which operates at fairly high temperatures; as a result, the detector failed
on several occasions due to heating of the detector cryostat, with consequent degradation of its energy
resolution. This problem would not occur at many GCEPs, since the piping at these plants operates at
ambient, or near ambient, temperatures. These detectors are not universally used in all Gas Centrifuge
Enrichment Plants (GCEPs). The IAEA is currently upgrading CHEM using extensive Monte Carlo
simulations. 302 The enrichment ratio is determined from the measured gamma spectrum using
corresponding gamma and X rays from the decay of both U-235 and U-238 isotopes. The CHEM must
perform energy calibration on the equipment using XRF to get full E peak efficiency prior to
measurement. 303
B. Continuous Enrichment Monitoring System
CEMO was developed in the past by the UK Support Programme, and it is applied at only two
URENCO GCEPs in the Western Europe. This equipment monitors the UER of gaseous UF6 in the
product pipe as it is being produced, and it sends daily information to EURATOM (Luxembourg) and
IAEA HQs to confirm its working status and the non-presence of HEU at the facility. 4 The CEMO is
nonintrusive, and provide timely, continuous detection of HEU production and monitoring of
enrichment in a manner that is acceptable to the operator. Currently, CEMO is not operating on a
continuous basis. However, it would be a highly desirable surveillance technique that could be applied
inside the cascade area not only to detect changes in piping or operation characteristics but also to
measure inventory (hold-up) in the cascades.
The CEMO requires two parameters for UF6 enrichment calculation: the total mass of U-235
and the pressure of the process gas. The total mass of U-235 in the pipe is monitored by measuring the
185.7 keV gamma rays emitted by that isotope. The process gas pressure (P) is determined from the
measurement of the absorption of Ag Ka x-rays (22.25 keV) emitted by a Cd-109 source. These two
measurements permit the enrichment (E) to be calculated from:305
301 P. L. Kerr et al., "IAEA Verification Experiment at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant: Report on the
Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor, LA-13557-MS."; David Gordon et al., "IAEA Verification Experiment at
the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, BNL-65714," (1998).
302 IAEA, Research and Development Programme for Nuclear Verification 2008-2009 (2009). ,p.87. Dmitry
Sharikov, "Verification Challenges for Safeguarding Uranium Enrichment Plants," ESARDA Bulletin, no. 37 (Dec.
2007).The false alarm probability of these detectors is estimated as 0.001.
303 D.A. Close et al, Operating Procedures for the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor: Non-Destructive assay
(DA) on 3-Inch and 8-Inch Header Pipes at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, LA-UR-98-121 1, Los
Alamos National Laboratory. This approach is called "intrinsic calibration approach."
304 Peter Friend, "Urenco's Views on International Safeguards Inspection" (paper presented at the 8th International
Conference on Facility Operations-Safeguards Interface, Portland, OR, Mar.30-Apr.4 2008).
305 The CEMO is not based on the enrichment-meter principle because the "infinite-thickness" criterion is not met.
It may be said that the CEMO uses "pressure-corrected 186-keV count rate. Personal communication with an
expert via e-mail. Dec.8, 2009.
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E = R x ( K
P
(7.4)
where R is the measured count rate of the 186-keV rays and K is a constant, specific to each detector.
Both measurements use a low-resolution Nal scintillation detector coupled to a photomultiplier, which
is gain-stabilized using the 88-keV gamma-rays from the same source. Comparisons of these two
techniques are shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Comarison between CEMO and CHEM 3 06
Specification Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor Continuous Enrichment Monitoring
(CHEM) System (CEMO)
Developer Los Alamos National Laboratory United Kingdom
Portability Portable [a] Permanently installed
Purpose Inspections Monitoring and inspections
Technique High Resolution Gamma Spectrometry Low Resolution Gamma Spectrometry
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant GCEP at Carpenhurst, U.K. and the
Application (1997 and 1998) Dutch Almelo facilities since the 1990s.
Calibration Relative efficiency calibration 307 Geometry-dependent calibration
requirement constants
Calibration Co57 (272 days of a half-life) or Cd-109 (453 days of a half-life) for
source 308 Am-241 normalization [b]
(also serves as (XRF source)
Energy resolution might be affected by X-ray absorption varies with pipe
Limitation vibration and temperature, and diameter, wall material , temperature
geometry. and cascade pressures
Notes
[a] Some hardware (such as "mounting fixtures, collimators, and x-ray fluorescence source) remains in place and
is located within tamper-indicating enclosure seals by the IAEA.
[b] The IAEA sees it as non-sustainable due to its usage of a short-lived source (Cd-109) and limitation in
monitoring each cascade in a commercial size GCEP: the IAEA considers replacement of Cd-109 with 1-129
which has half-life of 1.57x107 years. This is for pressure correction purposes.
7.2.5 Limitations of Gamma Ray Spectrometry (GRS)
For Gamma Ray Spectrometry (GRS), the accuracy of measurement results can be influenced by
systemic uncertainties3 09 as well as statistical uncertainties. Causes of systematic uncertainty include
306 Sharikov, "Verification Challenges for Safeguarding Uranium Enrichment Plants."
307 D.A. Close et al., "Operating Procedures for Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor: Non-Destructive Assay
(NDA) on 3-Inch (7.62 Cm) and 8-Inch (20.32 Cm) Header Pipes at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant,"
(Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1998).;D.A. Close et al., "LA-UR-98-1211.". N.C. et al. Tam, "Non-
Destructive Analysis of Low-Enriched and Natural U Samples by Gamma-Spectrometry," Nuclear Instruments
and Methods in Physics Research A 515, no. 3 (Dec. 2003).
308 For comparison of x-ray spectrums of uranium from Co57 and Cd109 see Fig.10.3 and 10.4, p.3 17 in M. C.
Miller, "Chapter 10 X-Ray Fluorescence," in Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials, NUREG/CR-
5550, ed. Doug Riley et al. (U.S.Government Printing Office, Mar. 1991).
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attenuation factors with regard to the thickness and composition of container walls," interfering
radiations from deposits in the inner wall of the containers and from neighboring storage containers, the
chemical or physical states of uranium-containing material,3" the UER of material, and the calibration
procedure.
- Thickness of container
As the thickness of a UF6 container increases, so does attenuation of gamma rays. For example, a
16 mm wall of a UF6 cylinder attenuates the 90 to 100 keV radiations by about a factor of 250.12
This can be overcome by establishing so-called "attenuation correction," the relationship between
the relative fluctuation of the enrichment result and the relative fluctuation of the wall thickness.
-Influence of UER
The accuracy of UER measurements is degraded in case of very low U-235 enrichment ratios. 313
-Deposits of material on the cylinder walls
If uranium or thorium daughter products are deposited on the cylinder walls, UER accuracy may
be compromised. This can be overcome through Nuclear Forensics, using Th231 and Th 234,
which are the daughter products of U-235 and U-238, respectively. Two principal gamma ray
double peaks (or doublet) of Th-234 (92.38 and 92.80 keV, and 62.86 and 63.29 keV)3 1 4 will be
prominent compared to the singlet from Th-231 (84.2 keV) as time goes on. This occurs because
Th-234 has a longer half-life, 24.1 days, than that of Th-231, which is 25.52 hours.315
-Material of cylinders
In the case of the Russian gas centrifuge technology, the detectability using CEMO or CHEM is
significantly reduced because it uses steel piping.316
309S Guardini et al., "Performance Values for Non Destructive Assay (NDA) Techniques Applied to Safeguards:
The 2002 Evaluation by the ESARDA NDA Working Group," (ESARDA, 2003).; and Stephane F. Terracol et al.,
"Ultra-High Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometer Development for Nuclear Attribution and Non-Proliferation
Applications".
31 Hastings A. Smith Jr., "Chapter 7. The Measurement of Uranium Enrichment Measurement.", p.209.
311 See Table I for measures results in different forms of matrices in R. Gunnik et al., "Mgau: A New Analysis
Code for Measuring U-235 Enrichments in Arbitrary Samples, UCRL-JC-114713" (paper presented at the The
IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards,, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 8-14 1994).
312 R. Gunnik et al., (1994). If the HRGS is used, then the gamma-ray response is corrected for cylinder-wall
thickness as measured by an Ultrasonic Thickness Gauge (ULTG).
313 In general, one can measure the UER of HEU quite well with gamma-ray NDA because of the high count rate
of 185.7 keV gamma rays and the low background underneath the 185.7 keV peak.
314 James Kaste, Benjamin Bostick, and Arjun Heimsath, "Determining 2 341h and 238U in rocks, soils, and
sediments via the doublet gamma at 92.5 keV," Analyst, Vol.131, (2006), pp. 75 7 -7 6 3 .
mI. Adsley et al., Decay of Th-234 and Daughter Pa-234m in Secular Equilibrium: Resolution of Observed
Anomalies, DoE Report No: DOE/CPR2/41/l/219, (June 1996).
<http://resource.npl.co.uk/docs/science -technology/ionising%/20radiation/clubs-groups/nsuf/2005/cpr2_41c.pdf>316 A. Panasyuk, A. Vlasov, S. Koshelev, T. Shea, D. Perricos, D. Yang and S. Chen, "Tripartite Enrichment
Project: Safeguards at Enrichment Plants Equipped with Russian Centrifuges," IAEA-SM-367/8/02, (2002)
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7.3 Destructive Assay (DA)
Destructive Assay (DA) or High Precision Trace Analysis (HPTA) is used for material-balance
verification and analysis on environmental samples. Destructive Assay (DA) provides more accurate
information than NDA. DA for material-balance verification purposes has been performed for decades
since the 1970s, whereas DA of environmental samples was introduced into IAEA safeguards 1996.
The IAEA's Class-100 Clean Laboratory for Safeguards, a part of SAL, began operation in early 1996
and mainly provides DA for samples.m Techniques of DA are alpha spectrometry, mass spectrometry,
isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS), isotope assay, thermal ionization mass spectrometry
(TIMS), and secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS). Mass spectrometry is the most commonly used
DA technique in nuclear safeguards. 318 Table 7.2 shows the differences in applying DA techniques for
material-balance verification and for environmental samples.
Table 7.2 Use of DA for Two Different Purposes
Material balance Environmental samples
Determine element and isotopic abundances in
order to verify that nuclear materials are Determine elemental and isotopic
.b v . properly accounted for and that detection of composition in order to verify whether
the diversion of a significant quantity of or not an enrichment plant produces
nuclear material can be achieved with a high HEU.
probability.319
Individual micro-sized particles
A few grams (bulk samples) collected through cotton sampling
mass
media
Standard chemical and mass-spectroscopic
Techniques techniques such as the Davies-Gray asS-SectrosocTec such
as SIMS and Fission-Track TIMS
potentiometric titration method
317 The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) at Seiberdorf has been in existence since 1976. The SAL serves
as a focal point for a Network Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) in several member states. The functions of SAL
includes: provision and certification of environmental sampling kits; screening and distribution of environmental
samples to NWAL coming from safeguards inspections. SAL is capable of measuring of uranium isotopic
composition in uranium-containing particles by Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) or Secondary Ion
Mass Spectrometry (SIMS). D. L. Donohue, "Strengthening IAEA safeguards through environmental sampling
and analysis," Journal ofAlloys and Compounds Vol.271-273, (1998), pp. 1 1-18.
318 Types of mass spectrometry include accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS), inductively coupled plasma mass
spectrometry (ICPMS), gas source mass spectrometry (GSMS), resonance ionization mass spectrometry (RIMS),
secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) and thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS).
319 IAEA R & D Program for Nuclear Verification 2008-2009, page 51. Wide-Area Environmental Sampling
(WAES) is defined in Article 18.g of the AP as meaning "the collection of environmental samples (e.g., air, water,
vegetation, soil) at a set of locations specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw
conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities over a wide area." The term
'wide area' has been used to mean the collection of environmental samples that are not targeted around a suspect
facility or geographic location, but instead over regions containing much larger areas (e.g., on the order of
hundreds of thousands of square km).
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Limitations
DA is still limited when unexpected HEU particles are discovered in UF6 cylinders during shipping,
when there is cross-contamination, and during personnel movement between different plants.320 For
example, in the case that HEU particles are found in LEU-producing facilities formerly used for HEU
production, environmental sampling may be less useful because it is challenging to determine whether
the HEU particles were the remnants of former operation or signatures of current operation. Cluster
analyses of particulates over time or nuclear forensics may provide a solution by analyzing differences
in minor isotope ratios.321 Nuclear forensics can provide information regarding uranium age and the
origin of material. 2
7.4. Environmental Sampling (ES)
Environmental sampling was introduced into IAEA safeguards in the mid 1990s, and it has been
implemented in the Additional Protocol as complement to the existing safeguards agreement.
7.4.1 Scheme of Environmental Sampling
Samples are collected in a variety of fashion for Destructive Assay (DA). The IAEA classifies the
scheme of Environmental Sampling (ES) according to where and how samples are collected as follows:
(i) Swipe sampling at strategic locations within the facility; 323
(ii) Location-specific sampling at the specified location by the IAEA; and
(iii) Wide Area Environmental Sampling (WAES).
(ii) and (iii) are both features of the Additional Protocol, however main difference is that (ii) can collect
samples at only limited locations, whereas (iii) can collect samples anywhere. In this study, sampling
scheme is simply divided into environmental sampling within the facility and outside the facility as
shown in Table 7.3.
320 W. Bush, G. af Ekenstam, J. Janov, E. Kuhn and M. Ryjinski, IAEA Experience with Environmental Sampling
at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants in the European Union, IAEA-SM-367/10/04, (2004).
321 Separation Theory, U-234 is typically ignored in mathematical discussions of enrichment and uranium is
considered simply as a two component system. (U-234 concentrations in natural uranium vary slightly from mine
to mine and these small differences in U-234 concentration can help identify the source of illicit nuclear
material. Such tracking is one example of nuclear forensics.)
< http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/fuelcycle/centrifuges/separation-theory.html>
32 In some cases, it is possible to determine the age of uranium or plutonium particles via nuclear forensics. The
primary objective of nuclear forensic analysis is to determine the attributes of questioned radioactive specimens,
which are conveniently divided into two key forensic areas: source and route. Thus, Nuclear Forensics enables
analysis on interdicted illicit nuclear and radioactive materials for clues to the materials' origins and routes of
transit. If the technique that can trace the age of HEU particles can be developed, which lies in the area of Nuclear
Forensics, it would resolve the last problem.
323 Swipe samples are collected at selected areas of safeguarded facilities with squares of cotton cloth. The cotton
cloth is sealed in plastic bags. It has a size of 1Ox10 cm and is prepared under ultra clean conditions.
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Table 7.3 Different Definitions of Environmental Sampling Scheme
IAEA Kalinowski et al. (2006) This study Safeguards
Swipe sampling Swipe sampling Sampling within the facility INFCIRC/153
Location specific Short range (1km) and long Sampling outside the facility or INFCIRC/540
sampling range scheme Environmental Sampling at Additional
WAES (1-100km) from the facility Wide Area (ESWA) Protocol
Air Sampler for
WAASG Network
(WAES)
Long Range
1-100 km away from
the facility
0l
Location cific
Environmen I
Sampling
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(Und
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0I
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Figure 7.1 Schemes of Environmental Sampling
In 1997 and 1998, the IAEA convened a technical committee to study the technical possibilities
of WAES under the Additional Protocol (AP). The evaluation of WAES implementation in the context
of the Additional Protocol was completed through a Multi-Member States Support Program (MSSP)
study in 1999. The study evaluated the potential feasibility of WAES for use in the detection of
undeclared nuclear facilities. The conclusion was that WAES was not economically feasible because
sufficiently dense network of monitoring stations must be established in order to detect weak
signatures.324 The grid constant, (the distance between samplers in a square grid) is the major factor
affecting detection capability. At the time, only Wide Area Air Sampling Grid (WAASG) was
324 In this case, an aerosol-WAES method should utilize a large number of samplers located in an area of hundreds
of square kilometers for the localization of the source. The subsequent challenge is the enormous cost of installing
this network system and changing filters.
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considered as WAES. Even though economic justification is ignored, a detection probability is not still
high enough, whereas a false-negative is high, even in a dense network. 5
The high cost with regard to the use of WAES can be reduced in three ways: the development
of screening process;326 the use of global transport models;327 and minimization of maintenance cost for
a network stations.328 An effort to use WAES was restored through the IAEA's Novel Technologies
Program in 2004. In 2004 and 2005, the IAEA hosted a workshop and a couple of technical meetings
with regard to detection of uranium enrichment using WAES .329 However, WAES is still far from being
a common feature of IAEA safeguards. Figure 7.1 shows possible schemes of environmental sampling.
7.4.2. Environmental Sampling over Wide Area (ESWA)
ESWA requires a sample collection system and a sample analysis system as shown in Figure 7.2.
Sample Collection System Sample Analysis System
Atmospheric
Chemistry Analytical
Laboratories
Characteristic Sample
Effluents erosol Effect Air Mobile Analysis Techniques
amplers (ATTA)
Nuclear
Facilities Modeling for
ESWA Application
(HYSPLIT)Sample Collection
Sampling StationsHUMINT Vehicle (WAASG)
Figure 7.2 Schematic Figure of Environmental Sampling over Wide Area (ESWA)
325 For the relationship between grid constants and probabilities of detection, see Ephraim Asculai, Verification
Revisited: The Nuclear Case, ISIS Reports, Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security
Press,2002), pp.101-112. Appendix 1. The Efficacy of Effluent Detection By Wide-Area Environmental Sampling.
326 D.W. Swindle, R.L. Pearson, N.A. Wogman and P.W. Krey, "Screening of potential sites for undeclared
nuclear facilities in environmental monitoring for nuclear proliferation, "The Journal of Radioanalytical and
Nuclear Chemistry, Vol. 248, no.3 (June, 2001), pp. 599-604.
327 Atmospheric Transport Simulations (ATS) or Atmospheric Transport Modeling (ATM) can be used to
determine both optimum localization for sources and procedures for detecting clandestine proliferation activities.
For information on global transport models for verification purposes, see Martin Kalinowski et al., "Atmospheric
Krypton-85 Transport Modeling for Verification Purposes," INESAP Information Bulletin, no.27, (December,
2006), pp.17 -19 .
328 Valmari T. et al., "Aerosol Sampling Methods for Wide Area Environmental Sampling (WAES)," Finnish
support to IAEA, STUK-YTO-TR1 83. (June 2002).
329 Martin B. Kalinowski, "Nuclear Safeguards and Proliferation: Remote Environmental Sampling for the
Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Production and Testing," ESARDA Training Course, Ispra, (14-18
April 2008)
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A. Sample Collection System
The collection system can be classified in terms of the distance from the source, the mobility of
collection means, and the altitude of sampling locations (ground or air). But, ground and air sampling
seem to be the best classification in many ways. Ground sampling can be called Surface Deposition
Sampling (SDS)330 and it can be performed through either mobile sampling vehicles (during on-site
inspections) or Human Intelligence (HUMINT).33 1 On the contrary, air sampling is done through
WAASG and aircrafts. Air sampling is considered the most prominent among various means to collect
samples because fine aerosol particles (diameter smaller than one micrometer) can be carried in air
thousands of kilometers (km) from the source. However, HUMINT and UAVs are military intelligence
assets that may be politically sensitive due to the presence of a foreign entity. In order to improve the
efficiency of air sampling, optimization of sampler deployment, capabilities of filters,332 features of
particles to collect, and the intensity of source need to be considered. In addition, atmospheric chemistry
and aerosol effects influence sample collection efficiency.
B. Modeling for ESWA Application
Modeling for ESWA can be used for several purposes including: estimating ESWA capability in terms
of detection range for a given sample analysis capability and concentration of particles from the source
or vice versa; optimized or strategic placement of sampling stations; 33 and confirming the particles
selected emanated from the suspicious facility. For example, it is always desirable to locate samplers in
proximity to the source for effective detection because the concentration of the non-natural nuclides
decreases as the distance from the source increases. However, this is not always the case and this
limitation can be overcome by simulating the transport of aerosol particles in consideration of
geographical features and atmospheric environment. The transport code of NOAA's Hybrid Single-
Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory (HYSPLIT) is one of models that can be used for ESWA
330 Ephraim Asculai, Verification Revisited: The Nuclear Case (Institute for Science and International Security
Press, 2002). Surface Deposition Sampling (SDS) that simply takes samples on the surface.
331 The mobile samplers have three advantages over the fixed samplers: shorter detection period; elimination of
the high cost for fixed monitoring sites; and increase in unpredictability. For more information see M. Kalinowski,
H. Daerr, and M. Kohler, "Measurements of Krypton-85 to Detect Clandestine Plutonium Production," INESAP
Information Bulletin, no. 27 (Dec. 2006).
332 For more information, see T. Valmari et al., "Aerosol Sampling Methods for Wide Area Environmental
Sampling (WAES): Finnish Support to IAEA," (2002).
3 The optimization issues arise with regard to the efficiency and effectiveness of WAES: the siting process of a
suspicious undeclared nuclear facility; and the optimization of sample collection means. As for sample collection
stations for WAES, places where air movement converges downwind of an interested region are considered as the
most efficient siting. D. W. Swindle Jr et al., "Screening of Potential Sites for Undeclared Nuclear Facilities in
Environmental Monitoring for Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry 248, no.
3 (2001).
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simulation.3 4 The HYSPLIT simulates the transport of aerosol particles so that modelers can see how
far aerosol particles can move and how fast they are diluted as they transport.
C. Sample Analysis Techniques
The capability of ESWA differs for a specific type of particles because different types of facilities emit
different effluents and in different concentrations. The capability of ESWA is described in terms of a
minimum detectable number density or a minimum detectable mixing ratio (or concentration) such as
ppmV (parts per million by volume) or ppbV (parts per billion by volume). Kemp and Glaser (2008)
provided the capability of ESWA as detection range for a specific type of particle.336 Among various
analysis techniques applicable to ESWA, Atom Trap Trace Analysis (ATTA) seems to be the most
prominent technique. m Atom Trap Trace Analysis (ATTA) is based on the laser manipulation
technique of neutral atoms, and it would vastly reduce the cost of ESWA. ATTA has application in the
analysis of several fission isotopes including krypton 85, strontium 90, cesium 135 and cesium 137.
ATTA is also capable of analyzing two trace-isotopes of krypton, Kr-85 and Kr-81 at the parts-per-
trillion level.
7.4.3 Limitation in Environmental Sampling over Wide Area (ESWA)
The current level of sampling under the AP can be described as "swipe sampling away from strategic
points." That is, the application of environmental sampling is still restricted to the locations that are
routinely visited by inspectors. 339 The application of ESWA can be allowed only under the Additional
Protocol. Even under the Additional Protocol (AP). IAEA inspectors' access to obtain environmental
samples is still limited in the sense that an unlimited range of sampling is not allowed. This is because
Article 9 of the AP requires prior consultations with the state to be inspected and the approval of the
33 R. Scott Kemp and A. Glaser, The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Program on
Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 2007 [cited May 5 2008]); available from
<http://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/2007aglaser splg.pdf>.HYSPLIT model simulates the transport of aerosol
particles from a reference facility and provides airborne-concentration isopleths in terms of pg(UO2F2)/m3. For
more additional information, see M. Kalinowski, "Detection of Clandestine Production of Nuclear-Weapons-
Usable Materials," iGSE Bulletin 2 (Dec. 2006).: 17-20.
35 Jens B6senberg and Martin Kalinowski, "Detecting Atmospheric UF6 and HF as Indicators for Uranium
Enrichment," INESAP Information Bulletin, no. 28 (April 2008). It should be noted that different values would be
obtained for different particles with the same technology. These values are estimated using the differential
absorption cross section of the gas and the range interval where the gas is present, and the differential optical
depth. DIAL is applicable to only gaseous compounds.
336 Kemp and Glaser, The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
337 iGSE, "iGSE-Detection of Clandestine Production of Nuclear-Weapons-Usable Material," INESAP Information
Bulletin, no. 27 (Dec. 2006).. The analysis was first developed by the Argonne National Laboratory and the
Independent Group of Scientific Experts_(iGSE) in 1999 with the purpose of using it on ground water and ice core
dating studies.
338 Zheng-Tian Lu et al., "Atom Trap Trace Analysis," (Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/PHY/CP-101981,
2000).
339 Personal Communication with John Carlson, the Head of Australia Safeguards Nonproliferation Office
(ASNO), in January 2009.
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Board of Governors (BOG) with a view to constraining the implementation of WAES. This is due to the
cost limitations and political sensitivity.
7.5. Containment and Surveillance (C/S)
Containment and surveillance (C/S) systems have been the principal means for ensuring the
completeness and maintaining Continuity-of-Knowledge (CoK) of nuclear materials and safeguards
equipment during the absence of inspectors between inspections since 1970s. Containment system
includes tamper indicating systems and systems that maintain physical integrity of fuel or of an area
where the fresh fuel casks, storage tanks are situated. Video surveillance provides a means by which
access to nuclear material can be monitored and any undeclared movement of material detected. In
almost all cases, containment and surveillance systems are used in combination. C/S systems have
evolved from commercially available cap-and-wire seals and film cameras to modern integrated
systems that can be combined with digital image surveillance and electronic sealing. C/S system can be
further equipped with unattended monitoring systems or remote data transmission to provide
information on a real-time basis. In this regard, C/S systems can be regarded as a part of an unattended
and remote monitoring system (UNARM).
7.5.1 Containment Systems: Seals
A seal is a Tamper-Indicating Device (TID) that prevents undetected access. Seals can save inspectors'
effort by eliminating the need for re-measurement of verified items or samples. However, a seal is not
designed to prevent access but only in non-erasable and unambiguous way record that such access has
occurred. The seals can be characterized by their main properties: single or multiple use and single or
multiple on-site verification. Table 7.4 lists types of seals that the IAEA uses or develops. Electronic
seals are the most sophisticated ones and permit multiple use and multiple verification purposes.
Table 7.4 Types of Seals
Types Description Remarks
Metal seals For single use and single verification In use
(CAPS) Standard IAEA E-type and X-type metal seal and seal wire
For single use and single verification
VOID (Improved Adhesive Seal) and ADPS is a paper seal that is
Adhesive seals
used by IAEA safeguards staff for temporary sealing of equipment In use
and enclosures, developed to replace existing paper seals to improve
detection of tampering. 340
(Continued)
3 IAEA, New Safeguards Equipment Systems: Teaming IAEA Inspectors with Technology, 2002.
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For single use and multiple verification
Fiber optic seals In use
Cobra and In-situ Readable Ultrasonic Seal System (IRUSS)
Variable Coding Sealing System (VACOSS)-S is in use by the
IAEA and an in situ readable electronic seal, being used with fiber In use
optic cable.
The Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS) is a re-usable
mechanical locking seal for long-term surveillance, which In use
communicates via RF with a seal reader. The system employs an Ger
active fiber optic light source and light sensor to record any Support
ope/clse vens.Program 3 4
Electronic seals open/close events.
Integrable Reusable Electronic Seal (IRES) enables independent The French
verification by different inspectorates (IAEA, Euratom, and National Support
Inspectorate). The seal can be remotely interrogated by radio Program for
frequency and can be used with fiber optic cable or an electrical the IAEA
wire. 342 Safeguards)
The Sandia
TRFS (Two-way Radio-Frequency Seal)343  National
Lab.
For the monitoring, identification and verification of containers used
Ultrasonic seals for under-water storage of fissile materials to be reprocessed, Future
nuclear transportation casks, or for other movable structures of
strategic value 34
7.5.2. Surveillance Systems
Surveillance instruments and devices are designed to detect or confirm all movements of nuclear
material and spent fuel containers. They also are used to indicate whether the integrity of the
containment of nuclear material (i.e., as containers, storages, and reactor vessels, etc.,) has been
maintained. Each of the video cameras, along with additional electronics for data storage and data
authentication, is contained within its own tamper-indicating enclosure sealed by the IAEA. The
cameras are connected by cable to an IAEA computer contained within a tamper-indicating enclosure
sealed by the IAEA.
Surveillance instruments offer the possibility of increasing inspection efficiency and of
reducing the inspection effort because they can operate unattended for long periods of time. All-in-one
System (ALIS), All-in-one Portable System (ALIP), Digital Single Camera Optical Surveillance System
(DSOS), Server Digital Image Surveillance System (SDIS), Digital Multi-camera Optical Surveillance
System (DMOS), Hawk Digital Imaging System (HDIS), and General Advanced Review Station
Software (GARS) are used.
34' In November 2005, the IAEA approved the EOSS seal "for routine use" (category A). In 2006, the IAEA
began to procure it for replacement of the VACOSS seal
342 B. AUTRUSSON et al., The IRES Electronic Seals, IAEA-SM-367/14/01/P
343 Matter, John and Tzolov, Roumen, "The T-1 Two-way Radio-Frequency Seal (TRFS) And Its Application for
Joint Operator-IAEA Use, IAEA-SM-367/7/01 P.
'4 ESARDA, "JRC Ultrasonic seals," ESARDA Bulletin, no. 37, (December 2007), pp.6 6 -6 8 .
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7.5.3 Application at UEFs
At Uranium Enrichment Facilities (UEFs), the most important safeguards feature is to maintain CoK
about the flow of UF6. Surveillance cameras at feed/withdrawal stations can detect the diversion of UF6
flow at uranium enrichment plants. However, it should be noted that the use of cameras at UEFs is often
limited to restricted areas because of the issue of information protection from inspectors.
The surveillance cameras are triggered to record images in any of three ways: (i) the detection
of motion based on the detection of scene changes within the field of view; (ii) rapid changes in the
weight observed by any other weighing systems; and (iii) elapsed-time interval. In addition, the IAEA
can use surveillance cameras at the onset of the unannounced inspections. Possible locations of C/S
system installations include feed, product, and tail cylinders; the uranium feed point and the product and
tails removal points; and process piping, boundary valves, flanges, and locations where monitoring
instruments are installed.
7.6 Load Cell Based Weighing System (LCBS)
There are two types of UF6 -weight measuring equipment; LCBS and LCBWS as shown in Table 7.5.
LCBS and LSBWS were developed by the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) in 1980 and 1984,
respectively. The LCBWS is designed to provide verification of UF6 cylinder masses by the IAEA at
UEFs that handle large-capacity UF6 cylinders. LCBS can be applied at feed, product, and tails stations
to measure the weights of UF6 cylinders.
Table 7.5 Features of LCBS
Type Year developed UF6 cylinders LCBS capacity Developer
LCBS 1980 2.277 ton 4.54 metric-ton BNL
9.07 and 12.70 BNL and Oak
18.14 metric-ton-
LCBWS 1984 metric-ton UF6  . Ridge Gaseous
cylinders capacity Diffusion Plant
The main components of a LCBWS includes a crane hook, universal flexures, load cells, eye nuts,
threaded connecting rods, lifting shackles, a lifting fixture etc. The LCBWS offers the advantages of
portability, ease of assembly and use, and high accuracy within ±1 kg.345 The error of a load cell is on
the order of 0.01% and it is defined as the root mean square sum of nonlinearity, hysteresis, and
3 Wanzie McAuley, et al., "A 20-ton-capacity Load-Cell-Based Weighing System for UF6 Cylinder Mass
Verifications," DE87 002803, CONF-850210-5, Jan. 1985.
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repeatability.34 6 The LCBWS would permit the IAEA to correlate real-time weight data, obtained as the
UF6 cylinders are emptied and filled, with the "Mailbox" declarations and video-surveillance system
results.
When total amounts of UF6 are reported, care should be taken to note whether the quantities are
measured in terms of uranium mass or UF6 mass. The mass of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is equal to 1
uranium atom and 6 fluoride atoms. The molecular weight is therefore given by:
m(U)+ 6m(F)= 2 38+ 6(19)= 352[g / mol] (7.5)
This makes the mass of uranium approximately 67.6 percent of that of uranium hexafluoride.
347 The IAEA reports usually describe material feed rates in terms of UF6 . However, flow rates should
be converted to uranium when calculating separative properties such as the separative power.
7.7 Unattended and Remote Monitoring System (UNARM)
UNARM is a term for the combined Unattended 349 Monitoring System (UMS) and Remote Monitoring
System (RMS). RMS is an unattended instrument that can automatically upload data directly to IAEA
Headquarters. UNARM is different from the C/S system in that UNARM is designed to report to the
IAEA on a real-time basis, using satellite communication, which is assured by the Additional Protocol.
UNARM will minimize intrusiveness, reduce inspection manpower requirement, and decrease exposure
of personnel to radiation. With UNARM installed, surveillance data can be reviewed by safeguards at
any time and thus inspections can be more effective during inspection preparation for planning and
during on-site inspections. Fewer follow-up visits by inspectors will make less impact on operator's
tasks performance.
For UEFs, the currently-used unattended and remote monitoring system by the IAEA is done
through a continuous enrichment monitoring system (CEMO). Two UANRM instruments were used to
support the Russia/US HEU purchase agreement. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) developed
an Enrichment Monitor (EM) based on thallium-activated sodium iodide [Nal (TI)] gamma-ray
scintillation detectors for on-line measurement at Russia's uranium downblending facility. Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL) also developed a Fissile Mass Flow Monitoring System (FMFM), which
used a modulated neutron source to simulate fissions and Nal detectors to measure the decay product
346 Cooley, J.N. and Huxford, T.J., "Load-Cell-Based Weighing System (LCBWS) Equipment Survey,K/ITP-112
(ISPO-271)," United States Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), Sep.1988.
347 The mass ratio of U-238 to UF6, which can be calculated by (23 8/352) x100(%).
348 Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan Oelrich, Separation Theory (Federation of American Scientists, [cited Jan. 11
2009]); available from http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/fuelcycle/centrifuges/separationtheory.html.
349 Unattended means the absence of inspectors.
170
pulses downstream. This was installed on each leg of the UF6 piping, so that both the feedstock and
product were continuously monitored.
However, the use of UNARM remains limited except for European countries because of the
cost and reliability of techniques. In 2002, the IAEA had 63 cameras and other monitoring devices
connected to 27 RMS established in five countries. Five UMS in two countries providing remote 'state
of health' data were used by the IAEA.3 si
7.8 Satellite Imagery
Since the discovery of Iraq's nuclear weapons program in the early 90s, the possible roles of medium-
resolution commercial satellite images were explored for monitoring nuclear proliferation activities.
Under the AP, high-resolution Commercial Satellite Imagery (CSI) is being utilized as a complementary
source of information in the state evaluation process. Satellite Imagery Analysis Laboratory (SIAL) was
established in 2000 by the IAEA to support IAEA safeguards. What makes SIAL so different and
promising is the fusion of these resources with the inspectors themselves.3 2
Satellite imagery can be obtained from both National Technical Means (NTMs) of states and
privately-operated satellite systems. CSI is the imagery obtained from the latter systems and is generally
referred to as "unclassified imagery publicly offered for a fee on a routine basis, whether by private or
public agencies."353 Since the early 1960s, the US and the USSR/Russia have been using their satellites
as NTMs to identify and monitor each other and other countries' nuclear facilities and activities.
Starting in 1972, these satellites as well as other NTMs were used to verify strategic arms control
agreements, including Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.
As for CSI, it became available with NASA's deployment of Landsat-1 in 1972 and Landsat-2 in
1975.314 In the United States, KH-series of U.S. military reconnaissance satellite belong to the category
of NTMs.
350 The instruments were calibrated before shipment to Russia. Taner Uckan et al., Blend Down Monitoring
System Fissile Mass Flow Monitor and Its Implementation at the Siberian Chemical Enterprise, Seversk, Russia,
ORNL/TM-2005/137, (Springfield, VA: ORNL, Jan. 1996)
351 Russell Leslie, Peter Riggs and John Clarson, "The Role of Remote Monitoring under Integrated Safeguards,"
Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Orlando, FL, (23-27 June 202) and IAEA Dept.
of Safeguards, New Safeguards Equipment Systems: Teaming Inspectors with Technology, (2002)
<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Teaminglnspectors/teaminginspectors.pdf>
352 For more information on task performing process, see K. Chitumbo, S. Robb, J. Bunney and G. Leve, Satellite
Imagery and the Department of Safeguards, IAEA-SM-367/16/08, (2008).
3 James F. Keeley and Jason K. Cameron, "Chapter Two the Need to Know: Commercial Satellite Imagery and
IAEA Safeguards," in Non-Proliferation Arms Control and Disarmament: Enhancing Existing Regimes and
Exploring New Dimensions, ed. Peter Gizewski (Toronto, ON: York University, Centre for International and
Security Studies, 1998). Commercial Satellite Imagery (CSI) first became available with NASA's deployment of
Landsat-1 in 1972 and Landsat-2 in 1975.
35 Vipin Gupta, "New Satellite Images for Sale," International Security, Vol.20, no.1, (Summer 1995), pp. 94-
125. Commercial satellite imagery generally refers to unclassified imagery publicly offered for a fee on a routine
basis, whether by private or public agencies. Keeley, J. F. and Cameron J. K., "The Need to Know: Commercial
Satellite Imagery and IAEA Safeguards." In Peter Gizewski (ed.), Non-Proliferation Arms Control and
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7.8.1 Capabilities of Satellites
Satellites can provide imagery information in different types depending on what types of imaging
sensors are uploaded. Imagery information is generally categorized into visible (photo-optical), infra-
red (electro-optical), and radar imaging, depending on energy levels used for imaging. For safeguards
application, Visible and Near-Infrared (VNIR) and Thermal Infrared (TIR) channels are of importance
and their specifications are described in Table 7.6."' VNIR captures infrastructure signatures, whereas
TIR is sensitive to thermal signatures. TIR is very useful to detect the difference between the
temperature of an object of interest and its surroundings, rather than to measure absolute temperatures.
The capability of satellite imagery is often described in terms of resolution.
Table 7.6 Two Types of Satellite Sensors Useful for Detecting Nuclear Facilities
Specifications Visible and Near-Infrared (VNIR) Thermal Infrared (TIR)
Wavelength about 0.4 to 1 micrometers about 8 to 14 micrometers
used
Types of Traditional photographic image Relative Temperature Difference
information (RTD)
Description of -Spatial resolution -Spatial resolution
capabilities Panchromatic or Multispectral -Panchromatic or Multispectral
-Reflective sensitivity -Thermal Sensitivity (TS)
Taken during the night as well as theAdvantage Higher resolutionda
day
Notes
[a] RTD is the temperature difference between a target and the surrounding environment.
[b]Thermal Sensitivity (TS) is the minimal RTD that TIR imagery can detect and is equivalent to Noise-
Equivalent temperature different (NEdT).
[c] The square of spatial resolution is called Instantaneous Field of View (IFOV). 356
Panchromatic and multispectral images are available in both VNIR and TIR wavelengths in satellite
imagery. A panchromatic image consists of only one band in the broad visual wavelength range; thus, it
produces black and white images. On the contrary, a multispectral image consists of several bands of
data. Each band of the image may be displayed one band at a time as a grey scale image, or in
combination of three bands at a time as a color composite image. Current CSI for VNIR has obtained
Disarmament: Enhancing Existing Regimes and Exploring New Dimensions, (Toronto, ON: York University,
Centre for International and Security Studies, 1998), pp. 13-33.
355 Image is generated in the form of radar pulses which allows imaging at any time of day or night. Long
wavelengths allow penetration of cloud cover and imagery even in dusty conditions. Yet, resolution is not as good
as visible or infrared images. Images can also be subject to "noise" due to "backscatter" (a form electronic static)
caused by certain unfavorable conditions such as rough seas or nearby large, metallic surfaces. Radar satellites
are also susceptible to active jamming. Center for Defense Information (CDI), Terrorism Project: Military
Reconnaissance Satellites (Imint) (2001 [cited May 5 2009]); available from
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/satellites-pr.cfm.
356 Field of View is described as milliradians by milliradians.
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0.5 m spatial resolution and this level can distinguish the major visible characteristics of nuclear
facilities.
7.8.2 Interpretation of TIR Capability
TIR imagery requires coupled analysis of spatial resolution and thermal sensitivity. For simple
comparison of TIR capability the following criteria can be used:
Instant Field of View...
x Temperature Sensitivity (7.6)
Field of View
This is further illustrated in Figure 7.3 by comparing different TIR image capabilities for
detection on the same size target.
1 km i km
:4------------------- N: ----------------------W
IF0V 2$0 m
............ ........ ........ ..f.....
500 m
..Y..------ ..... .. Y. ---- .... ----....
(a) 1 (km)*1 (km) F0V with 500 m Spatial Resolution (b) 1 (km)*1(km) F0V with 250 m Spatial Resolution
Figure 7.3 Description of Thermal Infrared (TIR) Imagery Capability
TIR imagery can detect a target that emits a heat when the following condition is satisfied under clear-
sky conditions:
(Target Facility Footprint ) x ( R TD ) >! (IFO V) x (T S) (7.7 )
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Inequality (7.7) can be used in several ways. As for the detection of a clandestine GCEP, we can
calculate either a minimal heat that a given GCEP should release under a given footprint of a facility or
TIR's capability requirement in order to detect under a given specification of a GCEP such as a
temperature release and the size of footprint. In addition, it could be said that a rough estimate about a
capability of different TIR imagery can be compared using the multiplied values of IFOV and TS. Table
7.7 shows currently-available TIR capabilities.
Table 7.7 TIR Capabilities of Commercial Satellites for Land Surface Temperature
Year TIR VNIR Thermal IFOVxTS/FOV[d]
Operator Satellite Launched Resolution Panchromatic Sensitivity (OK)
(TS)
Landsat
1999 60 m 15 m 0.5-1 "K [a] 0.018-0.036
5,7
NASA ASTER [bl 1999 90 m 15 m 0.2 0 K 0.162
MODIS [c] 1999 1 km N/A 0.05 OK 50.
NOAA AVHRR/3 1998 1.09 km N/A <0.1 *K3 5 7  120.
Notes
[a] Thermal sensitivities of Landsat -5,7 and ASTER from Zhang (2000)
[b] ASTER from < http://www.yale.edu/ceo/Documentation/ASTER.pdf>
[c] MODIS from <http://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/about/specifications.php>
[d] FOVs for each satellite are assumed equal as 1km for criteria (1)
7.8.3 Application of Commercial Satellite Imagery
The possible roles of CSI are as follows: (i) support for inspection planning associated with declared
facilities or shut-down facilities; (ii) the provision of complementary information for detecting
undeclared sites (i.e., a screening tool to detect suspicious sites); and (iii) the establishment of
chronology of facilities from construction to the current operational status.3 ss The effectiveness of using
satellite imagery depends on knowledge about the existence of a facility and its strength level of optical
and thermal signatures.359
7.8.4 Future Use of Satellite Imagery
The limitations of SIAL include the difficulties in identifying of small-scale undeclared facilities and
the costs associated with purchasing satellite imagery. The greater access to military satellites will help
to identify clandestine facilities because of their superior capabilities than commercial satellites.
357 Personal communication with Drs. Rama Mundakkara and Xianqian Wu. For more information, see Jonathan
P.D. Mittaz and Andrew R. Harris, "A Physical Method for the Calibration of the Avhrr/3 Thermal Ir Channels 1:
The Prelaunch Calibration Data," Journal ofAtmospheric and Oceanic Technology 26 (2006)., pp. 996-1019.
358 O.J. Heinonen, Verification of the Correctness and Completeness of Initial Declarations, IAEA-SM-367/2/02
(2002).
359 Kalinowski, "Detection of Clandestine Production of Nuclear-Weapons-Usable Materials."
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However, not all countries have access to such capabilities, and states with these satellites are not
willing to share the information acquired from such satellites. 360 As far as the cost is concerned, if SIAL
can purchase a percentage of satellite time under a United Nations umbrella agreement, it can save the
IAEA budgets and allow the creation of effective collection strategies.
7.9 Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) and Differential Absorption
LIDAR (DIAL) 361
Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR)3 62 is increasingly used because of its feature that does not
require sampling process. LIDAR is an active optical remote sensing technology used routinely by
environmental monitoring agencies to determine the presence of pollutants in the atmosphere. LIDAR
detects particles in the air by transmitting short pulses of electromagnetic radiation into the atmosphere
and analyzing the backscattered light collected in a receiving telescope. A laser in LIDAR can be tuned
to precise wavelengths and selectively stimulate specific molecules. In this manner, LIDAR can directly
measure the properties of stimulated airborne molecules without environmental sampling. However,
LIDAR is limited in specifying the chemical composition of the target particles; thus, it is used only for
determining the density of unspecified particles.
B6senberg and Kalinowski (2008) suggest that DIAL, a special application of the LIDAR
technique can detect any gaseous component with high sensitivity and can determine the chemical
composition of gaseous components. Yet, the current DIAL technology is limited to within the
distances up to several km for the detection of clandestine GCEPs. For concentration measurement,
DIAL measures two adjacent wavelengths at a peak of absorption (online) and at a trough (offline),
giving a different signal. The differential nature of the measured wavelengths simplifies the
measurement process. The difference between two wavelengths at different distances, a total of four
signals, determines of the gas concentration.363 In particular, DIAL has its core competence in remote
sensing of trace gases that provides narrow isolated absorption lines such as UF6 and HF. In addition,
DIAL is operable from various platforms and in an automated way, if required.3" The CALIOP LIDAR,
360 Hui Zhang, "Strengthening IAEA Safeguards Using High-Resolution Commercial Satellite Imagery (IAEA-
SM-367/16/01)" (paper presented at the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear
Material Security, Vienna, Austria, Oct.29 - Nov.1 2001).
361 Kalinowski, Daerr, and Kohler, "Measurements of Krypton-85 to Detect Clandestine Plutonium Production.",
.9-12.
iGSE, "IGSE-Detection of Clandestine Production of Nuclear-Weapons-Usable Material." iGSE on the
detection of clandestine nuclear-weapons-usable materials was launched in May 2006. The purpose of this project
is three folds: develop technologies and procedures to help uncover clandestine production of weapons-usable
materials; demonstrate practical usability in the field; and inform relevant political bodies as well as a wider
public audience of the emergence of such new tools.
63 Spectrasyne, What Is Dial and How Does It Work? (2007 [cited Aug. 13 2008]); available from
http://www.spectrasyne.ltd.uk/html/aboutdial.html.
3 64 Bsenberg and Kalinowski, "Detecting Atmospheric UF6 and HF as Indicators for Uranium Enrichment.",
pp.5 5 -59 .
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which is one of satellite-loaded LIDARs, may show better performance than DIAL. Thus, the
application of the CALIOP LIDAR is worthwhile to investigate.365
7.10 Design Information Verification Equipment
System for Design Information Verification (DIV) can be used to detect the presence of undeclared
changes and hidden facilities that may indicate undeclared proliferation activities such as the diversion
of nuclear material and provision of undeclared material. Currently, two types of DIV equipment are
developed: 3D Laser Range Finder (3DLR) and Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR).
The three-dimensional Laser Range Finder (3DLR) is already being used by the IAEA for
DIV activities at Rokkasho Plutonium Reprocessing Plant. This system can detect any structural
changes within an accuracy of millimeters through the comparison of scanned images with the previous
ones. Changes are shown in highlight such as piping arrangements.366 However, the software of 3DLR
needs further improvement including the revision of 3DLR encryption module.367 GPR is one of
geophysical non-destructive methods and it can detect hidden objects and structures within facilities
during regular inspections. GPR is not in use yet; however, GPR also has the potential for DIV and for
detecting undeclared facilities.368 The current challenge of GPR is to interpret the resulting radargrams
in an immediate and unequivocal fashion.369
7.11 Limitations and R & D Efforts
The IAEA incorporates new technologies as the techniques and implementation of safeguards continue
to evolve. Novel technologies are defined as those for which the methodology has not been applied
previously by the IAEA for safeguards applications. In 2004, the IAEA General Conference called upon
the Secretariat to examine innovative technological solutions to strengthen the effectiveness and
improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. The IAEA Board of Governors decided to call for help in
exploring novel technologies and verification approaches to detecting clandestine activities. The IAEA
started its NTP and collected technical proposals from member states. The Novel Technologies Project
(The project Novel Techniques and Instruments for Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Facilities,
Material and Activities) was established in 2005. Table 7.8 shows the technical limitations of current
inspection techniques. Most of these novel techniques are under development through the Member State
Support Programs (MSSPs).
365 For more information, see David M. Winker et al., "Status and Performance of the Caliop Lidar," (Hampton,
VA: NASA Langley Research Center, 2004).
366 Mark Zendel, "IAEA Safeguards Equipment," International Journal of Nuclear Energy Science and
Technology 4, no. 1 (2008).
367 IAEA, Research and Development Programme for Nuclear Verification 2008-2009., p.48.368 1bid.,p.3 1.
369 Zendel, "IAEA Safeguards Equipment."
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Table 7.8 Techniques for Future Development Requirement37 0
Technique Future
-Vulnerability assessment of sealing system and Laser Surface Authentification (LSA)
Containment design
371
CDevelopment of the ultrasonic sealing bolt, a conduit monitoring system.
-Application of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)372
-Laser Item Identification System (LIIS) Development and Field Testing for UF6
Surveillance cylinder tracking373
- Hawk Digital Imaging System (HDIS) and 3D Spatial Imaging Techniques
Swipe -Nuclear Forensics for tracing the origin of uranium particles and determining age (age
sampling dating) of uranium and plutonium particlesDsmplige -Establishment of cost effectiveness network of laboratories for nuclear material analysis
Destructive while optimizing NWAL resources for reduction of the time response, the shipment
costs, and the waste production.
-Laser Ablation Techniques to detect secondary environmental signatures37 4
ESWA -Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) and Optically Simulated Luminescencein Forensics (OSL)
-Air sampling field trials
-Establishment of NDA Data Acquisition Platform (UNAP)
-Improvement in detection capability, efficiency and effectiveness of detectors based on
Non-. Tunable Diode Laser Spectrometry (TDLS)
Dstructive -Improvement of CHEM and CEMO
-Enhancing the capability of detecting undeclared materials and activities for illicit
trafficking monitoring and support for design information verification.
Unattended -Unattended Monitoring System (UMS): Extension of currently installed UMS lifetime
and Remote and standardization of UMS.
Monitoring -Remote Monitoring (RM): Data transmission methods, data security, data integrity
(UNARM) check and state of health monitoring. CEMO is part of RM.
-Information establishment on characteristic imagery signatures of facilities used in
various enrichment process
Satellite -Information establishment on high-spatial-resolution thermal and hyperspectral data375
imagery -Population of a comprehensive data imagery indicators/signatures for all nuclear fuel
cycle processes
-The use of geospatial information combined with satellite imageries
3701AEA, Research and Development Programme for Nuclear Verification 2008-2009. This document provides
introduction to the IAEA's R & D projects that are conducted through Member State Support Programmes.
371 3D scanning system for DIV and the IAEA is investigating the authentication of metal seals, used widely in
many safeguards applications. By scanning a seal's unique microscopic surface structure, the inherent "fingerprint"
produced provides increased assurance against seal-counterfeiting.
72 Currently, UF6 cylinders can only be tracked manually using tag checks. Tags based on radio frequency
identification (RFID) do not meet strict safeguards requirements concerning tamper resistance.
3 The IAEA has successfully tested LIIS that identified individual UF6 cylinders by the intrinsic spatial
irregularities that are unique to each cylinder. This technique would be coupled with video surveillance to provide
fully unattended system for continuity of knowledge. M. Zendel, "IAEA Safeguards: Challenges in Detecting and
Verifying Nuclear Materials and Activities."
37 IAEA, "Internal Report on the IAEA Technical Meeting on Application of Laser Spectrometry in IAEA
Safeguards (August 28 to September 1, 2006)," (Vienna: 2006).
35 Carlson and Leslie, "Safeguards Intensity as a Function of Safeguards Status".
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7.12 Schematic of IAEA's Safeguards Measures
Figure 7.4 shows IAEA's safeguards measures, both legal and technical, that are currently being used.
This figure was drawn based on Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA). The newly-added
features of AP are represented in shaded boxes. It should be noted that AP is not universalized in most
IAEA member states. In addition, Wide Area Environmental Sampling (WAES) can be implemented
once the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) approves the use of the technique, as requested. But, it is
still limited because of immature level of technology and political sensitivity.
Figure 7.4 IAEA Activities with regard to Safeguards
Table 7.9 shows how long each technology has been applied to safeguards activities by the IAEA. From
this Table, it can be noted that the IAEA's technological capabilities have been strengthened by
introducing new types of technologies in order to increase effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards.
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Table 7.9 Development of Technological Capabilities of the IAEA
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
C/S
DA
NDA
UNARM
Swipe
sampling
Satellite
LCBS
ESWA
Note: The shaded boxes denote that the inspection techniques are applied.
7.13 Summary
The IAEA's capabilities in safeguarding nuclear facilities and detecting proliferation activities were
reviewed in Chapters 6 and 7 from a legal and technical perspective, respectively. The IAEA has been
strengthening its legal and technical capabilities since 1956 after its establishment. In particular, after
the'discovery of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, the IAEA expanded its scope of safeguards
measures to include the transfer of nuclear equipment and fechnology as well as R & D activities with
regard to a nuclear fuel cycle.
The IAEA seeks not only generalization of all possible safeguards and security measures but
also techniques and procedures that are location- or facility-specific in order to ensure the efficiency
and effectiveness of its capabilities. However, the IAEA still seriously lacks capabilities to detect
clandestine proliferation activities. Also, it should be noted that technical capabilities of the IAEA may
vary, depending on its legal capabilities that facilitate detection activities. This happens because the
legal capabilities of any organization can broaden or confine the effectiveness and efficiency of
technical capabilities.
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PART II MODELING HEU PRODUCTION SCENARIOS AT
GCEPS
Part II is dedicated to modeling Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) production scenarios at Gas
Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs). Where Part I is a broad analysis of nuclear weapons programs
and the NPT regime, Part II narrows the scope to a HEU production stage in a nuclear weapons
program and the capabilities of the NPT regime to prevent the production of HEU by proliferators.
In Chapter 8, the general characteristics of Uranium Enrichment Technologies (UETs) were studied. In
this chapter, one can understand how uranium is enriched through a variety of UETs, following the
conversion of uranium ore concentrates to a proper chemical and physical form. Chapter 9 reviews the
technical specifications and characteristics of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Technology (GCET), the
most threatening and efficient UET, associated with nuclear proliferation .
In Chapter 10, the IAEA's approach to safeguarding declared Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants
(GCEPs) was analyzed. However, there are some limitations in describing the exact specifications of
the IAEA safeguards due to security issues with the IAEA and the diversity of GCETs. Through the
study on current safeguard approaches, a new conceptual framework for developing future approaches
was proposed. In Chapter 11, in order to understand the current issues concerning the difficulty of
detecting clandestine GCEPs, the current technological capabilities of the IAEA were analyzed with an
extensive literature survey and input from experts.
In Chapters 12 and 13, proliferators' HEU production scenarios using GCEPs were developed,
incorporating both technological and legal perspectives. Chapter 12 is dedicated to describing scenarios
of acquiring nuclear elements for producing HEU, whereas Chapter 13 focuses on the operation of
declared GCEPs for HEU production. Four modes of off-design operation for producing HEU were
analyzed.
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CHAPTER 8 URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGIES
8.1 Introduction
Uranium Enrichment Technology (UET) produces enriched uranium through separating the U-235 from
the U-238. UET used to be regarded as a technology that only a country with the most advanced
technology could acquire and operate because UET is delicate and complex. In order to produce HEU
for manufacturing nuclear weapons, mined uranium must go through a variety of conversion and
enrichment processes. Despite its technological complexity, UET is becoming the preferred means, over
Plutonium Reprocessing Technology (PRT), for the creation of weapon materials.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze what types of UETs are promising for potential
proliferators to use for the enrichment of uranium. To this end, this chapter begins with an
understanding of why a uranium enrichment program can be preferred over a plutonium reprocessing
program for nuclear proliferation. The technological specifications of both a uranium conversion
process and a uranium enrichment process are explained. Finally, a comparison of different UETs as
potential proliferation risks is provided.
8.2 Why Uranium?
8.2.1 Advantages of a Uranium Enrichment Program
The production of nuclear weapons-grade uranium has always been an expensive and complex process.
Therefore, uranium enrichment technology used to be regarded as a technology that a country with a
limited industrial and scientific base would find hard to obtain. This was the view until the advent of the
Pakistani nuclear weapons program.376 The success of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program based on
uranium enrichment technology demonstrated that the global spread of technological advances allowed
the development of a uranium enrichment program to be far easier than in the past.
It is assumed that the uranium enrichment route is a preferred option over the plutonium
reprocessing route for several reasons as described in Table 8.1. Despite the fact that uranium
enrichment technology is a very complex one that requires a high level of material technology and
accuracy; there are some reasons why a state would want to acquire uranium enrichment capabilities
and why uranium enrichment technology is preferred over plutonium reprocessing technology. In short,
the acquisition of uranium enrichment capability can be explained in terms of completing nuclear fuel
cycle and relative advantages over reprocessing plutonium.
376 In 1977, U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) concluded the following; "It is improbable that
centrifuge enrichment would be the route take by a country with a limited industrial and scientific base." Jeffrey
Lewis, "A Crisis of Confidence " Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 63, no. 1 (January / February 2007).
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Table 8.1 Uranium- and Plutonium-based Paths for Nuclear Weapons Programs
Factors Uranium Enrichment Preference Plutonium Reprocessing
Time required Within a year [a] Uranium More than a year [b]
Number of Reactor for irradiating U-238
required facilities fci Plutonium Spent fuel storage
UEF
and its ease to build PRF
Material Complex uranium . Relatively simple via extraction
Plutonimm
acquisition enrichment technology from reactors rods
Very low due to weak
environmental signatures High due to relatively stronger
Detectability Uranium Hihdetrlavlysonr
Almost impossible to detect environmental signatures
small clandestine facilities
Relibiliy of Highly reliable
Reliability of HMust go through nuclear
Even without detonation tests Uranium
nuclear weapons Tests are not necessary detonation tests
Weapon
manfa t Straightforward Uranium Complex [c]
manufacturability
Cost Less expensive Uranium More expensive 377
Notes
[a] This refers to conversion time for nuclear material that means the time required to convert different forms of
nuclear material to the metallic components of a nuclear explosive device. For more information please see Table
I. in IAEA Safeguards Glossary (2001), page 22.
[b] Spent fuel rods from nuclear reactors must be cooled down before they are reprocessed.
[c] For more information, see Chapter 4.
Compared to Plutonium Reprocessing Facilities (PRFs), Uranium Enrichment Facilities (UEFs)
have advantages in terms of economics, detectability, manufacturability, and reliability as shown in
Table 8.1. For proliferators, it makes more sense and supports a proliferator's position to build UEFs
rather than PRFs. First, from an economic point of view, an open fuel cycle is more economic than a
closed fuel cycle under the current situation. 378 For proliferators, building UEFs is more presentable to
the international community because UEFs are necessary for both closed and open fuel cycles, whereas
PRFs are required only in a closed fuel cycle scenario.
377 This might vary over different countries. However, according to the MCTL, this is true for the United States,
HEU is considered less expensive to use in a weapon than plutonium. U.S. Department of Defense, "Militarily
Critical Technologies List (MCTL), Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies, Section 5-Nuclear
Weapons Technology."
378 O.E. Aleksandrov, "Comparison of Two Approaches to Using the Averaging Method for Analyzing Separation
in a Gas Centrifuge," Atomic Energy 94, no. 4 (2003).
182
Second, from a technical point of view, solely considering the fissile material production
technique itself, uranium enrichment might be considered more complex. However, considering the
whole nuclear fuel cycle for each route, it is estimated that the complexity of uranium enrichment
technology can be offset by the straightforwardness of uranium weapon manufacturability."7 In
addition, the acquisition of weapons-usable plutonium is much more complicated because it requires a
large number of fuel assemblies and massive shielding requirements during transportation and
reprocessing of spent fuels. 380 Third, from a viewpoint of detectability, even though there have been
improvements in the efficiency of environmental detection, it is still challenging to detect uranium
enrichment facilities with regard to the cost and efficiency of those safeguards.
8.2.2. Uranium Enrichment Capability and Nuclear Weapons Programs
Most states want to acquire uranium enrichment technology, analogous to nuclear proliferation
propensity, for national security, energy security, and economic benefit purposes. It is obvious that a
state with a uranium enrichment capability can manufacture a nuclear weapon in a shorter duration than
a state with no such capability. This capability can play a role in deterrence against surrounding states.
As for energy security, if a state has nuclear reactor facilities, either possession of its fissile material
production capacity or acquisition of a fuel supply guarantee from another state must be obtained to
ensure sustainable operation. However, the former option seems to be more attractive in reality. As for
economic benefits, if a state has uranium mines, a state can obtain a higher economic benefit by
producing more qualified product with uranium enrichment facilities or by not importing qualified
products of uranium. All nuclear weapons states have developed both plutonium and uranium-based
programs. In contrast, India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea dedicated their efforts to one path after
they had spent a while exploring both pathways. Recently-known proliferators, Iran and Libya, sought
uranium-based nuclear weapons. Table 8.2 shows the relationship between the possession of uranium
enrichment program and fissile material used for a nuclear weapons program.
379 U.S. Department of Defense, "Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), Part II: Weapons of Mass
Destruction Technologies, Section 5-Nuclear Weapons Technology."
380 Victor Bragin, John Carlson, and Ressell Leslie, "Building Proliferation-Resistance into the Nuclear Fuel
Cycle" (paper presented at the International Seminar on Status and Prospects for Small and Medium Sized
Reactors, Cairo, Egypt, May 27-31 2001 ).
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Table 8.2 Relationship between Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Weapons Program38 1
Material used for Commercial
Comments on uranium
Country weapons program uranium enrichment
Pu HEU program enrichment 
program
US 0 0 0 Full scale production plants
Russia 0 0 0 Full scale production plants
UK 0 0 0 Full scale production plants
France 0 0 0 Full scale production plants
China 0 0 0 Full scale production plants
India 0 X X Experimental enrichment program
Israel 0 X X Experimental enrichment program
South
X 0382 0 Full scale production plants
Africa
Pakistan A 38 3  0 X Full scale production plants
Iran A 384  0 X Pilot plants
NK 0 A385  X R & D Projects
Iraq386 0 0 X Experimental program
Note: 0 = possess a program, X = not possess a program, and A denotes that the information about the program is
not confirmed.
Some might argue that HEU can be purchased to make a nuclear weapon without uranium
enrichment facilities being installed. But, it is necessary to build UEFs for proliferators. First,
proliferators need more than several SQs to be a de facto nuclear weapons state, because a couple of
nuclear warheads is not enough to exploit effective nuclear tactics, such as a second-strike capability.
Second, some loss of uranium material is unavoidable during the warhead manufacturing process and
detonation testing, as necessary. In this regard, a proliferator should acquire HEU production
capabilities rather than simply acquiring smuggled fissile material for the sustainability of a nuclear
weapons program. It does not seem feasible to obtain several SQs of HEU via purchase.
381 Arjun Makhijani, Lois Chalmers, and Brice Smith, "Uranium Enrichment: Just Plain Facts to Fuel an Informed
Debated on Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Power," (Tacoma Park, MD: Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research for the Nuclear Policy Research Institute (IEER), 2004). Table 1: Nuclear Weapons
States-Uranium Enrichment, Military and Commercial, p. 17.
382 "South African Enrichment Program," (Central Intelligence Agency, Aug. 1977).
383 Zhang, "IAEA-SM-367/16/01 ". Pakistan has a heavy water reactor at Khustan reactor site and a gas centrifuge
enrichment plant at Khuhuta.
384Iran has heavy water research reactor project at Arak. David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, "A Witches' Brew?
Evaluating Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Progress," review of Reviewed Item, Arms Control Today, no. (Nov.
2007), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_11 /Albright.
385 Paul Kerr, "N. Korea's Uranium-Enrichment Efforts Shrouded in Mystery," Arms Control Today (May 2003).
386 Albright and Shire, "A Witches' Brew? Evaluating Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Progress," review of Reviewed
Item, no.
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8.3 Overview of Uranium Hexafluoride Production
8.3.1 Production of Yellow Cake
The final output of the uranium mining and milling process is U308 , called yellow cake [or Uranium
Ore Concentrate (UOC)]. However, yellowcake is not pure U30 8, and it typically contains 65 to 68
percent uranium by weight. Other components include uranium dioxide (U0 2) and uranium trioxide
(U0 3). The milling process consists of: leaching to bring uranium present in the solid matrix
into solution; concentration and purification of the dissolved uranium; and precipitation of the
concentrated and purified dissolved uranium into a suitable chemical intermediate. Leaching is
at the heart of the milling process, and acid-leaching and alkaline-leaching techniques are
most commonly used. Ammonium diuranate (ADU)[(NH 4)2U20 7] is produced via the acid-leaching
technique which uses sulfuric acid (H2SO 4) as a leachant and sodium chlorate (NaClO 3) as an oxidizing
agent. Sodium diuranate (Na2U20 7) is produced through alkaline-leaching with sodium carbonate
(Na2CO3).387
8.3.2 Conversion of Yellow Cakes
The chemical form produced from uranium milling plants is U308 . For enrichment operation, uranium
must be prepared in appropriate forms.38
Chemical Process
Uranium
Enrichment Ratio ------- Burnup Process
HEU
Blend
LEU 
-Dwn
Enrichment
LWR
NU
CANDU: Depletion
DU
Conversion
Reduction
_______1 W_____ Chemical
U Metal U308 U02 UF6 Forms
Figure 8.1 Degrees of Freedom of Uranium Material389
387Chiranjib Kumar Gupta and Harvinderpal Singh, Uranium Resource Processing: Secondary Resources (New
York, NY: Springer, 2003)., pp.89-105.
388 U6 and UCl 4 are the principal compounds used as inputs to uranium enrichment processes. More specifically,
gaseous UF6 is used as the feed in the GCEP and GDP, and UCl 4 is used as the feed in the EMIS process.
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Figure 8.1 shows how uranium-containing material changes its chemical forms and Uranium
Enrichment Ratio (UER). As can be seen, there is no way to change both UER and the chemical form.
Here, I will focus on the conversion process from U308 to UF6 because UF6 is the form on which most
uranium enrichment facilities operate.
A conversion process has two objectives: (i) the chemical conversion of U308 to UF6 and (ii)
the removal of impurities. In other words, during a conversion process, impurities are removed and the
uranium is combined with fluorine to create the UF6 gas. 390 The purification process is necessary
because yellowcake typically contains 65 to 80 percent uranium by weight and up to 20 percent
extraneous impurities. Two commercial processes are used for the conversion of uranium from Uranyl
Nitrate Solution or Uranium Nitrate Hexahydrate (UNH), [UO 2(NO) 3)2-6H20] to UF6 . These are the wet
process and the dry process, respectively. Table 8.3 and Figure 8.2 show the overall schematic of
uranium conversion process.
Table 8.3 Chemical Equations for Uranium Conversion Processes [Settle (2005)391
Reactions Chemical Equations
U308 -> U0 2(NO 3)2  -U30 8+8HNO 3-> 3UO2 (NO 3)2+2NO 2+4H 20
UO 3-> U0 2  - UO 3+H2-+ U0 2+H20 (in a kiln) or U0 3+NH3 (cracked) -+ U0 2+H20
- U0 2+4HF(gaseous) -> UF4+2H 20 (in a kiln at 300-500*C)
UO2-+ UF4
- U0 2+4HF(aqueous) -> UF4+2H 2
U0 2 -+ UCl 4  - CC14 (Carbon tetrachloride) at 700 "F
UF4-+ UF6  - UF 4+ F2 -+ UF6 (in a tower reactor or fluidized bed reactor)
UO2-+ UF 392  - U0 2+3F2-- UF6+0 2
Note: U308 is dissolved in nitric acid and extract using a solvent such as tributyl phosphate.
389 HEU blenddown methodology is well described in Kevin Alldred, "Russian HEU Blend-Down Technology
and Options for Expansion" (paper presented at the 49th Annual Meeting of INMM, Nashville, TN, July 13-17
2008).. Metallic uranium must be transformed into HEU oxides and then HEU UF6. Finally, HEU UF6 is blended
with LEU UF6 to achieve lower level of uranium enrichment ratio.
390 The quality of UF6 is crucial for ensuring more successful uranium enrichment operation. Iran used stocks of
high-quality uranium gas imported from China in order to hasten a breakthrough in enrichment. Low quality of
UF6 that contains contaminants can cause centrifuges to crash.
391 Frank Settle, Nuclear Chemistry Uranium Production (Chemcases.com, 2005 [cited Nov.13 2008]).
392Victor Galinsky et al., "A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors," (The
Nonproliferation Education Center, Oct. 2004)., p.41.; and Direct process A can be made using fluorine gas or
chlorine trifluoride (ClF3).Ayyub, "Uncertainties in Expert-Opinion Elicitation for Risk Studies".. Direct process
A can be made using fluorine gas or chlorine trifluoride (ClF3), especially at small size facilities.
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Figure 8.2 Uranium Conversion Process from Yellow Cakes to UF6 Gas3 93
8.3.3. Reduction of Uranium
A. UF6 to U0 2
The inverse process of UF6 to U0 2 or uranium metal is called reduction.394 A proliferator must go
through this process after the completion of uranium enrichment to make nuclear warheads. There are
three possible techniques to reduce UF6 to U0 2 as shown in Figure 8.3: Integrated Dry Route (IDR),
Ammonium Diuranate (ADU), and Ammonium Uranyl Carbonate (AUC). In the IDR, UF6 is reduced
and hydrolyzed using hydrogen and steam. In the ADU process, UF6 is hydrolyzed in water, and
393 A process through ADU or AUC is used at small size plants (100 MTU/year), whereas the thermal denitration
process is favored by medium (100 to 1000 MTU/year) and large plants (1,000 to 10,000 and higher MTU/year).
R. L. Faulkner et al., "Oak Ridge Efforts to Enhance Conversion Plant Safeguards" (paper presented at the INMM
45th Annual Meeting Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Orlando, FL, July 2004 ).
And U.S. Department of Defense, "Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), Part II: Weapons of Mass
Destruction Technologies, Section 5-Nuclear Weapons Technology." ADU is produced through neutralization
with gaseous ammonia and followed by filtering, drying and calcining. Ayyub, "Uncertainties in Expert-Opinion
Elicitation for Risk Studies".
394For more detailed information about plants and equipment for the conversion and reduction of uranium, see
Nuclear Transfer and Supplier Policy Division U.S. Department of Energy, Handbookfor Notification ofExports
to Iraq: Annex 3 (Apr 1998 [cited Nov.11 2008]); available from
<http://www.iraqwatch.org/govemment/US/DOE/DOE-Annex3.htm>..
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ammonia is added to precipitate ADU. ADU is reduced with hydrogen at 820 *C. In the AUC process,
UF6, CO,, and NH3 are combined in water thereby precipitating AUC. AUC is combined with steam
and hydrogen at 500-600 "C.
The conversion process involves primary risks in association with chemical and radiological
impacts. Strong acids and alkalis, which are used in the conversion process to convert the yellowcake
powder to very soluble forms, may lead to possible inhalation of uranium. In addition, conversion
produces extremely corrosive chemicals that could cause fire and explosion hazards.39s
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Figure 8.3 Process of Reduction from UF6 to U0 2396
B. Production of Uranium Metal
For enriching uranium using AVLIS technique or manufacturing nuclear bombs, UF4 needs to be
converted to uranium metal by reduction with magnesium (large batches) or calcium (small batches) at
temperatures above the melting point of 1130 0 C. The chemical equations are as follows: 397
(UF4)s + 2(Ca)s -- Us + 2(CaF 2)s
(UF4)s + 2(Mg)s + Us + 2(MgF 2)s
(8.1)
(8.2)
395 The United States only uranium conversion plant is in Metropolis, IL. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Uranium Conversion (May 10 2005); available from http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-
conversion.html. Canada, France, United Kingdom, China, and Russia also have uranium conversion plants.
396 0ECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), The Safety of the Fuel Cycle, 3rd ed. (Paris, France: OECD, 2005)., pp.
31-32; and G. A. Stoetzel et al., Radiological Health Ascpect of Commercial Uranium Conversion, Enrichment,
and Fuel Fabrication, PNL-4438 USUR-03 (Nov. 1982).
397Ayyub, "Uncertainties in Expert-Opinion Elicitation for Risk Studies". For magnesium at 600 * C from R.
Rogers, K. Seddon, and S.Volkov, Green Industrial Applications of Ionic Liquids (Boston, MA: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2002)., pp.2 10 -2 1 1.
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8.3.4 Treatment of UF 6
A. Properties of UF 6
UF6 is a highly corrosive material. It is a strong fluorinating agent and reacts violently with water, many
organic compounds, and many metals except for Ni, Al, or their alloys.398 At the final state of uranium
conversion process, UF 6 gases pass through a cold trap and are cooled to -10 0 C. At an interim storage
place, UF6 is stored in the form of liquid or solid. However, UF6 should be sublimated before
enrichment operation. As shown in Figure, at atmospheric pressure, solid UF6 transforms directly to
UF6 gas (sublimation) when the temperature is raised to 134' F (57 C), without going through a liquid
phase. On the contrary, after operation, gaseous UF6 should be deposited from gas to solid or condensed
from gas to liquid for storage and transportation.
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Figure 8.4 Phase Diagram of UF6
B. Transport of UF6
After the completion of the conversion process, UF6 is then pressurized and cooled to a liquid. The
liquid state of UF6 is drained into specially designed thick-walled steel shipping cylinders. As the liquid
UF6 within the cylinder cools, it becomes a white crystalline solid in approximately five days and is
then shipped to an enrichment plant in solid form. Table 8.4 list types of cylinders for transporting UF6.
398 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation (New York, NY: Taylor &
Francis, 1983)., pp.1 16 -1 19 .
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Table 8.4 Types of Cylinders for UF 39 9
Capacity
Size Type (Model) Size
Weight Enrichment
IS (1.5 inch)a 230 kg (500 lb) HEU
Small 1 S,2S,5A,5B,8A, 1 OA, 12A, 12B of UF 6
5A (5 inches) 25 kg HEU (5A)
Medium 30A, 30B 30 inches (D) 2.5 tons solid LEU
and 7 feet (L) UF6 (4.95% U-235)
480H, 480HI, 48HX, 48H, 48 inches 14 tons Below LEU
480, 480M
48 y 4 01  1.0% of U-235
Large40 0  48 inches (D) 14 tons of solid (NU) 402
48 G and 12 feet (L) UF6 Depleted
Uranium
48A, 48 X, 48T 48 inches (D) 10 tons of solid 4.5% of U-235
and 10 feet (L) UF6
Notes
[a] Cylinder type designations generally correspond to the approximate diameter of the cylinder, except for 1S and
1S, which are 1.5 and 3.5 inches, respectively.
[b] 48 X and 48 Y are made of carbon steel (A-516) at a nominal thickness of 5/8 inch.
8.4 Overview of Uranium Enrichment
8.4.1 Separative Work Unit (SWU)
In order to understand uranium enrichment, the concept of Separative Work Unit (SWU) 403 must be
understood. The SWU is a unit of measure indicating the physical effort or the work required for a
certain degree of enrichment. In other words, the value of SWUs quantifies the resources required to
perform the enrichment operation to the desired product level. It should be noted that the SWU is
determined under given values of waste concentration and feed concentration. A cascade has three
399 B.M. Biwer et al., "Transportation Impact Assessment for Shipment of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) Cylinders
from the East Tennessee Technology Park to the Portsmouth and Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plants," (Argonne,
IL: Argonne National Laboratory, Oct. 2001). Table 1-2, p. 1-8 .
400 "UF6 Cylinder Program System Requirements Document," (Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Nov. 1995).
Figure 4, p.2 3 . Each model is differently designed in terms of weight capacity, wall thickness (think or thin), and
the possession of skirts.
40' There are about 100,000 48 Y UF6 cylinders in the world, nearly 80,000 in the U.S. and about 10,000 in France.
WISE News Communique, Rupture of UF6 Cylinder (1998 [cited Jan. 3 2009]); available from
http://wwwl0.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http://wwwl0.antenna.nl/wise/487/4836.html.
402Moody, Hutcheon, and Grant, Nuclear Forensics Analysis., p.98; D.G. O'Connor, A.B. Poole, and J.H. Shelton,
"Assessment of Reusing 14-Ton Thi-Wall, Depleted UF6 Cylinders as Llw Disposal Containers," (Nov. 2000).
The tails of the enrichment process are stored in steel drums on-site at UEFs. These drums are effectively self-
sealing.
403 Sometimes this is called Separative Power with the nomenclature of 6U.
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streams of material; the feed material (F), the waste or tails material (W), and the product material (P).
The SWU is defined as the following equation:
SWU = P V(xp) + W V(x.) - F-V(x) (8.3)
where P, W, F are the amounts of the product, the waste, and the feed; x,, x,,, and xf are weight fractions
of U-235 in the product, the waste, and the feed materials; and V(x) is a value function that takes the
form of
xV(x)=(2x-1).ln( ) (8.4)
1-x
the V(x) values are dimensionless and are known as "separation potentials", so the units of SWU can
be in terms of any amount of material. The value function V(x) is dimensionless, so the unit of SWU is
contingent on the units of P, W, and F.
In the calculation of SWUs needed for the enrichment, the number of SWUs expended per unit product
is commonly used, which is described as the following equation:
SWU x -x x
SF = =V(x,)+ __t V(x,)+ 2 f V(xf) (8.5)
P x-x, x-x,
SWU/P is dimensionless, and it is also known as SWU Factor (SF).
The units of SWU-related nomenclatures are often confused. This is because SWU is meant to
measure the work required during the enrichment process, whereas the value of SWUs is given in terms
of kilograms or tons because P, W, and F are described in units of kilograms, according to equation 8.3.
In practice, either kg-SWUs or metric ton-SWUs are the preferred ways to denote that it is the unit for
SWUs. In the description of an UEF capacity, a time period that SWUs are expended should be taken
into consideration. Thus, a capacity of UEFs is expressed in terms of kg-SWUs per year or ton-SWUs
per year.
Table 8.5 and Figure 8.5 show the relationship between the use of SWU and the degree to
which uranium is enriched. For example, if one wants to produce 93 percent Weapons-Grade Uranium
(WGU) with 0.72 percent Uranium Enrichment Ratio (UER) of uranium feed, a mass of 197.34
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kilograms and 214.03 SWU are required in theory. However, during the enrichment process, the loss of
SWU is inevitable.
Table 8.5 Requirements to Produce 1kg of 93 % WGU per Different UER of Feed 4
Feed UER Mass required SWU required Feed UER
[%] [ kg] %
19.53 60.88
Mass required
[kg] _
1.33
SWU required
3.74
10 9.51 36.23 80 1.16 2.23
20 4.70 20.34 90 1.03 0.6
Note: UER = Uranium-235 Enrichment Ratio
SWU and Enrichment
250
200
=0 150
100
50
0 ~ - II oi
0 20 40 60 80 100
Uranium Enrichment Ratio (%)
Figure 8.5 Relationship between Required SWU and the UER of Feed Used in Producing
1 kg of 93% WGU
4W xw=0.0025 and xp=0.93 are assumed for the analysis.
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8.4.2 Terms and Parameters with regard to Uranium Enrichment
Understanding terminology regarding uranium enrichment operation is necessary in the analysis of
enrichment operation. Parameters are classified into separation, mass, reflux, and time-related terms.
A. Separation and Mass
For the enrichment of any isotope, the enrichment element in the flow process diagram can be treated as
a 'black box' that changes an isotopic composition of a mixture between two different isotopes. To fully
quantify the enrichment operation a mixed input goes into the "black box" element, i.e., 'feed', 'product'
and the output 'tails' or 'waste' come out of the element. Table 8.6 shows separation- and mass related-
terms for describing uranium enrichment.
Table 8.6 Important Parameters for Uranium Enrichment I [SIPRI (1983) and Villani (1983)]
Term Definition
R = N N refers to the percentage composition in numbers
Relative isotopic (1 - N)
abundance (R) of molecules of the desired isotope (U-235), whereas (1-N) refers
to the fraction of U-238.
Single-stage Renriched R mole fraction of U 23 ,
separation factor q R enriched or depleted (1- mole fraction of U2 3 )
(q)
Separation Stage enrichment a R,
factor R.
(a) where R,=UER entering stage n, Rn+1=UER going out of stage n.
Separation gain g =q-1
(g)
Enrichment gain e = a - 1
Total mass flow Loa ( 82)A V AV=total separative work
rate (Loral) ,
The amount of uranium present in any given stage or in the full
cascade
Mass In-process I = (8t )AV = L,, X th,
or hold-up where th= hold-up time, g = separation gain
(1) Nuclear material deposits remaining after shutdown of a plant in
and about process equipment, interconnecting piping, filters and
adjacent work areas*05
405Sharikov, "Verification Challenges for Safeguarding Uranium Enrichment Plants.", pp. 75-79.
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B. Parameters for Uranium Enrichment
Table 8.7 describes important parameters for uranium enrichment. The required time and the desired
level of enrichment are amongst the most important considerations in uranium enrichment process.
Therefore, reflux ratio is an important parameter because it can be adjusted by the operator inputs
throughout the process. Reflux ratio refers to the ratio of the amount of flow extracted or produced to
the amount of flow recycled.
Table 8.7 Important Parameters for Uranium Enrichment II [Krass et al., (1983)]
Term Definition
Poduct withdrawal
Reflux ratio Reflux ratio =
Countercurrent flow
Reflux Reflux loss Percentage of the uranium loss in the reflux process
Operating condition where no product is extracted (with no productTotal Reflux rmvl406
Flushing time The time required to flush out UF6 in a gas centrifuge machine
(i) The time from the initial start-up to the point at which the product flow
rate reaches half of its asymptotic value. Conventionally defined as the
time from the initial start-up to the point at which the product flow rate
.r reaches half of its asymptotic value.
E im (ii) The time required to reach the equilibrium concentrations at every
time point of the cascade.4"
Time t, = ~ E(N, NF) , where E is multiplying constant, Nr and NF are
g
enrichment ratios of the product and feed
Cascade fill
tiae f The time to fill the cascade for the operation with new feedstock.
time
The time for taking a given sample of material to pass through a single
Stage stage, and determined by the specific design of the separating elements.time
i .e This is necessary information to calculate the plant equilibrium time and(transit time) inetoy 408
mnventory.40
Notes
[a] Reflux is defined as either the portion of the stage flow at the top of a stage or a cascade which is sent back
down the stage.
[b] Countercurrent flow means a form of internal reflux which causes a continual recirculation of the gas in the
centrifuge.
446Amnon Kohen and Hans Heinrich Limbach, Isotope Effect in Chemistry and Biology (Boca Raton, FL: CRC
Press, 2006). p.6 3 . This term is adopted from the old technique of fractional distillation.
4 07Stelio Villani, Isotope Separation (Hinsdale, IL: American Nuclear Society, 1976)., p. 134 .
408 Gregory S. Jones, Iran's Centrifuge Enrichment Program as a Source of Fissile Materialfor Nuclear Weapons
(Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, April 8 2008 [cited Feb.3 2009]); available from http://www.npec-
web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20081017-Jones-IranEnrichment&PDFFolder=Essays.
194
8.5 Gas Centrifuge Enrichment
8.5.1 Introduction
Lindermann and Aston first suggested the use of gas centrifugation for the separation of isotopes in
1919. The uranium enrichment industry in the Soviet Union was created at the end of the 1940s to
produce WGU. An Austrian scientist Zippe worked on gas centrifuge technology in the Soviet Union
and he got involved in the American project after coming to the University of Virginia in 1956. 409He
continued development and then his work resulted in the success of a new advanced centrifuge
technology later used in the US and the Urenco states.
Centrifuges have evolved from a variety of materials, with varying lengths, diameters, and
operating speeds. 410 The U.S. installed more than 1,300 centrifuges at Portsmouth with fiberglass rotors
with some limitations in 1985. In 1999, USEC began exploring potential deployment of a GCEP to
replace gaseous diffusion. The most recent design of the USEC is called "American Centrifuge" and
USEC is developing technology in cooperation with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). 4" As of
2004, the world total enrichment capacity available is estimated to be 53,500 tSWU/yr and gas
centrifuge accounts for about half, 23,000 tSWU/yr.4
8.5.2 Principles
The gas centrifuge uses convective diffusion, with strong accelerations to magnify the effect. The gas
centrifuge chamber is a hollow cylindrical tube and it rotates on its axis at very high speeds. As the
cylinder rotates at very high speed, the UF6 gas is separated into the two isotopic concentrations through
the weight differences. The gas is accelerated by rapid rotation and creates a centrifugal force. The
centrifugal force accelerates particles towards the periphery of the circle; hence, it separates uranium
isotopes because of the variation in atomic mass. A schematic drawing and the functions of the various
parts of a gas centrifuge are given in Figure 8.6 and Table 8.8.
409 Beginning in the mid-1950s (1955), the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission began supporting significant
developmental work on gas centrifuge technology. B. McGinnis et al., "Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment
Facilities in the United States-IAEA Safeguards Implementation" (paper presented at the 46th Annual Meeting of
INMM, Phoenix, AZ, July 10-14 2005).
410 H.G. Wood, A. Glaser, and R. S. Kemp, "The Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation," Physics
Today (Sep. 2008)., pp. 40-45.
411 ORNL, "Gas Centrifuge Research Comes Home to Oak Ridge," ORNL Reporter, no. 48 (May 2003).
412 M. D. Laughter, "Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007, ORNL/TM-2007/193," (Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, 2007). The gaseous diffusion plants in France and the US are supposed to be replaced by gas
centrifuge facilities.
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Figure 8.6 Schematic Drawing of Gas Centrifuge Separation Chamber 4 1 3
413 For more information concerning the properties of a hypothetical centrifuge, see Table 6.2 Properties of a
hypothetical centrifuge in Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proiferation. p.133.
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Table 8.8 Main Parts and Functions of Centrifuges [GlobalSecurity.org] 4"
Main parts Function
Top and bottom -Stabilization of the rotor in the presence of radial rotor vibrations.
bearing -Prevention of contact between feed spindle and rotor
Suspension system -Damping of rotor vibration.
Electric power supply -Provision of an AC output to gas centrifuge drive motors
-Conversion of AC input at the 50-6 Hz from the electric power grid to a
Frequency converters much higher frequency (typically 600 Hz or more)(the speed of an AC motor
is proportional to the frequency of the supplied current)
-Bellows make rotor tubes connected together.
-Either triangular or rectangular shape4 15
-A specialized Urenco-designed component made from maraging steel.
These are thin-walled cylindrical pieces that act as a type of spring, allowing
the rotor to bend ever so slightly and avoid breaking during start-up and
shutdown.4 16
vacuum system -Friction prevention and thermal isolation 417
-Promotion of the reflux flow along the end plates. 4 18
Baffles -Prevention of countercurrent generation opposing the one produced by the
bottom scoop by shielding the top scoop from the main gas flow419
-Protection of rotor from external shocks
-Maintenance of vacuum
.n . -Overall temperature control to maintain gaseous phase of UF6
-Generation of thermal drive for counterflow generation
-Knock UF6 molecules back into interior of rotor using high speed rotatingMolecular pump blades 420
414 GlobalSecurity.org, Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment ([cited 2009 Jan. 15]); available from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/u-centrifuge.htm.
415 Tsunetoshi Kai, "Basic Characteristics of Centrifuges (IV)," Nuclear Science and Technology 14, no. 3 (Jul.
1977)., pp.5 0 6-5 18 .
416 Albright and Shire, "A Witches' Brew? Evaluating Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Progress," review of Reviewed
Item, no.
417 Karl Cohen, The Theory of Isotope Separation as Applied to the Large Scale Production of U-235, 1st ed.
(New York: McGraw-Hill Boo Co., 1951).
418 Kai, "Basic Characteristics of Centrifuges (IV)."
419 Donald R. Olander, "The Theory of Uranium Enrichment by the Gas Centrifuge," Progress in Nuclear Energy
8 (1981)., pp. 1-33.
420 Robert F. Mozley, The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation (Seattle, WA: University of
Washington Press, 1998)., p. 10 3
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8.6 Laser Enrichment Technology (LET)
8.6.1 History
Research on laser isotope separation technologies began in the early 1970s as a third-generation
enrichment technology because it can produce HEU far more effectively than gas centrifuge technology
of the second-generation. 421 Laser enrichment technology has significant advantages over other
enrichment technologies in terms of low electricity consumption 42 2 and low capital costs. During the
1980s and 1990s the US, France, Britain, Germany, South Africa, Japan and possibly Russia attempted
to develop laser enrichment technology, but all failed because of its technical complexity. It is known
that US efforts involved 500 scientists and spent around 2 billion dollars on three different laser
enrichment projects:423
- Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) based on selective photoionization by Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Jersey Nuclear-AVCO Isotopes (JNAI) in the 1970s
- Molecular Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS) based on photo-dissociation by a group of scientists at
the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in 1971, and
- Plasma process by TRW Corporation
The US, Japan, and France did research on both MLIS and AVLIS. Major enriching counties like
the US and France was in favor of AVLIS while MLIS was being pursued in other countries such as
Germany and the UK. But most countries terminated their MLIS development program, except for
South Africa and Japan.424 Continued research in AVLIS in Australia resulted in a very promising
technology, the so-called SILEX technology. 42 5
421 William Metz, "Laser Enrichment: Time Clarified the Difficulty," Science, New Series 19, no. 4232 (Mar
1976)., pp. 1162-1163+1193.
422 Great savings in energy 1000 times less than gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) and 100 times less than the gas
centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs).
423 Richard Macey, Laser Enrichment Could Not Cut Cost of Nuclear Power (The Sydney Morning Herald, May.
27 2006 [cited 2009 Mar. 18]); available from http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/laser-enrichment-cut-cost-
of-nuclear-power/2006/05/26/1148524888448.html.
424Ann MacLachlan, "South Africa's Aec Plans to Test Prototype Mlis Enrichment in Unit 1994," Nuclear Fuel 17,
no. 5 (1992). South Africa planned to test economic and technical parameters of a prototype uranium enrichment
unit using MLIS around 1994 and had stated that their MLIS program was ready to be deployed for LEU
production.
425 Maurice Lenders, "Uranium Enrichment by Gaseous Centrifuge" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting on
Nuclear Technology 2001, Dresden, Germany, May. 16 May 2001)., p.7. Urenco was aware of the prospective
benefits of laser enrichment and carried out significant research at a cost of some 300 million dollars. However,
MLIS and AVLIS were terminated in 1992 and 1994 respectively, the reason being that the technology could not
be justified on a commercial scale. Urenco had no need of a new technology, because it was very optimistic about
the future of the gas centrifuge. Urenco focused on its advanced centrifuge while maintaining a watching brief on
laser enrichment technology.
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Laser enrichment techniques will pose a significant threat to nonproliferation, if it is developed
and commercialized which is currently the case. It is generally estimated that the transition from a
physical principle to an economically viable industrial technique is usually hard. But the basic physical
principles are really quite simple, and all have been understood for many years. It allows the
construction of a small facility thanks to its large separation factors. In addition, a small size of
components and highly energy-efficient operation enable clandestine operation of HEU production.
Generally, a laser enrichment technique is capable of producing HEU in just a few stages. Metz (1976)
estimated that laser methods could potentially save as much as half the cost and 90 percent of the
energy used in GDPs. If the technology is realized, laser methods will enable proliferators to build
bombs in their basements.
8.6.2. Molecular Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS)
A. Operation Process
Figure 8.7 and Table 8.9 show the overall schematic and process of MLIS, respectively. For the
enrichment operation using MLIS, UF6 must be supercooled before it is irradiated by lasers, because at
room temperature, the collisions between UF6 molecules are so violent that virtually all of the
molecules become excited so that they are above their lowest vibrational states.
Reaction Products
UV Laser
fXCI)
CollectGas
Carrier Gas Nozzle
tN or Ar) (Spercooling)
Mixer A7ife
IAKL5
17 Fluorine
FEED R Laser
We~r) (1) C02-CF. a(U2) COb Cena Fluorination
Scattering *__ Ytr
PRODUCT (UF)
Figure 8.7 Schematic of MLIS
Molecules with a wide range of vibrational energies make it difficult to get any significant selectivity by
tuning to a particular vibrational transition. Supercooling the UF6 can solve this problem. MLIS can use
either multiple infra-red (IR) lasers or a combination of IR ultraviolet (UV) lasers for the excitation and
dissociation of 235UF6 molecules. An IR laser should be tuned precisely to selectively vibrate 235UF6
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because 23 5UF6 and 238UF6 have different excitation reactions to infrared laser systems, resulting from
the difference in vibration frequencies of the molecules. However, it is extremely difficult to design an
optical system that can deal with both IR and UV light. The product of MLIS is 235UF5 and is not
subject to 235UF6 degradation because any non-irradiated 2 35UF6 gas simply continues on to the tails
stream.426 In particular, the higher 2 5 UF6 enrichment ratio, the fewer fluorine-exchange reactions are
going to occur. However, as the concentration of 238UF6 increases, the exchange reaction, which is the
cause of 235UF5 degradation, will increase and can be represented as follows:
nsUF5 + 2UF 6 ++ 23 UF6 + 23sUF5 (8.6)
However, the MLIS technology is a stage-wise process and each stage requires conversion of the
enriched UF5 product back to UF6 for further enrichment, so called re-fluorination process as follows:
23 5UFF +  ->5UF6 (8.7)
Table 8.9 Process of MLIS4 2 1
Step Description
Why? Maintain dilute 235UF6 density
235UF6 density can easily be made independent of feed assay and thereby
Mixing of feed always matched to the capabilities of lasers.
1 What is done?: Prepare for expanding UF 6 in a nozzle
The UF6 feed and the inert carrier gases such as argon or nitrogen are
mixed in the mixer. An inert carrier gas will play a role in expanding the
UF6 through a nozzle.
Why? Put UF6 molecules in the ground state
In order to use only one single isotopically selective laser for exciting UF6
molecules, UF6 molecules must be put into the lowest vibrational state
2 Nozzle through supercooling.
What is done? Expand and subsequently supercool UF 6
Mixed gas is expanded at supersonic speeds through a nozzle. (UF6 in a
supersonic gas jet. As a result, 95 percent of the molecules are in the
vibrational ground state.
426 For more information about degradation of the product, see Alexander Obermayer, "Uranium Isotope
Separation Process Following the Molecular Laser Process," (Fed. Rep. of Germany: Uranit GmbH, 1990).
427Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation.,p.21;Allan S. Krass, "Laser
Enrichment of Uranium: The Proliferation Connection," Science 196, no. 4291 (1977).; and, U.S. Department of
Defense, "Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), Part 1I: Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies,
Section 5-Nuclear Weapons Technology." p. 11-5-17
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(Continued)
First IR laser
radiation
Why? Selective excite 23 5UF 6
In order to excite only 235UF6 to its first vibrational state while leaving U-
238 UF6 molecules unexcited.
What is done? Irradiate mixed gas with IR laser
An isotopically selective IR laser system operates near the 16 pm
wavelength.428
(i) Option 1: A combination of CO 2 and CF4 laser system with 16 pm
wavelength
(ii) Option 2: Raman scattering in hydrogen to step up the wavelength of
CO 2 laser light from 10 to 16 pm
Why? Molecular dissociation
In order to dissociate the excited 35UF6 and toform 2UF5 and free fluorine
Second laser atoms.
4
radiation What is done? Molecular dissociation
(i) Option 1 (Multi-step IR multiphoton absorption)
(ii) Option 2 (Two-step IR and UV dissociation)
Filtering and The 235UF5 so-called "laser snow" formed from the dissociation precipitates
Re- from the gas as a powder that can be filtered from the gas stream and sent
fluorination on to be refluorinated back to UF6 .429
5
-The remaining gas is cleaned up and sent on for further tails stripping.
Pcessn s -A scavenger gas such as methane is used to capture the fluorine atoms that
clean-up
are released as a result of the dissociation of 235UF6 molecules.
B. Proliferation Risk
Krass et al., (1983) expected that MLIS would be the most proliferation-prone process among all
available techniques, though it had not been fully developed. However, because of the technical
complexity of laser enrichment techniques, it was expected that laser techniques would not be available
in the foreseeable future. 4 0 The separation factor for MLIS, if developed, will be extremely high.
Moreover, if coupled with the compact size of a separating element, both inventory and equilibrium
time would be reduced. With MLIS technology, there exists no problem in producing weapon-grade
uranium at the small warehouse size of an MLIS facility. 43
428 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., p.167. Only one laser is needed
to excite most of the 235UF 6because roughly 95 percent of the UF6 molecules can be put into the lowest vibrational
state, while AVLIS requires four lasers because only a minority of the uranium atoms can be excited out of the
lowest energy state.
429 Krass, "Laser Enrichment of Uranium: The Proliferation Connection." mentions that the high recombination
rates of dissociated molecules (UF5 and F) may ultimately impose a more severe limitation.
430 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation. , p.25.
43 Ibid., p.21.
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Okamoto and Nishimura (1997) propose three advantages of using MLIS over other technologies: 43 2
- The MLIS has a larger separation factor and much shorter holding time. Therefore, it has a much
higher diversion probability.
- UF5 fine particles are likely to be absorbed on the inside wall of a multi-jet impactor, so that they
might be accounted as an uncertainty associated with MUF in a collection process.
- Special care should be given to depleted uranium stored on the site. It is easily reusable as feed
material.
8.6.3. Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS)
A. History
JNAI's project on AVLIS started in the early 1970s and continued until 1981. In the same year, US
DOE decided to direct most of its support to LLNL, which had been doing a similar project since 1972.
US DOE estimated that the AVLIS process at LLNL had an advantage over its two competitors, the
MLIS process also at LANL and a Plasma process at TRW Corporation. The AVLIS process was the
only advanced enrichment method brought to the pilot plant stage in the USA. In 1985, LLNL
transferred the technology to United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) which operated at the
former K-25 site. 4 In 1995 USEC and DOE reached an agreement on the transfer of intellectual and
physical property of AVLIS technology to USEC. In June 1999, USEC announced that it was
discontinuing its development of the AVLIS process. However, research on AVLIS was continued by a
private company in Australia.
B. AVLIS Process
AVLIS works on the principle of photo-ionization using a powerful laser to ionize U-235 atoms present
in a vapor of uranium metal.434 AVLIS utilizes very small shifts in the frequencies at which atoms
absorb light. Thus, AVLIS requires a laser system that can selectively use light to distinguish tiny
frequency shifts because these changes are very small. Figure 8.8 shows the schematic of AVLIS.
432 Tsuyoshi Okamoto and Hideo Nishimura, "Uniqueness of Diversion Paths at Molecular Laser Isotope
Separation Facility " Proceedings of the School of Engineering, Tokai University 23 (1997)..
43 The U.S. DOE announced the selection of AVLIS as the technology to meet future U.S. needs for the
internationally competitive production of uranium separative work. J.A. Paisner, "Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope
Separation," Applied Physics B: Lasers and Optics 46, no. 3 (July 1988)., pp.2 5 3- 26 0 .
434 Uranium Enrichment (World Nuclear Association, 2009 [cited 2009 Aug. 13]); available from http://world-
nuclear.org/info/default.aspx?id=452&terms=uranium+enrichment.
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Figure 8.8 Schematic Drawing of AVLIS435
The AVLIS process can be divided into three stages. First, the pure metallic form of the uranium ingot
is melted into uranium vapor (evaporated atoms at about 2500 'K) 436 in a crucible as shown at the
bottom of the figure. An electron-vacuum evaporation unit produces an atomic vapor of natural uranium
by heating it with a beam of electrons directed to the surface of the ingot by a magnetic field. An
elaborate mechanism must be used to get as many uranium atoms as possible into their lowest energy
states and to allow the ionization of atoms by the electron beam to recombine into neutral form. Then
vapor moves toward the interaction zone for photoionization.
Second, at the irradiation zone, the U-235 atoms are excited and ionized by four types of dye
lasers.437 As the U-235 atom absorbs the laser light, its electrons are excited to a higher energy state. U-
235 atom will become a positively charged ion by ejecting an electron upon the absorption of sufficient
energy. The photoionization of uranium vapor takes place when it is excited to the energy level of 6.19
electron volt (eV) via a three-step excitation process as shown in Figure 8.9. Removing an electron from
a uranium atom with a total energy of 6.19 eV is very difficult to achieve with a single dye laser in
practice in an isotopically selective way because there are three discrete energy levels between the
ground state and 6.19 eV. A dye laser system can produce light beams to excite U-235 atoms selectively
in a uranium isotope mixture, which is pumped by another high-power system of copper-vapor lasers.
4" The size of AVLIS is 1 meter in height and 1-3 meters in length and it is composed of laser system and
separation system: a vaporizer and a collector.4
' The melting point of pure uranium metal is 1,132 *C and the boiling point of liquid uranium is 3,818 "C.
437Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., pp.160-166. The rhodamine dye
lasers can be tuned to provide precise laser beam frequency, timing and control in a manner that only the U-235
atoms absorb the laser light. Four lasers of slightly different colors are used, to remove an electron from a uranium
atom through isotopical selection. The laser light is being reflected several times through each collection volume
by a system of mirrors.
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The dye lasers in the red spectral range (590-600 nm) are typically chosen to allow transitions between
three steps for effective cascade excitation.
Finally, electrically-charged U-235 will become trapped in an electromagnetic field and drawn
to a metal plate for collection.438 The positively-charged U-235 ions are deflected by a pulse of strong
electric and magnetic fields and collected on the vertical plates (product collector). Ionized atoms can
be separated from the neutral atoms in the beam by the use of electric or magnetic fields. The neutral U-
238 atoms continue outward (pass through the product collector) and are deposited on the horizontal
plate (tails collector) at the top.
8.6.4. Comparison between MLIS and AVLIS
Both MLIS and AVLIS have excellent features for nuclear proliferation, including a high separation
factor, low energy consumption (approximately the same as the centrifuge process), and a small volume
of generated waste. But the success of laser enrichment technology is mainly dependent upon the
development of suitable lasers. The main differences are that MLIS is a process based on the exchange
of resonant vibrational energy in molecules, while AVLIS is a process of atoms and the exchange of
ionic charge in atoms between ionized U-235 atoms and neutral U-238 atoms. As a result, three
differences between MLIS and AVLIS arise and they will result in different features as follows:
- Different forms of uranium in process: size of facilities, ease of handling, specific requirement for
lasers, density restrictions and throughput limitations,
- Use of different laser systems, and
- Different forms of tails assay: collection system requirement, reflux problems, and product
degradation.
As for laser systems, both technologies require a laser that can provide isotopically selective light and
be precisely tuned to excite UF6 atoms or molecules. However, the second laser of AVLIS requires a
high pulse repetition rate, while MLIS needs a laser with considerably high power to excite large
numbers of UF6 molecules as shown in Figure 8.9
438 P.A. Bokhan et al., Laser Isotope Separation in Atomic Vapor (Weinheim, Germany: WILEY-VCH, 2006).;
and Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation.
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Figure 8.9 Summary of Laser Systems used in MLIS and AVLIS [Krass et al. (1983)1]39
A. Proponents of MLIS
Krass et al. (1983) argue that MLIS is generally regarded as advantageous over AVLIS because the
actual implementation of the AVLIS process is likely to be more difficult and expensive than MLIS.
AVLIS requires much sophisticated hardware constructed of specialized materials that must be capable
of reliable operation for extended periods of time in a harsh environment.
First, MLIS is better in the handling of feeds, tails and products. MLIS uses UF6 and produces
enriched product in the form of UF5 . In contrast, AVLIS uses a metallic form of uranium as feed and
then proceeds to the atomic vapor. The atomic vapor is very hard to handle because if its high
temperature and corrosiveness. The molecular process of MLIS can be conveniently operated in stages
because enriched product in the form of UF5 can be filtered from the gaseous tails stream. In addition,
non-irradiated UF6 gas at MLIS can be easily dealt with because it simply continues on into the tails
stream and has no effect on the product assay of the irradiated vapor. The formation of "UF snow"
facilitates the segregation of the product from tails and removes the need for very high laser pulse rates,
which are required in the AVLIS process. In the case of AVLIS, non-irradiated vapor is collected at a
439 Figure 6.19 on page162 and Figure 6.22 on page 169.
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fixed rate along with the irradiated U-235 ions. The need to collect and recycle large quantities of
uranium, which condense out of vapor would create a significant reflux problem." 0
Second, MLIS may be capable of considerably higher production rates than AVLIS for a given
interaction volume because AVLIS uses uranium vapor of very low density to enrich uranium. An
MLIS facility is going to be much smaller than an AVLIS facility for the same enrichment capacity
because of two factors: the atomic vapor used in AVLIS is much less dense than the gaseous UF6 used
in the molecular process, and MLIS has a less complex optical system for the laser beams because much
smaller irradiation volumes are required than for AVLIS.
Third, the MLIS has a higher operational efficiency than AVLIS. Only 50 percent of the
evaporated atoms reach the irradiation zone and the rest are deposited on various surfaces inside the
chamber. About 70 percent of the uranium atoms reached and placed in the zone are illuminated by the
lasers and another 30 percent goes on to the tails collector as neutral particles. Configuration of
cascades at MLIS facility is easier than that of AVLIS because the enrichment efficiency of MLIS
would further improve at higher assays.
Fourth, MLIS is better suited to produce HEU than AVLIS. The higher the feed assays at MLIS,
the less degradation of product would occur as a result of fluorine-exchange reactions. However, as for
AVLIS, vapor state requires a collector unit of large size for a HEU production and the issue of plasma
shielding effect becomes problematic as U-235 enrichment rates go up.
B. Proponents of AVLIS
Metz (1976) and the U.S. DOE prefer AVLIS over MLIS. They argue that MLIS seemed to be a great
gamble. This view is in the opposition to Krass et al., (1983). The advantage of AVLIS could be two
factors. First, its high selectivity could lead to one-pass enrichment with low tails assay with the result
of lower quantities of uranium being used. Theoretically, three batch recycles makes it possible to
produce 97 % HEU from natural uranium. Second, the required laser power for AVLIS is not as great as
that for molecular processes, although the pulse repetition rate (the number of emitted pulses per
second) must be higher to obtain reasonable production rates.
In contrast, Metz (1976) pointed out two critical weaknesses of MLIS: difficulty with finding
the wavelength that could selectively excite 235UF6 because of high density of the molecules; and the
great power requirement for the second laser system. MLIS cannot be used in enrichment of Pu metal
while such is possible with AVLIS. These factors might have contributed to the development of SILEX,
which is an advanced version of AVLIS rather than MLIS. 441 Table 8.10 shows a comparison of key
features between MLIS and AVLIS.
440Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., p.162.
441 Paragraph 114. "INFCIRC/640, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report
Submitted to the Director General of the IAEA."
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Table 8.10 Comparison of Key Features between MLIS and AVLIS [Krass et al., (1983)]
Preferred Option
Specifications MIS AVILIS for Proliferation
Irradiation volume Smaller Larger MLIS
Handling of Uranium UF6  Uranium vapor MLIS
Process operation Convenient (molecules) Complicated (atoms) MLIS
Degradation of product Less More MLIS
Specific Size of facility Smaller Larger MLIS
Collection system Not required Required MLIS
Overall efficiency lower higher AVLIS
Power requirement Higher Lower AVLIS
Applicability to Pu No Yes AVLIS
8.6.5. SILEX - Advanced AVLIS Technology
A private Australian company (Silex technology) operating out of the Australian Nuclear Science and
Technology Organization (ANSTO) facility has successfully developed a new laser enrichment
technology called "SILEX (Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation)", with support from the US
Enrichment Corporation from 1996 to 2002. In 2001, the Silex process was officially classified by the
US Secretary of Energy and the Australian government. On 22 June 2006, Silex Systems announced US
government approval for an agreement giving exclusive commercialization rights to General Electric
Company. The Silex-GE agreement resulted in commercial deployment of laser enrichment in the US.
In 2007, the Silex Technology licensed the SILEX process to General Electric.
The process is based on selective excitation of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) molecules that
contain U-235 by laser light at a narrow spectral line near 16 pm, but few details have been released.
Many details are classified or proprietary.
235 UF6235U
3 pm Abo6 Enriched1 Product
Pulsed C02 10.8 P Parahydrogen is pm
I aer Raman C-nnverterLZIJ
16 \ 238 UF6 Not 0depletedI tailings
Figure 8.10 Simple Schematic of Silex Technology Process" 2
442 In the Silex process, light at 10.8 pim from a CO2 laser is converted to a 16 im wavelength and used to separate
U-235 from U-238. Beljac, Pakistan and the Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism.
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As shown in Figure 8.10, the pulsed CO 2 lasers can generate pulses, but with limited efficiency
and limited repetition rate. To convert the CO 2 laser of 10.8 pm to 16 pm, a Parahydrogen Raman
converter is needed as a nonlinear optical trick. As far as production rate is concerned, it would take
about 100 hours to produce one kilogram of U-235, assuming complete separation of U-235 and U-238
isotopes, if a laser could illuminate a one-liter volume at an ideal repetition rate.
Nonproliferation issues can be very significant if this new laser enrichment technology is
commercialized. A Greenpeace report on the Silex project at ANSTO quotes a 1981 declassified CIA
report on threats posed by laser enrichment of uranium: "Any country might acquire the necessary
technology to set up a garage sized plant to produce weapons grade uranium anywhere in the world". In
addition to the generally favorable features of laser enrichment technology, SILEX is expected to lower
capital costs and produce considerably fewer greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, relatively simple
and practical separation modules and modular technology will provide versatility in deployment.
However, the current level of SILEX technology does not appear mature enough to enrich U-235
concentration to the higher levels needed for nuclear weapons, according to a researcher who reviewed
the SILEX process for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).43
8.7 Gaseous Diffusion Technology
The world's first commercial uranium enrichment facility was the Portsmouth plant. It used gaseous
diffusion technology in mid-1960s and shifted from a military mission to a commercial focus.4 4 At
present the gaseous diffusion process accounts for about 40% of world enrichment capacity. This
technology has proved durable and reliable. However, most Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs) are now
nearing the end of their design life. GDPs are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment
plants are constructed. The GDP is composed of a series of diffusion stages and each stage consists of a
compressor, a diffuser, and a heat exchanger to remove the heat of compression. More than a thousand
stages must be linked for enrichment operation.
443Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., p.166. This is due to a plasma
shielding effect. Tuning the lasers to excite U-238 will work only if the plasma shielding effects remain small, up
to 50 percent ionization. If the U-235 content is over 50 percent, the lasers can be tuned to remove U-238 instead.
If laser powers are increased, then the U-235 plasma created by the ionization becomes so dense that the
efficiency of the ion collectors drops.
44 USEC, History: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant ([cited Jan.1 2009]); available from
http://www.usec.com/gaseousdiffusion-ports-history.htm.
208
Natural Uranium
(0.711% U235) Enriched Uranium
(>1.0% U235)
0.
Depleted Uranium
(Tails)
(<0.7% U235)
@00U2350 0W0 0
U238 Porous Membrane
Figure 8.11 Gaseous Diffusion Process [U.S. NRC] 445
The basic physical principle underlying the gaseous diffusion technique is the so-called
'equipartition principle' of statistical mechanics. This principle states that in a gas consisting of several
types of molecules each type will have the same average energy of motion (kinetic energy)" 6. If two
particles have the same kinetic energy, the one with the smaller mass will have the larger velocity. In
the gaseous diffusion process this velocity difference is exploited by allowing the gas to diffuse through
a solid barrier permeated by many small holes or pores (i.e., through the preferential permeability of U-
235 through a porous membrane). The faster-moving molecules, which are U-235 atoms, pass through
the holes more frequently, and the mixture which emerges on the other side of the barrier is therefore
somewhat richer in the light species than the original sample. This process is repeated many times in a
cascade.
A typical GDP covers a large floor space and consumes enormous quantities of electrical power
for its pumps and compressors. The old GDPs use hundreds or thousands of large compressors; hence
they require approximately 10,000 W/m2."7 The gaseous diffusion technique requires more than 1400
stages to produce LEU, a lot of energy, a large amount of in-process uranium, and a long time to reach
equilibrium.
8.8 Other Uranium Enrichment Technologies
Aerodynamic separation, plasma separation, chemical separation, and electro-magnetic isotope
separation (EMIS) are other possible techniques for enriching uranium. The EMIS process was the only
electromagnetic processes practically developed in the early 1940s in the Manhattan project to make
44 U.S. Nuclear Regularatory Commission, "Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Process," (2007).
446Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., p.121.
"
7Laughter, "Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007, ORNL/TM-2007/193."
209
HEU. However, it was abandoned soon afterwards. It reappeared as the main thrust of Iraq's clandestine
uranium enrichment program for weapons discovered in 1992. All electromagnetic processes use
magnetic fields to accelerate uranium ions. If an atom or molecule can be ionized, it can then be
accelerated by either electric or magnetic fields or both. EMIS is very energy-intensive and consumes
about ten times as much energy as gaseous diffusion. Sometimes, plasma separation is classified as
EMIS; however, it uses the principle of ion cyclotron resonance to selectively energize the U-235
isotope in a plasma state.
The chemical-exchange process utilizes the very small tendency of different isotopes of an
element to concentrate in different molecules when there is an opportunity for exchange between
molecules. Only Japan and France developed chemical exchange processes, the Asahi Chemical
Exchange Process and the French Chemex process. Chemical-exchange processes involve a long
equilibrium time and facilities of large size. In addition, the separation effect decreases as isotopic mass
increases.
Aerodynamic separation technique refers to two methods: the separation nozzle process and the
vortex tube separation process. The separation nozzle process was developed by E. W. Becker at the
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center in Germany and the vortex tube separation process was developed
in South Africa, which is also called the Helikon process named after a cascade design technique, called
Helikon. This process creates centrifugal forces by forcing a mixture of UF6 gas and either hydrogen or
helium through a nozzle at high velocity and then over a curved surface.
8.9 Comparison of Uranium Enrichment Technologies
There have been a number of attempts to evaluate the proliferation sensitivity of various enrichment
techniques. It is not easy to develop a single straightforward and quantitative index. Krass et al., (1983)
used five indices to rate the proliferation dangers of enrichment techniques. Table 8.11 compares each
uranium enrichment technology in relation to proliferation risks. Each index is set on a three-point scale,
ranging from low (1) to high (3). These have to be conceived as relative terms. Laser-based uranium
enrichment facilities, if commercialized, pose the highest threat to the current nonproliferation regime.
High separation values imply that fewer stages are required. Based on Table 8.11, gaseous diffusion,
gas centrifuge, and laser enrichment technology need particular attention with regard to nuclear
proliferation.
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Table 8.11 Summary of Enrichment Process Characteristics .Krass et al., (1983)]
. Working Separation Specific energy Required number of
Process Equilibrium time
matrix factor consumption (kWh / SWU) stages for HEU
Gaseous diffusion UF6  1.0040-1.0045 2300-3000 3500-4000 Months
Gas centrifuge UF6  1.3-1.6 100-300 <60 Hours
Calutron UC14  20-40 3000-4000 2
Electromagnetic 5-15 days
Ion cyclotron U plasma 3.5-10 200-600 N/A
Nozzle 1.015 2500-3000
Aerodynamic Helicon UF6 3000-3500 Days
1.025-1.003 Thousands(Vortex tube)
Solvent Aqueous 1.0025-1.003 <600
Chemical extraction uranium 5000-6000 >150 days
Ion exchange solution 1.0013 400-700
MLIS UF6  5-15 10-50 <4
Laser Very short
AVLIS U vapor 5-15 10-5041 <4
Source: Required number of stages and equilibrium time from The Safeguards Options Study (1995), Table 7-1I, p.91.
448 Lenders, "Uranium Enrichment by Gaseous Centrifuge". assumes MLIS (40) AVLIS (150).
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Table 8.12 shows a more detailed analysis for the three technologies suggested by Krass et al. (1983).
As discussed earlier, gaseous diffusion is far from being useful for nuclear proliferation. On the
contrary, gas centrifuge and laser enrichment technology can be well-suited for nuclear proliferation.
However, laser enrichment technology is yet to be developed for commercialization.
Table 8.12 Enrichment Technique Property Ratings and Proliferation Threshold 44
Equilibrium Ease Proliferation threshold*Separation Facility ofTechnology acton time and iit batch Misuse of Construction of
inventory450  sz bach existing dedicated
recycle facility facility
GaseousDi us Low Low Low Low Medium HighDiffusion
GasC Ge Medium High High High Low IntermediateCentrifuge
Laser MLIS High High High High Low 
Intermediate
AVLIS High High Medium Low Intermediate High
Note: High threshold means it is relatively difficult to use the facility for proliferation purposes.
8.10 Summary
The various uranium enrichment technologies have been reviewed in association with possible
proliferation risks. A uranium-based nuclear weapons program was chosen for the scope of study
because it provides an edge over a plutonium-based program from several aspects. Among the currently
available uranium enrichment technologies, gas centrifuging poses the most challenging threat for the
nuclear nonproliferation regime. The gas centrifuge has good features suited for nuclear proliferation.
Also, gas centrifuging is increasing its shared total world capacity and it replaced gaseous diffusion,
which was the first generation commercial technology. Though laser enrichment technology is about a
decade away from commercial use, it may pose an alarming threat to international security once it
reaches the level of commercialization. For now, gas centrifuge technology is the technology that
requires a particular attention with regard to nuclear proliferation. Among available technologies, only
gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge have reached the level of commercialization, and gas centrifuge
technology can operate much more efficiently than gaseous diffusion technology. In addition, laser
enrichment technology is expected to impose serious security threats once it is available on a
commercial scale.
449Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., Table 2.1 on p.19 and Table 2.2
on p.26.
450 Sharikov, "Verification Challenges for Safeguarding Uranium Enrichment Plants."The inventory hold-up in a
typical cascade is a few kg for a GCEP and a thousand metric tons for a GDP. The equilibrium time for a typical
cascade is on the order of minutes to tens of minutes and weeks to months for a GDP. It is suggested that 5 kg of
uranium is required to fill a 10,000 SWU/year cascade , E.A. Hakkila et al., The Safeguards Options Study., p.90.
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CHAPTER 9
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION OF GAS CENTRIFUGE
ENRIHMENT PLANTS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
9.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to review why Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) are important
in dealing with nuclear nonproliferation issues from a technical point of view. At present, Gas
Centrifuge Enrichment Technology (GCET) is the most efficient enrichment technology, and it is well-
suited for nuclear proliferation. GCET is not only very efficient and economic in enriching uranium but
flexible in diverting LEU-producing facilities to HEU-producing facilities. In this regard, understanding
the technical specifications of GCET is essential to analyze a proliferator's possible proliferation
activities.
There have been publications that provide detailed explanations about GCET.451 However, most
of them are not easily understood by readers who have general interest in GCET for nuclear non-
proliferation issues. It is because those publications describe GCET from a technical perspective. In
addition, they do not deal with contemporary GCET-related issues because most of them were
published between the early 1950s and the early 1980s. However, GCET has since the early 1980s and
its use by Pakistan has raised the issue of using GCET for proliferation. In this regard, there exists a
need to provide a balanced description about GCET from both technical and nonproliferation
perspectives.
This chapter will give insights into nonproliferation issues with regard to GCEPs such as what
kinds of technologies are required for a proliferator to build GCEPs and how GCEPs can be diverted to
produce HEU for nuclear weapons. This chapter begins by reviewing fundamental theories of GCET,
ranging from the design of a gas centrifuge machine to a cascade formation. And then ways to divert
GCEPs producing LEU to GCEPs producing HEU are reviewed, coupled with some of the technical
challenges in doing so. This chapter concludes by reviewing the evolution of the gas centrifuge
technology and the potential use of GCEPs for nuclear proliferation.
9.2 Separation Theory of Gas Centrifuge
9.2.1 Basic Principles
The forces work in gas centrifuge machines can be classified as vertical and horizontal ones. Axially, all
particles in a gas centrifuge machine are under the influence of gravity. The density distribution of two
different isotopes along the axis can be written as:
4 Cohen, The Theory of Isotope Separation as Applied to the Large Scale Production of U-235.; D.G. Avery and
E. Davies, Uranium Enrichment by Gas Centrifuge, Isotope Separation (London, U.K.: Mills & Boon Ltd., 1973).;
Villani, Isotope Separation.; and Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation.
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N=235 (h)=/N235(O) R(h) - exp[-(mU 235 -mU2 38)( gh)] (9.1)
Nu23s(h)/ NU23s(0) R(O) RT
where N is the density of particles, R is the relative isotopic concentration ratio, T is absolute
temperature, g is gravity, h is the height, and m is the molecule's mass. 42
Radially, a rapidly rotating centrifuge generates the force from "centrifugal acceleration" and this force
replaces the force generated by the acceleration of gravity. The distribution of two isotopes can be
shown as:
R(r) rwa
= exp[(mu s235 - MU-238) ] (9.2)
R(O) 2RT
where co is the angular velocity (rad/sec), r is the distance from the center of the centrifuge, m is the
molecular mass, T is the absolute temperature, and R is the ideal gas constant.453
9.2.2. Actual Modeling of Isotope Separation in a Gas Centrifuge
In reality, the separation of two isotopes in gas centrifuges is far more complex than basic principles. It
is very important to have good models of the internal flow of UF6 gas in a gas centrifuge machine. Such
models are needed to seek the optimal operating conditions of the centrifuges based on fluid dynamics
and to predict the separation performance for design optimization. The change in the concentration of
the U-235 along the axial direction of a rotor in the presence of radial convective flows and the
dependence of the axial concentration gradient on the radial direction can be described in the form of
differential equations.
In any type of gas centrifuges, none of the local points has the same concentration of U-235.
In the radial direction, the U-238 is flung closest to the wall, while the U-235 mostly migrates towards
the center. In the vertical direction, a vertical counter-current forms along the rotational axis of the
cylinder, and it transforms the radial isotopic gradient into an axial gradient. The current flowing
upwards is gradually enriched with U-235 atoms while the downward current is depleted with more U-
238 atoms than the feed. Depleted and enriched fractions are caught by scoops at carefully optimized
distances from the cylinder wall.
Cohen (1951) developed the approximate approach based on the stream function to describe
the in-rotor flow and derived the one-dimensional equation. Onsager's pancake model is one of
452 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation. p.128.
45 Moody, Hutcheon, and Grant, Nuclear Forensics Analysis."a" is used in Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium
Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., p. 129.
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approximated models in two dimensions, which simplifies the system of equations into a single,
dimensionless, linear partial differential equation valid in the region away from the ends of the
cylinder . 4 54 However, this approach is not applicable to that is non-uniform circulatory flow resulting
from approximations and assumptions in the derivation: uniform flow along the axis, the neglect of the
axial diffusion flux, and the allowance of the violation of the boundary conditions for radial diffusion
flow. 455
At present, the radial averaging method is the main method that simplifies the analytic
description of centrifuge separation of isotopes. The radial averaging method is based on the rotational
potential and it decomposes the mass flux density inside the rotor into rotational and potential
components. This method is applicable to any arbitrary circulatory flux in the rotor.456
Table 9.1 Separation Power of Gas Centrifuges
Terms Description
#1 General description
d2V(5U= (<DdA(N) 2 dO= PV(N,) + WV(Nw) -FV(NF
0
.o <D is the total diffusion flux, V is the value function which depends only on the molarSeparation
power concentration N.
P, W, and F stand for product, waste and feed, respectively.
#2 Ideal cascade u = - f2
where E = separation gain and f = the flow rate per centrifuge45 7
(Continued)
454 H. Wood and J. Morton, "Onsager's Pancake Approximation for the Fluid Dynamics of a Gas Centrifuge," J. of
Fluid Mechanics 101, no. 1 (1980)., pp. 1-31; W.H.Furry, Clark Jones, and L. Onsager, "On the Theory of Isotope
Separation by Thermal Diffusion " Physical Review 55, no. 9 (June 1939)., pp.10 8 3-10 9 5 . This was named after
the late Dr. Lars Onsager, who led a group of scientists to develop a theory of the hydrodynamics of the flow in a
as centrifuge. The work began in 1961.
" Aleksandrov, "Comparison of Two Approaches to Using the Averaging Method for Analyzing Separation in a
Gas Centrifuge." The description of the mass flux density in a gas centrifuge can be made by the rotational
potential-based and the stream function-based derivations. For many reasons, the former method is preferred in the
analysis.
4561bid.; V.I. Tokmantsev, "More Accurate Equation for Radial-Averaging Analysis of the Separation of a Binary
Isotopic Mixtures in a Gas Centrifuge Radial," Atomnaya Energiya 92, no. 5 (May 2002 ).; and Aleksandrov,
"Comparison of Two Approaches to Using the Averaging Method for Analyzing Separation in a Gas Centrifuge."
457 Toshio Kawai et al., "Sensitivity Analysis of Ideal Centrifuge Cascade for Producing Slightly Enriched
Uranium," Journal ofNuclear Science and Engineering 50 (1973)., pp.63 -7 2 .
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#1 Dirac's classical expression of maximum separative power 45"
/T Amn(rco) ' 2UDircmax =-pDH[ ]2
2 2RT
Maximum #2 Absolute maximum separative power 
459
Separation SU abs,max = 2rp DH ( Am(ro))2
2kT
power H is the height of a rotor, D is the diffusion coefficient, k is Boltzmann's constant, T is
the mixture temperature, A m is the difference of the molecular mass of the
components of the mixture, co is the angular rotational velocity of a rotor, p is the
density of a mixture, r is the radius.
Note: Kemp calls Dirac's expression the separative performance for a gas centrifuge. 46
Table 9.1 shows the definition of the separation-related terms that are used in the description of
separation principles in a gas centrifuge. Single-stage separation factor is the ratio of isotopic
abundances at the center of centrifuge to that near the wall or the relative abundances of the enriched
and impoverished separation fractions. Separative power is the rate of change in value produced by the
separative element and is measured in the same units as the feed flow [kgSWU per unit time]. Thus, the
performance of a gas centrifuge machine is often described using separative power. It should be noted
that the maximum separative work is used as a standard to evaluate the efficiency of the various
centrifuge designs. From the maximum separation power, it can be concluded that the maximum
separation power of the centrifuge is proportional to the fourth power of the peripheral velocity.4 6'
However, it should be noted that the flow-profile efficiency reduces the fourth power exponents as the
peripheral velocity increases. 462
458 Cohen, The Theory of Isotope Separation as Applied to the Large Scale Production of U-235., pp. 109-111.
459 For more discussion see O.E. Aleksandrov, "Separation Power of a Gas Centrifuge and Certain Errors in
Optimizing the Centrifuge," Atomic Energy 92, no. 3 (Mar. 2002)., pp.2 3 0 -23 8 . He claims that the Dirac's limit
for the separation power cannot be applicable to modem centrifuges due to the limitations of the mass
conservation law.
460 R. Scott Kemp, "Gas Centrifuge Theory and Development: A Review of U.S. Programs," Science & Global
Security 17, no. 1 (2009).
461 However, Ratz claims that the maximum separative power is proportional to the second power of the peripheral
velocity in case of very fast centrifuges due to the emptying of the interior of the machine, based on his two-shell
radii model. E. Ritz, "Analytische L6sungen fir die Trennleistung von Gaszentrifugen zur Urananreicherung,"
Ph.D. Thesis (Technical University of Berlin, 1983) [cited in A. Glaser, "Characteristics of the Gas Centrifuge for
Uranium Enrichment and Their Relevance for Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," Science & Global Security 16, no.
1 (2008)., pp. 1-2 5 .
462 E. Raetz, "Uranium Isotope Separation in the Gas Centrifuge" (paper presented at the The VKI Lecture Series
on Aerodynamic Separation of Gases and Isotopes, Belgium May 29- Jun 3 1978)..Thus, at 313 m/s, the exponent
is 4, but at 440 m/s the exponent has dropped to 2.7, and at 750 m/s the exponent has dropped to 2.2.
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9.3 Design of a Gas Centrifuge Machine
9.3.1 Classification of Gas Centrifuge Model
A gas centrifuge machine requires very high level technologies ranging from hydrodynamics to
computational science. For example, computational models are used to model fluid flow inside the
centrifuge based on the convective diffusion equation, with different design factors and varying degrees
of simplicity based on assumptions such as boundary layers. A gas centrifuge model has evolved and it
is categorized based on the following four factors:
- Material of rotors: Aluminum, maraging steel, or Carbon Fiber Resin Composite (CFRC)
- Criticality of rotor speeds: rotors rotate above or below critical speeds, i.e., supercritical rotors or
subcritical rotors
- Number of axial segments: number of tubes connected by bellows
- Internal flow scheme: concurrent flow regime or countercurrent flow regime463
Among these, first three factors are associated with the choice of material.
9.3.2 Material Selection
Material problems have been a major constraint on the development of an optimized design for a gas
centrifuge machine. The most challenging issue with regard to material is to produce a reliable rotor
material because a rotor is spinning at extremely high speeds. Three factors including the tensile
strength of the rotor, resonance frequency, and chemical resistance must be considered when a material
is chosen for the centrifuge machine. The development of bearings that can endure mechanical stress
from ultra-high speed rotation is also important.
A. Tensile Strength of the Rotor
The rotor should be able to resist the centrifugal stress as designers increase the peripheral speed. The
tensile stress (YUTS) of a rotor is given as*6*
a-,s = p(rco)2 = pv 2  (9.3)
where r is the distance from the center of the cylinder to the wall of the cylinder, p is the density, o is
the angular velocity, and v is the peripheral speed. Therefore, the maximum speed is given as
463 Cohen, The Theory of Isotope Separation as Applied to the Large Scale Production of U-235., pp. 114-125
464 Ibid., p. 1 10.
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vmax = rs
the tensile strength of material
the density of the rotor
The maximum speed of a gas centrifuge can be increased by introducing high strength-to-density (or
strength-to-weight ratio) materials for a rotor as shown in Table 9.2. The ratio in the square root is often
called the specific length. The rotor will break if T is greater than the tensile strength of the rotor
material.465
Table 9.2 Typical Maximum Peripheral Speeds of Thin-Walled Cylinders [Whitley
(1979)1466
Tensile Tensile Approximate max
strength strength Density (p) Aprxmt2aMaterial T/p [(m/s) 21 peripheral speed
(GuTs) (T) [N/cm 2] [gi/cm 3  (mis)
[kgf/cm 2] [a]
Al alloy 5200 50960 2.8 185,700 425
Titanium 9200 90160 4.6 200,000 440
High-strength 17000 166600 8.0 210,000 455
steel
Maraging steel 22500 220500 8.0 281,300 525
Glass
7000 68600 1.9 368,400 600
fiber/resin
Carbon
8500 83300 1.7 500,000 700
fiber/resin
Note: [a] Ikilogram-force (kgf) =9.8 Newton (N) and the unit of Newton is [kg-m/s 2].
B. Resonance Frequency
The rotation of a long, thin rotor generates characteristic vibrations and flexion that can wreck the rotor
or its bearings when the frequency of rotation coincides with the natural frequency of the rotor, such
frequencies are called transverse or flexural vibration modes.467 The speeds at which these violent
465 Ibid., p. 110.
466 Stanley Whitley, "The Uranium Ultracentrifuge: The Story of the Development of the Gas Centrifuge for the
Separation of the Isotopes of Uranium," Physics in Technology 10 (Jan. 1979).
467 Ibid.;Agnieszka Muszy'nska, Rotor Dynamics (Boca Raton, FL CRC Press, 2005)., p.1048.The state of rotor
vibration (rotor mode) can be identified by several characteristics: natural frequency, hierarchy (first, second, third,
etc), deflection shape (rigid or flexible), or end-to-end relative phase (in phase or out of phase).
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(9.4)
vibrations occur are called critical speeds.46 In a gas centrifuge, these occur when the speed of a rotor
coincides with the natural frequencies of vibration of the non-rotating shaft on its rigid bearings. 4 69 A
natural frequency and a resonance frequency are given by:
- Natural frequency: fnaturai = ( ) (k ) 1/2 (9.5)
2;r m
- Resonance frequency: fresonance = nv (9.6)
2d
where k is the material stiffness, m is the mass of weight, n is an integer number, d is the travel distance
of the resonator, and v is the velocity of a wave.
As shown in equations (9.5) and (9.6), the natural frequency ( fnatura ) is inversely proportional
to the square root of the mass, whereas the resonance frequency (fresonance ) is inversely proportional to
the travel distance. As the length of a rotor increases, the travel distance and the weight of material will
increase. This implies that the vulnerability of a rotor to the resonance occurrence increases as a
designer achieves the higher separation efficiency by increasing the length of the rotor. To avoid critical
speeds from occurring during operation, a rotor must spin below or above its critical speed (i.e.,
subcritical or supercritical, respectively). Supercritical operation naturally involves greater difficulties
than does subcritical as shown in Table 9.3. The longer the rotor or more specifically, the higher the
length-to-diameter ratio, the higher the number of critical speeds which must be negotiated during
acceleration.470
Table 9.3 Length-Diameter Ratio (L/D) and Corresponding Critical Speeds of Aluminum
Rotors [Whitely (1979)]
L/D Critical speeds (m/sec) Number of critical to negotiate
1st 2nd 3rd 4th if a rotor spins at 350 m/sec
7 400 0
11.6 145 400 1
16.3 74 204 400 2
21 45 123 242 400 3
25.5 30 83 162 269 4
468 Critical speeds can be defined in several ways: (1) The critical speed is the theoretical angular velocity which
excites the natural frequency of a rotating object or (2) The speed at which the frequency of rotation coincides
with natural frequencies. Critical speeds can be translated in terms of 'critical rotation frequencies.'
469 Den Hartog, Mechanical Vibrations (York, PA: The Maple Press Co., 1947)., p. 2 85 .
470 Whitley, "The Uranium Ultracentrifuge: The Story of the Development of the Gas Centrifuge for the
Separation of the Isotopes of Uranium."
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The issue of critical speeds can be solved through damping vibrations as well as developing a
centrifuge that can endure mechanical stresses when accelerated through the critical speeds. Two
approaches are available to get around this problem for supercritical rotors. First, the use of multiple
bellows and tubes will allow a gas centrifuge to avoid resonance destruction by having multiple axial
segments, which allows controlled flexing. Tubes are connected with bellows in a gas centrifuge
machine.47 Second, the use of a lighter rotor material can help overcome the problem by increasing the
natural frequency of the rotor. The use of a light material can increase not only the natural frequency
but also the resonance frequency because, in many cases, the natural frequency and the resonance
frequency are almost equal to each other when damping 472 is very small. This will result in lower
probabilities of the generation of destructive vibration.
C. Chemical Resistance
The rotor must be able to resist a high chemical reactivity of UF6 in addition to endure mechanical
stress. UF6 reacts vigorously with water and several metals, but Ni, Cu, and Al are resistant. However,
the presence of even small quantities of hydrogen fluoride (HF), one of by-products of UF6 hydrolysis,
increases the rate of attack on even the resistant metals. 4 Hydrofluoric acid, a solution of hydrogen
fluoride in water, attacks glass, concrete, and many metals. It also attacks carbonaceous natural
materials such as wood derivatives, leather, and rubber. Some materials resist the corrosive action of the
acid, such as platinum, wax, polypropylene, polyethylene, and Teflon. In contact with metals with
which it will react, hydrogen gas is liberated and the danger exists of a spark or flame resulting in an
explosion.474
9.3.3 Types of Centrifuges
Gas centrifuge design can be classified as evaporative (or vacuum-type air-driven), concurrent, or
countercurrent (or Urey scheme). Modem centrifuges use a countercurrent flow design because the
countercurrent flow can generate an internal reflux that results in a recirculation of gas in the machine.
These three types of centrifuges are shown schematically in Figure 9.1.
471 Marvin Miller, "Appendix I the Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear Proliferation," in A Fresh Examination of the
Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors, ed. V. Gilliinsky et al. (The Nonproliferation Education Center,
2004). A very careful control of the rotation speed by connecting a number of shorter rotor segments with flexible
bellows to ensure that the centrifuge does not operate for very long at speeds where resonance is a problem.
472 Muszy'nska, Rotor Dynamics p.90. Damping is the process that a part of the mechanical energy is irreversibly
transformed into thermal energy and then dissipated, during deformation of elastic elements. Two types of
damping are available: material and structural damping.
473 Moody, Hutcheon, and Grant, Nuclear Forensics Analysis.p.98. For further information about material
consideration for other components with regard to UF6, see Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC), 10 CFR
Appendix C to Part 110 - Illustrative List of Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment Plant Assemblies and Components
under NRC Export Licensing Authority (Dec. 2005 [cited Dec. 3 2008]); available from
http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/illustrative-enrichment-assemblies-19616256.
474 Dangers of Hydrofluoric Acid, Chemical Safety Office/EH & S UCLA Department of Chemistry and
Biochemistry, Safety Notes, Newsletter #4 (Feb. 1997 [cited Nov. 25 2008]); available from
http://www.chem.ucla.edu/Safety/newsletter4.html.
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Figure 9.1 Different Types of Centrifuges 475
The evaporative centrifuge [Figure 9.1 (a)] was first developed by R.S. Mulliken and
experimental works were successfully conducted by J. W. Beams. 476 The use of vacuum-chamber
centrifuges makes the centrifuge vibration-free and thermally isolated for the elimination of convection
currents. In the concurrent centrifuge [Figure 9.1 (b)], a single stream of gas enters one end of a rotor
through a hollow shaft, and two streams are taken off the other end, one from the periphery and the
other near the axis. The design of the countercurrent centrifuge [Figure 9.1 (c)] was first developed by
H.C. Urey and further developed by Konrad Beyerle, Wilhelm Groth (the ZC3 centrifuge), and Gernot
Zippe (Zippe centrifuge).477 In the countercurrent centrifuge, the two streams of gas are fed from
opposite ends of the working chamber and run in opposite directions, making the multiplication of the
elementary separation factor possible by amplifying the radial effect of separation. Figures 9.1 (d) and
(e) show different designs of countercurrent gas centrifuges. In Figure 9.1 (d), the feed is injected at the
bottom of the rotor, whereas the feed is injected in the middle of the rotor in Figure 9.1 (e).
47 Figures (a), (b), and (c) from Villani, Isotope Separation., p.208 and figures (d) and (e) from Aleksandrov,
"Comparison of Two Approaches to Using the Averaging Method for Analyzing Separation in a Gas Centrifuge.",
?P.2 4 6-2 5 2 .
J. W. Beams, "High Speed Centrifuging," Reviews of Modern Physics 10 (1938).; J. W. Beams and C.
Skarstrom, "The Concentration of Isotopes by the Evaporative Centrifuge Method," Physical Review 56 (1939).
477 For more information about the countercurrent centrifuge development and principles, see Villani, Isotope
Separation., pp. 214-232.
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The key question in the countercurrent system is how countercurrent flow can be effectively
generated. Olander (1981) explains that thermal and mechanical drives result in a countercurrent flow:
Thermal drive is accomplished by controlling the rotor wall or end cap temperatures, which affect
radial pressure distribution, radial convection, and axial diffusion. In contrast, mechanical drive is
generated by causing the rotating gas to interact with stationary objects inside the rotor in association
with centrifugal forces and gravitational forces. 478
Similarly, Borisevich et al. (1990) 479 suggest that a closed countercurrent flow in the centrifuge
is generated by the axial flow into the working volume (external component) and the temperature
distribution developing on the side wall of the rotor during the operation (thermal component). These
two factors contribute to the flow pattern of the current in the centrifuge cylinder. Furthermore,
centrifuges with bellows, baffle plates, and other parts will have the re-circulating flow, which makes
for even more complexity to model. 480 Figure 9.1 (d) and (e) show how the internal flow regime can
vary according to the point of feed injection into the rotor.
9.3.4 Other Considerations
In addition to aforementioned issues, a gas centrifuge machine involves very complex design factors
such as power electronics and instrumentation and control issues. As for power electronics, a stable
electricity supply using a high quality frequency converter is critical. The use of a fairly powerful motor
can help overcome critical speeds in the rotor and bearings by rapid acceleration.4 1 In the case of a
supercritical rotor, the rotor must not stay long at the critical speed and make a fast jump around the
range of the critical speed. These difficulties are partially addressed by very accurate balancing of the
rotor and by achieving a swift transition through the resonance zone.
A frequency converter, one of key components of a GCEP is responsible for the power supply
for the gas centrifuge machines and its design impacts the power of a motor. The power supply must
accept AC input at the 50-60 Hz line frequency available from the electric power grid and provide an
AC output at a much higher frequency (typically 600 Hz or more). The high frequency output from the
frequency converter is fed into the high-speed gas centrifuge motors because the speed of an AC motor
is proportional to the frequency of the supplied current. To this end, the centrifuge electric power
supplies must operate at high efficiency, provide low harmonic distortion, and provide precise control
of the output frequency.482
4 78 Olander, "The Theory of Uranium Enrichment by the Gas Centrifuge." pp.1-33. The term 'drive' connotes a
means of generating the internal circulation in the rotor.
4 79V.D. Borisevich, E.V. Levin, and V.V. Naumochkin, "The Optimal Flow Structure in a Gas Centrifuge for
Separating Uranium Isotopes," Atomnaya Energiya 70, no. 1 ( Jan. 1991 )., pp.28-32.
480Kai, "Basic Characteristics of Centrifuges (IV).", pp.267-281.
481 Villani, Isotope Separation., p.213.
482 GlobalSecurity.org, Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment.
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As for fission criticality constraints, fission criticality is not an issue with gas centrifuge
machines. The gas-phase inventory is very small, and if the machine were to permit air leakage (with
the resultant deposition of U02F2 on the rotor walls), the machine would crash before a critical mass
could accumulate.
9.4 Designing Cascade at GCEP
In order to obtain the desired enrichment of the U-235 isotope, it is necessary to connect a large number
of centrifuges together in series and in parallel. These are called a cascade. Most technical-economic
analyses of GCEPs show that the bulk of the cost is proportional to the number of centrifuges required.
483 This implies that an operator should minimize the number of centrifuges by using an optimized
configuration and by minimizing replacement requirements through careful operation. There are two
approaches for minimizing the number of centrifuges. First, designing an effective centrifuge machine
can contribute to the increase of separation power and reduce the required number of gas centrifuge
machines. Second, optimizing the configuration of cascades can also decrease the number of gas
centrifuge machines required.
9.4.1 Stage and Cascade for Uranium Enrichment
A. Stages
A stage is the unit formed when individual gas centrifuge machines are connected in parallel as shown
in Figure 9.2. This implies that all gas centrifuge machines in a stage would receive identical inputs and
produce identical outputs, which are fed into the next stages.
Depleted Flow (Fdep)
----------------
Feed (Fin) I - - -
[Interstage Flow] Product (Fout)
Recycled Flow
Figure 9.2 Schematic of a Stage
483 Aleksandrov, "Separation Power of a Gas Centrifuge and Certain Errors in Optimizing the Centrifuge."
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Stage cut and stage width are essential parameters to the description of a stage. Stage cut is the
ratio of feed out of a stage to feed into a stage. Stage width is the number of gas centrifuges in the
cascade. A stage cut is generally denoted by 0, and the work of stage can be described as follows:
Fout = Fn x 0 (9.7)
Fdep =F x (1 - 0) (9.8)
where Fi, is a flow fed into a stage (called "interstage flow"), F, 1 is a flow going to the next enriching
stage, and Fdep is flow going back for recycle or tails stream.484 In the ideal cascade, stage cut is
approximated as
1 1S~-(9.9)
2 4
where F is the separative gain.485 For an LEU cascade of centrifuges with a stage separation factor of 1.8,
the stage cuts are typically about 0.43.
There are two kinds of stages based on what they do in a cascade, stripping stages and enriching
stages. Enriching stages are the ones that enrich uranium. The number of enriching stages increases
with the enrichment ratio of the desired product. In contrast, stripping stages work to decrease the tails
assay, thereby saving uranium feed to produce a desired product enrichment ratio as shown in Figure
9.3. Trade-offs of having large number of stripping stages can be depicted in the Figure. In order to
lower the concentration of depleted uranium, the number of stripping stages must be increased.
Consequently, uranium feed consumption will be decreased. The greater the number of enriching stages,
the higher the product of the cascade.
484 Stelio Villani, (1976). Figure 4.5 Generic stage in a cascade, p.102. Fin, Fout, and Fdep can be denoted by F, P,
and W, respectively.
485 Kawai et al., "Sensitivity Analysis of Ideal Centrifuge Cascade for Producing Slightly Enriched Uranium." For
the analytical discussion of a stage cut effect, see Ichiro Yamamoto and Akira Kanagawa, "Effect of Stage Cut
Deviation on Uranium Enriching Cascades Performances," Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology 13, no. 4
(April 1976)., pp. 17 9 -189 .
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Figure 9.3 Role of the Number of Stripping Stages
B. Cascade
A cascade is composed of an array of stages. A cascade is actually a set of gas centrifuges designed to
produce a desired uranium enrichment level. Centrifuges should be connected both in parallel and in
series in a way to optimize given resources and efficiency. The formation of a cascade varies according
to an operator's purposes and a given condition such as product flow rates, desirable enrichment ratio,
feed and tails assay, and SWU capacity,
A cascade scheme can be classified in terms of either the presence of recycle or practicality. A
cascade scheme can be divided into no-recycling cascade [(a) in Figure] and recycle cascade
(countercurrent cascade) [(b) in Figure 9.4]. Countercurrent cascades can be further subdivided into
symmetrical and asymmetrical cascades. If recycling or product streams jump a different number of
stages, those schemes are called asymmetrical cascades [(c) and (d) in Figure 9.4]. For example, (d) in
Figure 9.4, the product from stage 1 goes to stage 3 (i.e., jumping two stages), whereas the waste stream
from stage 3 is recycled to stage 2 (i.e., proceeding to the very next stage).
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486 Villani, Isotope Separation.
1 2 3 4
(a) Cascade without recycling
....... 4..............................
1 2 3 4 5
(c) Asymmetrical Cascade with recycling two stages downstream
--- Enriching Flow
-Stage
.-.- Depleting Flow
1 2 3 4
(b) Countercurrent symmetrical cascade
(d) Asymmetrical Cascade with recycling one stage downstream
Figure 9.4 Various Cascade Schemes 487
Series
Tails
L ------- duct
I Stage 11 1 I stage III I
Stripping Stages Enriching Stages
Figure 9.5 Detailed Drawing of a Cascade"'
487 Stelio Villani (1976), pp. 100-101.
488 Glaser, Making Highly Enriched Uranium.
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The second way of a classifying cascade is dependent on whether it is ideal or practical. These designs
refer to the shape of cascades. Figure 9.6 shows possible formations of cascades in terms of
practicability.
e
-q f
(a)ion ie casad (b) quare cascade c) Equan -tepuremem d-tatnoff e (d) Nondqui-tae
ofstndrdze m fatue f tae. llofth saesinth sucascade haetsae-f auscade
stag fedr Figurte 9.6g Idepati Sqacre and squared-offaCascad e Schemie o h mniu
Figuere a)os a untyfpioclaeof rane wihealr cscae. oeetesur cascade fod tiuein
canl aproxuireme deal vraloel theeaiabu the ideal cascade arinfo ie codiscusse in pot nx
stionasa.9 Figure 9.6 () shows a square-f cascade which as an exreemoderta offjaet adtaget
ofe sandardize manfctureftges. Alls apofc thedtaes in theses cascde ahaeves the smpvluest of
performance calculation of square cascades, but the top and bottom stages would not optimal.**'
489 The term, equi-step was used in the paper, Takashi Yamada and Bunpei Ishii, "Influence of Stage Separation
Factor on Squared-Off Cascades," Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology 11, no. 2 (Feb. 1974)., pp.58-64.
However, the shape of a cascade does not need to be symmetric. Geldenhuys (1979) has developed the method to
design asymmetric cascades for different isotope enrichment based on mass conservation equations with linear
algebra. G. Geldenhuys, "Design of an Asymmetric Ideal Cascade for Isotope Enrichment," SIAM Rev. 2 1, no. 3
(Jul 1979). pp. 390-394.
490 B. Brigoli, "Cascade Theory," in Topics in Applied Physics, ed. S. Villani (New York, NY: Spring-Verlag,
1979)., pp.28-3 1.
491 For more discussion, see Chuntong Ying, E. Von Halle, and Houston G. Wood III, "The Optimization of
Squared-Off Cascades for Isotope Separation," Nuclear Technology 105 (Feb. 1994)., pp. 184-189.
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9.4.2 Design of Cascade
Since a gas centrifuge cascade can be constructed which is very nearly ideal, which is different
than other uranium enrichment technologies, the design of ideal cascades is further discussed in
this section.
A. Definition of Ideal Cascades
An ideal cascade is the most efficient arrangement of centrifuges. The ideal cascade can be defined in
three ways:
- SWU consumption
The ideal cascade is the one that minimizes the ratio of separative work to product produced by
ensuring that streams of differing concentrations are never mixed together (no mixing
condition).492 This results in low energy consumption (No SWU is wasted by mixing flows of
different concentrations).
- Reflux ratio
The ideal cascade minimizes the ratio of total cascadeflow to productflow, thereby producing the
largest possible amount of product for a given enrichment, tails assay and separative capacity
(minimum reflux ratio).493
-Equilibrium time
The cascade provides the shortest possible equilibrium time for a given product enrichment. This
results in the smallest inventory.
However, an ideal cascade is never achieved in practice for several reasons. The most challenging issue
in an ideal cascade is to ensure the absence of mixing of streams of differing concentrations. This is not
achievable even in a single stage because no individual centrifuge machine is identical in terms of
separation. Stages receive a mixed input of the waste flow that is recycled back as well as the product
flow of the previous stage. To achieve a no-mixing condition, the two flows should be identical. The
stage cuts need to be adjusted so the isotopic concentration of the waste flow is identical to that of the
product flow from the preceding stage. Thus, the ideal cascade requires every stage to carry a slightly
different flow from the ones adjacent to it. However, these adjustments in flow rates are too small to
achieve, and it is too complex and expensive to manufacture all different machines for all different
stages.4 95
492 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., p. 104.
493 Ibid., p.110 and p.115.
494 Ibid. ,p. 10.
495 Ibid, Barzashka and Oelrich, Separation Theory. One of possible methods to get around this problem is to
make centrifuges in different sizes for every stage because theoretically optimal flow for every stage may
correspond to a non-integer number of machines
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B. Design of Ideal Cascade
A scale model shown in Figure 9.7 can be used to determine some properties of the cascade design. The
horizontal dimension represents the number of stages, and the vertical dimension shows the flow rate of
material at each stage. The total area corresponds to the total material flow rate in the cascade, which is
proportional to the total separative power of the cascade (tonSWU/yr). The connection of the
centrifuges in series would increase the enrichment level, while the total number of centrifuges in a
stage determines the product flow rate.496 In practice, if a fixed number of gas centrifuge machines are
available, a designer must choose between a higher enrichment with a lower product rate and a lower
enrichment with more product rate.
--3.5 180
i 160
U-235 Concentration - 160
140
Fee fo ~Number of Stages As
Feed for HEU LE2rout5
120
100.
0 -- 80 0
waste
HEU Product "~60 Ei
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91011121314
Nth Stage in Cascade
Figure 9.7 Scale Model of Ideal Cascades
Based on ideal cascade design, uranium enrichment ratios in stripping stages and depleting
stages vary in exponential fashion as shown in Figure 9.7.4" Figure 9.8 shows several possible designs
of the ideal cascade. The numbers in gray bars denote the number of centrifuge machines connected at
each stage.
4*'Takanobu Ishida and Yasuhiko Fujii, "Chapter 2 Enrichment of Isotopes," in Isotope Effects in Chemistry and
Biology ed. Amnon Kohen and Hans-Heinrich Limbach (Boca Roton, FL: CRC Press, 2005)., p.6 1. In Chemical
Engineering, the design of cascade is limited by a reflux ratio ranging from minimum reflux ratio with infinite
number of stages and total reflux ratio in which the product is not withdrawn from a cascade. These two ratios are
obtained through the McCabe-Thiele diagram.
4" Whitley, "The Uranium Ultracentrifuge: The Story of the Development of the Gas Centrifuge for the
Separation of the Isotopes of Uranium."
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Figure 9.8 Example Designs of Cascade Configuration4 "
9.5 Optimization of a Cascade
For the effective operation of GCEP, a cascade formation should be optimized dependent upon the
operator's objectives and constraints. A cascade of gas centrifuges is generally optimized to produce
498 (a) from John Pirro, "The Layout of Centrifuge Cascades for Uranium Enrichment" (paper presented at the
American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, San Francisco, California, Nov.27-Dec.2 1977).. (b) from Houston G
Wood, A. Glaser, and R. Kemp, "The Gas Centrifuges and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation," Physics Today
(September 2008)., pp.40-4 5; (c) from Glaser, Making Highly Enriched Uranium.pp.88-95 ; and (d) from Whitley,
"The Uranium Ultracentrifuge: The Story of the Development of the Gas Centrifuge for the Separation of the
Isotopes of Uranium."
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maximum separative power for a given product and tails assays. All parameters that are to be optimized
are studied during the design stage and operators should follow the designed optimal operation
conditions. However, a cascade design that ensures optimal efficiency is a very complex process. For
example, the best operating conditions are settled in a way that minimizes total interstage flow.
However, once that is done, it is no longer possible to avoid mixing process streams of different
isotopic composition, and this would result in losses of SWU. 499 Thus, an optimal design will be
different depending on the objectives that designers want to achieve. There has been a lot of research
done to fined approaches to the optimization of cascades based on the designed goals and constraints.
Table 9.4 shows a typical approach to the modeling of an optimal cascade.
Table 9.4 Procedure for Optimization
Step Factors for consideration
-Desired isotopic composition of product, tails and feed
-Desired withdrawal rate of cascade product
-Technical capabilities: Separative power of a gas centrifuge
2 Identify constraints -Economic constraints: gas centrifuge manufacture cost, 500
uranium feed cost, and energy cost, SWU cost
-Cascade values: product flow, feed flow, tails flow, total flow
rate, inventory
3 Identify variables -Stage values: stage cut, stage separation factors, the flow rate per
stage
-Time values: equilibrium time, hold-up time
4 Optimize key controlling The number of stages and subsequent total flow rate
variables
Kawai et al. (1973) categorized the parameters involved in optimizing cascade design as
controlling variables and controlled variables. 501 For example, they identified the stage cut, the
centrifuge and stage separation factor, and feed flow rate as controlling variables. In contrast, total flow
rate, enrichment rates of product and waste at each stage, and separative work were designated as
controlled variables. Palkin (1997) classified the parameters into six external parameters and internal
parameters. The external parameters of a cascade are those that can be obtained by considering the
cascade as a black box. The internal parameters are obtained by considering the internal mechanism,
such as the interstage flow rates and compositions.50 2 He formulated the optimization problem in terms
499 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation.
so The minimization of the number of centrifuges for specific purposes is a very important optimization criterion
in designing a cascade of centrifuges.
501 Kawai et al., "Sensitivity Analysis of Ideal Centrifuge Cascade for Producing Slightly Enriched Uranium."
502 Barzashka and Oelrich, Separation Theory.
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of minimizing the total fluxes of the stages by determining internal parameters for the selected values of
external parameters. 503
9.6. General Layout of GCEPs
A cascade hall typically contains several cascades to produce the desired level of enriched uranium or
even products with different enrichment ratio. An overall schematic of a cascade hall is shown in Figure
9.9. Shown are autoclaves, holdup drums, cascades, and desublimers. The flow process in a GCEP
cascade hall is as follows: First, UF6 passes through autoclaves, (a pressurized device for heating liquid
UF6 above its boiling point at normal atmospheric pressure). Gaseous impurities in the input feed are
removed before it undergoes enrichment operation. Second, a holdup drum enables withdrawal of UF6
gas during operation and the input feed is depressurized. Third, UF6 is enriched through cascades. At
the final stage, the product and the tails go through a desublimation process not only to compress UF6
gas but also to remove impurities.54
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Figure 9.9 Block Diagram for Cascade Ha 505
503 Palkin, V.A., Optimization of a cascade with arbitrarily specified separation coefficients of the stages, Atomic
Energy, Vol. 82, No.4, pp.288-293, April (1997). See also Villani for further details.
504 UF6 gas is the heaviest one in the world, so it typically goes through the final stage of enrichment operation.
s0s Figure from H.A. Elayat et al., "Systems Analysis of Safeguards Effectiveness in a Uranium Conversion
Facility" (paper presented at the 45th Annual Meeting of the INMM, Orlando, FL, July 18-22 2004). For more
explanation from the flow of UF6, see Bhupendra Jasani.
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9.7 Operation of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants
9.7.1 Operation Procedure
GCEPs are very sensitive, complicated, and they require a dedicated level of technological know-how
in order to operate in an efficient fashion. The operation of gas centrifuges should be continuous
because mechanical problems are particularly apt to occur. when they stop or resume operation. Even in
case that there is no UF6 inventory in a gas centrifuge, the machine itself should continue operation in a
vacuum state. This also applies during batch recycling operation of uranium. 506 Operating procedures
for GCEPs are shown in Table 9.5.
Table 9.5 Operation Procedures of GCEPs [Krass et al. (1983), p.108]
Step Description
1 Introduce material Filling material of the same initial isotopic composition at all stages
2 Begin pump The pumps are started with the product extraction valves are closed.
operation
Operating under total reflux operation from the beginning of the
3 Operate under total enrichment operation until the concentration of U-235 reaches the
reflux desired level.
The enrichment at the output of the top stage is monitored.
4 Begin withdrawal of Extracting the product by opening valves slightly after the concentration
product of U-235 in the top stage reaches the desired level
5 Continue steady-state Operating at constant rate of enrichment
operation
9.7.2 Causes of Gas Centrifuge Breakdown
Because a gas centrifuge machine is very sensitive to a shock, a continuous, stable operation should be
ensured. In particular, the three issues should be carefully considered; vibration damaging, temperature
and pressure, and impurities.
A. Mechanical Damage: Vibration
The most important issue with regard to the operation of GCEPs is related to the prevention of damage
caused by vibration. This vibration can occur during startup and closing of enrichment operation when
it is difficult to keep balancing a gas centrifuge machine, i.e., during acceleration and deceleration of
gas centrifuges. Thus, typically an operator keeps running a gas centrifuge even if the gas centrifuge
does not hold UF6 gas. In addition, the aforementioned resonance frequency is another fact that causes
breakdown of gas centrifuges.
506 Personal communication with Dr.Forsberg (Jan. 20', 2009)
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B. Temperature and Pressure
Stationary centrifuge
The average temperature of the process gas during enrichment operation is typically 300 *K, slightly
above room temperatures.507 The vapor pressure of UF6 at room temperature is about 0.15 atm.50
Pressure in the gas centrifuge machine should be maintained below its sublimation vapor pressure at
room temperature (20 'C or 68 'F) to prevent the solidification of UF 6. Moody et al., (2005) suggest
that the gas load of a stationary centrifuge with a radius of 10 cm must remain less than 3.6x104 atm (or
0.00529 psi) in order to ensure the pressure at the rotor wall does not induce a phase change of UF6
during operation.509 Otherwise, the UF6 will be desublimated to a solid state, which will cause the rotor
to become unbalanced and crash.
Centrifuge during operation
Figure 9.10 shows the pressure gradient in the rotor during operation. Once the gas centrifuge machine
begins operation, in the rotor, the wall has the highest pressure, whereas the center has the lowest
pressure. The highest pressure must remain below 0.1 atm to prevent a phase change of UF6. The
resultant pressure at the center of the rotor should make up a good vacuum, about 2.5x109 atm.
H leavy isotope
Light isotope
Wall of
centrifuge
Wall Center Wall
Figure 9.10 Distribution of Partial Pressures of Light and Heavy Molecules in an
Operating Gas Centrifuge5 1 1
507 Jochen F. A. Delbeke, " Theoretical Analysis to Assess the Separative Power of Reconfigured Cascades of
Predesigned Gas Centrifuges," Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research 48, no. 10 (April 2009)., pp. 4960-
4965.
508 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation. This corresponds to 2.204 psi (1
atm is taken as 14.696 psi). Moody et al., suggest 0.1 atm.
509 Moody, Hutcheon, and Grant, Nuclear Forensics Analysis.p. 133. However, it should be noted that UF6 is fed
into the machine while the rotor is spinning, otherwise, UF6 would leak out into the casing, where it would be
pumped away by the vacuum system.
510 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation. p.133.
511 Moody, Hutcheon, and Grant, Nuclear Forensics Analysis., p.110.
234
C. Impurities in the UF6 Gas512
Impure UF6 complicates the uranium enrichment process and cannot be used as feed material for
centrifuges.513 Impurities can cause unbalancing of the centrifuge rotor and chemical reactions with
metals in the centrifuge machine. Thus, impurities in UF6 feed should be removed as much as possible
before enrichment operation begins. These impurities can enter by several pathways, including in the
initial feed and at different steps of the cascade. 514
D. Criticality
Criticality problems arise in any process where enough fissionable material might collect to produce a
self-sustaining nuclear reaction. This is not a serious problem when the process inventory is in gaseous
form because the low density of the gas prevent reaching criticality. The use of low pressure UF6 gas in
a gas centrifuge plant will not allow criticality problems to arise in the cascade. But when UF6 is treated
in liquid or solid form, special precautions must be taken to make sure that no critical mass can ever
accidentally be assembled.515 There may also be criticality problems in the product-collecting area
where the UF6 gas is transformed into the solid phase or in the case of batch recycling operation.
516
9.8 Off-Design Operation
There are always situations where an operator needs to change production rate or uranium enrichment
level of the product or change the feed assay.517 Any deviated operation from these optimum design
values (off-design operation) will result in the decrease in efficiency and the overall cascade separative
518power.
Figure 9.11 shows trade-offs with regard to adjusting the reflux ratio of a given cascade. A
variation in reflux ratio affects the rate of production and the UER of the product. If an operator wants
to increase the UER of the product, he may reduce reflux ratio which decrease the production rate as
shown in Figure 9.11 (a). If a proliferator wants to minimize the use of uranium feed, he may allocate
more SWU for stripping stages. The decision on whether an operator will operate off-optimal design
512Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., p. 1 18.
5 Sammy Salama and Elizabeth Salch, CNS Research Story, Iran's Nuclear Impasse: Give Negotiations a
Chance (2006 [cited Feb. 15 2009]); available from http://cns.miis.edu/stories/060602.htm.
514V.A. Palkin and R.S. Komarov, "Method for Calculating and Optimizing a Cascade for Separating a Mixture of
Isotopes with Impurities," Journal ofAtomic Energy 98, no. 4 (Apr. 2005).
515 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., p.11.
516Ibid., p.20.
517 This can be the case of LEU use as input feed at LEU UEFs for HEU production. The use of LEU feed for
HEU production will increase tails assay enrichment compared to the use of NU as a feed to UEFS.
518 The loss resulted from off-design operation could be compensated by tuning some of the centrifuge parameters.
However, wall heat constraints and corresponding issues with internal pressures will limit this compensative
measure. Delbeke, " Theoretical Analysis to Assess the Separative Power of Reconfigured Cascades of
Predesigned Gas Centrifuges.", pp. 4960-4965.
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can be made based on various factors including the price of uranium, the price of SWU, the amount of
uranium available, etc.
Production
rate
SWU usage for ~- Tails assay + U feed
9.9Ev ution ostripping stages concentration consumptionAter-frsts
UER of
product
(a) Increasing UER of Product (b) Saving Feed Consumption
Figure 9.11 Trade-offs with regard to Off-Optimal Design Operation
9.9 Evolution of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Technology
After the first successful operation of commercial GCEPs in the 1970s, GCEP technology has evolved
in Russia, the United States, and Western Europe as shown in Figure. Like other technologies, GCEP
technology spread out despite the technology holders' efforts to secure the technology mainly through
human resources.
Zippe Connection Zippe Connection
USA URENCO Russia
A. Q. Khan',
Ge-- rmany ................. ZS
Brazil France Pakistan -------
Khan
Network
Figure 9.12 Genealogy of the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Technology519
519 Glaser, Making Highly Enriched Uranium.
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Figure 9.12 shows how current GCEP technology holders obtained their gas centrifuge
technology. While these holders claim that they had developed gas centrifuge technology through their
own R & D programs without any external support, nearly all states acquired it through external
assistance. In the case of Iraq, Karl Schaab, a German engineer who worked at MAN played a key role
in its gas centrifuge development program until early 1990s.52 0
Table 9.6 Comparison between Pakistani Design and Other Designs of GCEP
Pakistan American Urenco .
P1 P2 P3 P45 2 1  centrifuge (TC-21)
Design SNOR URENCO SLM
Similar /CNORfd] G2 4M (TC-10)
Deployment 1960s-70s 1960s-70s Early 1980s Late 1980s 2000s 2000s
period
RPM Id 64,000 90,000
Peripheral 350 480 (500) 485 500 900 770 700
speed (m/s) >700
Velocity 350 500 485 508
Height 2m (1-2m) Im 2m 3.2m 12m 5 <1
Diameter 100 mm 150 mm n/a 150mm 60cm 20cm n/a
Pressure - 100 torr - - - -
Separation 
- 1.28 - - - -
factor
12
SWU/centrifuge 2-3 (1-3) 5-6 (5) (11.6) 21 330 (300) 100 (40) 10
Rotor material Aluminum Maraging Carbon Fiber-Resin Composites (CFRC)Steel
kWh/SWU 100-300 50-60 - - - -
SWU/area [m2] - 10-20 -
Notes
[a] Most values are from Alexander Glaser (2008) unless noted otherwise.
[b] Values in parentheses and Russian data are M. Miller's estimates52
[c] Nader Bagherzadeh, "IAEA's Report on Iran's on P2 Centrifuge Design, or is it really P3?," <http://www.uni-
graz.at/yvonne.schmidt/P2_orP3.pdf>
[d] SNOR (Scientific Nuclear Orbital Rotor or Scientific Nuclear Obreptitious Rotor) and CNOR (Cultivated
Nuclear Orbital Rotor or Commercial Nuclear Obreptitious Rotor)
[e] SNOR is a subcritical single tube centrifuge, whereas CNOR is a supercritical six-segmented centrifuge.
[f] R.S. Kemp and A. Glaser (2007)
520 Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Iraq's Acquisition of Gas Centrifuge Technology Part II:
Recruitment of Karl Heinz Schaab.
521 For more information about P3 and P4 designs, see Mark Hibbs, "Pakistan Developed More Powerful
Centrifuges," NuclearFuel 1 (2007).
522 Miller, "Appendix I the Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear Proliferation." pp.35-41. His data includes P1, P2, Russia,
Urenco and US design. However, it seems that he used the TC-12 data for Urenco design values.
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Table 9.6 explains the generally accepted notion about the origin of GCEP technology in the
world. As for proliferation purposes, P1, P2 and, presumably, P3 and P4 were proliferated by the
Pakistanis. The P1 centrifuges use an aluminum rotor, and the P2-P4 centrifuges use a maraging steel
or CRFC rotor. The largest centrifuge was developed in the US and is now called the American
Centrifuge, which is about 12 meter high.
9.10 Rapid Improvement in Economics of GCEP
GDPs have been being replaced by GCEPs due to a rapid improvement in the economics of GCET for
the following two reasons. First, the design of gas centrifuges have improved significantly as described
in section 9.9. Second, the economic improvement of GCETs is a direct result of advances in other
industrial fields. Thus, building GCEPs has become easier since many of the necessary technologies are
borrowed from other industries. These specific cases include the following:
a. Composite fiber centrifuge (carbon fiber and related materials)
In the last decade, the aircraft industry has rapidly moved to building composite fiber aircraft. Currently,
carbon fiber technology is quickly becoming the standard technology for new aircraft. This has resulted
in a massive investment to improve fabrication technologies and drive down the cost of carbon
composites. The aircraft industry is orders of magnitude large and centrifuge suppliers are benefiting
from the supply industry being built to support commercial and military aircraft manufactures.
b. Solid state electronic motor controls
The cost of power electronics has dropped significantly given their large-scale use in variable frequency
motor control systems. These controls improve the electrical efficiency of pumps in everything from
refineries to water plants. What was once considered exclusive technology is now commercially
available.
c. Design tools such as computational fluid dynamic codes for the chemical industry
The modeling of countercurrent flow in gas centrifuge machines can be more accurately designed using
computational fluid dynamics software.
9.11 Features of GCEP for Proliferation
GCET has an advantage over other uranium enrichment technologies from many perspectives. As
mentioned earlier, it is very hard for proliferators to set up GCET by themselves. However, once a
GCEP is established through a variety of paths including nuclear black markets, a GCEP can be easily
diverted for producing Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). This is why GCET imposes an unusually
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significant challenge to the NPT regime. The features of a GCEP favorable to nuclear proliferation are
as follows:
First, it has small inventory hold-up (a few grams per centrifuge) because of a low condensation
pressures on the wall. Small inventory leads to short equilibrium time. A short equilibrium time means
that the concentration of product would quickly reach the desired level of enrichment. In the case of P-2
type machines, the UF6 inventory per centrifuge is about 2 grams. The total mass of uranium present in
the cascade can be easily calculated by multiplying the number of gas centrifuge machines. A typical
mass would be typically between several hundred grams and one kilogram. Therefore, typical
throughput is on the order of milligrams per second, so an individual machine can be flushed in less
than an hour.m However, the equilibrium time for GCEPs can vary over the shape of the cascade and
the total UF6 holdup in the cascade.52 4
Second, the high modularity of gas centrifuges yields the high flexibility in diverting GCEPs
under any possible scenarios. A GCEP can be reconfigured for Weapons-Grade Uranium (WGU)
production in a relatively short time-duration.5 2 5 Third, a low level of effluents emission due to low
operation pressures of the process gas and low energy consumption make gas centrifuge operation even
much harder to detect. Fourth, most importantly, the high efficiency that is the result of its high
separation factor leads to the advantage of producing HEU with GCEPs of very small size.
If a reference GCEP is set to a plant with a capacity to make HEU efficient for one bomb per
year, it would have the capacity of 5,000~ 6,000 kgSWU/yr, the footprint of 160 square meter,5 26 and
the energy consumption of less than 100 kW.s27 Possible cases are shown in Table 9.7.
Table 9.7 Reference for Clandestine GCEPs
Case Capacity Footprint
Hypothetical minimum GCEP [528]
A (by D Gl) 5,000-6,000 kgSWU/yr 160 square meter(by Dr. Glaser)
5,000 gas centrifuge
B Plt at (approximately 10,000 190m* 170m
kgSWU/yr)
Note: 1 SWU per 1 square meter would be a reasonable assumption.
523 Wood and Morton, "Onsager's Pancake Approximation for the Fluid Dynamics of a Gas Centrifuge."
52 4Wood, Glaser, and Kemp, "The Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation.", pp.40-45.
525 Personal communication with Dr.Forsberg, It still requires additional time prior to starting-up of HEU
production operation because the remaining uranium gas with different enrichment ratio must be washed out from
the cascade.
526 Glaser, Making Highly Enriched Uranium.
527Alexander Glaser, "Beyond A. Q. Khan: The Gas Centrifuge, Nuclear Proliferation, and the NPT Regime,"
INESAP Information Bulletin, no. 23 (April 2004).
528 Glaser, Making Highly Enriched Uranium.
529 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, The Iranian Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Plant at Natanz:
Drawing from Commercial Satellite Images (ISIS, Mar. 14 2003 [cited Jan. 30 2009]); available from
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/natanz03_02.html.
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It could therefore be small and thus be indistinguishable from many other industrial buildings.
The small size of gas centrifuges allows them to be operated in hardened underground facilities which
even protect them from military strikes. And such a small GCEP (say producing enough HEU for a few
nuclear weapons per year) would have great strategic significance for Non-Nuclear Weapons States
(NNWS). Considering all of factors mentioned above, it would be a most challenging task to detect the
existence and operation of small-sized clandestine facilities with currently available detection
techniques. Figure 9.13 shows the characteristics of GCEPs and its impact to nuclear proliferation.
Characteristics Consequences Implications Results
Low
detectability by
remote
detection
technology
WAES: Wide Area Environmental Sampling
DIAL: Differential Absorption LIDAR
Figure 9.13 Features of Gas Centrifuge Technology and Influences to Proliferation
9.12 Conclusion
The design and features of GCET was reviewed. A gas centrifuge machine is a very complex and
sensitive device that requires a high level of technology. The gas centrifuge technology still remains one
of the finest multi-engineering projects in the world because it requires a high level of technology in
mechanical, electrical, materials, electronic, metallurgic and chemical engineering. Even though the
theoretical information is available to the proliferators, its use requires highly sophisticated equipment
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to actually construct and technological know-how to operate GCEPs.530 However, the spread of GCET
over the last several decades has allowed proliferators to jump those technological barriers. GCET will
remain as the most promising enrichment technology for both the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear
weapons programs because of its high efficiency until the next generation technology, most likely Laser
Enrichment Technology (LET), becomes commercially available.
530 The process data, pressure, flow and other variables are very critical information in operating uranium
enrichment facilities.
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CHAPTER 10 IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT GCEPS
10.1 Introduction
The most important safeguards approach for the nuclear cycle is the one for a Gas Centrifuge
Enrichment Plant (GCEP) because of its excellent proliferation-prone features. The development
of a safeguards approach to GCEPs began in the late 1970s and research has continued for more than
three decades. But a robust safeguards approach for GCEPs that can guarantee the non-existence of
proliferation activities has not been achieved. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and understand
the current status of safeguards for GCEPs and to propose the direction in which the IAEA should
continue to realize a mature safeguards approach to GCEPs.
The main weakness of the standard safeguards approach for GCEPs is the lack of standardized
IAEA Safeguards for GCEPs. This is because of the short history of a safeguards approach to GCEPs,
the proliferation sensitivity of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Technology (GCET), and the different
positions for the use of GCET by the gas centrifuge technology holders. In order to figure out these
issues, a systematic framework for a safeguards approach to GCEPs should be established as a guiding
tool. To this end, this chapter is composed of four parts: (i) the conceptualization of safeguards
framework, (ii) the application of safeguards components to safeguards framework, (iii) the
identification of problems, and (iv) possible solutions to the identified problems. This work is
applicable not only to Uranium Enrichment Facilities (UEFs) but also to other types of nuclear fuel
cycle facilities.
10.2 History of IAEA Safeguards at UEFs
The implementation of IAEA safeguards at Uranium Enrichment Facilities (UEFs) was far behind those
for other types of nuclear facilities. The IAEA has safeguards experiences for Uranium Enrichment
Technologies (UETs) of gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, and aerodynamic (or vortex tube) types.
Only safeguards experiences for GCEPs and GDPs are reviewed here only because the aerodynamic
facility (at Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center in South Africa) had been dismantled. The IAEA began
safeguards inspections at URENCO plants in 1979 on an ad-hoc basis after URENCO began
commercial operations at Almelo and Capenhurst in 1976.
10.2.1 Safeguards Experiences for Commercial GCEPs
URENCO of the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, and the MINATOM (Ministry for
Atomic Energy) / Rosatom Nuclear Energy State Corporation (Rosatom) of Russia are among the major
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corporations that produce enriched uranium using GCET.53 1 Among these major corporations, only
URENCO's GCEPs have been under safeguards. On the contrary, AREVA and Minatom/Rosatom have
never been inspected by the IAEA. The first IAEA inspection for GCEPs began in the late 1970s at
URENCO's GCEPs initially on an ad-hoc basis. Inspections were then continued by a joint team from
both the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the IAEA. This was followed by a
couple of safeguards projects as described below. However, most of safeguards experiences of the
IAEA have been accumulated through inspection activities from URENCO facilities. 2
A. U.S. Enrichment Safeguards Program
The U.S. conducted the U.S. Enrichment Safeguards Program in 1978 to design, develop, evaluate, and
implement an effective international safeguards approach for GCEPs. In the United States, a small scale
GCEP at Portsmouth Plant in Piketon, Ohio, began construction in 1977. The Portsmouth GCEP was
under IAEA safeguards from August 1983 to July 1985. But it was shut down after a short period of
operation in the mid 1980s. 3 3 Therefore, the program terminated in 1985. Since then, no commercial
GCEPs have been operated in the U.S.534 However, when GCEPs are completed in the U.S. (i.e., USEC
plant in Ohio, LES/NEF plant in New Mexico, and the AREVA Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility in
Idaho), they will be offered by the U.S. for IAEA safeguards.
B. Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP)
The actual beginning of safeguards development for GCEPs started in the early 1980s as the
Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP), which lasted from November 1980 to March 1983. Neither
INFCIRC/66- nor INFCIRC/153-type safeguards includes safeguards approaches for any type of
facility. INFCIRC/153 type safeguards are limited to the recognition of an isotope separation plant in its
paragraph 106. The HSP was initiated by eight participants including the centrifuge technology
holders of URENCO such as Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain, as well as Japan, Australia,
the United States, the IAEA and the Euratom.
531 AREVA is currently constructing a new gas centrifuge enrichment facility in France - Georges Besse II - with
first deliveries expected for 2009. On December 30, 2008, AREVA Enrichment Services, LLC (a subsidiary of
AREVA NC, Inc.), submitted an application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), seeking a
license to construct and operate a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility in Bonneville County, Idaho, known
as the Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility.
532 Friend, "Urenco's Views on International Safeguards Inspection". Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) are not
obligated to place their enrichment plants under IAEA safeguards.
53 IAEA inspections were ad-hoc inspections, pending completion of a facility attachment for the plant.
134D. W. Swindle, "Realities of Verifying the Absence of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in Gas Centrifuge
Enrichment Plants," (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., 1990).; B. McGinnis et al., "Gas Centrifuge
Enrichment Facilities in the United States - IAEA Safeguards Implementation" (paper presented at the
Proceedings of the 46th Annual Conference of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Phoenix,
AZ, July 10-14 2005).
5 Para.106 "Facility" means: (a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a
reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation. Conversion plants and fabrication
plants were first mentioned in INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (1968).
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The HSP was launched to reach an agreement on an international safeguards approach for Low
Enriched Uranium (LEU) Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs). The Goal of HSP was to
maximize the effectiveness of safeguards while expanding a consensus from all parties of safeguarders
and technology holders as follows:
- To minimize inspectorate resource requirements for verification from the standpoint of
inspectors;
- To minimize the risk of sensitive information and technology leakage to the inspectorates;5 36 and
- To minimize the additional operation cost resulted from intrusiveness by inspection. 537
In March 1983, the HSP agreed on a safeguards approach to GCEPs, which is called Limited
Frequency Unannounced Access (LFUA), subject to INFCIRC/1 53-type agreements. The LFUA was a
very important first step in the development of safeguards for GCEPs. However, the application of
HSP's proposal was confined to only HSP member states. The question of undeclared feeds, materials,
and activities was not addressed because these were all beyond the scope of the original HSP. The
IAEA put in place full-scope safeguards verification at all URENCO plants (including Gronau that
started production in 1985) during the period 1984-1986 based on HSP principles and with agreed
facility attachments.
C. Tripartite Enrichment Project
Russian GCET is distinct from those of URENCO and USEC. Thus, GCEPs based on Russian GCET
require a different safeguards approach from the HSP. For example, Russian gas centrifuges provide a
greater degree of operational flexibility in the piping arrangement than URENCO-type gas centrifuges.
Also, the Russian ones are made out of steel which reduces the sensitivity of monitoring instruments. 538
In 1993, China offered its Russian-supplied Shaanxi GCEP for IAEA safeguards. From 1997 to 1999,
the IAEA, the Ministry of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy (MINATOM), and the China
Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) conducted the Tripartite Enrichment Project (TEP) at the Shaanxi
GCEP in China. The TEP was designed to develop a safeguards approach for GCEPs built using the
Russian GCET. In addition to the issue of different the technological features of the Russian GCET, the
isolated location of Shaanxi GCEP made IAEA inspectors' travel conditions ineffective to achieve the
536 Peixoto and Vinhas, "Information Protection When Applying Safeguards to Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities."
57 Laughter, "Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007, ORNL/TM-2007/193."
538 A. Panasyuk et al., "Tripartite Enrichment Project: Safeguards at Enrichment Plants Equipped with Russian
Centrifuges," (2002). Steel has greater gamma-ray attenuation than aluminum because of its higher mass
attenuation coefficient.
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unpredictability of "LFUA." Nevertheless, the TEP concluded that the safeguards objectives of the
IAEA could be achieved in a satisfactory and cost-effective fashion.539
10.2.2 Safeguards Experiences for Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs)
It is worthwhile to look at safeguards approach for GDPs because some of those experiences at GDPs
are applicable to GCEPs. Although they have different features, for both types of facilities use uranium
hexafluoride gas (UF6) as a feed for enriching uranium. In this regard, it is beneficial to review
safeguards experiences about GDPs. The first GDP subject to international safeguards was the small
scale GDP at Pilcaniyeu in Argentina and it has been under IAEA safeguards since 1993.540 The U.S.
has more extensive experience in the application of IAEA safeguards at GDPs from a verification
experiment conducted at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in the late 1990s. In April
1996, the US added the PGDP to the list of facilities, and it became eligible for the application of IAEA
safeguards, following President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 13 of 1993, which offered
excess fissile material no longer needed for national security for IAEA inspections. The first IAEA
inspection at PGDP was conducted in December 1997 and followed by a verification experiment with a
variety of safeguards measures. As a result, valuable experiences about safeguards approaches were
obtained. This information is also applicable to GCEPs.54 1
10.3 Current Status of IAEA Safeguards at GCEPs
According to Laughter (2007), it is reported that there exist 13 countries that have GCEPs and 15 GCEP
in place. Currently, only eight out of the thirteen states that have GCEPs are under IAEA safeguards
and they are shown in Table 10.1.
Table 10.1 Status of Safeguards Application to GCEPs
GCEPs Under safeguards Not under safeguards Percentage
Countries 12 [a] 5 66.7% (8/12)[Group A and B]
Facilities 15 [c] (9) Jbi -6 60% (9/15)
(Continued)
539 Ibid. and International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), "Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and
Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty."540 A. D. Bonino et al., "DOE-ARN Proposed Method to Verify Uranium Inventory at the Picaniyeu Gaseous
Diffusion Enrichment Plant" (paper presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of Institute of Nuclear Materials
Management, Phoenix, AZ, July 21-24 1997).
541 David Gordon et al., "BNL-65714."
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Notes
[a] INFCIRC/640 (2005), para.128. The 12 countries are Argentina, Brazil, China, France, India, Iran, Japan,
Pakistan, Russia, the U.S. and three URENCO states (Germany, Netherlands, and the UK)s42
[b] Numbers in parentheses were obtained from McGinnis et al., (2005). 14 They claim that nine GCEPs in six
countries are under safeguards, which are three URENCO States, Brazil, China, and Japan. However,
INFCIRC/640 includes Argentina and Iran as countries under safeguards.
[c] Number of facilities under operation or stand-by.
For this study, we grouped states that have GCEPs into five categories from the viewpoint of
safeguards application as shown in Table 10.2. Most safeguards experience for GCEPs has been
obtained from URENCO states and Japan. 544 Hence, it is worth studying safeguards framework applied
to URENCO states. Based on the result, safeguards application levels of Group C, D, and E and
clandestine GCEP holders should be enhanced to that of URENCO states. The results of on-going
safeguards research in the U.S. can be added to the standard features of future safeguards framework for
GCEPs. Table 10.3 shows current status of safeguards application for GCEPs in Group C states.
Table 10.2 Classification of States with Confirmed GCEPs according to Safeguards
Application
Group Features States5 45
A High level of safeguards experience URENCO States , Japan 46
B No GCEPs under safeguards now, but developing U.S.
safeguards for future inspections
Brazil, China, Iran,
C Under limited safeguards, but not much experience Argentina
D Not under safeguards as Nuclear Weapons States France, Russia
E Not under safeguards, Non-member to the NPT Pakistan, India
Note: This classification is based on the author's subjective opinion.
542IAEA, "INFCIRC/640: Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report Submitted to
the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency," (2005). Argentina has only a Gaseous
Diffusion Plant (GDP) and it is under safeguards. However, Argentina is going to a build joint GCEP with Brazil.
543 McGinnis et al., "Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities in the United States - IAEA Safeguards
Implementation".
544 Japan has had GCEPs at Ningyo-Toge (now shut down) and Rokkasho-Mura (currently operating) under IAEA
safeguards since the HSP in 1983.
545 Para.128 in INFCIRC/640 (2005). For the details of enrichment programs in each country, see Laughter,
"Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007, ORNL/TM-2007/193.".
546 Rokkasho-mura uranium enrichment plant under IAEA safeguards (began operation in 1992). Office of
Technology Assessment U. S. Congress, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(Washington D. C.: U. S. Govemment Printing Office, June 1995).; and Ningyo Toge Pilot Enrichment Plant in
Japan had not yet reached the stage of decommissioning (started in 2000) to be removed from safeguards; thus,
inspections were performed very infrequently. McGinnis et al., "Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities in the
United States - IAEA Safeguards Implementation".
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Table 10.3 Safeguards Application in Group C States
State Current status Reference
Resende Enrichment Plant under safeguards since November Wise Uranium
2004 Project547
China Chinese Shaanxi GCEP under Voluntary Offer Safeguards Panasyuk et al.,
Agreement since 1997. (2002)
Iran Natanz pilot GCEP since December 2003 Iran Watch5 48
10.4 Safeguards Framework Development
10.4.1 Structure of Safeguards Framework
The IAEA and several nonproliferation research groups had been proposing safeguards for GCEPs until
the IAEA formulated a new safeguards approach for GCEPs that correct many of deficiencies of the
HSP approach. But those studies still lack a framework to synchronize efforts effectively for nuclear
nonproliferation. The first step is to define safeguards objectives for achieving the nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons. Each type of IAEA safeguards agreement has its own objective. For example, for
INFCIRC/153 type safeguards, the objective of safeguards is stipulated in paragraph 28 as,
"the timely detection of diversion ofsignficant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear
activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for
purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection."
The description above can be defined as a general safeguards objective because it is generally
applicable to all types of nuclear facilities. For a specific type of nuclear facility, safeguards objectives
can be further defined by considering the features of the facilities in the form of the list of proliferation
activities to be detected. This list is called specific safeguards objectives in this paper. In addition, the
detection of proliferation activities for a different type of facilities can be complemented by adding
certain conditions including a required time to meet timeliness and detection probabilities. We will refer
to these conditions as detection goals.
Once specific safeguards objectives and safeguards goals are set up, the safeguarders should
develop approaches for achieving the safeguards objectives, for example, regimes for inspection and
systems for inspection. Safeguards approaches will set the rights and capacities of safeguarders in the
54? Wise Uranium Project, Uranium Enrichment and Fuel Fabrication - Current Issues (Other Countries), (July 30,
2009) <http://www.wise-uranium.org/eproj.html>
548 Iran Watch, Iranian Entity: Natanz (2007 [cited June 18 2009]); available from
http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/natanz.html.
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conduct of their inspection tasks. Features of different types of nuclear facilities are considered in the
development of safeguards approaches.
The next step is to identify what inspectors have to do in order to achieve safeguards objectives
within the capacities of a developed safeguards approach. However, safeguards approaches can be
developed after the IAEA identifies inspectors' tasks in a way that can support inspection activities.
Thus, safeguards tasks and safeguards approaches can be developed in parallel. The last step is to
identify or develop measures that will help inspectors to perform their tasks such as inspection
techniques and inspectors' activities.
General Safeguards
Step I Objectives(IAEA Safeguards Types)
Specific Safeguards Detection Goals
Objectives (Timeliness Goal and
Step 2 PrLiest oDtectitnes Detection Probability)
Step 3 and 4 Safeguards Tasks Safeguards Approach(List of Checking and (Regime and System)Verifying)
Step 5 Safeguards Measures
Figure 10.1 Concepts for Developing Safeguards Framework 49
10.4.2 Specific Safeguards Objectives for a GCEP
This objective is the basis for detailed and specific inspection goals for inspecting each facility."" The
IAEA declared three main specific safeguards objectives for a GCEP: 551
549 The terms of verification and safeguards are interchangeably used in many safeguards documents such as
verification objectives, verification tasks, verification approach, and verification measures.
550 "INFCIRC/640, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report Submitted to the
Director General of the IAEA."
551 Friend, "Urenco's Views on International Safeguards Inspection".; W. Bush et al., "IAEA Experience with
Environmental Sampling at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants in the European Union," (Austria: IAEA, 2004).
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- Specific Safeguards Objective #1
To detect production and diversion of a significant quantity (SQ) of uranium with enrichment
greater than declared, especially, Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
- Specific Safeguards Objective #2
To detect diversion of a significant quantity (SQ) of declared uranium materials, including Low
Enriched Uranium (LEU), Depleted Uranium (DU), and Natural Uranium (NU)
- Specific Safeguards Objective #3
To detect LEU production in excess of declared amounts using undeclared uranium
The consensus made among HSP members was that HEU production posed a greater proliferation risk
than LEU diversion because of shorter conversion time to make nuclear weapons. Considering
conversion time and material form, the IAEA set timeliness goals for each specific type of nuclear
material. Detection goals for safeguarding nuclear material at GCEPs are given in Table (10.4)
Table 10.4 Detection Goals of Specific Safeguards Objectives for GCEPs 552
Specific UER/ Mass Timeliness Goals Detection probability
Objective
Unirradiated
#1 1 SQ HEU direct-use Within one month High confidence (HSP report)
material
1SQ LEU
#2 10 MT NU Unirradiated Within one year 50%
20 MT DU indirect-use
material
#3 1 SQ LEU Within one year 50%
10.4.3 Safeguards Tasks
An array of technical verification tasks can be developed in order to achieve each safeguards objective.
For GCEPs, identified safeguards tasks are as follows: 553
- For safeguards objective #1
- verify the Uranium Enrichment Ratio (UER) of UF6 collected at any place agrees with the
declared UER
552 Timeliness goals and detection probabilities are quoted from IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition.
and B.D. Boyer, Safeguards Approaches for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: LANL Safeguards Systems
Course - Pilot 2008 (July 1 2008 [cited Jan. 1 2009]); available from http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/BOYER-
%20GCEP%20SGS%20rev2%20oct%2008.pdf., respectively.
5 A. Panasyuk et al., "Tripartite Enrichment Project: Safeguards at Enrichment Plants Equipped with Russian
Centrifuges."
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- check cascade configuration
- For safeguards objective #2
- conduct Nuclear Material Accountancy Activities (NMAAs)
- For safeguards objective #3
- account total Separative Work Unit (SWU) capacity and consumption during inspections
- check identity numbers of cylinders
- check cascade configuration
- confirm that only declared cylinders are attached at feed and withdrawal stations
More detailed safeguards tasks were proposed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (1995) in the
Safeguards Options Study (1995). Table 10.5 shows these verification needs and possible measures that
can be employed by the IAEA.
Table 10.5 Safeguards Tasks to Achieve Specific Safeguards Objectives 5 4
Objectives Needs
- Continuous monitoring to verify that HEU has not been produced since the last
inspection
#1 - In-line monitors to verify UF6 in header pipes
- Environmental sampling in and near the plant
- Verification of cascade configuration changes
- Verification of UF6#2 and #3
- Design Information Verification procedures for operating facilities
- (Continuous) Verification of SWU consumption, i.e., SWU monitoring 555
#3
- (Continuous) Verification of plant throughput
10.4.4 Safeguards Approach
A. Features of GCEPs
Developing safeguards approaches is the process of setting the conditions or environments conducive to
conducting effective and efficient inspections. One might think that the development of safeguards
554E.A. Hakkila et al., The Safeguards Options Study., pp.102-105. This report uses the term, verification needs.
The author interprets the terms as safeguards tasks.
555A. Panasyuk et al., "Tripartite Enrichment Project: Safeguards at Enrichment Plants Equipped with Russian
Centrifuges." The introduction of SWU (separative work) monitoring was proposed as a means to confirm the
actual production of the plant, and thereby provide a means to assure that the entire production capacity is used to
produce declared product. Three methods are under consideration for SWU monitoring in terms of frequency and
tools: (i) annually, in conjunction with closing the material balance; (ii) monthly, on the basis of verified transfers
of inputs and outputs through cylinder verification; and (iii) monthly, on the basis of the flow monitors and
CEMOs. However, the introduction of SWU monitoring for actual inspections seems to be infeasible.
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approaches for GCEPs is straightforward. In reality, it is very complex because security, economic, and
technical issues are entangled. Security issues are mainly related to the protection of sensitive
enrichment technologies from proliferation; there are also concerns about protecting commercially
sensitive (proprietary) information. Economic issues are connected to the effective operation of uranium
enrichment facilities, avoiding the frequent intrusion by inspection activities. A high degree of
flexibility and efficiency in the operation of GCEP also complicates the establishment of
straightforward safeguards procedures.55 6 Furthermore, the use of different designs for GCET, such as
Russian, URENCO, American, and Pakistani designs, makes it much harder to establish universal
safeguards measures for GCEPs.
B. Inspection Regimes
Unique features of IAEA safeguards at GCEPs can be highlighted by Limited Frequency Unannounced
Access (LFUA). At URENCO plants five types of safeguards inspections are carried out: monthly
Interim Inventory Verifications (IIVs), annual Physical Inventory Verification (PIV), Design Inventory
Verification (DIV), Limited Frequency Unannounced Access (LFUA), and Complementary Access
(CA). These are shown in Table 10.6. "' Each inspection has different objectives and different
frequency. LFUA is a unique inspection regime, which is applied to only GCEPs.
Table 10.6 Inspections Currently Applied to URENCO Plants
Types Objective Frequency
Interim Inventory Verification To verify material flow 11 times per year [a]
Physical Inventory Verification To verify physical inventory Annually
To verify that the plants are built in line
Design Inventory Verification As necessary [b]
with the design information
Limited Frequency To detect undeclared HEU production 4-12 times per year [c]
Unannounced Access "inside cascade halls"
Complementary Access To resolve questions or inconsistencies As necessary
Notes
[a] The HSP suggested that the average frequencies of routine inspection visits can be 12-15 times per year for
outside cascade halls. 558
[b] DIVs are carried out once on a new plant is built and repeated up to once a year thereafter.
[c] However, depending on the size of the GCEP, it may vary from four to twelve times per year [W. Fisher and G.
Stein (1999)] or from four to ten times per year [B.D. Boyer (2008)].
556 Glaser, "Beyond A. Q. Khan: The Gas Centrifuge, Nuclear Proliferation, and the NPT Regime.", pp.1-5.
57 Friend, "Urenco's Views on International Safeguards Inspection".
558 Boyer, Safeguards Approaches for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: LANL Safeguards Systems Course -
Pilot 2008.
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C. Limited Frequency Unannounced Access (LFUA)
LFUA was proposed to resolve conflicting issues about the application of safeguards at GCEPs between
facility operators and safeguaders. Safeguarders need information to be as detailed as possible in order
to meet safeguards demands. On the contrary, facility operators want to protect sensitive technology
embedded inside cascade hall areas. They have the right to establish restricted areas so that IAEA
inspectors are not given access to the areas according to INFCIRC/153.559 Even the IAEA prefers to
keep its own inspectors away from proliferation-relevant technology because IAEA inspectors represent
the IAEA for a limited time.560 Once they complete their duties, they go back to home countries and
may contribute to nuclear programs. Therefore, the application of safeguards to GCEPs should be
always a balanced task between accomplishing safeguards objectives and avoiding unnecessary
information acquisition. In this regard, the most critical and complex issue is the degree of the
inspectors' accessibility inside cascade hall areas.
During the HSP study, an evaluation group proposed a partial solution by comparing the results
of the safeguards models "without inspector access to the cascade hall" and" with inspector access to
the cascade hall." The evaluation group recommended so-called "Limited Frequency Unannounced
Access (LFUA)" as the optimum solution.56' Finally, the HSP accepted LFUA and containment and
surveillance system for a safeguards inspection scheme inside the cascade hall.
Safeguarder Operator / Proliferator
Minimize resource requirement LMinimize the leakage of sensitive
for inspection L A i technology
C/S system
I insideMaximize verification efficiency cascade halls Minimize the intrusiveness to
andcade accuc ensure economic operation
Figure 10.2 Different Positions for Safeguards Measures inside the Cascade Halls
The LFUA enables the inspector to have unannounced access to the cascade hall, specified in
terms of time and space. The inspectorates are given access to the cascade halls within two hours, either
59 Paragraph 46, (b), (iv). "If the State so requests, a special material balance area around a process step involving
commercially sensitive information may be established."
560 Paragraph 9 (Agency Inspectors) of INFCIRC/153. "The visits and activities of Agency inspectors....as well as
to ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors'
knowledge."
561Fischer and Stein, "On-Site Inspections: Experience from Nuclear Safeguarding.", pp.45-54.
252
during the course of an announced routine inspection or on a completely unannounced, random basis 562
with the frequency of 4-12 times per year. The duration of LFUA is between one and eight hours,
depending on whether the inspector only makes visual inspections or also performs measurements. 563
The LFUA provides the benefit of unpredictability and increases the efficiency of safeguards.
D. Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) to GCEPs5"
SNRI is the concept of inspections that are performed at randomly chosen times at short notice. The
SNRI/Mailbox approach was first introduced in 1984 by Gordon and Sanborn specifically for IAEA
safeguards application at the Portsmouth GCEP. But the concept was not applied because the plant was
canceled before the concept was implemented. The concept was then adopted by the IAEA plant for
initial application at LEU Fuel Fabrication Plants (FFP) or Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCFs) in the
early 1990s. 565 The first field-test of SNRI was conducted at U.S. Westinghouse LEU FFP from March
to August 1993. The test demonstrated the validity, technical feasibility, and the effectiveness of
SNRI.566 The SNRI/Mailbox approach was used during the HEU downblending verification experiment
at the PGDP during 1997-1998.567 However, the plant as a whole was not subject to the approach, and
the experiment was completed in 1998.568 The plant is not at present subject to the approach. SNRI was
also introduced in 1998 in Japan and currently. All LEU FFPs and UCFs in Japan are now subject to
SNRI. 569 SNRI enables the IAEA to make technically valid statements of verification of shipment or
562 For LFUA, inspectors should notice GCEP operators at least two hours before an access to cascade halls. This
two-hour time window was determined considering the time long enough for the operator to protect proprietary
information but not long enough to remove all evidence of illicit activity
563 Fischer and Stein, "On-Site Inspections: Experience from Nuclear Safeguarding."However, Brian Boyer (2008)
suggests that LFUA is performed 4-12 times per year for facilities with less than 1000 MT SWU/yr.
56 M. M. Curtis and P. Durst, "An Inspector's Assessment of the New Model Safeguards Approach for
Enrichment Plants," (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, July 2007).
565 Leslie Fishbone et al., "The Mailbox for Randomized Safeguards Inspections" (paper presented at the
Proceedings of the 13th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management, 1991)., pp.83-
86; Leslie Fishbone, "Field Test of Short-Notice Random Inspections for Inventory - Change Verification at a
Low-Enriched-Uranium Fuel Fabrication Plant," (Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, April 1995).
566Fishbone, "Field Test of Short-Notice Random Inspections for Inventory - Change Verification at a Low-
Enriched-Uranium Fuel Fabrication Plant."; I. Tsvetkov et al., "Implementation of Short Notice Random
Inspection (SNRI) at Japanese Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bulk Facilities - the Experience Gained and an
Inspectorate Perspective," (2005).
567 David Gordon et al., "BNL-65714."The IAEA performed its Design Information Verification (DIV) during
December 1-17, 1997.
568 P. L. Kerr et al., "IAEA Verification Experiment at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant: Report on the
Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor, LA-13557-MS." Between December 12, 1997 and October 8, 1998, LANL
and IAEA personnel conducted a verification experiment at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
569 I. Tsvetkov et al., "Implementation of Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) at Japanese Low Enriched
Uranium (LEU) Bulk Facilities - the Experience Gained and an Inspectorate Perspective."
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receipt strata in the absence of a resident inspector."" SNRI effectively verifies a complete flow of
nuclear materials without increasing inspection frequency and resources.571
The principal objective of SNRI is to allow complete flow verification coverage of the
transfers of safeguarded material between facilities by randomizing the time of inspections and
projecting the verification data from collected samples over the material balance period. Additional
objectives of the SNRI can include:
- The confirmation of consistency between the plant operation and the declared operation program
and the state's fuel cycle;
- The deterrence of data falsification by shortening the interval between the notice of the inspection
and the granted access; and
- More efficient and cost-effective verification of material flow in process and in transfer. 572
The effectiveness of SNRI is dependent on inspectorate resources level, operational program of the
particular facility, fixed sample size process, and travel conditions to the target facilities. SNRI can
detect diversion activities with the IAEA desired detection probability.573
E. Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA)
Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA) is performed at three levels: the nuclear material accounting
activities at facility level by facility operators; the State System of Accounting for and Control of
nuclear material (SSAC) activities at the state authority level; and evaluation activities at the IAEA
level. This section focuses on Nuclear Material Accounting Activities (NMAA). NMAA is designed to
establish the quantities of nuclear material within defined areas and the changes in those quantities
within defined periods.5 7 4 NMAA includes establishment of Material Balance Areas (MBAs), record
keeping, nuclear material measurement, preparation and submission of accounting reports, 575 and
verification of the correctness of the nuclear material accounting information. The IAEA concludes its
NMA by comparing the operator's declarations and inspection data obtained during NMAA.
570 W. Murphey, C. Emeigh, and L. Lessler, "Some Remarks Relating to Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI)
and Verification of Flow Strata" (paper presented at the Annual Meetings of International Nuclear Materials
Management New Orleans, LA, July 28-31 1991).
571 I. Tsvetkov et al., "Implementation of Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) at Japanese Low Enriched
Uranium (LEU) Bulk Facilities - the Experience Gained and an Inspectorate Perspective."
572 Ibid.
3 Ibid.; J. Huenefeld et al., "Implementation of Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) at Japanese Low
Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bulk Facilities - the Experience Gained and an Inspectorate Perspective," (2005).
574 IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition., p.46.
575 David M. Gordon and Jonathan B. Sanborn, "An Approach to IAEA Material-Balance Verification with
Intermittent Inspection at the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant," (Upton, New York: Brookhaven
National Laboratory, 1984). Accounting ledgers at GCEPs include Shipping forms, material transaction reports
and journals, transfer receipts, process sample reports, weight tickets, process inventory-taking reports, material
balance reports, and others. (UF in cylinders)
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A GCEP can be divided into several Material Balance Areas (MBAs) in order to facilitate
nuclear material accounting. For example, MBAs of a GCEP can be either (i) shipper/receiver MBA,
UF6 handling MBA, and cascade MBA or (ii) storage MBA and Process MBA as shown in Figure 10.3,
which shows an overall schematic of a URENCO design-based GCEP.576
The flow of nuclear material at a GCEP is as follows. Uranium feeds (UF6 ) are provided in
cylinders at the receipt/shipment area. The cylinders are weighed in order to verify correctness and then
evaluate shipper-receiver differences, if any. They would be stored at a storage MBA until they are
introduced into process MBA for enrichment operation. Then, the UF6 is enriched to the degree which
the facility operator wants inside the cascade hall. Once the enrichment operation is complete, enriched
UF6 and by-products (depleted UF6 or tails) are produced. Both products and tails are stored together
with feed cylinders in a storage MBA.
Areas allow access
during only LFUAs
Desublimer Station
7 2
ELM
Material Balance Area 2 (Process)
Shipment and Receipt
UFO Material Flow
Water Weighing Decontamination
Treatment Station StationPlant
Central Technical
Heating WorkshopsPlantWokhp
Product Transfer
Product Storage (R00 Station(o e (Receipt and
JI Weighing)
Tails
Storage
I materiai Balance Area I
(storage or UPS Handling Area)]
Figure 10.3 Simplified Schematic of Gas Centrifuge Plants"7
576 For more information about numerical material balance accounting by the facility operator, see David M.
Gordon and Jonathan B. Sanborn, "International Safeguards at the Feed and Withdrawal Area of a Gas Centrifuge
Enrichment Plant" (paper presented at the American Nuclear Society Conference on Measurement Technology for
Safeguards and Materials Control, Kiawah Island, Charleston, SC, November 26-29 1979).; and see Paragraph 46.
(b) of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)
m Cynthia E. Atkins-Duffin, Nuclear Nonproliferation (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2008 [cited
May 15 2009]); available from http://www.cresp.org/NuclearChemCourse/presentations/17_Atkins-
Duffin_D1097_Atkins-Duffin.pdf.
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F. Mailbox System
A mailbox system is shorthand for a computer network or other arrangement in which operators provide
operational information in a form that cannot be changed, i.e., a secure tamper-resistant computer.
Under a mailbox approach, the operator agrees to hold receipts and shipments for a specified period of
time (called the "residence time"), along with a specified number of annual inspections, to enable
inspector access to a statistically large enough population of UF6 cylinders and fuel assemblies to
achieve the desired detection probability. 578
The concept of mailbox was first introduced as a form of near real-time material accountancy to
complement the SNRI objectives as a potential IAEA safeguards application at the Portsmouth GCEP in
1984.179 The mailbox declarations have been used for material balance verification by checking the
receipts, production, and shipments at some bulk-handling facilities such as LEU Fuel Fabrication
Plants (FFPs).
The operator declares the status of his plant to the IAEA on a daily basis using a secure
"mailbox" system. These declarations probably should be made by the nuclear-materials accountability
staff so the values can be checked for completeness and correctness. The data to be put into mailbox
includes :580
- Information on the facility status
- A type of event (cylinder connection and disconnection, or error correction), date and time of
event, concise note for explanations,
- Accountability values for feed, product, and tails cylinders (including U-235 enrichment and UF6
purity)
- SWU comparison.
- Cylinder inventory with receipts and shipments of UF6 cylinders
The IAEA is currently developing a near real-time mailbox reporting scheme based on Electronic Data
Transmission System (EDTS). As the operator enters data regarding material accountancy on a near-
real-time basis into the "Mailbox" computer, the randomness of inspections would effectively
511increase.
578Brian D. Boyer, David M. Gordon, and Jae Jo, "Use of Mailbox Approach, Video Surveillance, and Short-
Notice Random Inspections to Enhance Detection of Undeclared LEU Production at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment
Plants," (Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 2006).
579 Gordon and Sanborn, "An Approach to IAEA Material-Balance Verification with Intermittent Inspection at the
Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant."
580 David Gordon et al., "BNL-65714.", David M. Gordon et al., "IAEA Verification Experiment at the
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant," (August 1998).
581 For more concepts about randomization, see Fishbone et al., "The Mailbox for Randomized Safeguards
Inspections".
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G. Concurrent Use of SNRI and Mailbox
SNRI and the mailbox approach can be used in a combined way. The inspectors can access the
"Mailbox" during SNRIs and then verify the operator's declarations for that day. This approach will be
very efficient in preventing a so-called a "crash through approach"s5 2 to divert nuclear material.
Gordon and Sanborn (1984)583 and Nishimura (2004)584 developed the methods of calculating
detection probabilities based on the SNRI/Mailbox approach. In both cases, the number of inspections
per year is critical in the increase in detection probability. The new IAEA safeguards approach for
GCEPs includes the SRNI/Mailbox as one of the tools that can be applied, depending upon the facility
and the IAEA evaluations performed in its state level approach. Under current daily reporting schemes
(not near-real time), randomization conditions must be met for the valid application of SNRI/mailbox
inspection regime. A plant operator would declare the contents and amounts of nuclear material items
involved in transfers before knowing the occurrence of SNRI to verify them. 585
Brookhaven National Laboratory proposed the application of an expanded mailbox concept to
GCEPs combined with SNRIs and video surveillance. 586 By adding a video surveillance declaration and
verification of UF6 cylinder operational data, the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards approaches
to GCEPs will increase. Once the concept of SNRI/Mailbox system is adopted, this will replace
monthly interim inspections (a part of routine inspections). In addition, LFUA can be conducted during
SNRI, simultaneously. 587
H. Nuclear Real Time Accountancy (NRTA)
The IAEA is developing the concept of NRTA as a form of NMA for bulk handling nuclear facilities. If
NRTA is fully developed, the IAEA can receive the information about itemized inventory and inventory
change data maintained by the facility operators on a near real-time basis. 588 For example, Short Notice
Random Inspection (SNRI) and mailbox concepts have been used for increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency of safeguards through increasing the unpredictability of inspections at Fuel Fabrication Plants
(FFPs). However, these are not common features of current practice at GCEPs. The launch of this
582 Under this scenario a proliferator simply take the material from its safeguarded storage area as soon as the
IAEA inspector had finished performing one inspection. This would be intended to produce HEU before the next
inspection falls due. Bragin, Carlson, and Leslie, "Building Proliferation-Resistance into the Nuclear Fuel Cycle".
583 Gordon and Sanbom, "An Approach to IAEA Material-Balance Verification with Intermittent Inspection at the
Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant."
584 H. Nishimura, "Frequency of SNRIs and a Sampling Plant at an SNRI," (Japan: Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.,
Feb 2004).
585 Fishbone, "Field Test of Short-Notice Random Inspections for Inventory - Change Verification at a Low-
Enriched-Uranium Fuel Fabrication Plant."
586 Boyer, Gordon, and Jo, "Use of Mailbox Approach, Video Surveillance, and Short-Notice Random Inspections
to Enhance Detection of Undeclared LEU Production at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants."
587 Ibid.
588 IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition., p.46.
257
approach to GCEPs will significantly increase the unpredictability of inspections and that in turn will
complicate the proliferators' tasks for producing HEU.
10.4.5 Techniques for Inspection
Inspection techniques that can be used for GCEPs can be grouped into five categories as shown in Table
10.7.
Table 10.7 Inspection Techniques Currently Employed
Techniques Purpose
Mass measurement Load Cell Based Weighing System (LCBS) measures UF6 cylinders.
Non-destructive Assay (NDA) including Cascade Enrichment Monitoring
System (CEMO) and Cascade Header Enrichment (CHEM) measures uranium
UER measurement enrichment ratio of UF6 in feed, product, and tails of cylinders.[a] 589
Destructive Assay (DA) 590 for nuclear material accountancy is performed on
bulk samples of the nuclear material. [b]
Containment Tamper-indicating seals verify that no changes are made between inspections.
Video Surveillance (V/S) system can monitor facilities and maintain the
Surveillance continuity of knowledge and can be installed at UF6 cylinder handling areas,
including cylinder Feed / Withdrawal (F/W) stations.591
Unattended and Combinative use of CEMO and Electronic Data Transmission 
System (EDTS)
enables the IAEA to monitor the facility without residence inspectors at a
remote monitoring
remote distance.
Notes
[a] As reviewed in chapter 7, High-Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors or Nal scintillator/phototube detectors are
used to measure the intensity of 185.7 keV gamma ray from U-235 taking into account the thickness of the
cylinder wall. The thickness of the cylinder wall is measured using an ultrasonic thickness gauge.
[b] Typically, a few grams of UF6 are collected in sample tubes from the UF6 cylinders.
10.4.6 Inspection Procedures for Achieving Specific Safeguards Objective
The IAEA needs to verify two factors for achieving its specific safeguards objectives for GCEPs: (a) the
verification of the feed, product, and tails UF6 flows at GCEPs during the course of the annual PIV and
the monthly IIVs; and (b) the verification of the inventories of UF6 during the PIV. In principle, the
589 Sharikov, "Verification Challenges for Safeguarding Uranium Enrichment Plants."
590 Bush et al., "IAEA Experience with Environmental Sampling at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants in the
European Union."
591 McGinnis et al., "Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities in the United States - IAEA Safeguards
Implementation".
258
IAEA performs gross-, partial-, and bias-defect 5 92 tests that are intended to achieve a 50 percent
probability for detection of nuclear material quantities exceeding 75 kg U-235 (i.e., significant quantity)
[See Appendix G]. However, in practice the IAEA can achieve its specific safeguards objectives by
checking the weight of UF6 and the UER of UF6 as shown in Table 10.8.
Table 10.8 Tests Performed for Achieving Specific Safeguards Objectives
Test Defect tests Procedures
The IAEA rarely uses this test. However, the so-called "acoustic
Gross
resonance test" may be used.
UF6
The IAEA performs the partial- and bias-defect tests for UF6 weight by
weight Partial and
weighing the declared cylinder on an IAEA LCBS or on an operator'sbias
scale that the IAEA has properly authenticated.
The IAEA uses gamma-ray NDA, making use of the enrichment
Partial
UF6 principle through either through LRGS or HRGS. [a]
UER The IAEA obtains a physical sample of UF6 from a declared cylinder
Bias
so that it can perform the test by using mass spectrometry, i.e., DA.
Note: [a] The IAEA has experienced a number of difficulties with gamma-ray NDA due to cold weather and to the
presence of heels with their accompanying decay products, particularly for tails and feed cylinders.
10.4.7 Summary of Safeguards Framework
The annual conclusion of safeguards activities is made through comparing the declared data by facility
operators out of SSAC and the data obtained during inspection activities. IAEA inspectors need to
gather all available information and data to ensure completeness and correctness, including facility
operational data and measurement data about material flows and balance. Figures 10.4 and 10.5 show
currently available safeguards tools for GCEPs and a hierarchy of safeguards framework for GCEPs,
respectively.
592 Defect refers to a difference between the declared amount of nuclear material and the material actually present.
IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition. page 63.
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AP (Additional Protocol)
CEMO (Continuous Enrichment Monitoring)
CHEM (Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor)
CIS (Containment and Surveillance)
DIV (Design Information Verification)
EDTS (Electronic Data Transmission System)
ES (Environmental Sampling)
LFUA (Limited Frequency Unannounced Access)
NWAL (Network of Analytical Laboratories)
SAL (Safeguards Analytical Laboratory)
PIV (Physical Inventory verification)
: Declared by Facility
---. j Operators
Figure 10.4 Schematic of Safeguards Application to GCEPs
Objective #1 Objective #3 Objective #2
Safeguards Objectives
(Detection or Verification)
Safeguards Approach
(inspection Regimes and
system)
Safegaurds Tasks
Safeguards Measures
(Techniques and Acitivities)
Inspection Techniques Inspectors' Activities
Figure 10.5 Hierarchy of Safeguards Framework for GCEPs5 93
593 SWU balances are hard to use as a detection mechanism, since the operator can easily and credibly understate
by substantial amounts (-20%) the separative capacity of his centrifuges. It is not possible to tell the SWU
capacity by visual and aural observation.
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10. 5 Application of Safeguards Framework
10.5.1 Safeguards Approach: NMA and LFUA
Different safeguards objectives are applied for two district areas, inside the cascade hall and outside
cascade hall. The safeguards objective #1 is met primarily inside the cascade hall, while #2 and #3 are
met primarily outside the cascade hall. Because of the different features of the two areas, the NMA
approach is applied outside, whereas LFUA approach is applied inside. With different safeguards
objectives and different safeguards approaches, different sets of framework are also applied.
10.5.2 Safeguards Tasks and Measures Outside the Cascade Hall
A safeguards task of inspectors outside the cascade hall is to verify nuclear material flows and balance
through Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA). Inspectors carry out NMAA during monthly Interim
Inventory Verification (IIV) and annual Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) inspections. A key item
of information on nuclear material accounting at GCEPs is the total quantity of uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) per U-235 enrichment level. Thus, nuclear material accounting is performed in a way that all
characteristics of UF6 in feed, product, and tails cylinders are detailed in itemized lists.
In order to conclude NMAA as correct and complete, the data declared by the operators and the
data obtained by inspectors should be in agreement. The acquisition of data by inspectors can be done
in three ways: by collecting facility records such as operating parameters and the shipments/ receipts of
UF6 ; by reviewing records and reports declared by facility operators; and by measuring nuclear material
during inspections. In addition, Video Surveillance (V/S) can be installed for maintaining the continuity
of knowledge at Feed/Withdrawal (F/W) stations (or at sublimation/desublimation stations) and cascade
hall entry and exit points. 594
10.5.3 Safeguards Tasks and Measures Inside the Cascade Hall
A task of inspectors inside the cascade hall is to detect the production of uranium at an enrichment level
which is higher than declared. This task can be approached via LFUA. As mentioned earlier, five
elements of safeguards measures can be applied and detailed descriptions are shown in Table 10.9.
Therefore, inspectors' visual observation of the details of enrichment equipment specification s and
access to critical plant operating parameters are prohibited, so as to protect proprietary information.
594 McGinnis et al., "Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities in the United States - IAEA Safeguards
Implementation".
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Table 10.9 Safeguards Measures inside Cascade Hall [Swindle (1990) and Boyer (2008)]
Safeguards What to inspect or verify?
measures
Seals Valves in process piping, flanges, inspection equipment left unattended during 
non-
inspection periods
- Cascade configuration
Check overall configuration of cascades [a]
- Process piping/flanges
Check at randomly selected locations for comparison with the declared piping
drawings
.a Volume measurement of the entire piping system [b]Visual
- EquipmentObservation
Verify that no unreported equipment is placed inside cascade halls
- Cylinders
Verify that no unidentified or unreported cylinders are placed inside cascade halls
- Valves in cascades
Check a pressure and a vacuum to confirm that all boundary valves have been placed
in the closed position
NDA UF6 contained in the piping, cascade header pipe connections [c], chemical traps, F/W
Measurements connections points
SwipeSampg UF6 in the piping, [dsurfaces of carts, sampling stations, ventilation filters.Sampling
Monitoring Continuous Enrichment Monitoring system (CEMO)[e] 595
Notes
[a] 3DLR and GPR can be used.
[b] A measured value is compared with the engineering calculated volume of the entire uranium feed piping
system.
[c] Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM)
[d] This is very rarely performed.
[e] The result is displayed only qualitatively, as HEU Yes or No, due to operator sensitivity to enrichment level.
[Sharikov (2007)]
10.5.4. Compilation of Material and Operation Data
The most accurate way to account for nuclear material seems to be the coupling of the data for nuclear
material accounting with that of operational parameters using Separative Work Units (SWUs). In this
regard, the monitoring of Separative Work Units (SWUs) was experimented at the Tripartite
Enrichment Project (TEP). This is based on the fact that safeguarders can track how facility operators
used SWU for enrichment operation. But it turned out to be too complex to apply because of the
59s Boyer, Safeguards Approaches for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: LANL Safeguards Systems Course -
Pilot 2008. The CHEM is applied only at Capenhurst, U.K.; Friend, "Urenco's Views on International Safeguards
Inspection".; IAEA, "IAEA Annual Report 2006," (Vienna, Austria: 2006)., p. 6 8 . Two flow and enrichment
monitors were installed at the Shaanxi GCEP for unattended monitoring of enrichment levels and the quantity of
the product.
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inherent complexity of SWU calculations as well as systematic and statistical uncertainties. Examples
of those uncertainties include errors in association with the measurement of UER and random selection
of items on the inventory list.
10.6 Identification of Problems for GCEP Safeguards
Safeguards challenges with regard to GCEPs can be categorized into three issues. These three issues
have already been recognized by the IAEA, but the importance of putting more effort into this cannot be
over-emphasized. First, the IAEA still needs to enhance the use of inspection techniques in order to
detect undeclared proliferation activities with definitive detection probability as shown in Table 10.10.
Even though this is not purely the problem of technology development, inspection technique
requirements are as follows:
Table 10.10 Requirements for Increasing the Effectiveness of GCEP Safeguards
Objective Description
- Enhanced video surveillance inside cascade halls
#1 - Improved timeliness of the analysis of environment samples
HEU - Improved NDA measurements on piping inside cascade halls
production - Instrumentation for flow measurement inside cascade halls such as in-line mass
flow meter and thermal mass flow detectors
#2 - Development of installed Instrumentation to quantify the amount of material in-
Diversion of process vessels, usually located in the Feed/Withdrawal area at the time of PIV
DN/LEU - Instrumentation for measuring the nuclear material hold-up. [a]596
- Monitoring of UF6 flows at the feed, product, and tails stations
#3
-Mailbox/SNRI, video surveillance,
Excess LEU
-An attended weight monitoring system for each station (authenticated and
I continuously recording LCBS)
Note: [a] It seems that holdup in the cascade hall may be a problem in the Japanese Plants.
596 Sharikov, "Verification Challenges for Safeguarding Uranium Enrichment Plants."The measurement of "the
nuclear material hold-up" still remains to be one of the principal safeguards challenges in terms of enrichment
ratio, the location of material held-up, and the quantity of hold-up.
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#1 Detection of HEU
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Figure 10.6 IAEA Safeguards Objectives against Plausible Proliferators' Objectives
Second, all safeguards objectives should be reviewed in association with feasible proliferation
scenarios including ways to provide undeclared nuclear material and to manipulate operational data.
Finally, the current safeguards objectives do not address the issue of the production of HEU at
clandestine GCEPs. Figure 10.4 shows the summary of IAEA safeguards objectives for GCEPs under
safeguards and corresponding proliferation activities.
10.7 Possible Solutions to Problems of Safeguards for GCEPs
10.7.1 Developing Inspection Techniques
The IAEA continues efforts to circumvent the problem of restricted access inside cascade halls. In April
2005, the IAEA hosted a technical meeting in Vienna to discuss potential detection techniques for the
verification of enrichment plants. The IAEA continues to develop techniques to make up for its
deficiency with regard to limited access to cascade halls by computerizing safeguards equipment to
maximize the use of limited inspection time. The three-dimensional Laser Range Finder (3DLR) is
already being used by the IAEA for DIV activities at the Rokkasho Plutonium Reprocessing Facility
(PRF). This system can detect any structural changes within an accuracy of millimeters through
comparison of scanned images with previous ones and verify the absence of undeclared structural
changes between on-site inspections. The range finder shows changes such as piping arrangements in
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highlight. 97 However, the software of 3DLR needs further improvement including the revision of
3DLR encryption module.598 Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) is a geophysical non-destructive method,
and it can detect hidden objects and structures within facilities during regular inspections. GPR is not in
use yet. However, GPR also has the potential for DIV and for detecting undeclared facilities.599 The
current challenge of GPR is to interpret the resulting radargrams in an immediate and unequivocal
fashion.600 Also, the IAEA continues efforts to track cylinders inside cascade halls in the absence of
inspectors using Centralized Portal Monitor, coupled with RFIDs.0 1
10.7.2 Modeling Efforts (U.S.)
Modeling a safeguards framework application can greatly help to identify loopholes in the framework
and to develop proliferation scenarios that can be employed by potential proliferators. Recently, the U.S.
decided to construct two GCEPs one at Eunice, New Mexico as a national enrichment facility (by
Louisiana Energy Services for 5% U-235) and the other at Piketon, Ohio (by United States Enrichment
Cooperation for 10% U-235).602 The U.S. is developing and evaluating safeguards measures for these
new GCEPs. The IAEA has been assessing the needs and capabilities necessary to safeguard GCEPs in
an efficient way. As a part of those efforts, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL),
under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is developing tools and methods for
potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems for GCEPs. One of those products is
the LLNL Integrated Safeguards System Analysis Tool (LISSSAT). 03
Using the LISSAT, the marginal increase of a detection technique's effectiveness can be
identified and prioritized given limited resources conditions. Lambert et al. (2007) did some qualitative
analysis on the impacts of introducing new safeguards options (safeguard options 2 and 3 in Table
10.10). Their study provides a detection probability for 18 scenarios. These 18 scenarios are plotted
according to the combination of three proliferation scenarios and six safeguards scenarios for each
proliferation scenario. Safeguards scenarios are schemed considering safeguards options and the
feed/withdrawal points (which means whether outside or inside the cascade hall). Table 10.11 shows
possible detection probabilities for different scenarios.
597 Zendel, "IAEA Safeguards Equipment.", pp.72-80.
598 IAEA, "R & D Programme for Nuclear Verification 2008-2009," (2008)., p.4 8 .
59Ibid., p.31.
600 Zendel, "IAEA Safeguards Equipment."
601 Carlson and Leslie, "Safeguards Intensity as a Function of Safeguards Status".
602 McGinnis et al., "Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities in the United States - IAEA Safeguards
Implementation".
603 For more information about diagraph-fault tree methodology, see H. A. Elayat, H. E. Lambert, and W. J.
O'Connell, "Systems Analysis of Safeguards Effectiveness in a Uranium Conversion Facility" (paper presented at
the 45th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Orlando, FL, July 18-22 2004).
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Table 10.11 Possible Schemes of Safeguards Options [Lambert et al., (2007)]
Safeguards tesafe SNRI/
Options IIV PIV LFUA Ding Mailbox V/S [d CEMO LCBS RFID
(Frequency [']
per year) 1 1 1 6 15 days 13
2
3
Notes
[a] X denotes that a scheme is included in each safeguard option.
[b] Time for holding feed, product, and tails cylinders on average
[c] SNRI replaces IIV and may include LFUA. During SNRI, verification of mailbox declaration, re-Design
Information Verification (DIV), Containment Surveillance (C/S) checking can be performed by inspectors.60
[d] Continuous and unattended video surveillance
As described in Table 10.11, if the 11 scheduled Interim Inventory Verification (IIV) outside cascade
halls were replaced with the Mailbox/SNRI approach, then these SNRIs could also serve as
opportunities for LFUA inspections, without increasing the overall number of inspections at the plant.
Table 10.12 shows the detection probability for each scenario in Table 10.11.
Table 10.12 Detection Probabilities for Proliferation Scenarios using LISSAT405
Safeguards 1 Safeguards 2 Safeguards 3
Scenario Outside Inside Outside Inside Outside Inside
cascade cascade cascade cascade cascade Cascade
HEU production 50-90% 99% 99%
at declared GCEPs
LEU diversion by 50-90%
skimming
Excessive LEU
Below
production with Below 50% 99% Below 50% 99%
50%
undeclared feed
Note: This table is simplified version of Table 1 from H. Lambert et al [2007].
604 David Gordon et al., "BNL-65714."
605 H.Lambert et al., "LISSAT Analysis of a Generic Centrifuge Enrichment Plant" (paper presented at the
Proceedings of the 48th annual meetingof the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management INMM, Tucson, AZ,
July 8-12, 2007).
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10.7.3 Efforts to Standardize GCEPs
Because of the unique features of GCEPs, it is beneficial to reduce degrees of freedom in the
construction, operation, and management of GCEPs. For example, URENCO suggests that the
IAEA should issue design guidelines for the future construction of GCEPs. The best, but admittedly
idealistic scenario would be to use a standard design in building GCEPs so as to facilitate inspection
activities. Outside the cascade halls, equipment containing UF6 including process gas pipework and
cylinders, should be ready for inspection. Inside the cascade halls, centrifuge casings and cascade
piping should be displayed for easy visual inspection during LFUAs. Minimization of the amount of
equipment is also highly recommended.606
10.8 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a concept of safeguards framework for GCEPs in order to provide a systematic
approach for developing strategies which strengthens IAEA safeguards based on published studies.
Despite efforts for strengthening safeguards for GCEPs, it is not expected that the current safeguards
can properly deal with the challenges posed by the rapid proliferation of GCEPS. In particular, the
unique features of each GCEP make it difficult to strengthen safeguards. In this regard, the
establishment of a safeguards framework for GCEPs is particularly important. Such a framework could
provide a conceptual structure for safeguards development and application processes. Furthermore, a
standardized safeguards framework could be applicable to other types of nuclear facilities.
With regard to a conceptual safeguards framework, the IAEA should put more effort into
developing strong, standardized safeguards for GCEPs than for any other type of nuclear facility. Those
efforts should include developing inspections techniques, modeling, and standardization. Lessons
learned from safeguards for GCEPs will be of great use for Laser Enrichment Technology (LET). LET
is the next generation UET and is far more threatening to nuclear nonproliferation than GCET. The
establishment of a holistic approach that involves other elements of the NPT regime will be essential to
building long-term plans for safeguarding GCEPS.
606 Friend, "Urenco's Views on International Safeguards Inspection".
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CHAPTER 11 NPT REGIME'S CAPABILITIES FOR
DETECTING A CLANDESTINE GCEP
11.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to the clear identification of the current status of the NPT regime's capabilities
for detecting clandestine nuclear facilities. The current level of technology available for detecting a
clandestine GCEP is far from ideal. However, it is still unclear where the NPT regime stands in the
process of achieving the desired level of detection technology. Thus, clear differentiation between the
current and desired detection ability is extremely important in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) regime in order to establish effective strategies in response to proliferation using a GCEP.
The focus of this Chapter is on the technological levels for detecting a clandestine Gas
Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) with no access. This requires a well-established strategy on the
part of the monitoring agency. However, it should be noted that the detection of a clandestine facility
itself does not mean that the international community can stop proliferation activities. The use of
information regarding detection of a GCEP is limited to only raising reasonable suspicion, which is
expected to be followed by inspections on site. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the detection of
clandestine UCFs will directly incur political actions by the international community.
11.2 Strategy for Detecting Clandestine Nuclear Facilities
11.2.1 Direct and Indirect Detection
As reviewed in Chapters 6 and 7, a variety of legal and technical measures are available for detecting a
clandestine nuclear weapons program in the NPT regime. Each stage of a nuclear weapons program
involves different type of proliferation activities and safeguards should consider a different combination
of available measures for each stage in the NPT regime. Through these various measures, the IAEA
should obtain information about nuclear proliferation activities in a variety of types and from a multiple
sources. The collation and analysis of information can contribute to raising the probability of detecting
clandestine facilities.
Kemp and Glaser (2007)607 suggest two ways of detecting clandestine GCEPs and is described
in Figure 11.1. First, direct detection approach to a clandestine GCEP can be performed through
recognizing environmental signatures. In practice, it is hard to obtain concrete evidence for verifying
the existence of clandestine nuclear activities through direct detection only. Thus, indirect detection
approach must be employed in order to acquire complementary information. Indirect detection includes
607 Kemp and Glaser, The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
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the detection of auxiliary facilities that support a clandestine facility or the analysis of nuclear trade
concerning nuclear-related material and equipment.60
Figure 11.1 Detection Methods for a Clandestine GCEP609
11.2.2 Environmental Signatures
Each type of nuclear facility generates its own unique environmental signatures. These environmental
signatures can be grouped into optical signatures, thermal signatures, and atmospheric effluents as
shown in Table 11.1. The more environmental signatures are available, the higher the probability for
detecting the facility. According to the table, nuclear reactors and GDPs generate all of the various
types of environmental signatures. On the contrary, UCFs and GCEPs only release gaseous effluents,
which make atmospheric detection the only available measure.
608 Dual-items tracking for gas centrifuge manufacture such as centrifuge motor, frequency converters, aluminum,
maraging steel, composite materials.
609 Kemp and Glaser suggested that the indirect detection of GCEPs by monitoring supporting fuel-cycle facilities
may be the most promising route. Kemp and Glaser, The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.Kemp and Glaser suggested that the indirect detection of GCEPs by monitoring supporting fuel-cycle
facilities may be the most promising route.
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Table 11.1 Environmental Signatures of Nuclear Facilities
Thermal Atmospheric
Classification Optical signatures
signatures effluents
Nuclear - Cooling towers or a natural water body -Cooling pond
Reactors - Reactor buildings Hot effluents Fission gases
- Water-vapor plume discharge
- A very high stack (and shadow)
Plutonium - A long canyon-like building (or with
Reprocessing vent) Under dispute610  Kr-85
Facilities (PRFs) - Ponds or reservoirs for waste or sludge,
railroads
- Large-area process buildings [bi
Gaseous - Water vapor plume -Plumes from
- Cooling towers or a nearby river cooling towersDiffusion Plants coln oesHF
(GDPs) Waste management and disposal -Hot roof
facilities
- Electricity-supplying facilities [c]
Uranium
Conversion N/A N/A U0 2F2
Facilities (UCFs)
Gas Centrifuge
Enrichment N/A N/A (very little) [d6 HF
Plants (GCEPs)
Notes
[a] Security perimeter, isolated site, railroads, roads are common
GDPs.
[b] The roof of most buildings ventilation shafts
[c] A nearby fossil fuel power plant, large electric switchyard
features of reactors, reprocessing plants, and
[d] GCEPs do not require special cooling systems. However, the operation of facilities results in a small increase
in the roof temperature. Zhang (2001).
11.2.3 Technologies Available for Detecting Clandestine GCEPs
Under the scenario that access to clandestine nuclear facilities is not given or very limited, technologies
that can be used for detecting clandestine facilities include satellite imagery, Environmental Sampling
over Wide Area (ESWA), Raman-scattering-based LIDAR and Differential Absorption LIDAR (DIAL)
as shown in Figure 11.2.611
610 Hui Zhang (2000) argues that PRFs do not emit thermal signatures. Hui Zhang, "Report: Uses of Commercial
Satellite Imagery," The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2000). On the contrary, CNS (2003) claims that the
United States can detect thermal signatures of PRFs using infrared sensors on satellites. James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), NWFZ Clearinghouse.
611 The IAEA classifies environmental sampling scheme as swipe sampling, location specific sampling, and Wide
Area Environmental Sampling (WAES). Some scholars claim that only WAASG was originally meant to be
WAES. In this paper, a new term, Environmental Sampling over Wide Area (ESWA) that includes the second and
the third types of environmental sampling is used in order to prevent the confusion of terminology. LIDAR stands
for Light Detection and Ranging.
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Figure 11.2 Technologies Applicable to Detecting Clandestine GCEPs
The use of detection technologies is not solely the problem of the IAEA's technical capabilities but
related to the legal capabilities of the IAEA for two reasons: first, the application of ESWA requires the
approval of the Board of Governors (BOG) of the IAEA under the Additional Protocol; second, military
satellites, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) assets are part of
NTMs which require cooperation with governmental authorities.
11.3 Definition of Detection and Technology Levels
Before beginning discussion about detecting clandestine nuclear facilities, the use of term, detection,
should be defined. The IAEA should establish the level required to achieve its safeguards goal. Keeley
and Cameron (1998) argue that the IAEA requires a detection capability that would raise sufficient
suspicion to justify an inspection rather than a detection capability that would identify definitive
evidence. 612 For now, this argument seems reasonable considering the current level and the inherent
probabilistic nature of detection technology. Yet, this argument does not consider the inability to get
access to a clandestine GCEP within current IAEA capacity such as the case of North Korea and Iran.
612 Keeley and Cameron, "Chapter Two the Need to Know: Commercial Satellite Imagery and IAEA Safeguards."
They argue that raising reasonable suspicion may be needed to justify an inspection request, which seems to be
impractical in the current capacity of the IAEA. Concerning the use of the term "definitive," Merriam-Webster
defines "definitive" as "serving to provide a final solution or to end a situation." Available from
http://www.merriam-webster.com/
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In this regard, the IAEA should continue its efforts to achieve the technology level which can obtain
definitive evidence.
Three levels of detection technology are proposed as shown in Figure 11.3 and Table 11.2. The
differentiation of these three different levels enables the NPT regime to identify the current status of
detection technology level and how far the current detection technology level is from that which is
desired. A size of the gap between different technology levels depends on the type of technology, the
IAEA's available resources, and the level of international cooperation among the international
community.
Desired Performance Leve
(Level 1)
State-of-the-art Level
(Level 2)
Current IAEA Level
(Level 3)
-- - -t  -- - - -- - - -9 - - - Ic
Gap1
National Technical
Means (NTMs) Gap 2
IAEA's Stand-Alone Capability
Figure 11.3 Levels of Information and Their Gaps
Table 11.2 Definition of Different Technology Levels
Levels Definition
This is the highest level of information that can be defined as "the level at which
the IAEA can detect proliferation activities with confidence" or is "required level
performance evdne 613to detect proliferation activities with concrete evidence"
This level of information can be obtained through other sources such as National
State-of-the- Technical Means (NTMs), 614 the Intelligence Community, and national
art laboratories in the IAEA's member states.615 However, exact capabilities from
NTMs are generally not known for security reasons.
(Continued)
613 Personal Communication with Yong-Sang Choi, Sep. 15, 2009. However, the conventional approach is to
allow a confidence level between 85 and 99 percents. In satellite imagery analyses, a confidence level is
statistically determined by counting how many tests a target pixel has passed.
614 This is the term that first appeared as national technical means of verification, but was not detailed, in the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) between the US and USSR. The term covers a variety of monitoring
technologies, including others used at the time of SALT I. Examples are imaging satellites, imaging aircraft,
SIGINT platforms, etc.
615 National Technological Means (NTMs) including satellite imagery for IMINT, and other technologies for
HUMINT are representative of this level of information. Laboratories may belong to this category with the state-
of-the-art technology.
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Gap 3
... m-m
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This level of information can be obtained through IAEA's stand-alone capability.
The definition of stand-alone capability can be described as "the capability that the
IAEA can utilize without any delay or barriers, as necessary." The IAEA has the
Current IAEA capability for analyzing commercial satellite imagery, which is done by Satellite
Image Analysis Laboratory (SIAL), established in 2000 in the Department of
Safeguards.
11.4 Current Capabilities for Detecting Clandestine Nuclear Facilities
The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) (2007) 616 suggests overall estimates on the NPT
regime's technical capabilities for detecting clandestine nuclear facilities as shown in Table 11.3 [See
Appendix E].
Table 11.3 Current Capability for Detecting Clandestine Nuclear Facility
Satellite imagery
[IPFM (2007)]
Thermal
Infrared
(TIR)
Aerosol ESWA
Long
range
Short
range
Atmospheric
signatures
UCFs
Gronau
GCEPs No No No No U0 2F2  N/A fafacility
X iPending the
Nuclear Xe isotopes nulaFid
- (X-13, 13m, nuclear Fieldweapons ' oik oss(Xe-135, 133m,61
, yield experimenttest 133, 131m)"
magnitude
Notes
[a] From a technological point of view, it is generally suggested that many analytical methods in aerosol sampling
can achieve 1 to 0.1 ppb sensitivity under limited circumstances. 620
[b] * means that detection depends upon the capacity of the facility.
[c] No field experimental data is available for UCFs.
616 Table 9.1 International Panel on Fissile Materials, International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), "Global
Fissile Material Report 2007: Second Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials," (2007).617 Kalinowski, "Detection of Clandestine Production of Nuclear-Weapons-Usable Materials."
611 Wood, Glaser, and Kemp, "The Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation."619 B6senberg and Kalinowski, "Detecting Atmospheric UF6 and HF as Indicators for Uranium Enrichment."
620 R Scott Kemp, "Technical Note on the Detectability of U02F2 Aerosols Produced by UF6 Released from
Clandestine Uranium Conversion Plants," (July 28, 2006).
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Remarks
Nuclear reactor facilities can be easily detected by both satellite imagery and Environmental
Sampling over Wide Area (ESWA), whereas GCEPs can hardly be detected. This fact suggests that
indirect ways to detect GCEPs should be developed in order to detect clandestine GCEPs.
11.5 Direct Detection of GCEPs
11.5.1 Environmental Signatures
A. General
Before discussing further details on capabilities of current remote sensing technology, characteristic
environmental signatures (by-product effluents and other observables) of GCEPs should be reviewed. In
this paper, these signatures are classified into optical signature, thermal signature, atmospheric effluents,
and others as shown in Table 11.4. These signatures also can be grouped into operation- or
construction-related signatures.
Table 11.4 Environmental Signatures of UEFs
Classification of Features Remarks
Signatures
Characteristic Security perimeter
Enrichment buildings
Optical infrastructure Electricity supply Operation and
signature62 1  construction
Daily activities Large trucks and roads for shipment622
Thermal signature Heat release Temperature increase of a roof of a Operation
facility in association with operation
Aerosol particles Uranyl fluoride (UF2 0 2)
AtmouespheriUranium hexafluoride (UF 6) Operationeffluents Gas
Hydrogen fluoride (HF)
Seismic signatures Explosion of tunnels for underground Construction
facilitiesOther signatures fclte
Electromagnetic Use of high frequency of electricity for
623 Operation
________________ signatures gas centrifuge machinesOprto
621 For information about other types of nuclear facilities, please see Zhang, "IAEA-SM-367/16/01".
622 Shipment of UF6 cylinders, components required for the construction of a GCEP including gas centrifuge
machines.
623 The detection of an electromagnetic signature is currently a potential method and is still very limited within a
kilometer. Kemp and Glaser, The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.; and David E.
Sanger and William J. Broad, How to Listen for the Sound of Plutonium (New York Times, Jan. 31 2006 [cited
Mar. 5 2009]).
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B. Atmospheric Signatures
The uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas escapes during the various process steps at UEFs. But, UF6 quickly
reacts with atmospheric humidity and produces UF20 2 and HF in humid air as follows: 624
UF (g) +2H 20(1) -+UO2F +4HFg (11.1)
Due to such reactivity of UF6, by-products of UF6 should be considered for detecting these atmospheric
signatures. However, UF 20 2 is the only reliable indicator for uranium enrichment operation because this
is the only particle that contains uranium and fluorine. There are no natural or other anthropogenic
sources for this compound. On the contrary, the detection of HF does not provide concrete evidence for
uranium enrichment because it can also be emitted from other industrial facilities other than UEFs.
C. Optical and Thermal Signatures
Very few operating signatures for a GCEP are available for Visible and Near Infrared (VNIR) and
Thermal Infra-Red (TIR) Imagery. Optical features include characteristic infrastructures and
construction activities. However, unlike a Gaseous Diffusion Plant (GDP), a GCEP does not have
obviously observable characteristic features. Thus, these features must be collated with other
information.62 s The footprint of a GCEP can be considered as a secondary optical feature. However,
these vary with the intent of the proliferators and, in general, are too small to be detected reliably. For
example, Glaser (2007) suggests that a GCEP that capable of producing 25 kilograms (kg) of HEU
annually, about 6,000 Separative Work Unit (SWU)/yr, is estimated to have a hypothetical footprint of
160 square meters (42 ft x 42 ft). 626 The smallest GCEP that has been identified thus far is the Fuel
Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, Iran with the footprint of 200 m x 200 m, with an estimated capacity
of 7,500 SWU per yr (SWU/yr), which can produce 40 kg of HEU. 627
A GCEP releases less heat than that of a GDP because of higher operating efficiency. The
increase in the roof temperature from a GCEP is very small. Jasani (2009) suggests that a reference
GCEP of 1,000 (tonSWU/yr) would release 15 MW of heat via roof-mounted air cooled radiators or a
low-profile forced draught cooling tower. These signatures, if detected, could be used for further
estimates of production capabilities. [See Appendix F]
624 iGSE, "iGSE-Detection of Clandestine Production of Nuclear-Weapons-Usable Material.", pp.4-8.
625 Zhang, "IAEA-SM-367/16/01".
626 Glaser, Making Highly Enriched Uranium, Kemp and Glaser, The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.
627 R. Scott Kemp and A. Glaser, "The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (paper
presented at the Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases,
Beijing, Sep. 18-21 2006).
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11.5.2 Detecting through Environmental Signatures
A. Detection through Atmospheric Effluents
Table 11.5 shows the characteristics of three atmospheric effluents emitted from a GCEP. The detection
limit can be interpreted as the distances in which each atmospheric effluent can be detected. The
distances may be divided into right above the stack, short distance from the fence to several km away
from the fence, and significant distances.
Table 11.5 Comparison of Atmospheric Signatures 628
Characteristics
Signatures Detection
Phase Problems for Detection Detection Limit
Means
UF 6  Gaseous DIAL Highly instable 
30 ppmV-
50 ppbV
-Chemically instable 100 ~ 0.2 pppV
HF Gaseous DIAL -Not specific because of the existence of or
other industrial facilities that emits HF 0.02 mg/m3
Aerosol ESWA or -Non-detectable because of extremely low
UF 2 2  29 N/AParticles LIDAR6  signature
Note: Detection limit means minimum detectable concentration. These values are estimated using the differential
absorption cross section of the gas and the range interval where the gas is present, and the differential optical
depth.
Detailed explanation regarding the detectability of atmospheric effluents is as follows:
First, UF202 is the only atmospheric effluent that can be detected, but the detection limit of GCEPs can
be achieved only in the vicinity of the release point. In sum, all of three atmospheric effluents of a
GCEP cannot be detected even off the fence of the facility unless accidental release occurs. Second, the
amount of HF release to the level of detection limit cannot be achieved with conventional detection
technology even right above the exhaust stack because air filters in the exhaust stack can effectively
contain HF and significantly decrease the amount of release to the atmosphere. However, the use of
DIAL shows a possibility of detecting this gaseous tracer. Third, UF6 is the most difficult signature to
62 8M. Kalinowski, "Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation" (paper presented at the ESARDA Training Course,
Ispra, April 14-18 2008).; Bbsenberg and Kalinowski, "Detecting Atmospheric UF6 and HF as Indicators for
Uranium Enrichment.", pp.55-59.
629 B6senberg and Kalinowski, "Detecting Atmospheric UF6 and HF as Indicators for Uranium Enrichment." In
particular, Raman scattering-based LIDAR can be applied. Raman spectroscopy is another way to measure a
molecule's infrared fingerprint. Here light of high frequency (visible or UV) interacts with the molecule, and re-
emitted (scattered) light is analyzed. Due to the Raman effect, some of the scattered light will be shifted in
frequency by an amount equal to a characteristic frequency of the molecule. With a single-frequency laser source,
the returning light will display a spectrum with bright lines corresponding to molecular frequencies-also a
fingerprint.
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detect. The amount of UF6 release even right above the exhaust stack is three orders of magnitude
below the detection limit of DIAL because UF6 is quickly converted into UF202 and HF prior to
release (inside the building) or within minutes after the release from facilities.
B. Detection through Satellite Imagery
Satellite imagery is very limited in its capability to detect a GCEP because the features of GCEP (small
size, no requirements for cooling towers and high-energy efficiency), make it hard to detect by either
optical or thermal imageries.630 0.5 to 1 meter spatial resolution of optical imagery can detect
infrastructural features of any building. However, a GCEP does not have characteristic features. Thus,
even if optical imagery detects a suspicious GCEP, it is unlikely that the imagery can prove whether the
facility is a GCEP or not. Zhang (2004) analyzed a small GCEP operated by Pakistan at Kahuta. Zhang
estimated that the detection of the facility requires a TIR system that has 20-meter thermal resolution
and 0.1*K accuracy. This is beyond current commercial satellite capability.631 The gap in the detection
of GCEPs might be bridged if an environmental sampling method is used is in conjunction with
* ,,632imagery.
11.5.3 Evaluation of Direct Detection Technology
Direct detection of a clandestine GCEP using currently available technology does not seem to be
possible. Among the four technologies, only spatial resolution of VNIR imagery has reached the desired
performance level. Figure 11.4 summarizes the description of different technology levels for detecting
clandestine GCEPs. However, TIR is not applicable to the detection of a clandestine GCEP because its
spatial resolution still falls short of the desired goal, whereas thermal sensitivity has sufficient capability.
Moreover, significant technological advancement in TIR imagery is not expected to be made within the
near future. DIAL may possibly be deployed for detection of hydrogen fluoride (HF) emanated from
GCEPs, but only within a short range of several km.
630 Adam Bernstein, "Monitoring Large Enrichment Plants Using Thermal Imagery from Commercial Satellites: A
Case Study," Science and Global Security 9, no. 2 (2001)., pp. 143-163.
631 The most recent commercial satellite, Landsat 7 of the US launched in 1999, has 60-meter thermal resolution
and about 0.5 to 1 Kelvin degree accuracy. Zhang, "Report: Uses of Commercial Satellite Imagery.", pp.120-135.
632Intemational Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), "Global Fissile Material Report 2007: Second Report of the
International Panel on Fissile Materials." , pp. 101.
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Technological Advancement
Military Satellites
(U.S. KH-13 of
1999)
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Level 2
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WorldView-1 IKONOS
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Level I
[Zhang(2000)]
(a) Spatial Resolution of Panchromatic VNIR Imagery
AVHRR/3
-- - - - - - - -*
<0.1K
Level 3
0.1 K
Level I
[Zhang(2000)]
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(b) Thermal Sensitivity of TIR imagery
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[Zhang (2000)]
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Level 3
(c) Spatial Resolution of TIR Imagery
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Figure 11.4 Gaps in Technological Levels for Detecting GCEP Using Satellite Imagery
and DIAL
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11.6 Indirect Detection of Clandestine GCEPs
11.6.1 Detection of Nuclear Facility Construction
The construction of nuclear material production facilities requires activities, such as the shipment of
heavy components, and construction work for a considerable period of time. Satellite imagery can
provide sufficient capability to detect these activities. Direct detection of clandestine facility
construction is very limited and satellite imagery is the only available option. Zhang (2001) estimated
that commercial satellites with several days' revisit time and one-meter resolution could detect
construction activities of nuclear facilities. 6 3 However, it may not be feasible for satellite to detect
construction activities in the case of small-size or underground facilities.
Nuclear export control measures such as Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) and Multilateral
Export Control Regimes (MECRs) can complement detection capabilities by satellite imagery. Careful
analysis of information about the trade of sensitive Dual-Use Items (DUIs) can be a good indicator for
detecting a nuclear weapons program. In the case of the construction of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment
Plants (GCEPs), those items include electrical-frequency converters, high-purity cobalt powder for
magnetic-top bearing assemblies, high-strength aluminum tubes, and a special grade of steel for rotors,
caps, and rotor bearings. Trade information regarding these items by a specific state can be taken as
limited evidence for constructing GCEPs.634
11.6.2 UCF Operation Detection
It is easier to detect Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCFs) than GCEPs because UCFs release more
uranium-containing particles as shown in Table 11.6. The amount of UF6 that can leak out of a UCF is
much more than that which would leak out of a GCEP. UCFs typically release more UF6 to the
atmosphere than GCEPs per unit of throughput because the uranium conversion process occurs at
atmospheric pressure, whereas GCEPs operate far below atmospheric pressures. This difference results
in a higher probability of detecting UCFs than GCEPs.
633 Zhang, "IAEA-SM-367/16/01".
634 International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) observed hundreds of such converters would be required for a
production-scale enrichment facility equipped with enough centrifuges to make weapons-grade enriched uranium.
Selig S. Harrison, "Did North Korea Cheat?," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2005).
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Table 11.6 Estimated Uranium Releases from Reference Nuclear Facilities 635
Type of facility Maximal (kg/year) Central (kg/year) Minimal (kg/year)
Uranium Conversion
10 5 0.2
Facility
Gaseous Diffusion
7 4 0.04
Plant
Gas Centrifuge 2 1 0.01
Enrichment Plant
Note: A reference facility is defined as the facility that produces 25 kg of HEU per year.
11.7 Summary
The current status of safeguarders' technological capabilities for detecting clandestine nuclear facilities
focusing on a GCEP was reviewed. Four types of technologies are available for detecting a clandestine
GCEP in which inspectors have no access. They are satellite imagery, ESWA, LIDAR, and DIAL. The
current level of these technologies seems to be far from the desired performance level because it
scarcely releases environmental signatures. It is concluded that among the various types of nuclear
facilities, a clandestine GCEP poses the most challenging threat.
There may be several alternative ways to overcome these difficulties. First, all types of
information should be fused to raise the probability of detecting clandestine nuclear facilities. Second,
satellite Imagery of TIR and VNIR has proven to be effective in locating and characterizing some types
of nuclear facilities as well as in monitoring daily activities such as construction and transportation, if
this information is accumulated over a long duration. Finally, detecting supporting/auxiliary facilities
such as Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCFs) may be helpful in detecting a clandestine GCEP.
635 Bbsenberg and Kalinowski, "Detecting Atmospheric UF6 and HF as Indicators for Uranium Enrichment." cited
from D. Albright and L. Barbour, "Source Terms for Uranium Enrichment Plants, Institute for Science and
International Security, Compiled for the U.S. Support Program to the IAEA," (Aug. 1997).. This paper remains
the only one reference with extensive investigation on uranium releases from GCEPs; A modern UCF that
produces enough weapon-grade uranium for making one nuclear explosive device is estimated to release about 20
grams of the 6 tons or so of natural uranium in the UF6 feed. International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM),
"Global Fissile Material Report 2007: Second Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials."p.1 16.
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CHAPTER 12 A PROLIFERATOR'S STRATEGY FOR HEU
PRODUCTION: PART I
12.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes possible ways for a proliferator to establish a uranium enrichment program
through a Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP). Most studies on proliferation risk of a GCEP do
not provide holistic overview of (a) how a GCEP can be built, regardless of whether they are declared
or clandestine, or (b) how uranium can be obtained. In this regard, a flow chart that describes a possible
process for completing the production of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) was developed. A
proliferator's plan for the production of HEU is analyzed according to this flow chart.
This chapter is composed of three parts: i) ways to acquire nuclear elements required for a
GCEP program either through transfer or trade, ii) ways to construct a GCEP, and iii) ways to provide
uranium feed to a GCEP for producing HEU. For the systematic analysis of the proliferator's strategy to
acquire nuclear material, it is important to assess the legitimacy of the methods used in obtaining this
material. Such information is necessary if one wants to research improvements to the system of
Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRs), which were reviewed in chapter 5. Although the
discussion is focused on a GCEP, the approach would be applicable to other types of nuclear
facilities.636
12.2 A Proliferators' Strategy to Prepare a GCEP for Producing HEU
Once a proliferator decides to produce HEU at a GCEP, the proliferator will set up an appropriate plan
and try to make the best use of domestic resources and external assistance. As we can see in the cases of
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, proliferators will carefully study the weaknesses of the contemporary non-
proliferation regime prior to the initiation of any plan. Based on the analysis of possible ways of
acquiring the necessary nuclear elements, a strategy to set up a GCEP for producing HEU can be
developed, Figure 12.1.
6 36E.A. Hakkila et al., The Safeguards Options Study. p.89.
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Figure 12.1 Flow Chart of the Process to Prepare for the Production of HEU
Figure 12.1 shows the overall preparation process for the production of HEU. A proliferator may first
look at the possibility of constructing a GCEP under IAEA safeguards. If a construction plan is agreed
by the IAEA, the proliferator could build a declared GCEP. Otherwise, a proliferator has no choice but
to build a GCEP clandestinely. In this case, proliferators must set up a strategy to acquire technology,
equipment and nuclear material that can evade safeguards measures of the NPT regime.
12.3 Declared GCEP Construction
12.3.1 A Political Plan for Building a Declared GCEP
In order to construct a declared GCEP, a proliferator should have a plan that includes both legal and
technological perspectives. Provided a proliferator possesses either technology or foreign technological
assistance, the question may arise whether it would be possible for proliferators to build a declared
GCEP. From a legal perspective, three points should be considered when answering this question. First,
it remains unclear whether Article IV of the NPT allows the construction of a GCEP. 637 The
637 This ambiguity adds the ambiguity problem of "the inalienable right" in Article IV coupled with "in
conformity with Articles I and II Zhang, "The Riddle of Inalienable Right in Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-
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international community generally interprets that sensitive nuclear facilities including a GCEP should
not be constructed.638 Second, a state may have bilateral or multilateral agreements signed when
receiving nuclear technology from other states for the first time. For example, South Korea is not
allowed to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium without agreement with the United States in
advance. 639 Third, in theory, any state subject to only INFCIRC/153-type subsidiary safeguards may
build a new nuclear facility and must provide information about the facility to the IAEA 180 days
before construction of a new facility can commence.
The proliferator should develop a rationale for claiming the GCEP as an exercise of one's
inalienable rights and obtain international support for constructing the facility as part of a nuclear fuel
cycle intended for peaceful purposes as described under Article IV of the NPT." Those may include
the possession of a large amount of uranium reserve and a reasonably large capacity of nuclear facilities
that requires enriched uranium. A potential proliferator may justify his GCEPs as a means of avoiding
permanent reliance on foreign-supplied fuel for domestic needs."41 This is particularly challenging to the
NPT regime because the construction of those facilities can be used as a disguise to acquire a potential
nuclear weapon capability.642
12.3.2 A Technological Plan for Building A Declared GCEP
Once an agreement with the IAEA is reached for a GCEP, the next step is to acquire technology and
equipment for constructing and operating the facility. Proliferators should have a technology transfer
contract in place with states that have the necessary technology. Those states possessing this technology
are presented in Table 12.1. Such a contract is necessary because even though theoretical information
and sources with the knowledge to build these facilities have become easily accessible, the construction
of GCEPs remains difficult. According to INFCE's report (1980), eight hundred dollars are needed per
SWU/yr for GCEP and lead times vary between 1.5 years and 7 years." 3 Table 12.2 lists the
requirements to build a GCEP.
Proliferation of the Nuclear Weapons: Intentional Ambiguity.",pp.647-662; and Zarate, "The NPT, IAEA
Safeguards and Peaceful Nuclear Energy: An "Inalienable Right," but Precisely to What?."
638 It is a general notion that even a state with no present intention to acquire nuclear weapons builds a peaceful
nuclear industry in anticipation of potential military benefits. In other words, if a situation forces or allows them to
acquire peaceful nuclear technology, they can eventually "go-nuclear" much easier.
639 Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Republic of Korea Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy (Feb.3, 1956). (Revised in 1973)
640 Japan did not have a problem with constructing its enrichment facilities, whereas Brazil had suffered from the
international community.
641 Iran has built its GCEPs by claiming that it has the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as
prescribed in the NPT; however, they are facing significant opposition from the international community for their
highly-likely diversion to military purposes.
642 For discussion on the establishment of internationally-accepted norm against the proliferation of uranium
enrichment technology see Babur Habib et al., "Stemming the Spread of Enrichment Technology," (Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2006).
643 IAEA, Enrichment Availability: Report of INFCE Working Group 2 (Vienna, Austria: IAEA, 1980)., p. 10
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Table 12.1 Holders of Nuclear Fuel Cycle related Technology or Facilities
Facility type Holders
-Gaseous Diffusion: China, France, and the U.S.
U Enrichment -Gas Centrifuge: 12 countries and 17 plants
Facilities Brazil, China(2), France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan(2), Netherlands,
Pakistan, Russia(4), U.K., U.S.
Pu Reprocessing France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, and perhaps India, (Pakistan.645
Facilities"44 North Korea)
Table 12.2 Components for GCEP Construction [Albright and Hinderstein (2004)]646
Phase Components
Project design -Plant construction
-Flat land with low seismicity
Site selection -Good means of transport
-Availability of water and electrical power supply
Purchase -Turn-key products
Centrifuge -Centrifuge designs
acquisition Manufacture -Manufacturing equipment
-Centrifuge manufacturing technology (manual)
Cascade configuration -Design of optimal cascade configuration
-Technical know-how for connecting centrifuges
12.4 Constructing Clandestine GCEPs
12.4.1 A Political Plan for Building a Clandestine GCEP
Proliferators may try to build clandestine facilities due to the challenges of persuading the international
community to accept their rationales for having GCEPs. For proliferators, this is a more preferable
option than to build a facility under safeguards. There exist two barriers in acquiring technology and
equipment in building clandestine GCEPs. First, pre-existing technology holders do not share
technology because it is an industrial secret. Second, pre-existing technology holders are subject to
MECRs that prohibit the distribution of sensitive technology to states. However, recently, favorable
conditions have been created for proliferators concerning the acquisition of technology and equipment
because of (a) the technological advancement and diffusion of dual-use technologies and (b) the
emergence of nuclear black markets. These factors significantly increased the possibility of acquiring
technology and equipment required for building GCEPs.
644For more information, see Frans Berkhout, "The International Civilian Reprocessing Business " Energy and
Security, no. 2 (Jan 1997).
645 Andrew Koch and Jennifer Topping, "Pakistan's Nuclear-Related Facilities," The Nonproliferation Review 4,
no. 3 (1997).
646 Albright and Hinderstein, "Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: World toward Closing Gaps in the
International Nonproliferation Regime".
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12.4.2 A Technological Plan for Building a Clandestine GCEP
In the construction of a clandestine GCEP, several factors should be considered carefully. First, the
construction of a clandestine GCEP should not be detected by verification resources of the NPT regime.
Second, the facility should preferably be protected from possible military air assaults. Third, the facility
should be located where the construction can be kept secret to the public even within the state. However,
it has become more difficult to build nuclear facilities in secret as the transparency of government
policy increases. Zhang (2001) suggests three possible site selection scenarios for constructing
clandestine nuclear facilities : 647
e Build the facility amid a major industrial site
A small GCEP can be built in almost any large industrial building anywhere, including a
metropolitan area like a fuel fabrication plant in Canada
- Build the facility within or near declared sites
A small GCEP can be associated with a plant that uses HF or other fluorinated chemicals, thus
hiding the potential HF emissions within the background HF already being released. One such
example is a manufacturer of fluorinated hydrocarbons
- Build the nuclear facilities underground
Iran's GCEPs at Natanz and Qom, both of which are subterranean.
All of these scenarios may help clandestine facilities avoid possible detection from the NPT regime as
well as military strikes by the international community, if any. However, building a clandestine facility
in urban areas may involve technological difficulties. Thus, most proliferators try to build facilities far
from urban areas. Another challenge associated with clandestine facilities is cost. Moving heavy
equipment in adverse weather conditions in order to avoid satellite imagery detection will cost
proliferators additional resources and time. 648 Therefore, the overall cost of a clandestine facility is
likely to be higher than that of a declared facility.
12.4.3 Other Considerations
Another consideration is the past experience a proliferator has building GCEPs. If a proliferator is
already associated with the construction of a declared facility, then this experience can easily be applied
647 Zhang, "IAEA-SM-367/16/01".
648 Israel's reprocessing plant at the "Dimona nuclear complex"; the Russian plutonium production facility at
"Krasnoyarsk-26" (inside a granite mountain on the side of the Yenisey river); and Iranian Gas Centrifuge
Uranium Enrichment Plants at Natanz and at Qom.
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to the construction of a clandestine site.649 In addition, gas centrifuges in declared GCEPs can be
diverted to clandestine ones by claiming that they are broken or destroyed. This option may constitute
another proliferation scenario for producing HEU.
The possession of auxiliary or supporting facilities, including gas centrifuge machine
manufacturing facilities and Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCF), provides the flexibility to execute
any type of proliferation scenario. These facilities significantly save resources for producing HEU
clandestinely. In particular, the possession of UCFs allows the proliferation state to convert any form of
uranium into UF 6 , a chemical used as feed for GCEPs.
12.5 Elements for Building GCEPs
In order to better understand what is required for the preparation of HEU production at GCEPs, it is
necessary to categorize the components that constitute a nuclear program. It is not easy to distinguish
the different terminology used in the NPT regime. For this study, these components are classified as (i)
nuclear or nuclear-related material, (ii) nuclear or nuclear-related dual-use equipment, and (iii) nuclear
or dual-use technology.
While nuclear or nuclear-related material can be clearly defined, the differentiation between
equipment and technology is not as clear. Nuclear technology broadly refers to all components required
for a nuclear program. In the IAEA, the definition of "nuclear technology" was first developed in
1978.650 This was a direct result of neither the NPT Article 111.2 nor the Zangger Committee list
(INFCIRC/209) directly mentioning technology transfer. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) began to
evaluate the need to control intangible technology as a result of its 1999 Plenary Meeting. Only
Especially-Designed or Prepared equipment and components (EDPs) of the Zangger Committee (ZC)
and Dual-Use Items (DUIs) of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) are defined as equipment in the
present study. Table 12.3 shows the definition for these three elements.
649 Albright and Shire, "A Witches' Brew? Evaluating Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Progress," review of Reviewed
Item, no.
650 IAEA, Communication Received from Certain Member States regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear
Material, Equipment and Technology, INFCIRC/254/Part.2, (Austria: IAEA, Feb. 1978)
286
Table 12.3 Definition of Nuclear Elements
Element Description Reference
Technical data in physical form designated by the supplying
country as important to the design, construction, operation, or
maintenance of enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water production
facilities or major critical components thereof, but excluding data IAEA (1978) [a]
available to the public, for example, in published books and
Technology periodicals or that which has been made available internationally
without restrictions upon its further dissemination.
Specific information required for the "development", "production",
or "use" of any item contained in the Trigger list. This information IAEA (1992) [b]
may take the form of "technical data,"6s1or "technical assistance."
Equipment Devices and components for constructing and operating nuclear NPT Art. 111.2
facilities. Turn-key products are also included.
Source material and special fissionable material: nuclear material NPT Art. 111.2
Material
Nuclear material and radioactive material IAEA ITDB C
Notes
[a] INFCIRC/254 (Feb. 1978)
[b] INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 2 (July 1992)
[c] ITDB stands for Illicit Trafficking Database.
12.6 Transfer of Nuclear Components between States
Given the complexity of nuclear weapons-related technology, potential proliferators will try to obtain
foreign assistance to expedite their nuclear weapons programs. This is because foreign assistance is the
most common way of obtaining a nuclear program at the initial stage of technology development.
Currently, there exist two ways of developing a state's technology through foreign assistance. These are
technology transfer and technology acquisition. The distinction between the two methods is based on
the degree of participation of those developing and receiving the technology, respectively:
-Technology transfer - those receiving the technology rely solely on the source of the imported
technologies
-Technology acquisition - those receiving the technology are actively engaged; search for
technological solutions; and install, test and commission technologies, working with international
suppliers as partners 65 2
651 Institute for Science and International Study (ISIS), E-Book Glossary.
< http://www.exportcontrols.org/glossarv.html>. Technical data may take forms such as blueprints, plans,
diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or
recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, or read-only memories. Technical assistance by foreign
experts is important to every step of developing a nuclear weapons program. It can not only make the programs
successful, but can also shorten the time required to complete the programs. Even if would-be proliferators were to
acquire facilities and material, it would not be easy to operate or to divert facilities into military purposes without
a significant amount of experience accumulated for a long time.
287
Koblentz (2005) reviewed the question of why and how states and non-state parties share
nuclear weapons technology. He suggests a variety of ways for proliferators to obtain nuclear
technology from others as summarized in Table 12.4.653 According to his definition, nuclear sharing or
cooperation and provision fall into the category of nuclear transfer.
Table 12.4 Various Ways for Nuclear Technology Diffusion [Koblentz (2005)]
Paths Description Cases
Nuclear The knowing and willful transfer of United States to United Kingdom
1 Sharing or nuclear weapons-related technology to (1943-1946)
cooperation a non-nuclear actor Pakistan to Libya (1997-2003) [a]
Canada's supply of the CIRUS
The provision of civilian nuclear
2 Provision research reactor to India in the
technology for peaceful purposes19s
1960s
Sales of nuclear technology by private German firms and individuals to the
3 Sales entities without the knowledge of their
Iraqi program in the 1980s
host government
The theft of nuclear technology by a The Soviet Union's espionage
4 Theft
state during the 1940s
Nuclear The illicit procurement and smuggling Pakistan's A. Q. Khan network
trafficking of nuclear technology since the 1970s 654
High-Tech Exchange for complementary North Korea and Pakistan
6 Bartering bIb technology acquisition Israel and South Africa
Notes
[a] Koblentz suggests a total of eleven cases of nuclear cooperation.
[b] Complementary cooperation
Historically, almost all countries have acquired nuclear technology with foreign assistance in the form
of transfer or trade, 5 although many states claim otherwise.656 Whatever the purpose of nuclear
652 Marcelle, Policy Briefs, Technology Acquisition and Domestic Learning. He also explains two models for
acquiring technology: a linear model and a nonlinear model. For more discussion on the acquisition of new
technologies, see Annette L. Ranft and Michael D. Lord, "Acquiring New Technologies and Capabilities: A
Grounded Model of Acquisition Implementation," Organizational Science 13, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2002)., pp.4 2 0 -4 4 1.
653 Gregory D. Koblentz, "The Politics of Nuclear Cooperation: Why States Share Nuclear Weapons
Technology?" (paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sep.
1-4 2005).
654 Albright and Hinderstein, "Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: World toward Closing Gaps in the
International Nonproliferation Regime".
655 The author distinguishes transfer from trade in that trade is the activity of exchanges items in anticipation of
rewards. Otherwise, transfer does not necessarily require the exchange such as assistance or cooperation.
656 Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express : A Political History of the Bomb and Its
Proliferation (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009).
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technology transfer, it can save proliferators many years and millions of dollars.657 For this reason, all
recent proliferators developed their nuclear weapons programs in cooperation with other states or via
the black market. The transfer of nuclear elements would allow states with minimal nuclear
infrastructure to become nuclear-armed states.
The cases of Iran and Libya demonstrate the effectiveness of developing nuclear weapons
technology with foreign assistance. Iran failed to develop a nuclear weapons program after several
decades of trying, but was able to establish a uranium enrichment program within a decade after illicitly
purchasing gas centrifuge enrichment technology from Pakistan. Libya successfully assembled a
laboratory-scale uranium enrichment plant through the nuclear black market network in five years. This
success followed twenty years of failed attempts to do so on their own. Before their program was
revealed, Libya had purchased 10,000 maraging steel centrifuges, sufficient to produce as many as ten
bombs in a year in the form of turn-key products.
12.7 Trade of Nuclear Elements
12.7.1 Definition of Illicitness for International Trade
In order to establish an approach to analyze how proliferators access nuclear elements and how
safeguarders could control this access, possible ways of trading nuclear elements should be discussed
from a legal perspective. Criteria to determine the legality of nuclear trade may include UNSC
resolutions, the NPT, IAEA safeguards, and domestic legislation of the concerned parties.658 There exist
legal disputes about the definition of "licit or lawful trade" among international law scholars, usually
the point at which international treaties become legally effective. Andrew Prosser (2004)659 defines the
concept of illicit nuclear trafficking as follows:
(i) the diversion, purchase, sale or transfer of nuclear or radioactive material or
nuclear weapons-usable equipment in violation of local, national, or international
law, including UNSC 1540 (2004) and the NPT and
(ii) trafficking incidents where there is reason to believe that trafficked items could
be destined for weapons end-use, even where such trafficking does not violate any
law.
In the present study, Prosser's (2004) definition is used to define the illicitness of nuclear elements
acquisition. Various terms are used to describe illicit trade activities as shown in Table 12.5. Only
657 Koblentz, "The Politics of Nuclear Cooperation: Why States Share Nuclear Weapons Technology?"
658 It is noteworthy that the NPT and UNSC resolutions based on United Nations Charter Chapter VII were
empowered to have legal authorities as international treaties. In general, intemational treaties will not legally
effective until signatories reflect provisions of treaties into their legislative system. Hanson, Legal Method &
Reasoning.
659 Andrew Prosser, Nuclear Trafficking Routes: Dangerous Trends in Southern Asia (Center for Defense
Information, Nov. 22 2004 Feb. 1]); available from http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/TraffickingSmuggling.pdf.
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Prosser (2004) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2008) distinguish illicit trade
for different components: material, equipment, and technology.
Table 12.5 Definitions of Terminology for Illicit Trade
Reference Equipment and technology Material
IAEA ITDB (1995)"6 - Illicit trafficking
CNS - Nuclear trafficking
IAEA (2007) 661 - Nuclear smuggling
CISAC 662 - Nuclear smuggling
Illicit nuclear trafficking in Illicit nuclear trafficking in nuclear
equipment and technology material (nuclear smuggling) [b]
IISS [20081 Illicit trade Nuclear trafficking
Notes
[a] James Martin Center for Nonproliferation at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (CNS) and Center
for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University (CISAC)
[b] The term "nuclear smuggling" is confined to the description of the trafficking of material (either nuclear or
radioactive).
Unlike Prosser, the IISS uses 'nuclear trafficking' to refer to activities involving materials and
'illicit trade' to describe activities involving nuclear technology and equipment, when discussing
nuclear black market activity. 663
12.7.2 Classification of Nuclear Trade
Ways to purchase or acquire nuclear elements can be classified into the following three cases: (a) licit
interstate trade, (b) illicit interstate trade, and (c) illicit trade via nuclear black markets.
Case #1: Licit Interstate Trade
The definition of licit trade between states tends to vary. Generally, in any international market, trade is
considered licit as long as interstate trade does not violate domestic legislation of both parties or any
international treaties. When referring to the trade of nuclear elements in the NPT regime, trade can be
defined as licit as long as it is conducted under IAEA safeguards. Therefore, NPT non-member states
660IAEA, "ITDB Fact Sheet: IAEA Information System on Illicit Trafficking and Other Unauthorized Activities
Involving Nuclear and Radioactive Materials," (IAEA, 2007). Established in 1995, the ITDB is the IAEA's
information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear
and radioactive materials.
661 IAEA, "Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material," in Nuclear Security Series
No.6 (2007).
662 Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO) But, access is restricted.
663 John Chipman, Press Statement on ISS Strategic Dossier, "Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan and
the Rise of Proliferation Networks - a Net Assessment" (2007 [cited Dec. 11 2008]); available from
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategicdossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-press-statement/.
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can export their nuclear elements to proliferators without applying for Article III of the NPT.
Furthermore, trade activities involving NPT non-members are not defined as illicit activities according
to the norm of international law since non-member states are actually in violation of neither an
international treaty nor a domestic law.
Case #2: Illicit Interstate Trade
If NPT member states are involved in any trade with no safeguards applications such as nuclear
technology bartering, it can be defined as illicit interstate nuclear trade.664 Even member states that have
good reputations are occasionally tempted to export sensitive items to other states for economic or
political profit.
Case #3: Illicit Trade via Nuclear Black Markets
A "black market" refers to a market in which certain goods or services are routinely traded in a manner
contrary to the laws or regulations of the government in power. The IISS defines nuclear black market
as "the trade in nuclear-related expertise, technologies, components or material that is being pursued for
non-peaceful purposes and most often by covert or secretive means." The NPT regime should pay the
closest attention to nuclear black market networks because they are very hard to detect and operate very
efficiently. The emergence of a multinational illicit network, so-called A. Q. Khan network, has
seriously threatened the current nonproliferation regime.
Illicit trade via nuclear black markets can take place between a state and small groups or even
individuals. Once an illicit procurement channel is established, it enables the proliferators to penetrate
even embargos.6 s In general, it is difficult to define illicit interstate trade as explicitly 'illegal' if the
proliferators thoroughly exploit loopholes in Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRs) and
national export control systems either at government or company levels.
12.8 Tactics for Acquiring Undeclared Uranium Feed
12.8.1. Material Flow
Uranium exists in various physical/chemical forms and in a range of enrichment ratios. A proliferator
will decide what chemical forms and in what quantity uranium needs to be purchased. For example, the
illicit purchase of Non-UF6 [i.e., Uranium Ore Concentrate (UOC)], a form of NU, is much easier than
NUF6, LEU, and HEU to acquire for several reasons. First, the number of countries that can export
UOC is much higher than those that can export NUF6, LEU or HEU because countries that have
664 For more information see the website, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Illicit Nuclear
Trade Projects and Chronological Isis Reports on Illicit Nuclear Trade ([cited Nov. 11 2008]); available from
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/expcontrol/.
665 Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Iraq's Acquisition of Gas Centrifuge Technology Part II:
Recruitment of Karl Heinz Schaab.
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uranium enrichment and conversion capability are few, approximately twelve. Second, safeguards for
LEU- or HEU- containing facilities are stricter than those for uranium mining and milling facilities that
produce NU. If a proliferator does not have UCFs within the state, he should be able to acquire
undeclared uranium in the form of UF6. Otherwise, he cannot operate GCEPs.
Figure 12.2 shows a variety of ways to acquire uranium feed for producing HEU. The following
conclusions can be drawn from the figure:
- Existence of a black market and possession of uranium conversion facilities increases the degrees
of freedom in the acquisition of uranium material.
- It is obvious that the more complete a nuclear fuel cycle a proliferator has, the higher the
probability a proliferator can acquire weapons-usable material. In particular, the possession of
Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCFs) increases the degree of freedom in obtaining HEU for
proliferators.
Exporters Black Market Proliferators
--- -- -- -- - -- -- -
Uranium Mills Uranium Mills
(U308) (U308)
(Fab i ' UCF
P (UF) U
tb .(C
Pa(UO) , , (UF6)
Uranium Using FeFacilities DFabrication
PlatPlant (UO2)
... iii rnfr*Uranium Usin
FaFaciittie
II S
Ill-.~. icit transfer Uranium Using
- Licit transfer
Figure 12.2 Schematic of Possible Nuclear Material Flow
The right side of Figure 12.2 shows three possible ways to acquire HEU for nuclear weapons:
(a) direct purchase of HEU, (b) production of HEU from clandestine GCEPs, and (c) production of
HEU from declared GCEPs. Pathway (a) is feasible, but unlikely for two reasons. First, states require
continued recognized as de-facto nuclear weapon states. Second, it is very difficult to obtain Significant
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Quantities (SQs) of HEU through black markets. In other words, the possession of a few nuclear
weapons does not guarantee an effective exploitation of nuclear weapons tactics or strategy, such as a
second-strike capability. Thus only (b) and (c) are considered plausible options for HEU acquisition.
12.8.2 Illicit Acquisition of Material
There are generally three ways to acquire uranium in an illicit way: nuclear smuggling via nuclear black
markets, interstate trade or cooperation, and uranium mine development within the territory of nuclear
proliferation without an IAEA safeguard application. These scenarios are shown in Figure 12.3.
However, there are some situations where the illicitness of nuclear material-related activities cannot be
clearly defined.
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Table12.6 Nuclear Material Acquisition Paths Focused on Iran's Case
Interstate
contract
Bargain
Uranium co-
mining project -In 2002, Iran launched a uranium-mining project in Azerbaijan.
670
-In 2005, Iran tried to smuggle some U-238 by ship from Congo toSmuggling Bandar Abbas. 671
-Since 1988, Iran reportedly opened as many as 10 uranium mines,
including the Saghand uranium mine in Yazd province.
A. Nuclear Smuggling
It is important to understand that there is a high probability that some categories of nuclear material can
be potentially traded in nuclear black markets as reviewed in chapter 6. It is estimated that there is more
than 1,000 tons of reactor plutonium in spent fuel worldwide and 2,000 tons of HEU in weapon
stockpiles, civilian reactors, and military reactors on ships and submarines.672 A state that lacks control
of nuclear material and activities, the former Soviets Union for example, may risk becoming the target
of non-State actors that are involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology or in
clandestine nuclear-related activities.
Sources of nuclear materials traded illicitly can be smuggled from nuclear facilities by
government officials and workers. Table 12.7 shows some nuclear material trafficking incidents that
have occurred since the end of the Cold War. The type and quantity of illicitly-traded materials vary
significantly.
667 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Iran (Sep. 23 2003 [cited Aug. 28
2009]); available from http://www.nti.org/db/china/niranpos.htm.
668 Mark Lavie, Secret Israel Report: Venezuela, Bolivia Supplying Iran with Uranium for Its Nuclear Program
(The Huffington Post, May 25 2009 [cited June 25 2009]); available from
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/25/secret-israeli-report-ven_n_207405.html.
669 Jihad Watch, Iran Tried to Get Uranium by Arming Somalia (Jihad Watch, Nov.16 2006 [cited Jan. 5 2009]);
available from http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/014070.php.
670 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Research Library: Iran Mining Uranium in Azerbaijan, Baku Newspaper
Reports (2002 [cited Feb. 5 2009]); available from http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2002/20020210.htm.
671 But this was foiled by Tanzanian customs officials.
672 Garwin and Vadim, "Nuclear Weapon Development without Nuclear Testing?"
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Interstate
trade or
cooperation
Path Cases
-In the 1970s, Iran purchased yellowcake from South Africa.
-In 1991, China and Iran announced China's agreement to supply
Iran's first nuclear reactor, a 20 MW research reactor.667 China is
also widely acknowledged to have provided Iran with 400 kg of
uranium dioxide.
-In 1992, Russia and Iran made the inter-governmental agreements
for the Busher Reactor, which assured the supply of prefabricated
fuels.
-In 2009, Venezuela, and Bolivia are supplying Iran with
uranium.668
-In 2006, Iran tried to obtain uranium from Somalia in return for
669supplying weapons to the anarchic country's Islamist movement.
Table 12.7 Cases of Nuclear Smuggling [Zaitseva and Hand (2003)]
Time Supplier End-User Intercepted Type Quantity
_______place
Not
1992 Russia Military officers North Korea intercepted Pu N/A
Be 4.4 tons
1993 Russia Trading firms North Korea Lithuania
__________50% HEU 100 gram
A group of
1993 N/A smugglers and Iran Turkey NU 2.5 kgIranian Secret
Service Agents
1994 N/A Adolf Jaekle Iraq Germany WGPu 6.2 g
2000 N/A Three individuals Iran Kazakhstan LEU fuel 4 kg
_____I I___ _ I__ _ __ _ _ _ I__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ pellets
B. Interstate Trade of Material
Several pathways may be identified where proliferators can acquire nuclear material through long-term
weaknesses in IAEA safeguards. In particular, the international transfer of nuclear material before the
starting point of safeguarding is highly subject to remain undeclared to the IAEA. Many UOC-
producers or potential producers, such as African countries, do not have effective national control of
uranium production and export.7 Possible weaknesses of the IAEA are identified in Tables 12.8 and
12.9 and show the current status of safeguard application for four different types of uranium materials
considered in the study.
Table 12.8 Safeguards Application for Uranium Material for Domestic Use
Concentration Conversion Enrichment Fuel fabrication
Category Plant (U308) Plant (UF6) 6741 Plant (UF ) Plant (UO2)
UOC -Not subject to CSA
(yellow [Para 34 (a), (b)] [b]
_cakeff -v Sub'ect to AP
NUF6
LEUF6
Notes
[a] UOC (Uranium Concentrated Oxide), which is produced by refining uranium ore from uranium mines
[b] If the material is present in quantities exceeding 10 MTU. The provision of this information does not require
detailed NMA [Article 2 (vi)(a)].
[c] Only for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEP) and Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs)
673 The IAEA and various governments are conducing outreach/capacity building for NU producers to help
establish effective national control of uranium production and export.
674 According to IAEA Policy 18 (2003)The starting point of safeguards was changed from the output of the
conversion plant to no later than the first point in the conversion process at which the material meeting paragraph
34 (c) of CSA leaves the process state in which it is produced. Any purified aqueous uranium solution or any
purified uranium oxide to be considered to be declared. However, the application of safeguards procedures may
not be practical or economical. In such cases, therefore, the procedures should be applied at the first practicable
point earlier (i.e., "upstream") in the plant. In some of these cases, the first practicable point might be the UOC
input at the beginning of conversion process. For more information, see Owen, "Implementation of IAEA Policy
Paper 18 in Canada, IAEA-CN-148/39".
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Table 12.9 Safeguards Application for Nuclear Material for Trade
Case Description Reference
-Under the CSA, a uranium supplier does not need to notify the
IAEA of any source material containing uranium or thorium
No control over which has not yet reached the composition and purity suitable Sa
international for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, if it is
transfer of UOC for non-nuclear use*[bJ
a] -The AP requires information regarding the international
transfer of source material in quantities exceeding 10 metric
tons of uranium though it is for non-nuclear use.c[
Under CSA, a state should provide early notification of
Non-application material transfers to the IAEA in two cases. [d]
(1) Nuclear material in an amount exceeding one effective CSA
nofea kilogram or [Paragraphs
notiicatn (2) Successive shipments to the same state within a period of 91-96]
three months each of less than one effective kg but exceeding
in total one effective kg.675
Notes
[a] Uranium Ore Concentrate (UOC) is nuclear materials before the starting point of safeguards
[b] AP Art. 2 a. (vi)(b) requests a state to report source material for non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding
10 metric tons of uranium and 20 metric tons of thorium even if it is for specifically non-nuclear purposes.
[c] Information shall be provided to the IAEA, upon the request by the IAEA.
[d] Otherwise, notification of international transfer would be made annually.
Though the IAEA recognizes these weaknesses, there are currently no inspection procedures
for detecting the international transfer of Uranium Ore Concentrates (UOC). This is because it is highly
likely that this material remains unprocessed which does not induce safeguards concern, though there is
a possibility that a proliferator can process undeclared UOC. Currently, the detection of UOC transfers
by the IAEA solely depends on reports provided by suppliers and receivers, analysis of open source
information, and provision of national intelligence information. However, under the AP, the IAEA can
carry out complementary access to UOC-producing facilities.676
C. Uranium Mine Development within the Proliferation State
Article 2. a (v) of the Additional Protocol (AP) requests states to report operational status and the
estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines. Therefore, uranium mine development without
reporting to the IAEA is in violation of the AP. However, countries not governed under the AP can
develop their uranium mines without violating safeguards. Iran and North Korea are good examples. In
675 An effective kilogram is a special unit used in the safeguarding of nuclear material as defined in paragraphs
104 of INFCIRC/153 and para.72 of INFCIRC/66. In addition, according to Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty,
notification is not required if the quantity does not exceed one effective kilogram during transfers of material
between states.
676 Personal communication with John Carlson, Nov.22, 2009 via e-mail.
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particular, North Korea is estimated to have a significant amount of uranium reserves. Thus, if North
Korea were to develop these reserves in full scale, it could pose a significant threat on the NPT regime.
12.9. Diversion of Uranium Feeds
Uranium can be provided to GCEPs through diversion from declared nuclear facilities. Figure 12.4
shows the overall schematic of how uranium can be diverted from a typical nuclear fuel cycle A. From
the figure, a path of uranium acquisition can be identified. For example, LEUF6 can be made in four
ways: (a) diverting LEUF6 product from a declared GCEP, (b) converting diverted LEU from nuclear
reactor facilities or LEU Fuel Fabrication Plants (FFPs), (c) converting illicitly acquired LEU, and (d)
acquiring LEUF6 directly through illicit trade.
Non-UF6
Declared material flow
(under safeguards)
Undeclared material flow
(not under safeguards)
Fuel
Fabrication Declared facility
Plants
Non-UF6 -
declared facility
Undeclared facIlity
LEU --- U Non-UF6-
UF6
'al UF6
NUF6 Declared
------------ + GCEPs
D ExdessProduct HEUF6
LEUF6 &-----------* 0Clandestine -
.......... GCEPs
Figure 12.4 Uranium Flow toward HEUF6 Production
Table 12.10 gives a brief description of nuclear facilities referenced in the present study. Referenced
UCF or GCEP facilities were selected based on available literature in order to take advantage of study
results.
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Table 12.10 Description of Referenced Facilities
Facility type Capacity for the Study Reference
Fuel fabrication The nominal capacity of 500 [MTU/yr] a Areva 677
plants (FFPs)
Nuclear reactors The total capacity of 1000 [MWe]
facilities (in consideration of Iran's Busher Reactor capacity)
Uranium
conversion facilities 100 MT of Yellow Cake/yr [bi Elayat et al.
(UCFs) (2004)671
GCEPs 500,000 kgSWU/yr LISSAT
modeling
Notes
[a] 400MTU/yr is the capacity of South Korean LWR Fuel Fabrication Plant. And 650MTU/yr is the capacity of
Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) Lingen, Germany
[b] Lingen has a capacity of 500 MTU/yr.
12.9.1 Diversion of Nuclear Material from Nuclear Reactor Facilities, FFPs, and UCFs
Nuclear material can be diverted from any type of nuclear facility, including rector facilities, FFPs, and
UCFs, located within a proliferation state [See Appendix H]. A proliferator can divert uranium
materials from declared nuclear facilities in three ways: diversion by biasing (data manipulation or
falsification), diversion in material unaccounted for (MUF), and diversion using dummies. At UCFs,
UF6 can be diverted easily at the cold traps, where the effluent stream of UF 6 is cooled to -10*C and
condensed from the hot effluent gases as it passes through. 679 At FFPs, either UF6 or fuels in U02 can
be diverted in the same way mentioned above.
12.9.2 Diversion of UF6 from GCEPs
As mentioned previously, there are three ways to divert UF 6 at declared GCEPs. These include (a)
excess production of LEUF6 with undeclared supplies, (b) diversion of already produced LEUF6, and
(c) diversion of NUF6 feed.
A. Excess Production of LEUF6 Using an Undeclared Uranium Supply
Excess LEUF6 can be produced without detection if proliferators can operate in off-design modes,
coupled with some manipulation of the operating record. The following methods can be implemented:
- Increasing operation time
677 http://www.areva-np.com/common/liblocal/docs/Brochure/Fuelsect eng def.pdf
678 H.A. Elayat et al., "Systems Analysis of Safeguards Effectiveness in a Uranium Conversion Facility". The
analysis was done mainly through evaluating MUF indicators with regard to the diversion of UF6 from a cold trap.
679 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Uranium Feedstock ([cited Feb. 11 2009]); available from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/u-feedstock.htm.
298
Proliferators can operate a GCEP for a longer time than declared, claiming the additional time
for maintenance activities.
- Incorporating modularized cascades
Proliferators can modularize undeclared gas centrifuge cascades within a declared facility.
Doing so would provide an additional capacity of centrifuges and allow centrifuge operation to
continue during non-inspection periods. The additional SWU capacity can be added by
replacing existing centrifuge machines with an advanced design of cascades.680
- Increasing production rate
Proliferators can operate the facility at an increased production rate at the expense of efficiency.
Excessively produced LEUF6 can be diverted and stockpiled for later purposes such as
production of HEU at clandestine GCEPs.
B. Diversion of LEUF6 Product from GCEPs
Normally-produced LEUF6 at declared GCEPs can be diverted if proliferators can utilize the
uncertainties of Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA) or employ fake tactics as follows:
- Diversion by biasing (Data manipulation)
HEU can be diverted either through undeclared operations at a declared facility or by modifying the
quantity of material in declared inventories. Diversion by data manipulation at uranium enrichment
facilities includes (i) overstating or understating weight values of shipped/received UF6 cylinders
recorded by the Load Cell Based Weighing System (LCBS); (ii) overstating or understating the purity
of UF6; (iii) overstating/understating isotopic assay of uranium (enrichment level); and (iv) removing
undeclared cylinders following an inspection announcement and prior to the subsequent access of IAEA
personnel to the UF6 feed and withdrawal area.
- Diversion in Material Unaccounted For (MUF)
MUF is a quality indicator of the control of nuclear materials, which is obtained by simply subtracting
"Book Inventory" from "Physical Inventory." The International Target Values (ITVs) provide standard
uncertainties for measurement of nuclear materials and thereby establishing reasonable values of
MUF.611 At GCEPs, a proliferator could divert LEU from the declared UEFs or other facilities under the
guise of material-unaccounted-for (MUF) by taking small amounts of material over a long period of
680E.A. Hakkila et al., The Safeguards Options Study. p.96.
681 H. Aigner et al., "International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear
Materials," ESARDA Bulletin 31 (2008). The ITVs reflect the current state of measurement capabilities attainable
for DA and NDA techniques in performing safeguards verification activities. The published ITVs are designed to
provide a reference of the quality of measurements in nuclear material accountancy.
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time (diversion by skimming). Skimming scenarios at GCEPs were reviewed using LISSAT. Possible
scenarios are summarized in Table 12.11.
Table 12.11 Possible Skimming Scenarios at GCEPs using LISSAT
Specification Elayat et al. (2006)682 Lambert et al. (2007)683
Capacity 500,000 kgSWU per year [
Cascade composition 50 cascades of 250 centrifuges each
Product uranium 3.5%
enrichment ratio
MUF 2% of the product
Diverted amount of U-235 2000 kg of LEU, containing 2300 kg of LEU, containing
using MUF 70kg of U-235 80 kg of U-235.
Note: [a] This is the capacity that can produce 115,000 kgU/yr in the form of UF6 enriched to 3.5% (MUF for the
product is around 1,000 kg).
-Use of Dummy Cylinders
A proliferator could replace feed cylinders with inactive dummies or with dummies which mimic the
material taken (such as borrowing equivalent material from another facility within the State).
C. Diversion of NUF6 Feed at GCEPs
NUF6 can be diverted at GCEPs in two ways. First, the nuclear material values can be falsified for a
larger number of cylinders. Credibly falsifying the enrichment or purity of NUF6 is not an easy task.
However, this problem can be circumvented by falsifying the gross-empty weights of cylinders returned
to the NU conversion facility, particularly if the facility is owned by the proliferator. For this to be
considered a profitable option, nearly every cylinder would have to be falsified to get 1 SQ. However,
the practice of falsifying cylinders has a fairly high probability of detection by the IAEA. A second
option is to divert the entire contents of feed cylinders (two NUF6 cylinders for 1 SQ). This is a more
successful option than the former since there is an increased likelihood that the IAEA will not select one
of two entirely-diverted cylinders. Considering that the IAEA's goal for detection of 1 SQ of diverted
NU is set to 50 percent, this particular strategy may be considered self-explanatory.
12.10 Conversion of Undeclared Uranium at Declared UCFs
The possession of UCFs significantly increases the flexibility of a proliferator's control over uranium
processing. The reason being, UCFs can convert uranium to any ratio of uranium enrichment. Any
682 For more information see H.A. Elayat, W.J. O'Conell, and B.D. Boyer, "Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant
Safeguards System Modeling" (paper presented at the 47th Annual Meeting for the INMM, Nashville, TN, July
16-20 2006).
683 H. Lambert et al., "LISSAT Analysis of a Generic Centrifuge Enrichment Plant" (paper presented at the
Proceedings of the 48th Annual Conference of the INMM, Tucson, AZ, 2007).
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material diverted from FFPs or nuclear reactor facilities must be processed at UCFs before being
introduced into GCEPs or nuclear warhead manufacturing. Without UCFs, undeclared, diverted non-
UF6 nuclear material must be processed in foreign territories. This restriction to process increases the
possibility of detecting proliferation activities. To avoid detection and for the reasons mentioned above,
UCFs require serious control from a safeguarders' point of view.
However, the question may arise as to whether or not LEU can be processed at a UCF designed
for the conversion of NU. The answer is yes. In order to do so, uranium concentrations would require
careful controlling during some steps of processing. Typically, the equipment in NU conversion
facilities is very large, depending on the throughput, since there are no restrictions on equipment size
from a fission criticality point of view. However, aqueous LEU in dissolution and solvent extraction
processes are highly subject to restrictions due to fission criticality concerns.684 Thus, some of the
aqueous processing vessels (dissolvers, solvent-extraction pulse columns, or solvent-extraction mixer-
settlers) at NU conversion plants may not be safe for processing LEU. However, the accidental
formation of a critical mass of LEU in equipment handling dry materials is extremely remote. Therefore,
the conversions of U02 to UF4 and UF4 to UF6 would not present a problem for processing Non-UF6
form of LEU in equipment sized for NU.
The additional conversion operation at declared UCFs follows a procedure similar to the excess
production of LEU at GCEPs as follows: (a) operate the facility for an additional time than originally
declared; (b) increase the product rate to higher than normal operation; and (c) use add-on capacity
within the facility.
12.11 Conclusion
A possible strategy for establishing a uranium enrichment program using a GCEP was reviewed in
terms of the construction of GCEPs and the preparation of uranium material through illicit acquisition
and/or diversion. These results will be used for the development of an integrated model in Chapter 14 of
this thesis. The importance of controlling the transfer or trade of nuclear elements required for uranium
enrichment was discussed. It would be more effective for the NPT regime to control the movement of
nuclear material rather than merely attempt to detect a clandestine GCEP after it has been constructed.
The latter option is very limiting from both a technical and political perspective.
684 Finis S. Patton, John M. Googin, and William L. Griffith, Enriched Uranium Processing (New York, NY:
Pegamon Press, 1963).. On page 156, Table 7 shows that for NU, the maximum safe cylinder diameter (relevant to
solvent-extraction pulse columns) and the maximum safe slab thickness (relevant to mixer-settler equipment) are
infinite. However, for 5% U-235, the maximum numbers are 10 inches and 5 inches, respectively.
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CHAPTER 13 A PROLIFERATOR'S STRATEGY FOR HEU
PRODUCTION: PART II
13.1 Introduction
This chapter develops several possible scenarios in which proliferators can produce HEU given that
GCEP, either declared or clandestine, and uranium material for feed are available as discussed in
Chapter 12. Once proliferators decide to produce HEU a coherent plan needs to be developed on how to
successfully accomplish their illicit activities. Furthermore, the plan should include measures that can
minimize costs in association with the international community's response.
There have been some good studies on possible proliferation scenarios for producing HEU
using GCEPs. However, those studies were limited to taking into consideration only a technical
perspective. Proliferation scenarios should be understood from both political and technical perspectives.
Developing scenarios that integrate these two perspectives is critical to both identifying weaknesses of
the current NPT regime and establishing effective strategies to deal with proliferation scenarios.
In general, proliferation scenarios for producing HEU are classified into three cases: (i) break-
out scenario at declared GCEPs, (ii) sneak-out scenario at clandestine GCEPs, and (iii) the concurrent
sneak-out scenario at both declared and clandestine GCEPs. Considering historic precedence, the focus
of analysis in this chapter is given to the break-out scenario. From a political perspective, a timeline for
executing the break-out scenario is developed and divided into aggressive and defensive scenarios.
From a technological perspective, a technical description about some ways to divert a declared LEU-
producing GCEP into a HEU-producing GCEP is analyzed. Finally, this chapter concludes by
comparing different sub-scenarios under the break-out scenario. The results provide insight into the
possible improvement of IAEA safeguards at GCEPs.
13.2 HEU Production Scenarios
Three scenarios for producing HEU by proliferators can be envisioned based on two types of GCEPs, a
clandestine and a declared GCEP. First, a country with an enrichment facility that can produce LEU in
substantial quantities can modify such a facility to produce HEU, but such modifications increase the
risk of detection. Second, a country may produce HEU using a clandestine, dedicated GCEP only. Third,
proliferators can concurrently use a declared facility and a small, clandestine facility. Figure 13.1 shows
three possible scenarios and Table 13.1 is a brief description for these scenarios.
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(both declared and clandestine GCEPs)
Undeclared Material
[*] Unsafeguarded LEUF6 can be provided to GCEPs if proliferators diverted Non-UF6
LEU from other nuclear facilities and converted them at a uranium conversion facility.
Figure 13.1 HEU Production Tactics and Nuclear Material Flow
Table 13.1 Three Scenarios to Produce HEU
Scenario Name685  Types of Facilities Used Process
(1) Material provision (both NUF6 and LEUF6)
-Illicit acquisition of undeclared material
Break-out Only declared GCEP -Material diversion from other nuclear facilities
-Material diversion within the GCEP
(2) Operation: off-design operation
(1) Material provision (both NUF6 and LEUF6)
Sneak-out Only clandestine GCEP -Illicit acquisition of undeclared material
-Material diversion from other nuclear facilities
(2) Operation: clandestine operation
(1) Material provision
Concurrent use of -LEU diversion from declared GCEPsConcurrent declared and clandestine (2) Operation: two steps
sneak-out GCEPs686  
-LEU production at declared GCEPs
-HEU production at clandestine GCEPs
685 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes : A Net Assessment,
IISS Strategic Dossier (London, UK: Routledge, 2005)., pp.53-57.686 Friend, "Urenco's Views on International Safeguards Inspection". URENCO sees this as unfeasible because to
produce undeclared LEU for nuclear weapons is too complicated compared to other scenarios.
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13.2.1 Scenario A: Break-out Scenario
Under the break-out scenario, proliferators produce HEU at a declared LEU-producing GCEP. The
break-out scenario involves both political and technological issues. The fundamental technological
question is whether a GCEP designed to produce LEU can be used for producing HEU. The facility can
be modified in such a way as to redirect SWUs from the production of relatively large quantities of
LEU to the production of much smaller quantities of HEU by diverting feed to a HEU-producing GCEP.
It is highly unlikely that a proliferator can produce HEU at a declared GCEP without being
detected by IAEA inspectors under IAEA safeguards, especially under HSP-type safeguards or the
Additional Protocol (AP). It is a general notion that proliferators assume their illicit activities will
eventually be detected and are willing to face opposition from the international community.
The IISS (2005) study details this scenario into "direct break-out" and "indirect break-out"
depending on the Uranium Enrichment Ratio (UER) of the feed used: a direct scenario uses LEU feed
and an indirect scenario uses NU feed.687 The use of LEU feed (LEUF6 ) can shorten the period required
to produce HEU significantly as compared to NU feed.
13.2.2 Scenario B: Sneak-Out Scenario
The sneak-out scenario is where proliferators use only clandestinely-built GCEPs to produce HEU in
the absence of any declared GCEPs within the countries. As reviewed in Chapter 12, the construction of
a declared GCEP is not generally accepted as possible in the current NPT regime.688 However, this
scenario may not be the only option, but may be attractive for countries that do not have a pre-existing
declared GCEP. With current detection technology, it is almost impossible to detect clandestine GCEPs
in a straightforward fashion, as reviewed in Chapter 11.
From proliferators' standpoint, the operation of a clandestine GCEP will be much more
expensive than the break-out scenario.689 Proliferators need measures to hide environmental signatures
associated with the operation of the facility. However, this scenario can be more economical than
Scenario A because sanctions from the international community will be avoided as long as a proliferator
is able to keep their actions hidden unless this facility is detected by safeguarders.
13.2.3 Scenario C: Concurrent Sneak-Out Scenario
The concurrent sneak-out scenario is where proliferators utilize both declared and clandestine GCEPs.
This scenario may be attractive in that the advantages of break-out and sneak-out scenarios can be
selectively adopted. In this case, a declared GCEP can be used for two purposes; i) a means to gain
6 8 7International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes : A Net Assessment.,
p.5 5 .
688 The construction of sensitive nuclear facilities is not generally allowed according to Article IV of the NPT.
However, the interpretation of the NPT article IV is under dispute.
689 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes : A Net Assessment.,
p.57.
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technology, equipment and material for building clandestine GCEP, and ii) as a cover for distracting the
attention of the international community from building clandestine GCEP.
The former scenario can proceed as follows: First, proliferators legally build and operate a
declared GCEP and show a good level of compliance with the IAEA safeguards. Second, proliferators
clandestinely build a small footprint of undeclared GCEP in order to produce HEU exclusively. This
will take shorter time than to build only a clandestine GCEP because proliferators could use experience
accumulated through the operation of a declared facility.
In the case of the second scenario, the construction of this clandestine GCEP does not need to
be sequential and can be in parallel with the declared facility. This can be made possible if proliferators
build a GCEP just focus the international community's attention on the declared construction operations
and away from the clandestine operations.
Some perceive this scenario is too complicated to be successful. 690 Friend (2007) argues that the
sneak-out scenario is much simpler and less detectable than this complicated scenario. Under this
scenario, proliferators can significantly reduce the time required to produce HEU because proliferators
can stockpile LEUF6 from the declared GCEPs.691 The recent case of a second Iranian GCEP in the city
of Qom can be categorized as this scenario.
13.3 Break-out Scenario From a Political Perspective
13.3.1 Legal Loopholes Favorable to Break-out Scenario
In this section, possible loopholes that can be exploited by proliferators through abrogating the NPT are
reviewed. Proliferators may join the NPT with the goal of obtaining nuclear technology important to
nuclear weapons program. Figure 13.2 and Table 13.2 describe important requirements concerning the
timeline of the NPT and IAEA safeguards.
690 Friend, "Urenco's Views on International Safeguards Inspection".
691 Albright and Shire, "A Witches' Brew? Evaluating Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Progress," review of Reviewed
Item, no. For a break-out scenario, approximately 700-800 kg of 4 per cent enriched LEU would be required to be
able to produce 20-25 kg of weapons-grade uranium.
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Figure 13.2 Important Requirements for Time in the NPT Regime
After proliferators have obtained relevant nuclear technology, they can withdraw from the NPT
by simply sending notification to the NPT and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). But, the
UNSC does not have the legal power to reject a withdrawal notification by abrogators. These create
several problems as follows: First, it is highly likely that the initiation of taking benefits from the NPT
begins upon the signing of the NPT by states, whereas states' legal responsibilities begin with the
conclusion of safeguards agreements between the IAEA and a state. Second, the requirement of
information provision about a new nuclear facility depends on the content of subsidiary arrangements
between the IAEA and a state. Third, even if states withdraw from the NPT, there seems to be no
provision to decommission already-built nuclear facilities or to destroy already-acquired resources.
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Table 13.2 Important Timeliness Regarding Nuclear Proliferation of Iran in the NPT Regime
Time Activity / Reference Duration Descriptioninformation
A Negotiation of 180 days - Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into
agreements with NPT 111-4 1 force of this Treaty.
B IAEA 18 months * Such agreements shall enter into force not later than 18 months after the date of initiation of
negotiations.
Design information INFCIRC/153 - Design information in respect of new facilities shall be provided within the time limits to be
on construction of a (1971) N/A specified in the subsidiary arrangement, and as early as possible before the introduction of
C-1 new facility: nuclear material. [Para 42. of INFCIRC/1 53]
Safeguards INFCIRC/214 N/A - INFCIRC/214 is based on INFCIRC/153 - Article 42 is as paragraph 42 noted above.
Agreement (1974) - Iran had not accepted the obligation of IAEA BOG's decision in 1992.
Subsidiary - The initial Subsidiary Arrangement of each state with the IAEA said by 180 days before the
Arrangements prior to 180 days introduction of nuclear material.
Design information IAEA BOG decision [b] - Iran's Subsidiary Arrangements contained this provision. (May 15, 1974)
on construction of a of December 1992
C-2 new facility: IAEA BOG decision As soon as -. The IAEA Board of Governors asked all states to provide information about the design of a
Subsidiary of December 1992 [a] new facility as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction was taken.[c]
Arrangements Revised Subsidiary - Iran concluded amended subsidiary arrangements in 2003, accepting the 1992 IAEA BOG's
Arrangements of Iran As soon as decision by an exchange of letters. [d]AranemntoIan- Iran unilaterally sought to revoke the amendment in 2007.692
D Withdrawal from the Article X of NPT 3 months - A member state to the NPT that wants to withdraw can withdraw from the NPT by notifying
NPT the Treaty and the UNSC three months in advance.
Notes
[a] GOV/2554/Att.2/Rev.2; GOV/OR/777. Paras. 74-76. [Dec.12, 1992)
[b] Mark Hibbs makes an incorrect statement that Iran has "60 days" requirement for the provision of information.693
[c] Paul Kerr refers to an incorrect statement that "Boucher (State Department Spokesman) added that all other states, with the exception of Iran, have accepted to provide
complete information about a new facility about a new facility about a new facility no later than 180days before the start of construction." 694
[d] IAEA GOV/2003/40, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General (Paras. 6 and 15).
692James M. Acton, Iran Violated International Obligations on Qom Facility (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sep 25 2009 [cited Oct 1 2009]).
693 Mark Hibbs, "U.S. Briefed Suppliers Group in October on Suspected Iranian Enrichment," NuclearFuel 27, no. 26 (2002).
694 Paul Kerr, " IAEA to Visit Two 'Secret' Nuclear Sites in Iran," Arms Control Today (January/February 2003).
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13.3.2 Classification of Break-out Scenario
As previously reviewed, the IISS (2005) study divides the break-out scenario into direct break-out and
indirect break-out, depending on whether proliferators use NUF6 or LEUF6 feed. In this work, break-
out scenarios are classified into an aggressive break-out scenario and a defensive break-out scenario.
These are based on the timeline when proliferators declare the withdrawal from the NPT.
Table 13.3 Classification of Break-out Scenarios
Criteria Scenario Description Reference
UER of Feed Direct Use NUF 6 as feed for HEU production IISS (2005)
Indirect Use LEUF6 as feed for HEU production
Aggressive Declare withdrawal from the NPT at the same time
Proliferator's with the start of HEU production
Posture Hide or deny HEU production activities until it is
confirmed by the IAEA
A. Aggressive Break-out Scenario (short-duration scenario)
The aggressive break-out scenario means that proliferators declare withdrawal from the NPT at the
time when they begin break-out activities. It is highly likely that proliferators have sufficient
confidence that they can produce HEU in a very short duration after the launch of break-out scenario
and before the initiation of sanctions or punishment from the international community. In order to do
so, proliferators should have either a GCEP of large SWU capacity or stockpiled-LEU as feed. The
short duration of time required for this scenario would permit proliferators to produce nuclear
weapons before the international community takes any measures, and thus, renders the NPT regime
largely ineffective.
B. Defensive Break-out Scenario (long-duration scenario)
Te defensive break-out scenario can be chosen by proliferators when either (a) they want to hide their
nuclear weapons programs as long as possible, which may be until the successful production of
sufficient HEU or (b) when they think that they could sufficiently delay the IAEA's dealing with
proliferation activities. In general, if proliferators are able to accomplish the break-out plan before the
international sanctions become practically effective, the plan remains still attractive and successful.
Thus, proliferators may continue their defensive break-out scenario until they are sanctioned by the
UNSC.
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13.3.3 Setup of Time Plan
Proliferators should have an elaborate plan for break-out scenario based on the estimated time
required to produce HEU considering both the SWU capacity of the facility and the UER of the feed
material in order to launch the break-out scenario. 695 The plan should include a technological plan for
eluding IAEA's safeguards measures and a political plan for delaying the international community's
response after discovery. When a proliferator seeks the break-out scenario, it is the hope that the
production of HEU may not be detected until the desired quantity has been obtained.696 Thus, it is
critical to estimate when nuclear proliferation activities will be detected because it will decide the
available time to produce HEU until international sanctions are practically effective.
The overall time framework for the break-out scenario considering interaction between
safeguarders and proliferators is described in Figure 13.3. From a proliferator's standpoint, it is
important to determine when critical Decision Points (DPs) take place throughout the entire scenario.
Critical DPs include the decision to break-out, launch of the break-out scenario, possible detection of
break-out, withdrawal from the NPT, and completion of the break-out plan.
DP: Decision Point Safeguarder's Event
TW: Time Window Proliferator's Event
Preparation Time Execution of Breakout
for Breakout (Actual Enrichment)
Proliferator
Completion of
ee HEU production
Detection by Safeguards Release of Release of
Inspectors Conclusion Resoltion Resolon
.-------------- ----------------- P - - -4---------------
SafeguarderW#1 i W#31 [W#4]Timeliness Goal: Time for confirmation Time for IAEA Time for UN
For Detection and conclusion Resolution sanctions
protfierAtion activities
Figure 13.3 Possible Timeline under Break-out Scenario
695 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes : A Net Assessment.,
53.
The IAEA's timeliness goal for detection of undeclared production of HEU is set to one month. W. Bush et
al., IAEA Experience with Environmental Sampling at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants in the European
Union, IAEA-SM-367/10/04 (2004)..
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From a safeguarders' point of view, time framework can be divided into four Time Windows
(TWs) for response to proliferation activities: Time for detection of break-out, time for confirming the
existence of break-out, time for issuing IAEA resolutions, and time for drawing UNSC resolutions.
Historically, the NPT regime has neither been very effective nor swift in responding to the break-out
scenario of proliferators. Thus, it is highly likely that proliferators can establish the plan for the break-
out scenario in a way that minimizes the required time for HEU production, giving little time for the
international community to respond.
Proliferators can set different time objectives for success of the break-out scenario, thereby
requiring different amount of resources as shown in Figure 13.4. Based on this figure, proliferators
can develop tactics in order to extend each period by delaying safeguarders' response as listed in
Table 13.4. The scenario that completes for period #1 is the most threatening scenario 'in which a
proliferator diverts uranium from declared facilities right after the inspection is over and then
complete the production of HEU before the next inspection falls' and is named a crash-through
697scenario.
Event after breakout
UNSC sanctions )
> 1year
IAEA resolution
1year
Confirmed by
IAEA 3-4 months
Detected
by Inspectors
I months
Available Time for
Scenario CompletionPeriod #1 Period #2 Period #3 Period #4
Figure 13.4 Different Levels of Objectives for Break-out Scenario
697 Bragin, Carlson, and Leslie, "Building Proliferation-Resistance into the Nuclear Fuel Cycle".
698 The duration of each period is based on the author's subjective assumption.
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Table 13.4 Tactics to Delay Safeguarders' Response for Break-out Scenario
Period How each period can be delayed? Key factors
- Proliferators may start with refusing to allow IAEA inspections because Length of
the refusal of inspections does not necessarily imply that HEU is produced. non-
#1
- Proliferators make a compromise between the time required to produce inspection
HEU and the risk of being detected. period
- It takes about at least 3-4 months for the IAEA to obtain the result of IAEA's
#2
destructive assay for environmental samples due to lack of resources. resources
The IAEA
#3 - The IAEA will try to solve the issue with the state concerned before it BOG's
refers the case to the UNSC.
resource
- Even if suspicious proliferation activities are detected by the IAEA, the
IAEA should wait until it is able to provide concrete evidence about the
existence of proliferation activities in order to refer the case to the United
International
Nations Security Council (UNSC).
- Proliferators may threaten to withdraw from the NPT in order to deter the
consensus
UNSC from imposing sanctions.
- Some of permanent members of UN Security Council are not willing to
impose sanctions through UNSC resolutions.
Note: From technological point of view, it takes about three months to get accurate results through Destructive
Assay (DA) from swiped samples.
13.4 Break-out Scenario from Technical Perspective
GCEPs designed for LEU production can vary its operation to follow the demand of clandestine HEU
production facilities. Figure 13.5 shows how such diversion could take place in five possible off-
design operation modes. The batch recycling mode, Figure 13.5 (a), is the only method that does not
require the modification of the configuration of cascades. Only the first four approaches can be used
to produce weapons-grade uranium. The valve adjusting mode, Figure 13.5 (e), cannot be used to
produce weapons-grade HEU because this option has a limitation that the highest UER that can be
obtained is only 20 percent.
311
(a) Batch Recycling (
Figure 13.5
) Reconfiguration (c) Add-on of extra cascade
.. . .......
-
(d) Connection of Cascades (e) Valve Adjusting
Tactics to produce HEU at declared LEU GCEP
13.4.1 Batch Recycling
In the batch recycling mode, the cascade product is fed back into the same cascade for subsequent
cycles of enrichment without any change in the configuration of cascade. In a GCEP, feed of any
UER can be used. However, proliferators should go though the recycling process until the desired
enrichment ratio of product is achieved. The maximum value of the product enrichment ratio at each
pass of batch recycling can be calculated under the condition of a total reflux, which is given by:
Npn =a 2 NF. (13.1)
where Nr is product assay, NF is feed assay, and a is overall design enrichment factor.699
699 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., p. 116.
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Figure 13.6 Process for Batch Recycling Operation
A typical process for conducting a batch recycling operation is shown in Figure 13.6. In order
to recycle the output, the process should be repeated until product with the expected UER is achieved.
Proliferators can start batch recycling operation within a matter of days after decision is made to
conduct illicit operations. However, this option is considered very inefficient for HEU production
because of the high time costs associated with these operations and poor use of valuable uranium feed
resources.700 The batch recycling process requires iterative HEU production processes, which will
require additional enrichment time. In this regard, an equilibrium time is the dominant factor to decide
whether batch recycling is a viable option.70 1
In general, a batch recycling operation is a simple and fast option because it does not require
any modification of cascades.702 Three to four passes are considered sufficient to produce HEU from
LEU production facilities. As a result, the implementation of this option can be completed quickly and
minimizes the risk of timely detection by safeguarders and associated reactions from the international
community. 703
The batch recycling mode is very inefficient for HEU production because of the high time
cost and inefficient use of uranium feed for the following reasons: First, the plant must be shut down
and all stages must be evacuated, refilled with new feed, and then restarted.0 4 Even though there is no
visual change in cascade configuration, the batch recycling mode is not free from detection due to the
,00 Kemp and Glaser, The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
701 Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation., p.20.
702 International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, Enrichment Availability, Report of INFCE Working Group 2
(Vienna, Austria: IAEA, Mar. 1980)., p. 13 1 .
703 Kemp and Glaser, The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
704 Personal communication with Dr. Charles Forsberg, Mar. 5 2009. Stopping and restarting operation in gas
centrifuge is extremely sensitive process from mechanical point of view. During batch recycling operation, even
though the plant stops enrichment operation, it is still running in vacuum state of centrifuges. i.e., it does not
stop completely.
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operational changes.'0 5 Second, this option can only be chosen if enough uranium material is available.
The UER of tails assay increases as the number of passes increases; therefore, large quantities of
enriched UF6 are discarded. This makes detection more likely because the stripping step of the
cascade remains the same, but the UER of feed increases with each pass.706 Third, this option would
require special material transport equipment for the storage of product to avoid fission criticality
limitations. This is because enriched product should be stored before the next pass after each pass of
batch recycling operation. 07
13.4.2 Reconfiguration
Reconfiguration requires the total restructuring of a current cascade or building more cascades in a
manner that increases the total number of enrichment stages. Generally, cascades can be reconfigured
from few stages-many parallel (or long-width) elements to many stages-small parallel (short-width)
elements, i.e., a cascade or several cascades is reconfigured into a narrower, but longer assembly.'
This requires considerable time to complete the re-piping process and to prepare to operate in
reconfigured-mode for re-piping process. In addition, cascades need to be shut down for
reconfiguration and this procedure subjects the machines to high levels of stress that may result in
machine failure. Regardless, reconfiguration mode is the most effective way of producing HEU for
long-term operation.709 In particular, the use of manifolds with in-built valves enables cascades to be
reconfigured without obvious external indicators.
13.4.3 Add-on of Modular Extra Cascades: Use of Undeclared SWU
This option is to use undeclared additional cascades within declared GCEPs. The two ways to use
add-on cascades are as follows:
- Undeclared cascades within the facility
The proliferator could have additional cascades within the facility, but not inside cascade halls,
which are declared to the IAEA. Under this scenario, after LEU is produced inside cascade hall,
the LEU product is transferred using cylinders to the undeclared subsequent cascade within the
705 Intemational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, Enrichment Availability., p.131.
706 Roughly, three times more LEU feed is required than through operation in reconfiguration mode. R. Scott
Kemp and A. Glaser, Statement on Iran's Ability to Make a Nuclear Weapon and the Significance of the 19
February 2009 JAEA Report on Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program (2009 [cited May 5 2009]); available from
http://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/2009glaser iran.pdf. Bukharin (2002) suggests that a GCEP designed to
produce 3 percent LEU can produce 90 percent HEU in approximately four cycles. Bukharin, "U.S.-Russian
Bilateral Transparency Regime to Verify Nonproduction of HEU.", pp.2 11 -221.
707 International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, Enrichment Availability. , p.131.
708 Oleg Bukharin (2002) suggests that approximately 20 stages are required to produce HEU with current
technology; R.S. Kemp and A. Glaser (2007) argue that even for a first-generation centrifuge, a series of 30-40
stages are enough to produce HEU; The Safeguards Options Study (1995:p.90) proposes 60 stages are required.
709 Kemp and Glaser, Statement on Iran's Ability to Make a Nuclear Weapon and the Significance of the 19
February 2009 IAEA Report on Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program.
314
facility but located in restricted areas under the CSA-type subsidiary arrangements. Under the AP,
the proliferator can use "managed access".
- Undeclared cascades inside cascade halls during non-inspection period
Proliferators can simply add an additional modular cascade on top of a pre-existing cascade. To
prepare this option, additional centrifuges to form an extra cascade and additional floor area to
put an extra cascade in place are required. In addition to extra preparation efforts, this option
requires longer 'equilibrium time' and has some criticality constraints during operation. This
option takes longer to accomplish than reconfiguration or batch recycling.
13.4.4 Connection of Cascades: Cascade Interconnection
Modular plant design is one mode of construction of GCEPs. A GCEP typically consists of a large
number of cascades that operate in parallel with each producing LEU product. If proliferators
rearrange the parallel-operating cascades used for LEU production into a series-operation of several
cascades, HEU can be produced. This can be accomplished by resetting piping to connect pre-existing
cascades that were previously disconnected. This option is sometimes called the "parallel-overlap"
mode operation and may involve partial reconfiguration.710 This configuration will allow proliferators
to use a portion of the plant to produce HEU while producing legitimate LEU product in the rest of
the facility. 71' Similar to the scenario above, instead of connecting different cascades, UF6 cylinders
can be used to transfer the product to the subsequent cascade.
Cascades can be arranged to produce HEU through connection of cascades; these
arrangements are shown Figure 13.7. At declared GCEPs, there should be several cascades to produce
a large amount of LEU of same enrichment level or sometimes to produce different enrichment levels
of LEU. These cascades can be connected and can produce HEU without a significant change in
cascade design. The success of this mode would depend on the size and number of cascades and the
specific design features of the plant. 71
710 Kemp and Glaser, The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
711 Bukharin, "U.S.-Russian Bilateral Transparency Regime to Verify Nonproduction of HEU."
712 International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, Enrichment Availability., p.131.
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If a valve setting is adjusted in a way that a portion of the product is returned to the feed point of a
cascade the UER of the product could be increased about by 20 percent. In other words, this option is
a way to increase product assay at the expense of the product withdrawal rate. However, this option is
not feasible for directly producing weapons-grade uranium because of the limitation in enriching
uranium up to only 20%. This option is one scenario to produce uranium that can be easily diverted to
weapons-grade uranium in combination with either clandestine facilities or other options. This option
is performed at the expense of the efficiency of cascade operation. 71
13.4.6 Possible Combination of Five Off-Design Modes
It is highly unlikely that a proliferator can seek more than one of five off-design operation modes.
However, E.A. Hakkila et al., (1995) suggested that batch recycling and connection of cascades can
be combined.715 This combination may be selected to take advantage of two scenarios while
minimizing their weaknesses. These weaknesses include (a) the top cascade would run out of material
713 Figure (a) from International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes : A
Net Assessment., p.44; figure (b) from A. Glaser, "Characteristics of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium
Enrichment and Their Relevance for Nuclear Weapon Proliferation," Science and Global Security 1 (May
2008)., pp. 1-25. Figure 8, p.19 The Libyan Enrichment Project. The numbers in parenthesis stand for the
number of centrifuge machines.
11 Bukharin, "U.S.-Russian Bilateral Transparency Regime to Verify Nonproduction of HEU."
7" E.A. Hakkila et al., The Safeguards Options Study.
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in the connection of cascades mode; and (b) the first pass requires a long operation time in the batch-
recycling mode. Production time required for HEU would decrease by combining these two scenarios.
13.5 Evaluation on Off-Design Operation Modes under Break-out Scenario
13.5.1 Comparison
The research focused on the evaluation of the feasibility for each option discussed here has identified
key pros and cons of these options, which are outlined in Table 13.5. All references in the Table 13.5
include batch recycling as the only option that does not require the modification of cascades.
Modification of cascades can incur mechanical damage to centrifuges that result in inefficiency which
cannot be modeled in a simple fashion. In this regard, it is generally believed that the batch recycling
option is highly likely to be chosen by proliferators.
Table 13.5 Evaluation for Proliferation Application
Option Pros Cons References
Batch recycling No need to modify facilities Requires three times more input [a] [b][c][d]
than reconfiguration
Reconfiguration High efficiency in operation Takes substantial time to [a][b][d]
reconfigure cascades
Requires additional
construction and thus takes
Simple modification, if GCEPs cosrtinadhutkeAdd-on Sme modation, longer to accomplish than [a] [d]
reconfiguration or batch
recycling.
Interconnection Simple modification, if GCEPs Connection of several cascades [d]
have several cascades.
CascadeNo need to modify facility 20 percent enrichment is the [d]
Adjusting maximum limit
Notes
[a] David Albright and Jacqueline Shire (2007) 716
[b] R. Scott Kemp and Alexander Glaser (2009)7'
[c] Gregory S. Jones (2008)718
[d] 0. Bukharin (2002)719
716 Albright and Shire, "A Witches' Brew? Evaluating Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Progress," review of
Reviewed Item, no.
717 Kemp and Glaser, Statement on Iran's Ability to Make a Nuclear Weapon and the Significance of the 19
February 2009 IAEA Report on Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program.
718 Jones, Iran's Centrifuge Enrichment Program as a Source of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons. He
considers two main classes of scenarios for a break-out in Iran: using a clandestine enrichment plant from either
LEU stock or from natural uranium.
719 Bukharin, "U.S.-Russian Bilateral Transparency Regime to Verify Nonproduction of HEU."
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Table 13.6 shows quantitative values for each option. Cascade interconnection is the most time
efficient method for HEU production. However, this operation mode requires at least three cascades
to execute for LEU, MEU, and HEU production.
Table 13.6 Reference Data and Indicators for Each Option72
Min. Required
Scenario cascades Enrichment time for Affecting Indicators Detection
achieved 25 kg factors Possibility
required HEU
Cascade Flow 1 20 % 5 yrs Reflux ratio Valve setting Moderate
Adjustment [dl
-Valve
90% settings Moderate
Batch Recycling 1 90 p 2.6 yrs [al Throughput -Reduced [d]
(4 passes)pln plant
throughput
-Plant design
[b] Piping The
7.5 modifications highestReconfiguration 1 90% -mnh 'Maintenance mUniuthorizds detectio
months requirement -Unauthorized detection
-Throughput activities probability
90% 4.5 ValveCombination 7 2 passes) months Throughput settings and Moderate
tubing
-Header pipe
modification
Cascade
Incne 3 90 % 4 months Throughput -Tubing to ModerateInterconnectionce
connections
-Valve
Modularity settingsAdd-on 2 90 % N/A oaad sAtinal High
of cascade -Additional
space
Notes
[a] Passes 3 and 4 would take only one month. Kemp and Glaser (2009) estimate that it would take about eight
months with a 4,000 machine-cascade. (6 months to produce LEU and 7 weeks to process the LEU into HEU.)
[b] Plant design includes gas manifolds, appropriate valves, interplant piping.
[c] Non-routine setting: Values that are normally closed will be open, and valves that are normally open will be
closed.
[d] The most significant reduction in throughput, containment of HEU particles on all process equipment.
[e] FA, R, B/R can produce HEU by isolating only one cascade.
[f] Kemp and Glaser (2009)'s estimate is 'over 6 months', whereas IISS (2009)'s estimate is less than '6
months'72'
72
"E.A. Hakkila et al., The Safeguards Options Study., p.95. Table 7-V, indicators and detection probabilities
from pp.87-96.
721 Kemp and Glaser, Statement on Iran's Ability to Make a Nuclear Weapon and the Significance of the 19
February 2009 IAEA Report on Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program.; David Albright, Paul Brennan, and
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The following conclusions can be drawn for all options: First, the size of the plant is important. The
larger capacity of the GCEP allows proliferators to produce the larger the amount of LEU or HEU.
This is because of the isolation of a cascade would represent a small portion of the overall throughput.
Thus, in a large plant, proliferators can make use of statistical uncertainty to hide their activities.
Second, it is obvious that reduced plant throughput, and an HEU presence, would result in an increase
in radiation levels. Finally, all scenarios involve the use of portable feed and withdrawal (F/W)
systems, and would require the presence of extra cylinders.2
13.5.2 Technical Overview of Batch Recycling Mode
This section reviews the quantification of the batch recycling mode for producing HEU. The batch
recycling mode has been chosen for quantitative analysis two reasons: First, it seems to be the easiest
option because it does not include any modification of cascades; second, the quantification of the
cascade modification process is very complex and entails a lot of uncertainty.
The main focus of quantification studies has been to calculate the time necessary for
producing the required amount of weapons-grade uranium for making one nuclear warhead. It should
be noted that there are many variations in the results because of uncertainties which include individual
gas centrifuge machine capacity, mass or enrichment ratio of fissile material based on technology,
required time to reconfigure or equilibrium time and cascade fill time to recycle, decrease in
efficiencies from configuration change, and feed in different UERs. In the calculation, the required
time to produce HEU is affected by several factors and is a function of SWU throughput, selected
mode of off-design operation, feed assay, tails assay, etc. Furthermore, gas centrifuge machines of the
same design can produce different SWU capacity, depending on the level of operational skill of the
operators.
A. Increase in UER for Each Pass in Batch Recycling
The production as a function of product availability and time spent within each batch in a recycling
operation is presented in Table 13.7. The UER of the product increases exponentially with the
number of passes. For example, it takes around 95 days for proliferators to produce 20 kg of WGU
for making a nuclear bomb with feed of 4.8 % LEU.723
Jacqueline Shire, Nuclear Weapon Breakout Scenarios: Correcting the Record (Mar. 18 2009 [cited June 3
2009]); available from http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Correcting_the_Record.pdf.
722 The Safeguards Options Study (1995), p.9 6 .
723 Jones, Iran's Centrifuge Enrichment Program as a Source of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons.
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Table 13.7 UER Increase of Product Per Pass at GCEPs with P-1 Design
Reference Glaser [20081 Jones [2008]
Scenario Direct Break-out Indirect Break-out
GCEP 164-machine cascade 3,000-machine cascade
Capacity (250-300 SWU/yr) [a] (7,500 SWU/yr)
Enrichment TimeFeed assay Product assay Feed assay Product assay rirePasses required
1t  NU 3.498% -
2 nd 3.498% 16.30% 4.8 % (1780 kg) 26.2 % (206 kg) 70 days [b
3 rd 16.30% 91.089% 26.2%(201 kg) 71.4%(47kg) 16days
4 th 71.4% (42 kg) 94.6 % (20kg) 7 d
Notes
[a] The performance of Iran's machine may vary between 1.5 SWU/yr and 2 SWU/yr.[David Albright et al.,
2009]
[b] The initial pass requires longer operating time than the following passes.
[c] Two days are considered for equilibrium and cascade fill time between before the next pass begins.
[d] 5 kg of feed loss is assumed during feed/withdrawal process.
[e] In general, it is assumed that about 6,000 SWU is required for producing enough HEU to make one nuclear
bomb per year.
B. Relationship among Various Factors Affecting Time Required for HEU Production
Options A and B in Table 13.8 describe the impact of the concentration of trails on the mass of
product and the time required for producing WGU product. Given that proliferators want to produce
the same UER product, there is a compromise which balances the required time against the mass of
the product. Option C shows the potential advantage of an indirect break-out scenario which uses
stockpiled LEU for input. Under this configuration it only takes 8 days for proliferators to produce 25
kg of WGU from feed of 3.55% LEU.
Table 13.8 Impact of Feed and Tails Assay on Time Required to Produce
HEU 724
25 kg 93%
Feeds Concentration of Product Time
UER Mass Tails UER Mass Required
A NU (0.71%) 150,000 kg 0.3% 93% 654 kg 1 year
B NU (0.71%) 150,000 kg 0.65% 93% 100 kg 40 days
C NU (0.71%) 150,000 kg 0.2% 4% 20,000 kg 1 year
LEU (4%) 20,000 kg 3.55% 93% 100 kg 8 days
Note: These are values for a reference facility with a capacity of 130tSWU/yr.
724 Linear relationship is assumed between feed masses and products. Original input feed that Glaser assumed
150,000 kg of natural uranium but linearly divided by to calculate HEU required for making one nuclear bomb.
Data is excerpted from Glaser, Making Highly Enriched Uranium, A. Glaser, Making Highly Enriched Uranium
(4th) (Princeton University, Feb. 26 2007 [cited Oct. 18 2008]); available from
www.princeton.edu/-aglaser/lecture2007_makingheu.pdf
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Based on Table 13.8, a simple causal-loop diagram can be drawn as shown in Figure 13.8. The larger
the SWU capacity of a GCEP, UER of feed, concentration of tails, the shorter the time required to
produce a Significant Quantity (SQ) of HEU.
Figure 13.8 Factors Affecting Time Required to Produce HEU in B/R mode
C. Comparison between Batch Recycling and Reconfiguration
A recent study by Jones (2008) analyzed a possible break-out scenario in a batch recycling mode
quantitatively focusing on Iran's uranium enrichment program.725 Jones provided enrichment data in
terms of total time required based on several scenarios with different SWU capacities and different
levels of enriched uranium as an input. IISS (2005) performed a similar study but it focused on
reconfiguration mode. Table 13.9 is the summary of the research findings from Jones and the IISS.
Options A, B, and C in Table 13.9 represent indirect break-out in batch recycling, indirect break-out
in reconfiguration, and direct break-out reconfiguration, respectively. If options A and B with 3,000
gas centrifuge machines are compared roughly (this is because Jones (2008) does not provide the
concentration of tails), the reconfiguration mode can produce HEU in about one-half the time required
for batch recycling. 72 6 This effect significantly increases as the SWU capacity of a GCEP increases.
725 Jones, Iran's Centrifuge Enrichment Program as a Source of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons.
726 For further discussion on the comparison of required times between batch recycling and reconfiguration with
regard to Iran's program, see Albright, Brennan, and Shire, Nuclear Weapon Breakout Scenarios: Correcting
the Record.;Kemp and Glaser, Statement on Iran's Ability to Make a Nuclear Weapon and the Significance of
the 19 February 2009 IAEA Report on Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program.
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Table 13.9 Time Required to Produce HEU from Feeds of Different Enrichment Ratios
Reference Jones (2008) IISS (2005)
Operation Mode Batch Recycling Reconfiguration
Fissile Material 20 kg of 93.1% HEU 25 kg of 93% HEU
Option A [a] B Ibi C I
Feed assay 4.8% LEU feed 5% LEU feed NU feed
Tails assay - 0.4 % 0.2 % 0.4 % 0.2 %
164 - 1.8 yrs 2.4 yrs 13.6 yrs 17 yrs
1000 - 108 days 143 days 2.2 yrs 2.7 yrs
No of 3000 95 days 36-48 days 48 days 271 days 330 days
machines 10000 37 days
20000 24 days
50000 17 days 2-3 days 3 days 16 days 20 days
Notes
[a] Gregory S. Jones (2008), p. 7
[b] IISS (2005), Iran's Strategic Weapons Programs: a net assessment, Table 2A, p.55
[c] IISS (2005), Table IA. p.54
[d] P.1 Centrifuge technology is assumed for both cases; however, 2.5 SWU and 2
capacity per centrifuge for Jones and IISS, respectively.
SWU are assumed for
13.6 Summary
Possible scenarios available to proliferators to produce HEU were analyzed in this chapter. These
scenarios were break-out, sneak-out, and concurrent sneak-out, depending on the types of GCEPs
involved in HEU production. The break-out scenario seems the most feasible and most abundant in
the literature; thus, the break-out scenario was analyzed from both political and technical perspectives.
Technically, there are five off-design operation modes to divert a LEU-producing GCEP to a
HEU-producing GCEP. Each way has pros and cons and different time and mass requirements for
HEU production. Though an exact evaluation is limited because of the limitation in experimental data
and modeling tools, a rough estimate was made using available literature.
Each scenario requires different approaches from safeguarders' point of view. To deter break-
out and concurrent scenarios effective and efficient IAEA safeguards systems are necessary. Early
detection of proliferation activities will provide more time to the international community to take
political actions. Under the sneak-out scenario, the IAEA's typical safeguards approach cannot be
applied because of either limited or no access to the suspect facilities. Thus, other means to get around
this problem should be developed, which include improvement of remote detection technologies, as
reviewed in Chapter 11. It should be noted that all of these scenarios are both technological and
political.
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CHAPTER 14 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF MODEL
14.1 Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to the practical application of an integrated methodology for evaluating
proliferation scenarios focused on production of HEU at GCEPs. Three proliferation scenarios for
HEU production at GCEPs were developed in Chapters 12 and 13. In this chapter, the three scenarios
were translated into success trees and were quantitatively analyzed. Top event probability values
were calculated using Saphire@ by using input values for all basic events in the success trees. This
quantitative analysis is challenging due to the inherent competition of proliferator and safeguarder
resources and their affect on the probabilistic outcome. Two main methods were employed to evaluate
the basic events. Expert opinion elicitation was obtained for a quantitative study. Alternatively, a
hierarchic metrics-index method was developed to more completely understand the competition
between safeguarder and proliferators. Lastly, three types of quantitative analysis were completed as
were uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis, and importance analysis. Together, these analysis
methods provide insight to the state of proliferation and safeguards currently utilized.
14.2 Success Tree for Nuclear Weapons Program
A simple success tree for an entire nuclear weapons program is shown in Figure 14.1. Some of these
steps occur in parallel, whereas other steps occur sequentially.
O AND Gate
0 OR Gate
Weapon-usable Weapon-usable Weapon-usable
plutonium is uranium is plutonium is
produced. produced. acquired throughillicit trade.
Figure 14.1 Success tree for Nuclear Weapons Program
323
A success of each step can be represented as an event with probabilistic values. Thus, the success
probability of the top event can be expressed as:
Pr(Top Event) = Pr(Step 1)- Pr(Step 2) -Pr(Step 3) -Pr(Step 4) -Pr(Step 5) -Pr(Step 6) ... (14.1)
Among the six steps necessary to the success of nuclear weapons programs, only weapons-usable
uranium acquisition at step 4 was modeled and analyzed using the integrated methodology in this
study.
14.3 Logical Chart for HEU Production
Before success trees can be constructed, logics that lead to the success of the top event need to be
prepared as narrative scenarios. These logics were developed based on the scenarios identified
previously in Chapters 12 and 13. A logical chart used for building success trees in this work is shown
in Figure 14.2.
H EU production
at GCEPs
SCENARIOS BIC SCENARIOS A/C SCENARIO A Breakout
HEU production at LEU production at HEU producona
clandestine declared GCEPs declared GCEPs
GCEPs
t Excess LEU Diversion from
Opteraodution v4 * declared U
cliandes"4GCi undeclared feeds w "0
*---*----a
Additional time Dtoperation manipulation
Batch recycling Design change
* Material
peration ]aan : UnaccountedI
increased rate For (MUF)
Add-on of Connection of
Add-on of ThH modules Reconfiguration cascades
**moduar Fe
~ascadesI +
-.------- -- - - -- - - - -m Fake tact
SCENARIO C
Concurrent .. L__
Sneakout * EU Stockpile ----------------------------------Indirect Breakout
(LEU)
SCEBARIO B
Sneakout NU
Illicit Uranium
acquisition of diversion from .-----.-----------------------------
NU I LEU uranium other facilities Direct Breakout
(NU)
L -----------------
Undeclared uranium
Figure 14.2 Logical Chart for Establishing Success Trees
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14.4. Success Trees for HEU Production
A top event is defined as successful production of HEU by proliferators at GCEPs. As previously
described, HEU production can be achieved either through clandestine facilities, declared facilities, or
both. The success trees were structured as the intersection of two activities: (i) nuclear material is
provided to the facilities and (ii) a GCEP is operated to produce HEU. All events in the success trees
are described as "proliferation activities are not detected" for confronting the problem in a more
structured manner.
In reality, the detection of proliferation activities does not necessarily mean that HEU
production activities can be stopped. Nuclear weapon production is a technological and political issue
and this work only address the detection (technological) aspect, not the political arena. But, the
method used here to describe basic events is reasonable in the sense that the detection of proliferation
activities will trigger responses from the international community, which may significantly delay
proliferators' proliferation plan.
Close attention should be given to defining assumptions on the basic events due to their effect
of affecting the outcome of the analyses. First, two conditions should be met in order for basic events
to occur: (i) proliferators attempt to carry out a basic event and (ii) safeguards activities did not detect
the proliferation activities. However, it is assumed that all proliferators have an intention to
proliferate; thereby, making the probability attempted proliferation a certainty. Thus, the probability
of "Proliferators attempt to carry out a basic event" can be treated as unity. Second, it should be noted
that probability values of basic events are the results of the competition between safeguarders and
proliferators.
14.4.1 Scenario A - Break-out Scenario using only Declared GCEPs
A. Material Preparation
In the case of "direct" break-out scenario, proliferators do not need to stockpile LEU so that they can
use uranium out of declared inventory. It is a reasonable assumption that a generic declared GCEP has
at least several Significant Quantities (SQs) of uranium, though the exact amount of inventory is
dependent on the capacity of the plant. In the case of "indirect" break-out scenario, the proliferators
need to stockpile LEU while searching for a proper time to conduct "break-out." There are two ways
to stockpile LEU: production of excessive LEU using undeclared feed and skimming LEU product
using Material Unaccounted For (MUF).
B. Operating a Facility for Producing HEU
As reviewed in Chapter 13, there are four possible modes of off-design operation for producing HEU
at a GCEP that is optimized to produce LEU. It is general opinion that only one option may be chosen
for HEU production because each option requires a substantial effort to carry out. However, all four
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modes can be employed simultaneously if the plant has sufficient capacity, despite the likelihood this
will not occur.
C. Success Tree and Basic Events
A success tree for the break-out scenario was established in a way that includes all types of nuclear
facilities and all possible diversion scenarios. It should be noted here that within the tree the state can
operate both declared and clandestine Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCFs), which provides a high
degree of freedom in diverting non-UF6 form of uranium.
For the quantitative study, two basic events were not considered: NU (Non-UF6) is not
diverted from CANDU reactors and NUF6 is diverted from a GCEP feed. This is because these two
events are highly unlikely for uranium-based nuclear weapons programs. The success tree for scenario
is shown in Figure 14.3 and the basic events in the success tree are listed in Table 14.1.
Table 14.1 Basic Events in Scenario A
BE Activity Description Scenarios
Al NU illicit acquisition is not detected.
A2 U illicit LEU illicit acquisition is not detected.
AllA3 acquisition NUF6 illicit acquisition is not detected.
A4 LEUF6 illicit acquisition is not detected.
A5 NUprovision via diversion from NUFFP is not detected.
A6 NU provision via diversion from CANDU is not detected.
A7 LEU provision via diversion from LEU FFP is not detected.Al
A8 U diversion LEU provision via diversion from LWRs is not detected.
A9 NU diversion from the declared UCF is not detected.
A10 NUF6 diversion within the declared GCEP is not detected. A,C
All LEUF6 product diversion within the declared GCEP is not detected.
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by ESWA/LIDAR at short
Clandestine distances.
A13 UCF Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by ESWA/LIDAR at long Alldistances.
A14 Declared Undeclared NU conversion at declared UCF is not detected.
A15 UCF Undeclared LEU conversion at declared UCF is not detected. A, C
A16 Excess Excess LEU production with add-on modular cascades is not detected.
A17 LEU Excess LEU production at additional time is not detected. A, C
A18 production Excess LEU production at an increased production rate is not detected.
A19 HEU production in "batch recycling" mode is not detected.
A20 HEU HEU production in "reconfiguration" mode is not detected.
A21 production HEU production in "connection of cascades" mode is not detected. A only
A22 HEU production with "add-on modular cascades" is not detected.
Note: Basic events in italic were not considered for quantitative study because of their high unlikelihood.
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14.4.2 Scenario B- Sneak out Scenario using Only a Clandestine GCEP
A. Material Preparation
The most critical aspect for successful operation of a clandestine GCEP is the method in which
undeclared uranium feed is provided. The opportunities to obtain undeclared material increase when
the state has a large total capacity of nuclear facilities. As shown in Figure 14.2, undeclared uranium
can be acquired in two ways: illicit acquisition and diversion from other nuclear facilities.
B. Operating a Facility for Producing HEU
Proliferators with optimized cascades for HEU production at a clandestine GCEP do not need to
modify plants as would be required for declared nuclear facilities. However, in order to continue
operation of a clandestine GCEP without detection, proliferators may employ various subterfuge
tactics such as air filter for reducing atmospheric effluents, camouflage to hide thermal and optical
signatures.
C. Success Tree and Basic Events
A typical IAEA safeguards approach cannot be applied for detecting the sneak-out scenario. Instead,
remote detection technologies should be used. In establishing this success tree, detection of declared
UCFs operation was not considered because they cannot claim to the IAEA why they need UCFs
without having declared GCEPs. Three types of detection technologies were reflected in the success
tree. First, Environmental Sampling over Wide Area (ESWA) was considered for detecting both a
clandestine GCEP and a UCF. Second, Differential Absorption LIDAR (DIAL) was considered for
detecting HF that may be released from GCEPs, and Raman scattering-based Light Detection and
Ranging (LIDAR) was considered for detecting UF20 2 from UCFs. The use of satellite imagery was
considered for only GCEPs because this technology seems to be of no use in detecting clandestine
UCFs. It should be noted that ESWA, DIAL, and LIDAR cannot be used without the approval of
Board of Governors (BOG) under the Additional Protocol (AP), as reviewed in Chapters 6 and 7. The
success tree for scenario is shown in Figure 14.4 and the basic events in the success tree are listed in
Table 14.2.
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Figure 14.4 Success Tree for Scenario B
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Table 14.2 Basic Events in Scenario B
BE Activity Description Scenario
B1 NU illicit acquisition is not detected.
B2 U illicit LEU illicit acquisition is not detected. All
B3 acquisition NUF6 illicit acquisition is not detected.
B4 LEUF6 illicit acquisition is not detected.
B5 NUprovision via diversion from NU FFP is not detected.
B6 NUprovision via diversion from CANDU is not detected.
B7 U diversion LEU provision via diversion from LEU FFP is not detected. All
B8 LEU provision via diversion from LWRs is not detected.
B9 Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by ESWA/LIDAR at shortClandestine distances. All
B10 UCF Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by ESWA/LIDAR at long
distances.
B11 Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by ESWA/DIAL at shortdistances. BC
B12 Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by ESWA/DIAL at long '
_ _Clandestine distances.
B13 GCEP Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by commercial satelliteimagery. B,C
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by military satellite
imagery.
Note: Basic events in i alic were not considered for quantitative study because of their high unlikelihood.
14.4.3 Scenario C-Concurrent Sneak-out Scenario Using Declared and Clandestine
GCEPs
A. Material Preparation
Material preparation for a declared GCEP is the same as in scenario A. Under this scenario, LEUF6
produced at a declared GCEP will be transferred to a clandestine GCEP. The declared GCEP serves as
a LEU provider to the clandestine GCEP. It is assumed that LEUF6 intended for the clandestine
GCEP is provided only through the operation of the declared GCEP. Such a scenario minimizes the
probability of detecting a proliferator's activities. Thus, diversion of LEU from LWRs and LEU FFP,
and illicit acquisition of LEU was not considered because of high detection probabilities of those
events in the present study.
B. Operating a Declared GCEP and a Clandestine GCEP for Producing HEU
Operation of the declared GCEP is intended to produce LEUF6 and the produced LEUF6 will be
diverted to produce HEU at clandestine GCEPs. It is also possible that a proliferator may operate
multiple GCEPs to increase the probability of successfully diverting LEUF6. The operation of a
clandestine GCEP is identical to scenario B. However, the capacity of the clandestine GCEP can be
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much smaller than that of scenario B. This is because the clandestine plant will use LEU for feed,
which significantly reduces SWU and time requirement to produce HEU than NU feed.
C. Success Tree and Basic Events
The success tree for scenario C is the combination of success trees for scenarios A and B. The main
difference between scenarios B and C is that uranium feed for a clandestine GCEP is confined to
LEUF6 produced from a declared GCEP. Considering the difficulty with obtaining LEUF6 through
illicit acquisition and substantial reduction in required time to produce HEU with LEU feed, this
scenario may be promising. The success tree for scenario is shown in Figure 14.5 and the basic events
in the success tree are listed in Table 14.3.
Table 14.3 Basic Events in Scenario C
BE Group Description Scenario
C1 U illicit NU illicit acquisition is not detected. All
C2 acquisition NUF6 illicit acquisition is not detected.
C3 NUprovision via diversion from NUFFPs is not detected.
C4 NUprovision via diversion from CANDU is not detected. All
C5 U diversion NUF6 diversion from UCF is not detected.
C6 NUF6 diversion within the declared GCEP is not detected.
A, C
C7 LEUF6 product diversion within the declared GCEP is not detected.
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by ESWA/LIDAR at
C8
Clandestine short distances. All
UCF Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by ESWA/LIDAR at
C9 long distances.
C10 Declared Undeclared NU conversion at declared UCF is not detected. A, C
UCF
Excess LEU production with add-on modular cascades is not
C11 detected.
C12 Excess LEU Excess LEU production at additional time is not detected. A, Cproduction
Excess LEU production at an increased production rate is not
C13 detected.
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by ESWA/DIAL at
short distances. C
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by ESWA/DIAL at
5 C es long distances.
CCE OpClandestine GCEP operation is not detected by commercial satellite
imagery. B, C
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by military satellite
imagery. I_ I
Note: Basic events in italic were not considered for quantitative study because of their high unlikelihood.
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Figure 14.5 Success Tree for Scenario C
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14.5 Categorization of Basic Events
From the success trees developed for HEU production at declared and clandestine GCEPs, basic events
were grouped into five categories and are shown in Table 14.4. This grouping will facilitate the
quantitative evaluation for basic events.
Table 14.4 Categorization of Basic Events from Success Trees
Category Detection Description
Operation of HEU production in off-design operation modes
Category I declared GCEPs and Excess LEU production
UCFs Additional undeclared conversion operation at declared UCFs
Category II Operation of Satellite imagery for detecting a GCEP
clandestine GCEPs ESWA/DIAL for detecting a GCEP
Category III
and UCFs ESWA/LIDAR for detecting a UCF
Uranium feed Diversion of uranium (non-UF6) from other facilities
Category IV provision via
doision -Diversion of uranium feed (UF6) from GCEPs and UCFs
diversion
Uranium feed Illicit acquisition of uranium feed
Category V provision via illicit -UF6 form (NUF6, LEUF6)
acquisition -Non-UF6 form (NU, LEU)
14.6 Basic Events Evaluation from Experts
Basic event probability values were obtained from industry and government experts for each of the
categories listed in Table 14.4. Compilation of expert opinions provides a framework for determining
more accurate probabilistic input values further depth for analysis of the results. The expert opinions
were collected through a questionnaire for each category of experts. These questionnaires are provided
in the Appendix I. The experts provided their evaluation for each specific time period from 1970s to
201 Os as stated in Chapter 1.
Limited knowledge is available on detection of international uranium transfers, which
corresponds to the expert opinion for Category V activities. Two factors greatly affecting detection are
competing over time. First, a safeguards system for monitoring or detecting nuclear material transfer are
continually strengthened, which makes detection more likely. Second, the chances of smuggling nuclear
material may increase with the number of nuclear facilities.
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14.7 Basic Event Evaluation from Hierarchic Metrics
Hierarchic metrics were developed to quantify which factors affect the probability values of basic
events. A detection probability varies with capabilities or resources of two sides. As reviewed in
Chapter 5, the NPT regime's capabilities can be divided into technological capability and legal
capability. Thus, hierarchic metrics include all possible measures to detect a specific proliferation event.
If data about previous detection events are available, theses metrics can be used to evaluate basic events
in terms of probabilities. If each basic metric is assigned a score, a top measure is calculated with a
proper structure function and can lead to an importance index through data processing. This index is
further complicated because the IAEA's detection information is treated as classified material and used
of these metrics for quantitative evaluation is limited. However, these metrics are useful for
brainstorming what experts consider while formulating their expert opinions. In addition, these metrics
will provide insight into how different features of a facility affect detection probability values by
considering specific operational facility factor. These metrics are shown in Figures from 14.6 to 14.7.
[See Appendix J for other metrics]
Figure 14.6 Hierarchic Metric for Detection of Off-Design Operation of GCEPs
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Figure 14.7 Hierarchic Metric for Detection of Illicit Acquisition of Uranium Feed
Table 14.5 Full Description of Acronyms in the Metrics
Acronym Full Description Acronym Full Description
C/S Containment and Surveillance ISS Integrated Safeguards System
LCBS Load-Cell Based Weighing System PIV Physical Inventory Verification
NDA Nondestructive assay DIV Design Inventory Verification
CHEM Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor MECR Multilateral Export Control Regime
DA Destructive Assay SIAU Satellite Imagery Analysis Unit
Nuclear Trade and Technology
CEMO Cascade Enrichment Monitoring TTA Analysis Unit
VNIR Visual Near Infrared Imagery SAL Safeguards Analytical Laboratory
TIR Thermal Infrared Imagery NWAL Network Analytical Laboratory
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar UCF Uranium Conversion Facility
CSA Comprehensive Safeguards MUF Material Unaccounted For
Agreement
AP Additional protocol SWU Separative Work Unit
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14.7.1 Applicability of Hierarchic Metrics for Input Values
In this section, applicability of hierarchic metrics without relying on expert evaluation for basic event
quantification is explored. Input values for basic events can be determined, considering factors
described in a hierarchic metrics and inserted into the model. Illicit acquisition of uranium feed is
discussed using the Figure 14.7.
A. Relevant Literature: ITDB
The IAEA' Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) does not provide any information to "judge the extent to
which the recorded incidents represent a potential security threat." The ITDB provides information
about nuclear trafficking statics, which includes a total number of confirmed illicit trafficking accidents
and the materials involved. However, the IAEA does not provide an estimation of the total number of
unreported transfers. Much of the information processed by the IAEA was obtained through only
member states to the ITDB. Thus, these factors working together can provide incomplete information
on materials exchanges.727
B. Hierarchic Metrics
Two specific factors in Figure 14.7 were considered to determine input values. For simplicity, detection
probability goals for each material type were used. Table 14.6 describes the two factors in detail.
Table 14.6 Descriptions for Factors used in Figure 14.7
Factors Affecting Description
elements
- Starting point of safeguards
-Is the specific type of uranium is subject to declaration by the
CSA [Paras 33-35]?
-Is the specific type of uranium is subject to declaration by the
AP [Art. 2.a.(vi),(vii)]?
- Exemption from safeguards
-Can the specific type of uranium be exempted from safeguards
Black market application [Paras 36-38]?
availability intensity -Reporting international transfers
-Is the reporting of the international transfer of material under
safeguards? [Para 34 (a)(b) CSA]
-Is the reporting of the international transfer of material under
safeguards? [Art. 2.(a)(ix), AP]
- Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA)
Does the AP require detailed Nuclear Material Accountancy for
the specific type of material? [Art.2(a), AP]
(Continued)
727 IAEA, Illicit Trafficking Database, 2004.
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Black market
availability
Safeguards
application
intensity
World
inventory
- Detection probability goals for material types
-HEU: a high detection probability (90%)
-LEU: a medium detection probability (50%)
-NU: a low detection probability (20%)
- How large is the estimated inventory of a specific type of
uranium?
- How many facilities produce the specific type of uranium?
- How many facilities use the specific type of uranium?
- How large is the total throughput of facilities that produce the
specific types of uranium?
- How high is the U-235 enrichment ratio of the specific type of
uranium?
Material type
- How suitable is the composition and purity of the specific type
Material of uranium for uranium enrichment operation?
attractiveness - Are the features of containers for transporting the specific type
Detection of uranium favorable for clandestine transportation?
avoidance - How good is the level of proliferators' hiding technology that
can evade safeguarders' technological detection system?
Considering all of these facts in Table 14.6, it could be a reasonable assumption that one can use
detection probability goals for each type of material as detection probabilities for the illicit acquisition
of different types of material. (i.e., a high detection goal means that material diversion is difficult.) This
is because achieving a high detection goal leads to a high probability of detection and increased
difficulty for illicit materials export.
14.8. Scenario Analysis
14.8.1 Current Situation (in the 2000s)
A. General Scenario Analysis
The top events were calculated using Saphire@.728 Table 14.7 shows the characteristic values of the
distributions of the top events calculated with inputs obtained from experts using success tree models
(See Appendix I for input values). All basic events were assumed to have normal distributions with
model parameters, such as means and standard deviations. Thus, the uncertainty of basic event
parameters is propagated through the success tree models toward the top events.
728 The Monte Carlo technique was selected for calculating uncertainty distributions. The number of samples was
1,000 in the calculation.
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Table 14.7 Characteristics Values of Probability Distribution of Top Events in the 2000s
Point Standard
Scenarios mean 5th median 95th
estimate deviation
Type A (a) 0.9986 0.9962 0.9845 0.9989 1 8.646x10-
Type B (a) 1 1 0.9998 1 1 2.741x10i4
Scenario A
Type A (b) 0.9977 0.9942 0.9741 0.9981 0.9999 1.218x10-2
Type B (b) 1 0.9999 0.9995 1 1 6.210x10
Type A/B (a) 0.9999 0.9999 0.9997 1 1 1.014x104
Scenario B _______
Type A/B (b) 0.9947 0.9922 0.9786 0.9942 0.9988 6.665x10~3
Type A (a) 0.9990 0.9988 0.9977 0.9990 0.9996 6.490x104
Type B (a) 0.9988 0.9937 0.9734 0.9983 1 1.467x10
Type A (b) 0.9949 0.9926 0.9819 0.9940 0.9981 5.502x10
Type B (b) 0.9946 0.9813 0.9300 0.9913 0.9997 2.875x1o-
Notes
[a] Type A countries denote ones with the Additional Protocol and in high level of compliance with the IAEA.
[b] Type B countries denote ones with only Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and not in high level of
compliance with the IAEA.
[c] (a) means that ESWA, LIDAR, and DIAL are not applied.
[d] (b) means that ESWA, LIDAR, and DIAL are assumed to be applied. However, currently, these technologies
are not used by the IAEA and require Board of Governors' approval under the Additional Protocol.
0.9995 1
0.999
0.998 1 " t " I I
Scenario A Scenario A Scenario B Scenario B Scenario C Scenario C
Type A (a) Type B (a) Type A (a) Type B (a) Type A (a) Type B (a)
Figure 14.8 Comparison of Top Event Probabilities under Different Scenarios in the
2000s
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Figure 14.8 depicts top event probabilities under different scenarios for Type A and Type B countries
from the values recorded in Table 14.7. All of these values have very high success probabilities,
meaning that once GCEPs are constructed, proliferators' attempt to produce HEU would be highly
successful. Under scenario C, Type A countries have the higher top event probability value than Type B
countries. This is because Type A countries have higher success probabilities in producing excess LEU,
diversion of NUF6 at the declared UCF, and additional conversion of undeclared feed.
On the contrary, under scenario A, Type B countries have the higher top event probability value
than Type A countries. This is due to the fact that Type B countries have the higher input values for
basic events regarding 'off-design operation modes for producing HEU.' In particular, the unity value
of Type B countries implies that the construction of a new GCEP should be prevented. The impact of
ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL application is also shown in Table 14.7.
B. Direct Break-out VS Indirect Break-out
As described in Chapter 13, a break-out scenario can be further divided into 'a direct break-out' and
'indirect break-out' scenario, depending on the UER of uranium feed. This section provides a
quantitative analysis on those two scenarios. Table 14.8 and Figure 14.9 show the characteristic values
of the top event probabilities.
Table 14.8 Characteristics Values of Top Events for Direct- and Indirect Break-out
Scenarios in the 2000s
Point Standard
Scenario mean 5th median 95th
estimate deviation
Case I (a) 0.8735 0.8996 0.7368 0.8861 0.9615 7.567x10 2
Case II (a) 0.9851 0.9698 0.9031 0.9829 0.9987 3.679x10-2
Direct
Case I (b) 0.8633 0.8587 0.6974 0.8807 0.9541 8.008x10 2
Case II (b) 0.9788 0.9582 0.8698 0.9737 0.9978 4.543x10-2
Case I (a) 0.9956 0.9915 0.9969 0.9962 0.9997 1.507x10-2
Case II (a) 1 0.9999 0.9995 1 1 4.015x10 4
Indirect
Case I (b) 0.9958 0.9914 0.9648 0.9966 0.9998 1.735x10 2
Case II (b) 1 0.9997 0.9985 1 1 1.678x10 3
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Figure 14.9 Comparison of Top Event Probabilities for Different Break-out Scenarios in
the 2000s
Type B countries have the higher top event probabilities in both break-out scenarios. It should be noted
that the indirect break-out scenario gives higher success probabilities for a proliferator as they can
stockpile LEUF6.
14.8.2 Under Integrated Safeguards System: In the 2010s
A. Generic Scenario Analysis
As reviewed in Chapter 6, the IAEA is currently establishing the Integrated Safeguards System. It is
important to note here that the expert opinions contained in this section are based on the assumption that
current IAEA's plan is on track. Table 14.9 and Figure 14.10 show the top event probabilities for each
scenario. The impact of a generalized use of ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL was also reflected and noted as '(b)'
in the Table and Figure.
Table 14.9 Characteristic Values of Probability Distribution of Top Events in the 2010s
Type of Point Standard
Countries Scenario estimate mean 5th median 95th deviation
Type A (a) 0.9926 0.9870 0.9505 0.9940 0.9995 2.075x10~2
Type B (a) 1 0.9991 0.9958 1 1 3.738x10
Scenario A Type A (b) 0.9805 0.9725 0.9176 0.9811 0.9976 2.938x10~:
Type B (b) 0.9998 0.9975 0.9881 0.9998 1 7.816x10
Type A/B (a) 0.9999 0.9999 0.9997 0.9999 1 1.047x10~4
Type A/B (b) 0.9514 0.9471 0.9004 0.9513 0.9796 2.544x10
Type A (a) 0.8703 0.8626 0.7198 0.8767 0.9595 7.68x10~2
Type B (a) 0.9716 0.9512 0.8514 0.9667 0.9976 4.924x104
Scenario C Type A (b) 0.7343 0.7242 0.5606 0.7354 0.8752 9.883x10~
Type B (b) 0.8888 0.8604 0.6756 0.8794 0.9704 9.283x10
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Figure 14.10 Comparison of Top Event Probabilities under Different Scenarios in the
2010s
Here, notable difference from the current situation is that the top event probability for Type A countries
under Scenario C has the lowest probability among all possible scenarios. In the 2000s, Type A
countries under Scenario A has the lowest probability. This is due to the increase in detection
probabilities for producing excess LEU for SC Type A(a) and the introduction of ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL
for SC Type A (b).
B. Direct Break-out VS Indirect Break-out in the 2010s
Table 14.10 and Figure 14.11 report the top event probabilities under two sub-sets of Scenario A. Type
B states still have significantly high success probabilities under the indirect break-out scenario, even
though the use of ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL is assumed. This is because a proliferator still has high success
probabilities for the basic events such as diversion of nuclear material from declared facilities and
excess production of LEU with add-on capacity, without the application of the AP. This emphasizes the
importance of prohibiting the new construction of GCEPs in these types of countries.
Table 14.10 Characteristics Values of Top
Scenarios
Events for Direct- and Indirect Break-out
Point StandardScenarios estimate mean 5th median 95th deviation
Type A (a) 0.8511 0.8399 0.6813 0.8565 0.9476 8.783x10-2
Direct Type B (a) 0.9652 0.9377 0.8001 0.9609 0.9977 6.788x10
2
Type A (b) 0.8013 0.7879 0.6021 0.8027 0.9195 1.006x10 1
Type B (b) 0.9399 0.9146 0.7556 0.9377 0.9927 7.543x10 2
Type A (a) 0.9745 0.9638 0.8815 0.9774 0.9968 3.996x10-2
Indirect Type B (a) 0.9998 0.9975 0.9869 0.9998 1 6.960x10
3
Type A (b) 0.9325 0.9224 0.8117 0.9368 0.9864 5.622x10-2
Type B (b) 0.9988 0.9923 0.9647 0.9985 1 1.713x10-2
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Figure 14.11 Comparison of Top Event Probabilities for Different Break-out Scenarios in
the 2010s
14.8.3 Time Trend
Figure 14.12 shows the changes in top event probabilities as the IAEA's Integrated Safeguards System
(ISS) gets to the matured stage. In Figure 14.12 (a), the top event probabilities under Scenario C are
expected to significantly decrease compared to the current IAEA safeguards system. Notably, as
ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL is introduced, the top event probability for Type B countries under Scenario C is
expected to decrease. The IAEA's capabilities in dealing with Scenario C are expected to improve
significantly. On the contrary, the top event probabilities for Type B countries under Scenario A and
Scenario B (a) do not decrease, meaning that the establishment of ISS is not enough to safeguard
declared GCEPs in Type B countries. This implies that the IAEA should take significant measures to
deal with this case.
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Figure 14.12 Changes in Top Event Probabilities from 2000s to 2010s
Figure 14.12 (b) shows the analysis on Type B countries under two sub-sets of Scenario A: direct and
indirect. This figure clearly shows the impact of establishing the ISS except for the case of Type B
countries under the indirect break-out scenario.
14.9 Uncertainty Analysis
This section reviews uncertainty propagation through different epistemic uncertainty
distributions of basic events. The model employed for this work has a number of uncertainties. First,
the integrated methodology was applied assuming a typical nuclear fuel cycle in order to take advantage
of study results available in literature. Thus, the results are likely to vary in cases where state(s) in
question do not possess typical nuclear fuel cycle(s). Second, input data for basic events, evaluated by
experts, are also subject to uncertainties associated with the state-of-knowledge.
In the present study, uncertainty analysis was completed for two categories of basic events
under scenario B: Illicit acquisition of nuclear material-associated and ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL detection-
associated events. These two categories were chosen because these are considered to have the highest
levels of uncertainty among all basic events due to the unavailability of relevant information or research.
Table 14.11 lists the selected basic events and their input values. Changed input values were prepared in
order to perform uncertainty analysis by multiplying the original standard deviation values by a factor
of 2 for a parametric sensitivity study.
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Table 14.11 Changes of Input Values for Uncertainty Analysis
Original inputs Changed inputs
Basic Events Description Standard Standard
mean mean
deviation deviation [a]
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by 0.88 0.088 0.88 0.176
ESWA/DIAL at short distances.
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by 0.75 0.075 0.75 0.15
ESWA/LIDAR at short distances.
Illicit acquisition of NU (Non-UF6) is not
0.825 0.0825 0.825 0.165
detected.
Illicit acquisition of NUF6 is not detected. 0.75 0.075 0.75 0.15
Note: [a] The standard deviation of original inputs was multiplied by a factor of 2
The changed probability distributions of the top event generated through varying standard deviation
values for the selected basic events are shown in Table 14.12 and Figure 14.13. This table shows that
uncertainty distributions of the selected basic events are propagated to the top event probability through
the structure of the success trees.
Table 14.12 Results of Probability Distributions of Top Events from Changed Different
Uncertainty Distributions of Basic Events
Point 5th 95 th StandardInputs mean median
estimate percentile percentile deviation
Previous 0.9947 0.9922 0.9786 0.9942 0.9988 6.665x10 3
ESWA/DIAL for
0.9947 0.9830 0.9404 0.9917 0.9987 2.569x10-2
GCEP
ESWA/LIDAR
0.9947 0.9911 0.9755 0.9936 0.9989 8.368x10 3
for UCF Detection
Non-UF6 form 0.9947 0.9917 0.9768 0.9938 0.9988 7.467x10 3
UF6 Form 0.9947 0.9921 0.9781 0.9943 0.9990 8.096x10-3
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14.10 Sensitivity Analysis
14.10.1 Sensitivity of the Top Event Probability to Individual Input Values
A sensitivity analysis was completed to further explore the effect of varying an input value for a
selected basic event toward the top event probability. Sensitivity analyses are useful for identifying the
key variables that may have the most significant consequences on the end state.
In order to perform a sensitivity analysis in the present study, an input value for individual basic
events were varied in turn while the other variables were kept constant. Table 14.13 lists the values of
input variables that were used to investigate the sensitivity of the top event to each basic event. Under
scenario C for Case III, Type A is stated with the assumed application of ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL. The
input values for selected basic events were multiplied by a factor of 0.9, 0.6, and 0.3, respectively, in
order to determine whether an increase in safeguarders' capabilities have an impact on success
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probabilities of proliferators. Basic events related to the illicit acquisition of nuclear material and
ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL were analyzed in the uncertainty analysis.
Table 14.13 Changed Input Values and
under Scenario C
Results of Top Event Probabilities for Case III
Mean Value of Basic Event Probability
Basic event Case I Case II Case III
Base case Base x 0.9) (Base x 0.6) (Base xO.3)
NU feed provision through illicit 0.825 0.7425 0.495 0.2475
A acquisition is not detected.
Top event probabilities for each case 0.9947 0.9940 0.9921 0.9902
LEUF6 feed provision through illicit 0.75 0.675 0.45 0.225
B acquisition is not detected.
Top event probabilities for each case 0.9947 0.9936 0.9906 0.9875
Clandestine UCF operation is not
detected by ESWA/LIDAR at short 0.75 0.675 0.45 0.225
C distances.
Top event probabilities for each case 0.9947 0.9917 0.9753 0.9422
Clandestine GCEP operation is not
detected by ESWA/DIAL at short 0.88 0.792 0.528 0.264
D distances.
LITop event probabilities for each case 0.9947 0.978 0.8889 0.6245
- Base
- Case I
-- A- Case II
-M-Case III
Figure 14.14
Cases
Sensitivity of Proliferator Success Probability (PSP) through Sensitivity
Analysis
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Figure 14.14 illustrates the results of sensitivity analysis with varying input values for each basic event.
This figure shows that basic events associated with the capabilities of ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL generated
the largest variation in the top event probability value. This result implies that more investment in
developing ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL technology may produce higher returns than other options.
14.10.2 Sensitivity of Top Event Probabilities to Different Experts
In the present study, multiple experts were available for basic events related to off-design operation of
declared GCEPs for producing HEU, conversion of undeclared nuclear material at declared UCFs, and
diversion of nuclear material from declared nuclear facilities. Thus, the sensitivity of top event
probabilities to experts were investigated only using these two categories of basic events, whereas other
categories of basic events were assumed to remain unchanged. Table 14.14 and Figure 14.15 show the
different input values provided by two different experts concerning two categories of basic events.
Table 14.14 Different Input Values of Experts A and B Used for Sensitivity Analysis
Type A Type B
Proliferation
Category activities for BEs Expert A Expert B Expert A Expert B
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Batch recycling 0.25 0.075 0.25 0.25
Off-design operation Reconfiguration 0.275 0.075 0.25 0.3
for HEU production Add-on operation 0.2 0.075 0.99 0.125
Cascade connection 0.275 0.075 0.3 0.125
Additional time 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.25
Excess LEU
production Increase product rate 0.7 0.75 0.8 
0.25
Add-on operation 0.1 0.15 0.99 0.25
Declared UCF NU Conversion 0.7 0.95 0.99 0.85
operation with
undeclared feed LEU Conversion 0.15 0.35 0.9 0.35
Declared material LWR 0.85 0.95 0.85 0.95
diversion from UCF 0.7 0.75 0.7 0.65
declared nuclear GCEP 0.525 0.65 0.525 0.55
facilities FFP N/A 0.7 N/A 0.7
Note: Only expert B provided evaluation for Fuel Fabrication Plant (FFP).
The input values obtained from two experts are in good agreement for Type A countries, whereas there
are big differences for Type B countries. In addition, Expert B provided, in general, higher values than
Expert A for Type A countries with the exception of excess LEU production. On the contrary, Expert A
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provided higher values for Type B countries except for HEU production in reconfiguration mode and
nuclear material diversion from LWRs.
1.0
0.9 -
0.8 -
0.7 -
0.6 -
0.5 -
0.4 -
0.3 -
0.2 -
0.1 -
0.0
1? 0 0 >
LI~ U
(a) Type A Countries
A Expert A
-b
eExpert B
U W
(b) Type B Countries
Figure 14.15 Graphical Comparison of Different Experts Opinion
The top event probabilities were then calculated using two input values provided by different experts,
and the characteristic values of top event probability distributions are tabulated in Table 14.15.
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Table 14.15 Comparison of the Probability Distributions of the Top Event Concerning
Different Experts' Inputs without ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL Application
Case Category Point mean 5th median 9 5th Standard
deviation
Expert A 1 1 1 1 1 1.801x10~
Type A Expert B 0.9729 0.9707 0.9576 0.9715 0.9805 7.202x10-
Scenario Integrated 0.9986 0.9962 0.9845 0.9989 1 8.646x 10
A Expert A 1 1 1 1 1 0
Type B Expert B 0.9993 0.9992 0.9985 0.9993 0.9997 3.976xI04
Integrated 1 0.9997 0.9993 1 1 1.941x104
Expert A 0.9984 0.9980 0.9950 0.9983 0.9996 1.468x10
Scenario Type A Expert B 0.9998 0.9996 0.9987 0.9997 1 4.403x104
C Integrated 0.999 0.9988 0.9977 0.999 0.9996 6.490x104
Expert A 1 1 1 1 1 1.4x1o~
Type B Expert B 0.9573 0.9555 0.9353 0.9569 0.9716 1.i11x10ii
Integrated 0.9988 0.9937 0.9734 0.9983 1 1.467x1o-
Note: The integrated values are from Table 14.7
Figure 14.16 illustrates the Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) of the top event probabilities for
each case.
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14.11. Importance Analysis
14.11.1 Rankings of Minimal Path Sets (MPSs)
An importance analysis was completed to identify important sets of events that lead to the end state of a
proliferator being successful (i.e., HEU production without detection), which are typically called
Minimal Path Sets (MPSs) in success trees. For each scenario, importance analysis enables the
identification of the most favorable pathways toward the proliferators' success. A total of 88, 6, and 13
MPSs were generated under scenarios A, B, and C, respectively. In this study, Scenario C was chosen
for the analysis because this can be the case of possible proliferation states including Iran.
A. MPSs for Type A Countries under Scenario C
The MPSs for Type A countries under Scenario C are described in Table 14.16 according to their
rankings.
Table 14.16 Description of MPSs for Type A Countries under Scenario C
MPS(i) Material Uranium Excess LEU Clandestine
acquisition (form) conversion production GCEP Detection
MPS1 NU (C1) Clandestine UCF Increased product rate C14-C17(C8, C9) (C13)
MPS2 NU (C1) Clandestine UCF Additional time (C12) C14-C17(C8, C9)_______________ 
___
MPS 3 NUF6 (C2) - Increased product rate C14-C17
_______ _______ (C 13)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
MPS 4 NUF6 (C2) - Additional time (C12) C14-C17
MPS 5 LEUF6 diversion - C14-C17from GCEP (C7)
MPS 6 NUF6 diversion Increased product rate C14-C17
from UCF (C5) (C 13)
MPS 7 NUF6 diversion Additional time (C12) C14-C17from UCF (C5) _______
MPS 8 NU (C1) Declared UCF Additional time (C 12) C14-C17(C 10)_________
MPS 9 NU (C1) Declared UCF Increase product rate C14-C17(C1O) (C13)
MPS 10 NU (C1) Clandestine (C8' Add-on (C11) C14-C17
MPS 11 NUF6 (C2) Add-on (C11) C14-C17
MPS 12 NUF6 diverson Add-on (C11) C14-C17
_______from UCF (C5)________
MPS 13 NU (C1) Declred UCF Add-on (C11) C14-C17
As shown in Table 14.17, the rankings of each MPS are affected by two factors: material acquisition
paths and the operation mode for producing excess LEU with detection means for the clandestine GCEP
being included in MPSs. The probabilities and rankings of MPSs calculated from integrated inputs,
inputs from expert A, and inputs from expert B are shown in the Table.
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Table 14.17 Ranking of MPS in Different Experts for Type A Countries under Scenario C
Rankings from Integrated Rankings from Expert A Rankings from Expert B
integrated inputs Pr (MPSi) Expert A Pr(MPSi) Expert B Pr(MPSi)
MPS 1 0.587 MPS 1 0.567 MPS 5 0.637
MPS 2 0.587 MPS 2 0.567 MPS 1 0.607
MPS 3 0.534 MPS 3 0.515 MPS 2 0.607
MPS 4 0.534 MPS 4 0.515 MPS 8 0.576
MPS 5 0.516 MPS 5 0.515 MPS 9 0.576
MPS 6 0.516 MPS 6 0.481 MPS 3 0.552
MPS 7 0.503 MPS 7 0.481 MPS 4 0.552
MPS 8 0.426 MPS 8 0.397 MPS 6 0.552
MPS 9 0.426 MPS 9 0.397 MPS 7 0.552
MPS 10 0.101 MPS 10 0.081 MPS 10 0.12
MPS 11 0.092 MPS 11 0.074 MPS 13 0.115
MPS 12 0.089 MPS 12 0.069 MPS 11 0.11
MPS 13 0.073 MPS 13 0.057 MPS 12 0.11
Figure 14.17 illustrates comparison of probabilities and rankings of the MPSs for proliferators' success.
The result shows that important rankings of MPSs vary over different expert opinions. Expert A inputs
generated the result that MPS 1 is the most significant MPS, where as Expert B inputs led to the result
that MPS 5 is the most important one.
0 Expert A
* Expert B
N Integrated
MPSi
Figure 14.17 Comparison of the Proliferator Success Probabilities for Different MPSs for
Type A Countries under Scenario C
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B. MPSs for Type B Countries under Scenario C
The identified MPSs for Type B countries under Scenario C are listed in Table 14.18. Under this
scenario, MPS1, producing HEU using directly diverted LEUF6 from a declared GCEP, is the most
significant MPS.
Table 14.18 Description of MPSs for Type B Countries under Scenario C
. . Uranium Excess LEU Clandestine
MPS(i) Material acquisition conversion production GCEP detection
MPS1 LEUF6 diversion from C14-C17GCEP (C7)
MPS2 NU (C1) Clandestine (C8, C9) Add-on (C 11) C14-C17
MPS 3 NU (C1) Clandestine (C8, C9) Additional time (C 12) C14-C17
MPS 4 NU (C1) Clandestine (C8, C9) Increase product rate C14-C17
________ _____ ______ (C 13) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
MPS 5 NUF6 (C2) Add-on (C11) C14-C17
MPS 6 NUF6 (C2) Increased product rate C14-C 17
______ _____ _____ ___ __ _____ 
_____ (C13) _ _ _ _ _ _
MPS 7 NUF6 (C2) Additional time (C12) C14-C17
MPS 8 NUF6 diersion from Add-on (C11) C14-C17
____UCF (C5)_______
MPS 9 NU (C1) Declared UCF (C10) Add-on (C11) C14-C17
MPS 10 NUF6 diversion from Increased product rate C14-C17
UCF (C5) (C13)
MPS 11 F6 diersion from Additional time (C12) C14-C17
____UCF (C5) ______
MPS 12 NU (C1) Declared UCF (C 10) Increased product rate C14-C17
______ 
~~(C13)__ _____
MPS 13 NU (Cl) Declared UCF (C10) Additional time (C12) C14-C17
Table 14.19 and Figure 14.18 show the changes in the rankings of MPSs according to Expert A, Expert
B, and integrated input values. Expert A notes that MPSs involving illicit acquisition of NU are the
most threatening for proliferation opportunities. On the contrary, Expert B sees that MPS 1, LEU
diversion from a declared GCEP is the most threatening.
353
Table 14.19 MPS Rankings of Different Experts for Type B Countries under Scenario C
Rankings from Integrated Rankings from Expert A Rankings from Expert B
integrated inputs Pr (MPSi) Expert A Pr(MPSi) Expert B Pr(MPSi)
NIPS 1 0.576 MPS 2 0.801 NIPS 1 0.539
MPS 2 0.465 MPS 9 0.793 MPS 2 0.202
MPS 3 0.425 MPS 5 0.728 MPS 3 0.202
MPS 4 0.425 MPS 8 0.679 MPS 4 0.202
MPS 5 0.423 MPS 3 0.647 MPS 5 0.184
MPS 6 0.386 MPS 4 0.647 MPS 6 0.184
MPS 7 0.386 MPS 12 0.64 MPS 7 0.184
MPS 8 0.380 MPS 13 0.64 MPS 9 0.172
MPS 9 0.360 MPS 6 0.588 MPS 12 0.172
MPS 10 0.347 MPS 7 0.588 MPS 13 0.172
MPS 11 0.347 MPS 10 0.549 MPS 8 0.159
MPS 12 0.329 MPS 11 0.549 MPS 10 0.159
MPS 13 0.329 MPS 1 0.515 MIPS 11 0.159
ft_____
"li."il t
U Integrated
-- fExpert A
~ U Expert B
MPS MPS MPS MPS MPS MPS MPS MPS MPS MPS MPS MPS MPS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Figure 14.18 Comparison of the Proliferator Success Probabilities for Different MPSs for
Type B Countries under Scenario C
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14.11.2 Importance Measure Analysis
A. Fussell-Vesely (F-V) Importance for Type B States under Scenario C
F-V importance measure is used in order to evaluate the significance of each basic event under the
assumption that the event always fails in success trees. The F-V of a basic event is the fraction of the
normal top event probability that would be reduced if the event has the probability value of 'zero' (i.e.,
a basic event-related proliferation activity is always detected by safeguarders.) The larger the F-V, the
greater the importance of the basic event. This means that one can prioritize resources based on the
values of F-V importance. However, large F-Vs mean that the events are relatively unreliable, or the
event is relatively important. If F-V (BEi) has 0.3, then if Pr (BEi) =0, the top event probability would
decrease by 30%. Table 14.20 shows the F-V values for Type B states under scenario C.
Table 14.20 Fussell-Vesely Importance for Type B Countries under Scenario C
No. ofFVBasic event description No. of Pr (BEi) i toccurrence importance
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by 13 1 1
ESWA/DIAL at short distances.
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by 13 1 1
ESWA/DIAL at long distances.
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by military 13 1 1
satellite imagery.
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by 13 1 1
commercial satellite imagery.
NU provision through illicit acquisition is not detected. 6 0.825 2.32x10 2
Excess LEU production with add-on modular cascades is 4 0.575 8.93x1 0-
not detected.
Excess LEU production at additional time is not detected. 4 0.525 6.80x10-3
Excess LEU production at an increased production rate is 4 0.525 6.80x10-3
not detected.
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by 3 1 5.78x103
ESWA/LIDAR at short distances.
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by 3 1 5.78x103
ESWA/LIDAR at long distances.
NUF6 provision through illicit acquisition is not detected. 3 0.75 4.48x10 3
NUF6 diversion from UCF is not detected. 3 0.675 3.47x10 3
Undeclared NU conversion at declared UCF is not 3 0.775 3.08x10 3
detected. I
LEU6 diversion within the declared GCEP is not detected. 1 0.5875 1.69x10 3
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Figure 14.19 Fussell-Vesely Importance for Type B Countries under Scenario C
Figure 14.19 is a graphical representation of values in Table 14.18. The four basic events related to the
remote detection technologies have the value of the unity for F-V importance. Except for those four
events, it can be said that the most important factor is the control of non-UF6 form of NU for Type B
countries under Scenario C.
B. Sensitivity of Fussell-Vesely Importance to Different Experts
Table 14.21 shows the sensitivity of F-V importance measure to different experts. There exists several
orders of magnitude difference in F-V importance values between F-V importance values between
Expert A and Expert B except for the detection of clandestine GCEP-related basic events. Again, apart
from basic events related to the detection of clandestine GCEPs, the relative importance of controlling
NU illicit transfer is recognized.
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Table 14.21 Fussell-Vesely Importance of Different Experts for Type B
Scenario C
Countries under
Expert A Expert B
Basic event description
F-V F-V
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by ESWA/DIAL at
1 1
short distances.
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by ESWA/DIAL at
1 1
long distances.
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by military satellite
1 1
imagery.
Clandestine GCEP operation is not detected by commercial satellite
1 1
imagery.
NU provision through illicit acquisition is not detected. 1.463x10-3  1. 107x10-1
Excess LEU production with add-on modular cascades is not 2.694x10-4  5.413x10 2
detected.
Excess LEU production at additional time is not detected. 4.045x10~5  5.413x10-2
Excess LEU production at an increased production rate is not 4.045x105  5.413x10 2
detected.
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected at short distances. 3.832x10-5  4.35 1x10-2
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected at long distances. 3.832x10-5  4.351x10-2
Undeclared NU conversion at declared UCF is not detected. 3.546x10 5  3.415x10 2
NUF6 provision through illicit acquisition is not detected. 2.018x10-5  3.767x10-2
NUF6 diversion from UCF is not detected. 1.40x105  3.415x10 2
LEU6 diversion within the declared GCEP is not detected. 1.036x10-6  5.25 1x10-2
C. Under Indirect Break-out Scenario
Table 14.22 and Figure 14.20 show the difference in F-V importance values for Type A and Type B
countries under the indirect break-out scenario. This result shows the importance of the detection of
clandestine UCF operation and the control of Non-UF6 NU international transfer for both Type A and
Type B countries. It should be noted that in the case of Type B countries, the basic event related to the
detection of HEU production with add-on capacity has the highest F-V importance value. This implies
that complementary access would be the most crucial to reducing the proliferator's success probability
for producing HEU.
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Table 14.22 Fussell-Vesely Importance under Indirect Break-out Scenario
For Type A countries
Event Description occu rence Pr (BEi) impanceocPrrrenie importance
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by ESWA/LIDAR at 20 1 2.805 x10-2
short distances.
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by ESWA/LIDAR at 20 1 2.805 x10-2
long distances.
NU provision through illicit acquisition is not detected. 24 0.825 1.754 x10 2
Excess LEU production at an increased production rate is not 16 0.725 1.469 x10-2
detected.
Excess LEU production at additional time is not detected. 16 0.725 1.469 x10-2
HEU production in connection of cascades mode is not detected. 18 0.175 1.464 x10-2
HEU production in reconfiguration mode is not detected. 18 0.175 1.464 x10 2
HEU production in batch recycling mode is not detected. 18 0.1625 1.265 x10-2
HEU production with add-on modular cascades is not detected. 18 0.1375 9.316 x103
NUF6 provision through illicit acquisition is not detected. 12 0.75 5.385 x10 3
LEU provision via diversion from LWRs is not detected. 8 0.9 5.193 x103
NUF6 provision via diversion from UCF is not detected. 12 0.725 5.116 x10 3
Undeclared NU conversion at declared UCF is not detected. 12 0.825 4.659 x10 3
LEU provision via diversion from FFP is not detected. 8 0.7 3.590 x10 3
LEUF6 provision through illicit acquisition is not detected. 4 0.75 2.988 x10 3
LEUF6 provision via diversion from GCEP is not detected. 4 0.5125 1.823 x103
Undeclared LEU conversion at declared UCF is not detected. 8 0.25 1.326 x10 3
Excess LEU production with add-on cascades is not detected. 16 0.125 1.210 x10 3
For Type B countries
Event Description occurence Pr (BEi) im p anceoPrc(Bri)cimportance
HEU production with add-on modular cascades is not detected. 18 1 1.01 x10-
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by ESWA/LIDAR at 20 1 4.24 x10~4
short distances.
Clandestine UCF operation is not detected by ESWA/LIDAR at 20 0.825 4.24 X1O4
long distances.
NU provision through illicit acquisition is not detected. 24 0.725 1.53 X10 4
HEU production in reconfiguration mode is not detected. 18 0.725 7.8x0
HEU production in batch recycling mode is not detected. 18 0.175 5.76 X10 5
Excess LEU production with add-on cascades is not detected. 16 0.175 5.43 X10 5
LEU provision via diversion from LWRs is not detected.0.1625 4.69 X10 5
Excess LEU production at additional time is not detected. 16 0.1375 4.24 x10~4
Excess LEU production at an increased production rate is not 16 0.75 4.28 x10 5
detected.
HEU production in connection of cascades mode is not detected. 18 0.9 3.79 x10
5
NUF6 provision through illicit acquisition is not detected. 12 0.725 2.68 x10
5
LEU provision via diversion from FFP is not detected. 8 0.825 46 X10-
NUF6 provision via diversion from UCF is not detected. 12 0.7 2.14 x10-
Undeclared NU conversion at declared UCF is not detected. 12 0.75 1.92 x10 5
Undeclared LEU conversion at declared UCF is not detected. 8 0.5125 1.75 x10-5
LEUF6 provision through illicit acquisition is not detected. 4 0.25 1.27 xl03
LEU provision via diversion from GCEP is not detected. 4 0.125 8.20 x10
6
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Figure 14.20 Fussell-Vesely Importance under Indirect Break-out Scenario
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14.12 Conclusion
The actual application of the integrated methodology was carried out using success tree method and
experts' judgments on basic events. Three types of quantitative analyses were performed to investigate
the reliability of the success tree models that describe the success probabilities of HEU production. The
results of this quantitative analysis are as follows:
- In general, under the assumption that a clandestine or declared GCEP is constructed, the
proliferators' success probabilities are very high. This implies that the construction of a new
GCEP should be prohibited.
- From the sensitivity analysis, it was noted that the application and development of ESWA
technology for detecting clandestine GCEP would produce the highest benefit, albeit marginal.
- From the important analysis, the rankings of pathways were identified. This provides insight
into the development of nuclear nonproliferation policy.
In assessing the proliferator's probability of success, the influence of intelligence community
and the effect of information analysis were not considered. Consideration of these factors would result
in a decrease of the top event probabilities. The success tree models may have produced better results if
time delay factors, limited in the present study, could be accounted for.
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CHAPTER 15 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
15.1 Introduction
This study began with two questions: (a) how effective is the NPT regime in dealing with nuclear
nonproliferation issue, and (b) what is the probability of proliferators successfully producing Highly
Enriched Uranium (HEU) at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs). Answers to the first question
are essential to developing an integrated framework for evaluating the NPT regime effectiveness. The
integrated framework reflects all factors affecting the nuclear proliferation using success tree method.
This framework enables the evaluation of success probabilities for various proliferation scenarios on the
front-end fuel cycle.
A quantitative assessment on the proliferation risk was performed with the integrated
framework from the front-end fuel cycle point of view. The result shows that success probability of
proliferators' producing HEU at GCEPs is very high for the scenarios developed in the present study.
Within this integrated framework, the strengths and weaknesses of the NPT regime on the front-end of
the nuclear fuel cycle were analyzed. Some important factors were further identified to prevent or
reduce proliferation risks associated with GCEPs through the Fussell-Vesely importance measure and
sensitivity analysis. This study recommends three approaches for reducing the proliferation threat of
GCEPs as follows: (1) a nuclear elements control approach, (2) a multi-faceted approach (multiple-
layers), and (3) a multidimensional approach that integrates legal- and technological capabilities.
15.2 NPT Regime Findings
Finding #1: Articles of the NPT are not explicitly written for preventing proliferation
activities in Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS).
- Articles II and IV related to a nuclear weapons program are ambiguous. Thus, the interpretations of
"manufacture of nuclear weapons" (Article II) and "inalienable right" (Article IV) are under dispute.
Proliferators argue that they have the inalienable right to build questionable facilities. It is still in
dispute whether the inalienable right should be insured unlimitedly or there should be a control limit,
and based on what factors.
- Article X of the NPT allows a state to withdraw from the treaty without serious restrictions. Therefore,
states can withdraw from the NPT at their convenience after they acquire uranium enrichment or
plutonium reprocessing facilities in a licit way.
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Finding #2: Only the UN Security Council has compliance-enforcing resources with
regard to proliferation activities.
- The UN Security Council is the only organization that has robust compliance-enforcing measures with
legal effects. However, imposing sanctions on proliferators is not as simple as it looks. Even if the
IAEA concluded that a proliferation state is not in compliance with safeguards they signed, the IAEA
cannot take any legally-binding measures to stop proliferation activities. These problems are shown in
Figure 15.1
Not easy to issue resolutions
(opposition from some permanent members)
UN Security
Council
Hard to provide concrete evidence Sanctions are not very effective.
in a timely manner
Not cooperative with the IAEA
TheIAEA .. .. Proliferators
Lacks access right to investigate suspicious activities
Cannot punish proliferators directly.
Figure 15.1 Problems of the Current NPT regime in Dealing with Proliferation Activities
Establishing an international treaty would be required to make an international arrangement legally
binding. However, this would be very challenging for several reasons: First, drafting and ratifying a
treaty is a lengthy process. Second, legal effects of international treaties are not universal across
different countries even after they are introduced. This is because international treaties, in general, can
have legal effects after they are put into the form of legislation within each state.
15.3 HEU Production at GCEPs Findings
Finding #1: The NPT regime does not have legal authority to prohibit the construction of new
GCEPs in NNWS.
There is no international institution in the NPT regime with authority to decide if a new enrichment
plant may be built in NNWS. The IAEA's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) requests a
state to report a newly-proposed facility as early as possible. But, the IAEA itself does not have the
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legal authority to disapprove a proposal. The issue of building a new GCEP can be resolved through the
UN Security Council only if it is proven that a particular uranium enrichment project threatens the
international peace and security. To that end, however, the IAEA should be able to provide clear
evidence that the state concerned is in non-compliance with safeguards agreement.
Finding #2: The NPT regime does not have enough resources to control nuclear trade concerning
the construction of new GCEPs.
- Weakness in controlling nuclear material trade
The two types of IAEA safeguards have weaknesses regarding control of undeclared Uranium Ore
Concentrate (UOC) transfers. UOC that is to be used for non-nuclear purposes can be exempted from
declaration in a safeguards application under Para 34 (a) and (b) of the CSA. The Additional Protocol
(AP) addresses this loophole, by requiring notification of transfers of source material for non-nuclear
use. Even under the AP, however, the IAEA depends on the cooperation of states when it wants to
acquire information.729 It is generally regarded that most of UOC is not of serious safeguards concern;
however, it is possible that proliferators could process this type of material for its clandestine nuclear
program.
* Weakness in controlling in nuclear equipment trade
The IAEA does not receive information about Dual-Use Items (DUI) reporting. Through the
introduction of the AP, the IAEA receives information about the transfer of equipment or material
Especially-Designed or Prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material
(EDP), but the IAEA does not collect information about the trade of Dual-Use Items (DUIs).
- Weakness in controlling in nuclear technology trade
Nuclear technology is inherently hard to control because it is intangible and can be transferred via the
internet. Also, most of nuclear technology required for a nuclear weapons program is readily available
in many literatures. Even though the technology is out of date, it may suffice the requirement to build
nuclear weapons.
- Weakness in Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRs)
The MECRs, including the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) do not include
all possible states that can produce nuclear elements for a nuclear weapons program. In addition, the
MECRs do not require member states to report denial information. Therefore, the NPT regime has very
limited information about the proliferators' illicit attempts to acquire nuclear elements.
729 Under both CSA and AP, the international transfer of UOC is not under safeguards if it is for specifically for
non-nuclear purposes, and if it is below 10 metric tons of UOC under the AP.
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Finding #3: Safeguards effectiveness for declared nuclear facilities needs to be further
strengthened.
- Complementary access via the AP should be generalized in order to enhance the IAEA's
capabilities for detecting proliferation activities at declared UCFs and GCEPs.
Complementary access is crucial to detecting undeclared operation with add-on capacity at declared
GCEPs and UCFs.
- Success probability of diverting declared nuclear material is still high because of the uncertainty
associated with Material Unaccounted For (MUF).
MUF affects the efficiency and accuracy of Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA). This may provide a
favorable opportunity for proliferators in diverting declared nuclear materials, in particular, at GCEPs
of large capacity.
- The IAEA needs more resources to widely use currently available verification technologies and
to enhance the continuity of knowledge.
Technological level of various verification technologies is satisfactory. However, the IAEA lacks
resources to deploy those available technologies. For example, three to four month-duration to obtain
precise results through Destructive Assay (DA) may create an opportunity for proliferators. This is
because the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is the only IAEA-owned facility for DA analysis.
Finding #4: The construction of new GCEPs in NNWS will pose significant threats to the NPT
regime.
- Once GCEPs are constructed, there is little chance that the NPT regime can stop proliferation
activities, if a proliferator decides to do so.
Detecting the operation of clandestine GCEPs is highly unlikely because of its high efficiency in
enrichment operation. GCEPs do not release environmental signatures. In addition, a small GCEP could
be built in any large industrial building. Thus, current technology for detecting clandestine GCEPs does
not work at long distances in which IAEA inspectors are not given access to a state or near suspicious
facilities.
Finding #5: Safeguarding Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCFs) creates a bottleneck opportunity
in preventing HEU production.
For proliferators, the possession of a UCF gives a high degree of freedom in providing uranium feed to
GCEPs because a UCF produces UF6 gas, which is the form of uranium used for enrichment operation
at GCEPs. Thus, the enhanced control of UCFs could be effective in preventing the production of HEU.
730 Only 8 states have UCFs (Brazil, Canada, China, France, Iran, Russia, UK, and USA).
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As for the detection of clandestine facility operation, clandestine UCFs provide a higher chance of
detection than clandestine GCEPs using ESWA and LIDAR technologies.
Finding #6: The IAEA's safeguard capabilities differ for declared and undeclared facilities (or
material).
This difference in turn limits the ways in which information from each type of facility can be used.
For example, verification information about declared GCEPs would incur further verification
confirmation activities such as complementary access under the AP. On the contrary, verification
information about clandestine GCEPs is limited to raising reasonable suspicion that would incur follow-
up inspections at the suspicious facility.
15.4 Recommended Approaches for Strengthening the NPT Regime
15.4.1 Recommendation #1: Use of a Nuclear Elements Control Approach
The classification of nuclear elements into material, equipment, and technology will be very helpful for
controlling nuclear trade in the NPT regime. This approach can be applied at different steps of a nuclear
weapons program. Theoretically, proliferators cannot produce HEU unless, at least, one of these
elements is controlled. Among these three elements, the control of nuclear material seems to be highly
promising based on the quantitative study. Table 15.1 shows what NPT regime components are
involved in the transfer of nuclear elements. One must note that the number of NPT regime components
that are in place to control an element does not mean that the NPT regime is effective for that purpose.
Table 15.1 NPT Components with Measures for Controlling Nuclear Elements
NPT IAAIAEA MECRs US
copnet NT FMCT safe uards PNM1540 PS
compoentsCSA AP CPM ZC INSG Committe
Material
Equipment
Technology
Note: X denotes that corresponding NPT regime component has measures to control elements required for nuclear
weapons program.
15.4.2 Recommendation #2: Use of a Multiple-Layers (or Multi-faceted) Approach
A multiple-layers approach throughout the different steps of a nuclear weapons program is
recommended. As shown in Figure 15.2, all NPT regime components work at each phase in the
production of HEU. A total of five layers are depicted in the Figure. These layers can be used as a
decision-making framework to address the nonproliferation issues associated with GCEPs.
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Proliferators give up their YES Are preventive Guarantee for Supply of Fuel
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Proliferators cannot
cnntSEPs.[~ctutEP5 1 f
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A proliferator stops YES 
-
producing HEU.
Proliferators successfully
produce HEU.
Figure 15.2 Multiple Layers to Prevent the Production of HEU
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The prevention of clandestine production of HEU starts with persuading proliferators by
guaranteeing the assurance of fuel supply through the internationalization of nuclear fuel cycle. This
will not only provide a rationale for the IAEA to prohibit proliferators' construction of a new GCEP but
also may persuade other states not to consider an option to build a new GCEP. The second layer can be
banning nuclear elements trade through nuclear trade control via Multilateral Export Control Regimes
(MECRs), the UNSC Resolution 1540, and Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI). In parallel, the IAEA
carries out monitoring operations in order to detect the construction and operation of clandestine GCEPs.
In the case that the IAEA detects clandestine GCEPs and the proliferators do not comply with IAEA
safeguards, the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) and the UN Security Council will take measures to
stop proliferation activities.
15.4.3 Recommendation #3: Use of a Multi-dimensional Approach
In the NPT regime, the use of technology is highly dependent on legal capabilities. Thus, a
recommendation for increasing the NPT regime effectiveness should consider both perspectives.
- Cooperation with the intelligence community should be enhanced.
There is no single remote detection technology that can detect the operation of clandestine GCEP.m
The benefits of further investment in remote detection technology are estimated to be marginal.
However, the intelligence community has access to NTMs and HUMINT, which turned out to be a very
efficient NPT regime component in revealing clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Thus, the IAEA's
cooperation with the intelligence community is crucial to increasing the detection capabilities.
- Information collection and analysis capabilities should be enhanced.
In parallel, information management and analysis capabilities should be enhanced to compile all sources
of information in an efficient manner. While there exists a large volume of data concerning possible
proliferation activities, each source contains very limited information and little significance. To that end,
the 'Physical Model' of the IAEA is very promising since it can integrate all types of data, producing
meaningful information for detecting nuclear proliferation activities.
- Increasing legal capabilities associated with detecting clandestine GCEP operation
Legal constraints for applying ESWA/LIDAR/DIAL technologies can only be removed by a Board of
Governor (BOG)'s Approval under the AP. In this regard, the universal application of the AP to the
IAEA's member states is critical to increasing detection capabilities using currently available
71 However, remote detection technologies can be used for: providing supplementary information for safeguards
analysis and raising reasonable suspicion in order to warrant complementary access to the suspicious facilities.
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technologies. Changing legal constraints is more likely to be achieved in the immediate future, allowing
long-range GCEP detection that is currently not permitted under existing legal constraints.
15.5 Applicability of the Integrated Methodology and Future Work
The integrated methodology can be tailored to evaluate success probabilities of producing HEU in states
with a different completeness level of the fuel cycle. With some modification, the methodology can be
also applicable to evaluating success probabilities of producing weapons-grade plutonium at Plutonium
Reprocessing Facilities (PRFs). A quantitative analysis using hierarchic-metrics was not performed in
the present study. However, those metrics can be used for quantifying basic events in terms of
probabilities without experts' judgment, if one can get access to data about previous inspections. In
addition, a modeling tool that can simulate the time delay may produce more meaningful results.
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APPENDIX A: QUANTIFICATION CRITERIA USED FOR NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION EVLAUATION
Table A.1 Definitions and Methods for Quantification
Index Components considered
Science and Technology Capacity Index includes three distinct domains of S&T capacity:
(1) Enabling factors that help create an environment conducive to the absorption, retention,
production and diffusion of knowledge,
STCI (2) Resources that can be devoted to S&T activities, which concerns the indicators that relate most
directly to S&T capacity,
(3) Embedded knowledge of science and technology and the extent to which researchers are
connected to the global scientific community
The Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) takes into account whether the environment is conducive for
knowledge to be used effectively for economic development. The KEI is calculated based on the
KEI average of the normalized performance scores of all 4 pillars related to the knowledge economy -
(1) economic incentive and institutional regime, (2) education and human resources, (3) the
innovation system, and (4) Information and Communication Technology (ICT).
The Human Development Index (HDI) is an index used to rank countries by level of "human
development", which usually also implies to determine whether a country is a developed,
developing, or underdeveloped country.
The Human Development Index (HDI) combines four normalized measures of (1) life expectancy,
HDI (2) literacy, (3) educational attainment, and (4) GDP per capita for countries worldwide. It is
claimed as a standard means of measuring human development-a concept that refers to the process
of widening the options of persons, giving them greater opportunities for education, health care,
income, employment, etc.
GDP Gross Domestic Product
World Governance indicators (WGI) measures six dimensions of governance between 1996 and
2007: (1) Voice and Accountability, (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism,
WGI (3) Government Effectiveness, (4) Regulatory Quality, (5) Rule of Law, and (6) Control ofCorruption. In particular, 'political instability and absence of violence index' gauges the probability
that a government 'will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent
means, including domestic violence and terrorism.
Table A.2 References for Indices
Index Analysis Publisher Reference
Caroline S. Wagner, Edwin Horlings, and Arindam Dutta (2002), Can
STCI RScience and Technology Capacity be Measured?<http://users.fmg.uva.nl/lleydesdorff/cwagner/Thesis/Chapter%/20VI%
20Capacity%20index.pdf>.
Technology The World The World Bank, Knowledge for Development Program, KEI 2008
KEI Bak RankingsBank <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM page5.asp>
HDI UNDP UNDP-2007/2008 Report: Human Development Indices<http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI 2008 EN Tables.pdf>
GDP IMF GDP2007
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of countries by GDP (PPP)>
GDP Economy GDP per capita 2007, CIA World Factbook
per CIA <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
capita factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html>
WGI 2007 <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>
The World Bank, Governance matters 2008, The Worldwide
Domestic The World Governance Indicators (WGI) Project, WGI includes Voice and
WGI Politics Bank Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence,
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and
Control of Corruption
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APPENDIX B: DETECTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS
The detection of nuclear weapons test involves three kinds of information.
Detection of occurrence including information about location,
- Measurement of nuclear explosive yield, and
- Subsequent evaluation of success or failure of the test
B.1 Detection of Nuclear Test Occurrence
Zhang (2007) suggests that the best alternative way to estimate nuclear explosion is to analyze the
seismic data if on-site measurement is not available.732 In order for CTBT verification to be successful,
radioactivity must be detected and the risk of false alarms must be taken into consideration. As we saw
in case of North Korea nuclear test, one method alone cannot prove whether or not there was an
explosion. Seismic observations coupled with radionuclide analysis with Atmospheric Transport
Simulation (ATS) could make the distinction.
WAES: As for the detection of nuclear weapons tests, two kinds of information about nuclear weapons
tests can be obtained through WAES coupled with Atmospheric Transport Simulations (ATS).733 One is
the identification of nuclear test occurrence and the other is the location of nuclear explosion. This is
possible because nuclear explosions are most likely to entail the release of gaseous fission products
such as Xe-135, Xe-133m, Xe-133 and Xe-133m. 734 Yet, xenon gases can be released during normal
nuclear reactor operations. Thus, the inspectors must be capable of distinguishing between emissions
from reactors and releases from nuclear explosions. To this end, isotopic ratios analysis can be utilized
by modeling how the ratio of Xe-133m/Xe-133 develops over time after the explosion. Nuclear
explosion tests will result in the ratios well above the reactor domain and render source discrimination
possible even five days after the explosion. Ringbom et al (2007) demonstrated that isotopic ratios can
be utilized for source discrimination, even if only the two different isomers Xe-133 and Xe-133m were
quantified per sample.
Satellite Imagery: As for the detection of nuclear weapons tests, satellites are limited because they
cannot monitor for 24 hours a day, but it can provide some information about preparation activities for
nuclear weapons test. The U.S. has a classified system of satellite sensors for detecting nuclear
detonations, which is called Nuclear Detonation Detection System (NDS). NDS uses x-ray, optical, and
electromagnetic pulse sensors integrated on operational Global Positioning System (GPS) and Defense
Support Program (DSP) satellites to detect nuclear weapons tests. This system is the successor of VELA
satellites.736
732 Hui Zhang, "Revisiting NK's Nuclear Test," China Security 3, no. 3 (Summer 2007).
733 Atmospheric Transport Simulations (ATS) was used to identify North Korea's nuclear tests to relate detected
radioisotopes to the geographic region of the explosion. Ibid.
73 Even if nuclear tests are designed for full containment, there is always a risk that the containment fails and then
radioactivity is released unintentionally into the atmosphere. Atmospheric and underwater tests generally release a
larger amount of radioactivity than underground tests and will be easily detectable. For detection of trace gases
from underground tests, see C.R. Carrigan et el., "Trace Gas Emissions on Geological Faults as Indicators of
Underground Nuclear Testing," Nature 382, no. 6591 (1996)., pp.52 8 -5 3 1 .
73 A. Ringbom, K. Elmgren, and K. Lindh, "Analysis of Radioxenon in Ground Level Air Sampled in the
Republic of South Korea on October 11-14, 2006," (FOI-R-2273-SE, Stockholm: FOI, 2007).
736 The VELA satellites were the original system first launched in 1963 used to was developed to monitor
compliance with the Partial Test Ban Treaty until the 1980s. They were equipped with non-imaging silicon
photodiode sensors and electromagnetic pulse sensors. The former monitors light levels over sub-millisecond
intervals, whereas the latter detects electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear explosion.
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B.2 Evaluation of Nuclear Weapon Yield
Once the occurrence of nuclear explosive tests is identified, it will be followed by estimate on nuclear
explosive yield and subsequent conclusion on whether it was successful. The types of nuclear explosive
energy released should be identified to provide a theoretical background to measure nuclear explosive
yield and values are shown in Table C. 1. The nuclear explosive yield, which is the amount of energy
after nuclear explosion, can be estimated in various ways as shown in Table C.2.
Table B.1 Energy Release Depending on Different Forms after Explosion73 7
Form Nuclear fission weapon Thermonuclear weapon
Air blast and shock
Thermal radiation 85% 95%
Heat
The initial nuclear radiation 5% (within one minute after detonation)
The residual nuclear 10% 5%
radiation
Table B.2 Different Methods to Measure Nuclear Weapons Yield
Sources Methodology Reference
Shock wave 738  Measure the strength of shock wave by dropping small pieces of paper in the Fe.ni 739
air and how far they were moved by the shock wave of the explosion.
Energy Calculate the energy released with the radius of the blast, the density of the air, Taylor 740
released the time after the detonation, and the ratio of the specific heats of air
Estimate the light flash of an atmospheric nuclear explosion for an optical Barasch 741
detection and yield determination
Measure nuclear debris of radioactive isotopes produced in the detonation.
Radio (This is regarded as the most accurate yield measurement method and does not
require any electronics for data gathering for analysis.) MCTL 742
Measure ground motions.
Seismographs (This is a faster test but less accurate and limited in collecting a large quantity
of data enough for nuclear weapon developers.)
7 Samuel Glasstone and Phillip Dolan, "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department
of Defense/U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, 1977).
738 A shock wave is a pressure wave initiated by the rapid expansion of hot, compressed gases after explosion. Ibid.
739 LarryCalloway, The Trinity Test: Eyewitnesses July 16, 1945 (May 10 2005 [cited Nov. 11 2008]); available
from http://larrycalloway.com/historic.html? _recordnum= 105.
74 Geoffrey Taylor, "The Formation of a Blast Wave by a Very Intense Explosion: I. Theoretical Discussion,"
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences 201, no. 1065 (1950).,
.159-174.
Guy Barasch, "Light Flash Produced by an Atmospheric Nuclear Explosion," (LASL-79-84, Los Alamos
Science Laboratory, Nov. 1979). He used the light-flash signature of atmospheric nuclear test between time after
detonation and total thermal power with two-peaked character and very large radiation during the second peak.
742 A degree of uncertainty lies in the conversion of seismic magnitude into explosive yield due to many different
factors such as variations in geological structure, the type of rock of the explosion cavity, and emplacement
method of explosion. This is well-explained in "Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testing Treaties," Office of
Technology Assessment, OTA-Office of Technology Assessment U.S. Congress, Seismic Verification of Nuclear
Testing Treaties Office of Technology Assessment (OTA-ISC-361) (Washington DC: US Government Printing
Office, May 1988).
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B.3 Evaluation of Nuclear Tests
For estimating of whether a nuclear test is successful or not, two kinds of weapon yields, nominal or
explosive yield and design yield should be compared. The results can be classified as a success, a fizzle,
or a failure. A fizzle is generally defined as the smallest possible yield resulting from pre-detonation. A
nominal yield is the actual yield of the nuclear explosion while design yield is the planned yield of the
explosion. Seismic magnitude values can be translated into yields that differ by a factor of ten.
According to this methodology, 1 kiloton of nuclear explosive yield is estimated as an average
magnitude value of 4.2 Mb (magnitude of body wave) with an uncertainty factor of two. Zhang (2007)
suggests that the success of nuclear explosion test can be analyzed based on the Mark's simplified
model of the implosion design weapons behavior and von Hippel and Lyman's calculations of the
probabilities of different yields.743 However, it should be noted that a low-yield test might imply that a
proliferator seeks for a nuclear warhead that can be mated for a missile, i.e., warhead miniaturization.
B.4 CTBT's Verification System7 44
The CTBT's verification system comprises three elements: International Monitoring System (IMS),
International Data Center (IDC) and On-Site Inspections (OSI). The IMS consists of four networks with
different sensor technologies. International monitoring system is a network that can detect signals that
are indicative for nuclear explosions, as well as to identify and to locate nuclear explosions underground,
underwater or in the atmosphere. The IMS network will consist of 321 stations in order to monitor the
whole globe. 250 of these have already built by March of 2008. It has sub-networks with four different
sensor technologies. At present, a few kiloton is enough to detect nuclear weapons tests, even if it is
exploded underground.
CTBT Verification System
Provisional Technical
Secretariat (PTS)
International Monitoring
System (IMS) ] International Data Center (IDC) On-Site Inspections (OSI)
Figure C. 1 Verification System of CTBT
743 Zhang, "Revisiting NK's Nuclear Test.";Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium."; and F.
Von Hippel and E. Lyman, "Appendix: Probabilities and Different Yields," Science and Global Security 4, no. 1
(1993)., pp. 12 5 -12 8.
744 B6senberg and Kalinowski, "Detecting Atmospheric UF6 and HF as Indicators for Uranium Enrichment."; M.
Kalinowski, "Remote Environmental Sampling for the Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Production and
Testing" (paper presented at the ESARDA Training Course for Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation, Ispra,
April 14-18 2008).
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Table B.3 Sub-Network of CTBT's IMS
Number of
Techniques stations Description
-Conclusion can be made if a seismic event was caused by an explosion
- 50 primary and or by an earthquake.
120 auxiliary *Limitation: in case of low level of explosion falls within the range of
Seismic
seismological 0.5-0.8 kt TNT, it is impossible to reach a conclusion on whether the
stations explosion is caused by chemical explosives or by a nuclear one. Thus,
seismic signals cannot b used to make this level of distinction.
-Six hydrophone stations and five supplement T-phase stations located on
ocean islands.
- 11 stations to
Hydro- monitor all oceanic -Hydrophone stations will be located offshore from mid-ocean islands.
acoustic -T-phase stations are seismic stations that record signals that mainly
waters
propagate through the oceans and located near-shore typically on mid-
ocean islands. 745
- 60 infrasound The infrasound network will be equipped with microbarographs in order
Infrasound
stations to measure small changes in the air pressure.
-16 radionuclide laboratories
-Process
[1] The radionuclide stations will take daily samples, conduct the
- 80 radionuclide
measurement in the field and send the data to the IDC in Vienna.
Radio- stations [2] Upon receipt, the pre-analysis is done automatically and then
nuclides *80 particulate reviewed by analysts for quality control.
stations [a] [3] The results are sent to the member states and stored in a database.
-Minimal detection requirement of radioxenon monitoring system: 30
pBq/m3 and 1 mBq/m3 for Xe-133.
Note: [a] 40 noble gas systems are collocated with particulate stations
745 Jeffrey Hanson, "Operational Processing of Hydroacoustics at the Prototype International Data Center," Pure
Applied Geophysics 158 (2001)., pp.4 2 5 -4 5 6 .
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APPENDIX C: STATUS OF MECRs
Table C.1 Current Status of MECRs [As of April 20091
ZC NSG WA
No. of member
stts37 45 41states
Annual Plenary Meeting inMeeting Annually in Vienna Annual Plenary meeting December
December
-Consultative Group Meetg General Working Group
Subsidiary bodies N/A -Information Exchange Meeting -Experts GroupSubsnormin E Meeting -Licensing and Enforcement
-Working Group Meeting Ofcr etnOfficers Meeting
Selection by consensusChairmanship (butin a y Rotates annually Rotates annually(but not annually)
Office None None Secretariat in Vienna
-Strengthened re-transfer
provision 747: government-to-
Conditions of -Non-explosive assurance government assurance /A
supply of export -Re-transfer provision -Nonproliferation principle
-Full-scope safeguards
requirement for exports748
Member not require to be a member of the States that meet Participation
a member of the NPTqualification NPT criteria set by the WA
Annex to INFCIRC/209 INFCIRC/254/Part 1 and 2
NSG Guidelines 'List of Dual-Use Goods and
Partl: The Export of Nuclear Technologies
Material, Equipment and - Part 1 to 9,
Trigger List Technology - Sensitive List
Control items list Part 2: Transfers of Nuclear- -Very sensitive List
Related Dual-Use Equipment, 'Munitions Lists
Materials, Software and Related
TechnologyTec
-Especially designed or Transfers of Conventional
prepared items (EDP) Dual-Use Items (DUI) arms and dual-use goods and
-Heavy water technologies.
Transfers to NNWS not Transfers to all NNWS regardless Transfers to all states and
A party to the NPT of NPT membership possession non-state actors
746 Personal communication with Mr. Graham Styles (UK mission and the first secretary to the ZC) via e-mail on
Nov. 3 rd, 2008.
Meeting frequency-Meeting of the Committee tend to take place annually, usually in Oct. or Nov. If necessary,
there can be a second meeting in spring. The Chairmanship-The Chairmanship does not rotate annually unlike the
NSG. The Chair is selected by consensus of the ZC members, on a personal/individual basis rather than on the
grounds of nationality. Secretary of the Committee-The UK mission in Vienna traditionally provides the Secretary
of the Committee and serves as a modest Secretariat by maintaining an archive of key documents and by issuing
communications to members. The Secretary circulates to members the official record of meetings and other
official ZC documents. Meeting venue: The Austrian authorities provide the venue for official ZC meetings
747 In 1994, the NSG also strengthened its re-transfer provisions to require government-to-government assurances
to support the stipulation that a supplier's consent be obtained for the re-transfer of trigger list from any State that
does not require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply.
748 However, both ZC and NSG apply full-scope safeguards to NNWS as a condition of supply for trigger list
items.
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The Figure below shows the flow of trade information in Multilateral Export Control Regimes
(MECRs). As necessary, the IAEA can request MECRs to provide information about nuclear trade.
However, MECRs has no obligation to share information with the IAEA.
Information
provision as
necessary
Export Export
Information Information
Companies in Authorities of
Exporting States Exporting States
Export LicenseLicensing 
--. Review
Application
Recipient States
Govemnment
assurance
First First First Second
Recipient States Recipient States Recipient States Recipient States
Delivery
Tracking
System
End-Use
Verification
Figure C.1 Nuclear Trade Information Flow in the NPT Regime
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APPENDIX D: MEASUREMENT OF UF6 ENRICHMENT RATIO
D.1 Theory of UF6 Gas Enrichment Ratio Measurement
The enrichment of the UF6 process gas in the header pipe is calculated using the following equation: 749
E = Kx R186(Total) 186(BG)
R XRF
where
E = U-235 enrichment (in weight %) of the process gas,
R1s6 (Total) = U-235 185.7 keV total count rate (c/s) (gas + deposit + room background),
R186 (BG) = U-235 185.7 keV background count rate (c/s) (deposit + room background),
RxRF= Uranium 98.4 keV Kal x-ray count rate (c/s/mCi) induced by 57CoXRF source, and
K= Calibration constant
Equation for the uncertainty in the enrichment is given by:
AE = E2[( MF )2 AK K+( )2 + ( )[(AR18 6(Total) + (AR186 (BG) ) 2K RXRF
Statistical error comes from line separation and detector resolution. Systematic error of HRGS comes from
variations in gamma ray spectroscopy detection efficiency, uncertainties in the spectral background, and the
uncertainty of the branching ratios. 5
749P. L. Kerr et al., "IAEA Verification Experiment at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant: Report on the
Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor, LA-13557-MS.".
750 Stephane F. Terracol et al., "Ultra-High Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometer Development for Nuclear
Attribution and Non-Proliferation Applications".
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D.2 Mass Spectrometry for Measuring the UER of UF6 gas
Table F.2 Applications of Different Mass Spectrometers for Isotopic Composition Analysis75 1
Material
Type
U in solution
U-235/U-
238
U23 /U-
238
U236/U-
238
AMS
GSMSJI
RIMS
SIMS
Notes
[a] Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS), Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICPMS)
Gas Source Mass Spectrometry (GSMS), Resonance Ionization Mass Spectrometry (RIMS)
Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry (SIMS), Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS)
[b] 0: Fully applicable. A: Partially applicable.
"' I.T. Plazner, "Modem Isotope Ratio Mass Spectrometry", published by John Wiley & Sons, 1 edition January 1,
2001, ISBN-13; 978-0471974161
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APPENDIX E: DETECTION OF CLANDESTINE PRFs AND GDPs
E.1 Detection of Plutonium Reprocessing Facilities (PRFs)
[11 Direct Detection of PRFs
Satellite Imagery for PRF Detection: It would be difficult to detect a small size PRFs using Visible
and Near-Infrared (VNIR) imagery. Using satellite imagery in the Thermal Infrared (TIR), the detection
of thermal signatures emanating from PRFs would be very difficult because they do not have significant
thermal signatures. However, it is estimated that the United States has satellite capability to detect
them.752
Infrastructure features of PRFs that can be observed with high resolution satellite VNIR imagery
include a very high stack (or its shadow); a long 'canyon-like" building (or with vent); some holding
ponds or reservoirs for waste of sludge; security perimeter; railroads, roads; an isolated site, etc. 753
ESWA for PRF Detection: The feasibility of detecting clandestine PRF was proven through study
using both atmospheric transport modeling754 and field tests. 5 There are several environmental
signatures for PRFs such as Kr-85, 1-129, Sr-90, Cs-137, Ru-106, and T-3.756 These gases are among
volatile radionuclides released during the chopping phase in the reprocessing process. Among these
signatures, krypton-85 is the most suitable tracer of PRFs at long distances, whereas 1-119 seems to be
the most promising tracer for short-range detection. 757 Field tests have shown that Kr-85 can be detected
reliably at distances on the order of one hundred kilometers downwind from small PRFs by atmospheric
Kr-85 plumes.758
[2] Indirect Detection of PRFs: Heavy Water Reactors (HWRs) are one of the most efficient reactors
for producing a high quality of plutonium from natural uranium. In addition, HWRs can be used to
produce tritium. HWRs use high purity heavy water, which exists in low concentration in nature and is
produced at Heavy Water Production Plants (HWPPs). HWPPs typically use a dual-temperature water-
hydrogen sulfide exchange process (Girdler Sulfide process-GS) as the primary process to enrich the
deuterium from 0.015 percent to between 10 and 30 percent deuterium and finally use water distillation
752 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), NWFZ Clearinghouse.
7" Zhang, "Should and Can the FMCT Be Effectively Verified?."
74 D. Youn, D. Wuebbles, and M. Kalinowski, "Global Modeling of Atmospheric Krypton-85 Concentrations,"
INESAP Information Bulletin 27 (Dec. 2006)., pp.13-16. M. Kalinowski, J. Feichter, and 0. Roo, "Atmospheric
Krypton-85 Transport Modeling for Verification Purposes," INESAP Information Bulletin 27 (Dec. 2006)., pp.17-
20.
75 Kalinowski, Daerr, and Kohler, "Measurements of Krypton-85 to Detect Clandestine Plutonium Production."
756 Stafano Vaccaro, "Methods for the Detection of Undeclared Plutonium Production Facilities," ESARDA
Bulletin, no. 37 (Dec. 2007)., pp.7 0 -74 and Argonne National Laboratory, Environmental Consequences Of And
Control Processes For. Energy Technologies (Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes Data Corp., 1990).
757 Vaccaro, "Methods for the Detection of Undeclared Plutonium Production Facilities."
758 B6senberg and Kalinowski, "Detecting Atmospheric UF6 and HF as Indicators for Uranium Enrichment."
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method to get reactor-grade heavy water, which is 99.7 percent deuterium. Throughout these processes,
the poisonous hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas is leaked from the plant.759
E.2 Direct Detection of Clandestine GDP
Satellite imagery can play a role in detecting a Gaseous Diffusion Plant (GDP) because of its large size
and thermal signature. Infrastructure features of GDP that might be observable from high resolution
satellite imagery include: Large area (roof) process buildings (the roof of most building have ventilation
shafts); cooling towers or a nearby river or lakes; a nearby fossil fuel power plant; large electric
switchyard (substation); waste management and disposal facilities; security perimeter; railroads, roads;
an isolated site, etc. 760 There are also several signatures in association with the operation, including the
water-vapor plume rising from the cooling tower that results from the slight super-saturation of air as it
emerges; and thermal signature of the hot roof of the enrichment building as well as the cooling towers.
This is because the lowest UF6 temperature in a GDP must be safely above the UF6 condensation or
freezing temperature. The temperature of the compressors containing UF6 must be kept higher than that
of ambient air.76'
759 Zhang, "IAEA-SM-367/16/01".7 60 Zhang, "Should and Can the FMCT Be Effectively Verified?.", pp. 50-55.
761 Zhang, FMCT Verfication: Case Studies.
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APPENDIX F: EVLAUATION OF TIR APPLICABILITY FOR
DETECTING A GCEP
The question may arise whether Thermal Infrared Imagery (TIR) from satellites can detect the
operational status of clandestine nuclear facilities. Unfortunately, there is no straightforward way of
knowing whether TIR can detect a target that has a higher temperature than its background. Many
factors must be carefully considered to answer this kind of question.
There are three limitations in applying TIR for non-proliferation purposes. First, in order to
detect the operation of a clandestine nuclear facility, one must detect an anomaly or change in
temperature. This means that an exact background value should be established, spatially or temporally.
However, the background of a target is subject to change over time. The uncertainty of this
"background" may be considered the first limiting factor. Second, the target does not always fit
completely inside one pixel. Third, satellites utilize radiometers instead of thermometers as thermal
sensors, measuring radiance instead of temperature. Temperature and radiance have a non-linear
relationship. Sometimes, temperature can be inferred indirectly through Planck's function, using this
non-linear functional relationship between radiance and temperature and wavelength.
In order to evaluate whether thermal imagery could detect the operation of a clandestine facility,
information about the background and the target must be clearly defined such as (a) mean value and
standard deviation of the background temperature; (b) mean value and standard deviation of the target
temperature; and (c) the size of the target.
As for the detection of a clandestine GCEP, we can make a very rough analysis using (a) a
minimal temperature difference that allows the detection of thermal differences under a given GCEP
footprint or (b) TIR's capability requirement for detecting a given specification of a GCEP such as a
temperature release and the size of footprint.
Let us assume the following:
[1] A TIR has a thermal spatial resolution of 1 km and a Thermal Sensitivity (TS) of 0.05 *K.
762
[2] A GCEP has the size of 200 m x 200 m
[3] The temperatures of the background and the target are at steady-state
[4] Clear-sky conditions
Under these assumptions, if we calculate the RTD using inequality (7.7) in Chapter 7, the minimum
detectable RTD for the facility is obtained at 1.25 'K RTD as follows:
0.2(km)*0.2(km) > 0.05(OK)
l(km)*l(km) RTD (OK)
762 This corresponds to the estimated footprint of Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, Iran. Glaser, Making
Highly Enriched Uranium.
382
If a more realistic case is chosen, it can be assumed that a GCEP capable of an annual HEU
production of 25 kg has a footprint of 160 M2. If one wants to detect the operational status of this
facility with Landsat 5 or 7 (TS of 0.5 *K and 60 in spatial resolution), the minimal detectable RTD is
obtained at 11.25 *K using the following calculation:
12.65(m) x 12.65(m)> 0.5*K
60(m)x 60(m) R TD ('K)
It is well known that a temperature increase in association with the operation of a GCEP is
much smaller than 11.25 *K. Thus, we conclude that the operational status of a clandestine GCEP
cannot be detected with the most advanced TIR loaded onto contemporary CSI.
Again, the application of TIR imagery is highly dependent upon many factors and uncertainties.
However, this rough analysis may explain how TIR can be applicable to detecting thermal
abnormalities.
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APPENDIX G: SPECIFICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS
Table G.1 Multi-level Scheme for Detection of Falsification by the IAEA
Approach Definition Reference
Level -Detection of large falsifications
Two-level -Easily performed but has relatively poor accuracy John SanbornMeasurement andhnrecnborn
approach and precision (1984)
[a] Level 2 -Detection of small falsifications
measurement -Performed with higher accuracy and precision
An item or a batch that has been falsified to the
Gross defect maximum extent possible so that all or most of the
declared material is missing. STR-261(1991)
An item or a batch that has been falsified to such an
Thre-levl Partial defect extent that some fraction of the declared amount of [b]
approach t~ satal rsn.IAEA Glossary
material is actually present. 2001
An item or a batch that has been slightly falsified so
Bias defect that only a small fraction of the declared amount of
material is missing.
Notes
[a] These measurements types are called attribute measurements and variables measurements in the attribute mode.
[b] Jeach, J. L., and M. Russell. "Algorithms to Calculate Sample Sizes for Inspection Sampling Plans, STR-261,
Rev.1 ." IAEA, Mar. 1991
Table G.2 History of IAEA's Detection Goals
Period Description Reference
IAEA/SG/INF/1
Goals for material accountancy verification
1970s Rev.1
-For planning purposes, the probability of the detection of the absence IAEA
and of a SQ of nuclear material by accountancy measures is normally set at Saea
1980s 0.009.Safeguards
Glossary, 1987
Safeguards criteria
Since *Safeguard criteria are used both for planning the implementation of JAEA Glossary
1990 verification activities and for evaluating the results therefrom. 2001
-Some of these goals were revised downward for less sensitive nuclear
materials (LEU, NU and DU)
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Table G.3 The Safeguards Criteria for Detection of the Diversion of 75 kg of U-235 Contained in
LEU, NU and DU within One Year (1990)
Facility and Nuclear Material
Detection Likelihood
Gross | Partial Bias
t --
Medium
(50%)Medium
NU conversion (50%)
LEU FFP
LEU Medium(50%)
NU MediumNU (50%)
DU Medium(50%)
Medium
(50%)
Remarks
IAEA-CN-
148/98 (2006)[c]
Depending on
physical form
Medium Depending on
(50%) physical form
Depending on
physical form
Medium Item counting
Fresh LEU fuel - - or serial number
LWR (50%) identification
Reactors Other nuclear material Medium
consisting of indirect-use - - Item counting
material
Notes
[a] 'Safeguards criteria' is defined in IAEA Glossary, p.25.
[b] The partial defects detection probability of 20% for these two cases applies to UF6 in cylinders. Some other
forms are verified with a partial defects detection probability of 50%, while other forms are not verified at all for
partial defects.
[c] W.Bush et al. "Model Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants,
IAEA-CN-148/98." 2006.
Table G.4 Definition of Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safeguards
Reference Definition
IAEA Effectiveness (of IAEA safeguards implementation if a measure of the extent to which IAEA
safeguards activities are able to achieve the safeguards objectives
safeguards [paragraph 127]
glossary Efficiency (of IAEA safeguards operation) is a measure of the productivity of IAEA
(1997) safeguards, i.e., how well the available resources (manpower, equipment, money) are used to
fulfill the IAEA's part in the implementation of safeguards. [paragraph 130]
The effectiveness of a safeguards measure - it relates to whether an operator is deterred from
Peter Friend carrying out illicit activities by it. If he is not then it is not very effective.
(2008) The efficiency of a safeguards measure- it relates to whether it gives value for money. One
has to compare different measures and chose the one that gives the best value for money.
Note: For a quantitative modeling concerning safeguards effectiveness and efficiency, see
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GCEP
Table G.5 Three Levels of Defects in Accountancy Analysis 763
Main Relative Standard
Defects stratum / UER CEMO Example Method codes Relative error ranges for total R eviatan
material Measurements [a] measurement uncertainty (5, (RSD) 764
type
LEU/NU/ DU
in On feed NoUina
Gross cylinders and tails NoUina H 0.0625<- 0.125 ~25-50%
LEU/NU/DU Gamma headers ylinder
(waste) -ray
LEU/NU/ DU NDA -Lowered U-235 co
Partial in On product ntent F 0.010 <,5 0.0625 -5-12%
cylinders headers -Part of U is missin
E
LEU/NU/ DU Sampling and Lowered U-235 con (NDA)
Bias in DA N/A tent ,58< 0.01 N/A
cylinders (TIMS) [b] bias D
(DA)
Notes
[a] E and D use the most accurate NDA such as K-edge densitometer and the most accurate DA method, respectively.
[b] TIMS stands for Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry.
763 Boyer, Safeguards Approaches for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: LANL Safeguards Systems Course - Pilot 2008.
764 Jae Jo, Radio Frequency Identification Devices: Effectiveness in Improving Safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Plants, presented to the INMM, Tucson,
AZ, (July 2007)
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Table G.6 Differences of Legal Capabilities between INFCIRC/153- and INFCIRC/540-type Safeguards Agreement
Inspectors accessProvision of information
Environmental sampling Multiple
Nuclear material Equipment R & D Fciyr locatio Outside CA -entry
under safeguards Declared facilities declared visas
facilities
Uranium Ore Concentrate (UOC) Non-
strategic
pointsInitial
declaration [f]
CSA X [34 (a),(b)] X X X 0 [49] X 0 X X X X
0
0 0 0 0AP 2 (vi)] [2(i)] [] [2.a.(ix) and 0 O [g] [2.a.(v)] O 0 0 0 [4] O [12]
Annex II] [2.a.(v)]
International
transfer for non-
nuclear purposes
Notes
[a] Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA),
Export Nuclear fuel
cycle
Additional Protocol (AP)
[b] Environmental Sampling over Wide Area (ESWA), Complementary Access (CA)
[c] The location, operational status, and the estimated annual production capacity.
[d] Boxes in Italic are not subject to detailed Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA).
[e] Source material which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched in quantities exceeding ten metric tons of
uranium.
[f] Any nuclear material of a composition and purity not suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, specifically for non-nuclear purposes.
[g] Under CSA, only a general description about NMA is requested, where as operational status is required under the AP.
[h] 0 and X stand for existence and non-existence of stipulating articles or paragraphs, respectively.
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LOF
Mine &
concentration
plants
Strategic
points ESWA
APPENDIX H: DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL FROM VARIOUS
REACTORS
H.1 Characteristics of Different Types of Reactors
Properties PWR CANDU PBMR
Reference capacity 1GWe 600-900 GWe 160 GWe
Enrichment ratio (%) 4.5 0.72 9
Fuel burnup (MWd/kgU) 45 7.5 90
Fuel unit Assembly Calandria Pebble
Fuel unit dimension 21.4*21.4*400 10cm(d)*50cm 6cm
Fuel unit volume (cm3) 183134 3926.99 113.097
Fuel unit mass 619.1924 kg 21g[Westinghouse]
U02 mass in a single 480 kg jai 22kg 9 g
fuel unit
Number of fuel units 193 4,560 b, 456,000
in the core
U0 2 in the core 69.5 (950MWe) 84.7 (713MWe) 4.1(metric tons)
Refueling period Cycle length 1.98 channels/day 1'] 371.55 pebbles/day
Fuel residence time 12-18 months 12-18 months 3 years(6 passes)
U isotopes quantity 423.09 (kg) 19.39 (kg) 7.93 (g)per fuel unit
U-235 quantity in fuel unit 16.92 (kg) 0.14 (kg) 0.714 (g)
Total number of fuel units 4.43
required for 1 SQ [dl (=75kg/16.92kg) 535.7 105042
Estimated period Per cycle 22.60 days 282.71 days
to get 1 SQ (=535.7/23.76) (=105042/371.55)
Notes
[a] 0.0815 fraction of fuel unit mass was assumed.
[b] 12 (calandria/tube) x 380 (pressure tubes/reactor)
[c] 1.98 (channels/day) x12 (calandria/channel) =23.76 calandrias/day
[d] However, if losses during uranium conversion and losses during enrichment through tails assay are considered,
the required fuel mass would be higher than these suggested values.
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H.2 Estimate on the number of fuel assembly required to obtain 1 SQ of U-235 from PWR
A. General
Steps Description
Quantity of U isotopes in U02
Step 1 M(U0 2 ) 235 x (e) + 238 x (1 - e) + 16 x 2
M(U) 235x(e)+238x(1-e)
where 'e' is the U-235 enrichment ratio of fuels
Quantity of U-235 in uranium isotopes
Step 2
M(U)
M(U - 235) = M(U0 2 ) x x (e)M(U0 2)
Calculation of quantity of fuel assembly required for 1 SQ of U-235
Step 3
No. of Fuel Assembly = 7kgM(U -235)
B: Example in case of PWRs (4% U-235 enrichment ratio assembly)
Steps Description
M(U0 2 ) 235 x 0.04 + 238 x 0.96 + 16 * 2Step 1 M(U) 235 x 0.04 + 238 x 0.96 = 1.1345
M(U) 0.04
Step 2 M(U - 235) = M(U0 2 ) x M(U)x (e) = M(U0 2 ) x 1.14 M(U02) x 0.0353M(U0 2 ) 1 .1345
From the table above, M (U02) is 480 kg in PWR.
M (U-235) = (480 kg) x (0.0353) =16.944 (kg).
Step 3 If we calculate 1 SQ of U-235 dividing 75 kg by 16.944 kg, 4.43 fuel assemblies are
obtained.
Thus, 4.43 fuel assemblies are required for obtaining 1 SQ of U-235.
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APPENDIX I: EXPERT OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE
1.1 Lists of Questionnaire
Category Assumed Questionnaire
Capacity
If there are 100 identical, different GCEPs that are trying to produce
off-ein HEU each of the in aforementioned four ways (batch recycling,
opradtion r Hreconfiguration, add-on of modular cascades, connection of cascades),
production at
declared GCEP 200,000 typically how many facilities will be detected out of 100 identical
kgSWU/yr GCEPs for each?
Excess LEU If there are 100 GCEPs that are trying to produce excess LEU in
production aforementioned three ways, typically how many facilities will be
at declared GCEP detected out of 100 identical GCEPs?
Typically, how many GCEPs would be detected by WAES and DIAL
Cletin C -70k out of 100 clandestine GCEPs? (at short and large distances,
operation SWU/yr repcily
respectively)
NU / LEU 100 MT If there are 100 identical, different UCFs that are trying to convert
conversion at yellow additional one SQ of NU, typically how many facilities will be detected
declared UCF cake/yr out of 100 identical UCFs?
100 MT Typically, how many UCFs would be detected by WAES and Raman-
Caestin yellow based LIDAR out of 100 clandestine GCEPs? (at short and large
operation cake/yr distances, respectively)
LEU diversion from Typically, if there were or are 100 times identical, different attempts of
declared FFPs 500 MTU/yr diverting about 1000 kg of 3.5% enriched uranium (this corresponds to
around 1 significant quantity) over one year from declared nuclear
LEU diversion from 1000 MWe facilities, how many uranium diversion attempts would be typically
declared LWRs detected?
NUF6 diversion 100 MT Typically, if there were or are 100 times identical, different attempts of
from declared yellow diverting about 10 MT of UF6 from declared nuclear facilities, how
UCFs cake/yr many uranium diversion attempts would be typically detected?
LEUF6 / NUF6 500,000 Typically, if there were or are 100 times identical, different attempts of
diversion from [SWU/yr] diverting about 1 SQ over a year from declared GCEPs, how many
declared GCEPs uranium diversion attempts would be typically detected?
Typically, how many interstate illicit nuclear trade attempts for
acquiring 1 SQ of nuclear material would be detected out of 100
Illicit acquisition of 1 SQ/yr occurring per year for each time period below?
nuclear material Typically, how many nuclear smuggling attempts for acquiring 1 SQ of
nuclear material would be detected out of 100 occurring per year for
each time period below?
Note: GCEP (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant), UCF(Uranium Conversion Facility), LWR(Light Water Reactor),
FFP (Fuel Fabrication Plant)
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1.2 Sample Table for Evaluation
Time period Main feature of safeguards LEU diversion from LWR LEU diversion from FFP
1970s Early stage of INFCIRC/153
1980s Matured stage of INFCIRC/153
1990s Early stage of Additional Protocol
2000s Matured stage of Additional Protocol
2010s Integrated safeguards system
1.3 Translation of Expert Evaluation into Input Values
a. Detection Probability of Off-Design Operation Mode for HEU Production (in Type A countries)
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1'970 1980 1990 2000 2010
---- Batch recycling
-E -- Reconfiguration
- Add-on Module
-0-- Cascade connection
2020
Time
Notes
[a] Experts assumed that the add-on modular cascades are located on the site, but not within the declared
cascades halls.
[b] Capacity of GCEP was assumed to be 200,000 kgSWU/yr.
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- - - - - - --
- - _ _ _ _ _
b. Detection Probability of Off-Design Operation Mode for HEU Production (in Type B countries)
0.9 1
0.8
0.7
0.6
_______-_ --- Batch recycling0.5
PLO -_ _ -4- Reconfiguration
- Add-on cascade
0-.e Cascade connection
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Time
Notes
[a] Experts assumed that the add-on modular cascades are located on the site, but not within the declared
cascades halls
[b] Assumed capacity: 200,000 kgSWU/yr
[c] A probability value for off-design operation with add-on cascade remains high in the 201 Os without
the AP in force.
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c. Detection Probability of Excess LEU Production at Declared GCEPs
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6 0- Additional time/Increased
product rate (Type A)
S0.5 
--- Add-on capacity (Type A)
0.4 -
-A -- Additional time/Increased
product rate (Type B)
0.3--Add-on capacity (Type B)
0.2
0.1 -
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Time
Notes
[a] Values depend on inspection measures and effort applied. For example, SNRI + mailbox could
achieve 50% of detection goals set by the IAEA, whereas continuous monitoring at Feed/Product/Tails
stations could achieve 90%.
[b] Experts assumed that the add-on modular cascades are located on the site, but not within the declared
cascades halls. Considering the fact that IAEA inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points
specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements within the declared facilities, proliferators' success probability
for performing the add-on capacity operation is still high. [Paragraph 76 INFCIRC/153]
[c] There is an increase in the value of 'add-on capacity' operation for Type B countries. This is because
an expert thinks that in the 80's the number of GCEPS and the amount of technology was smaller and less
mature. However, the technology spread and INFCIRC 153 safeguards was behind the curve in the 90's
until the AP came in force.
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d. Detection of undeclared feed conversion at declared uranium conversion facilities.
0.9 -
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.4
E- U Conversion (Type A)
0.3 
---- LEU Conversion (Type B)
0.2 -
0.1
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Time
Notes
[a] Assumed capacity: 100MT of Yellow cake/yr
[b] Values depend on inspection measures and effort applied. For example, SNRI + mailbox could
achieve 50% of detection goals set by the IAEA, whereas extensive installed instrumentation (continuous
monitoring) at Feed/Product/Tails stations could achieve 90%.
[c] Experts assumed that the add-on modular cascades are located on the site, but not within the declared
cascades halls
[d] Type A countries have a higher success probability of processing NU. On the contrary, Type B
countries have a higher success probability of processing LEU.
[e] Introduction of environmental sampling decreased the proliferator success probability.
[f] Enhanced access right under the AP is the factor that affected lower success probability for LEU
conversion in Type A states. However, Type A states have better skill and technology to convert
additional, undeclared NU without being detected.
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e. Detection of uranium diversion from declared nuclear facilities
0.9 -
0.8
0.6- LWR (A,B)
0.6-_-_ FFP (A,B)
0.5
-- UCF (B)
~0.4
0.3 - ---- GCEP (A)
0 .3 -- G CEP (B)
0.2
-- 
_-- 
UCF (A)
0.1
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Time
Throughput assumed for each facility
Facility Type Throughput
LWR (Light Water Reactors) 1000 MWe
UCF (Uranium Conversion Facility) 100 MTU Yellow cake/yr
FFP (Fuel Fabrication Plant) 500 MTU/yr
GCEP (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant) 500,000 kgSWU/yr
Experts stated that the IAEA still lacks the following resources:
[a] at LWRs: a method for detecting partial defects in fresh fuel and spent fuel in LWRs.
[b] at GCEPs: a method for verifying empty cylinder weights at enrichment plant (if there is no resident
inspector and no continuously recording authenticated load cells)
[c] at FFPs: a method to verify NMA because of the short residence time of produced fuel assemblies.
This is because the operators want to move the assemblies out as quickly as possible for economic
reasons.
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f. Detection Probability of Illicit Acquisition of Nuclear Material
0.9 -
0.8 -0.7T
0
.
6
-
S0.5
0.4
0.3
0 .2 ...........
0.1
n
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Non-UF6 Illicit
Acquisition
UF6 Illicit
Acquisition
2020
Time
Notes
[a] Success probabilities for illicitly acquitting nuclear material will remain high in the 201 Os.
[b] Nuclear material in the form of UF6 can be more easily detected than non-UF6 from of nuclear
material.
g. Detection probability of clandestine GCEPs and UCFs using ESWA and DIAL/LIDAR at short
distances
-- - - -
2000 2010
--- Ground sampling for
GCEP
-- -- Aerosol Sampling/DIAL
for GCEP
-,-- Sampling/LIDAR for
UCF
2020
Time
Note: The expert made the following assumptions in providing his evaluations:
[a] Constant monitoring over extended time.
[b] Bad retention technology for both cases A and B.
[c] The detections in the 5 km range will all be made just outside the fence.
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APPENDIX J: HIERARCHIC METRICS
J.1 Hierarchic Metric for Detection of Off-Design Operation of UCFs
--------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Off-Design Operation
Of Declared UCFs Is
detected. e aLEU
e Technology (X1) Systems (X2 aI~y atr(3
Technical Technical Prolferator's Intelligence Information
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M inspecton Monitoring Safeguards Capability Capability
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CTScMo NIR CSAsPtVmCs Secr2)IA Faclity Fatota(X
Elcmentl AP SNRI intelligence PhIcal TTA
NDa Cmt Location inventory
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_ M Type
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J.2 Hierarchic Metric for Detection of Clandestine Operation of GCEPs
UNAFW~~~~ detecad.Is cpait
Technology Safeguards Capability Capabify Satees
Bi Avaibl Tech Stebi Type ofa n eAi
sysel Sysem
A nSc HUIN Spp. ~UF6 UF202 gron Fitas
Elements Aeo T DAR AP tiR P c T Trnsportion
In elg neF lt Toa
Asseis IvHFe [a r yOpen SAL U 'I
AN Fooprint Adjacncy
J. irrhcMtifDeteion ofClndsin OertonofeCs
397pratlte
ATTAopato
......... 397
J.3 Hierarchic Metric for Detection of Uranium Diversion
EventU Diversion from
Nuclear Facilities is
Detected.
Specific
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(X3)
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